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La grande revue des questions internationales

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Soviet Russia: a Geopolitical View

Robert G. Wesson

TO consider the Soviet experiment in broad historical perspective, it is useful to recall that the Russians have had the burden and opportunity of being the most eastern of Europeans and occupying the borderland where Europe joins Asia. From England and the Netherlands through Berlin to Moscow, the political climate of recent centuries has shown a gradient analogous to the change of climate from maritime-mild to continental-harsh: from the more individualistic and looser to more conformist and strongly-ruled societies. The West has been more given to commercial values, the East to political; while liberty has been an ideal and partial realization of the West through the vicissitudes of centuries, Russia has since Tatar times been gripped by autocratic power, from the despots of old Muscovy to Stalin and his heirs. Western Europe has been more fully a world of nation-states, while Eastern Europe has mostly been gathered in multinational empires, the Austrian and Turkish until recent times, and the Russian, which has now made itself heir of much of the holdings of its erstwhile rivals. The barometer of authoritarianism has usually risen in rough proportion to distance from the ocean into the expanses of the east; Germany historically has stood somewhere between Holland and Russia in political climate, and the Rhineland has long been more liberal than the Prussia of junkers and militarism. But the most marked discontinuity, since the days when boyars of Ivan the Terrible envied Polish liberties, has come at the Russian border.

GEOGRAPHICALLY, the most logical division between Europe and Asia would be the shortest line from the Baltic to the Black Sea, which nearly coincides with the present western frontier of the Soviet Union. But the Russians are racially not markedly different from Germans, despite some Asiatic admixture; they have always felt themselves Europeans; and the foundations of their culture are European. Orthodox in faith, they belonged not to heathendom but to Christendom; and their language, unlike Finnish and Turkish, is a member of the European family. Unlike the Turkish empire, the only other great state joining Europe and Asia, Russia has suffered no cultural barriers to the borrowing of Western ways and ideas. Before the Tatar invasions, Kievan Russia was approximately at the cultural level of the West and was much like it in political spirit, with parallel feudal institutions and representative, in some places even democratic, concepts.

The Tatar conquest separated Russia from the West and brought the technological lag and political difference which have continued to

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this day. But the situation which exposed the Russians to onslaughts from the steppe was also their fortune. Having freed themselves from Tatar hegemony about the same time as the Western Europeans began overseas exploration, they were sufficiently a part of the West to share its outreaching; and they had an open field at their doorstep. As first Portugal and Spain, then the Netherlands, France, and England gathered huge empires at the expense of non-Western peoples of less advanced technology, the Russians did likewise. The liberation of Russian lands merged into the conquest of Tatar lands to the east, as the rulers of Moscow made themselves first rebels against the Tatar empire and then its heirs; there was no great difference between the gathering of the Russian lands and the appropriation of crumbling khanates. Russia stretched out to the Pacific by the time of Peter the Great, who also dreamed of India, Persia, and Constantinople. In Central Asia and the Caucasus the Russians encountered more resistance and progressed more slowly; and expansion to the south and southwest, against the decaying Turkish empire, cost many wars. However, around the Asian periphery they had advanced, by the end of the nineteenth century, to positions where they met the power of Britain or newly westernized Japan. Power built up by expansion in Asia also made it possible to acquire lands in the West, although the antagonists were usually tougher. Aside from the fortuitous debility of Poland-Lithuania, Russia gained mostly through the defeat of invaders, Swedes, French, or Germans, frustrated by the vastness of the Russian lands.

The Russians thus built up, over five centuries, one of history's grandest empires, undertaking the government of a multitude of peoples of varied cultures. Yet there were important differences between Russian empire-building and the colonial expansion of Western states. The motivation of the latter was largely commercial, and the colonies amounted to properties to be exploited. Russian expansion was predominantly military and political, motivated by desire for land and dominion, the weak mercantile classes playing a lesser role. Russian empire building was also steadier than that of any Western state. Western powers had periods of rapid colonization, the Portuguese in the fifteenth century, the Spanish in the sixteenth, the Dutch in the seventeenth, and so forth; but the Russians carried on a nearly continual piecemeal expansion from the middle of the fifteenth until the end of the nineteenth century or after. Checked in one direction, they turned to probe other areas of weakness. There was no stopping point; the frontiers were indefinitely elastic. Outward thrust became part of the Russian tradition, seemingly inherent in the Russian state.

Since Russian expansion was not across the oceans but into contiguous areas, new lands became not a property of the state but were merged into and swelled it. Mixing of peoples further blurred the difference between older and newer Russian acquisitions, as in many areas Russian peasants occupied empty land or administrators filled the cities. The growth of the empire was hence almost irreversible. Non-

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contiguous holdings, as Alaska or the protectorate over Bulgaria after 1878, could be cheerfully surrendered; elsewhere, a loss of territory was equivalent to amputation of part of the body of the state, to be accepted only under grave duress. Russian imperialism has thus been more permanent than that of Western states and ultimately more successful. Empire was also a means to power and security, the effective counterweight to Western technical superiority. It was Russian's title to greatness and source of pride.

FOR such reasons, empire affected the Russian state far more than Western states. The governance of the huge realm became the greatest problem, the chief business and largest industry of Russia. The middle or economically productive classes never gained importance beside the bureaucracy, the administrators of empire, and the military, those ultimately responsible for its integrity. No institutions could develop to check the regime. The Zemski Sobor of pre-Petrine times, the nearest parallel to parliamentary institutions of medieval Europe, was hardly more than a showpiece except when there was no tsar. It died out, partly because the size of the realm made it impractical, partly because there were no strong independent classes for it to represent. Autocracy was taken for granted, as it had been in the Tatar empire. The monarch was the symbol and centre of unity, and he could justly contend that unqualified power was necessary to hold together the vast conglomerate. Not merely anything like democracy but any constitutional limitation on the ruler seemed to threaten disorder. All private and feudal rights were crushed by the greatness of the state.

The empire and the incontestable power governing it needed and produced a moral justification. The Russian drive, beginning as a struggle for national and religious liberation from an alien and heathen yoke, turned into something of a crusade, in which the tsar was seen as representative of a holy cause. Expansion was regarded always as defensive and benevolent; if not liberators of related peoples or fellow-Orthodox, the Russians made themselves bearers of civilization to more backward Siberians and Central Asians. Coupled with awe at the immensity and power of the mighty state and its boundless horizons, these claims and feelings generated a conviction that Russia bore a special world historical mission. Tsardom took on a semi-religious, universalist, and messianic cast. The empire was held to rule for the sake of the peoples; it was God's will; and domination by Russia was liberation, in tsarist as in Bolshevik times; nations were released from injustice and brought into the community of peace and brotherhood. Idealization of the empire underlay broad ethical concerns and the passion for justice which have characterized Russian political thought. It implied equality; as all were equally obliged to serve the ruler, status should theoretically rest not on birth but only on service to the community represented by the tsar. Freedom was synonymous with union

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of wills ('*sobornost*') in a spiritual community of one God, one faith, and one ruler, duty-bound to give peace to humanity.

The autocracy and imperial ethos were naturally accompanied and supported by the state church, censorship, political police, and other adjuncts of absolutism. In such respects, the Russian state responded to the needs and opportunities of extensive rulership much as dozens of other states have responded in the past. Very large empires, such as the Roman, the Chinese of its several dynasties, the Turkish in its time of potency, the Moghul empire in India, and sundry others of antiquity, have been much alike in political essentials, presumably because all have had the same overriding problem of maintaining control of an overextended realm. Such empires, which may be called 'universal' so far as they have felt themselves to have an indefinitely extensive right, have been characterized by the unlimited power of the ruler, centralization of administration, a large and powerful bureaucracy, weakness of all but the official classes, lack of standing of private property, political terror, cultural conservatism, an obligatory official creed, and pretensions to universal authority.[1]

But the Russian empire, despite its immensity, was in a quite different situation from that of the Roman or Chinese, which could despise the peoples on their borders as barbarians. On its openest frontier Russia faced states comparable in power to itself, although dozens of times smaller; it could never relax in security and devote itself, as would have been most agreeable, merely to the maintenance of established power. Moreover, Russia had to admit and reckon with the technological superiority of the little states of the West. Like other such empires, Russia has always been too politically oriented, centralized, and bureaucratic to produce much innovation. It has always had to borrow technology from the looser societies of the Western state system both to protect itself against the West and to fortify its dominion over more backward lands. Prone as Ivan the Terrible was to despising foreigners and the heathen, he tried to improve his arms by bringing in Western experts; and Peter became keenly aware of the need for Westernization in his first battles with Turks and Swedes. Since then, efforts towards self-isolation, as under Nicholas I, have produced only weakness, while defeat, as in the Crimean War, the Russo-Japanese War, and the First World War, has shaken the state from its complacency and led to a wave of reform and modernization.

Russian greatness has thus rested on the coupling of two rather incongruent features: authoritarian political organization with the ability to take over and use the achievements of a more liberal civilization. Russia is a meeting of opposites, a universal empire in continual friction with and influenced by a powerful and progressive system of independent states.

[1] For a discussion of the universal empire, see R. G. Wesson, *The Imperial Order*, Berkeley, Cal., 1967.

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THIS has given rise to the profound ambivalence of Russian history, the division or duality of Russian society and politics, as the authoritarian essence of the state has wrestled with the achievements, ideas, and forms of a more liberal way of life, seeking to use them without losing the ability to rule the empire, the political dominion which has compensated through the centuries for technological lag. Russia is unique as the Russian situation is unique.

Contact between Russia and the West was rather thin prior to Peter the Great, but ambivalence became acute after he decided it was essential to drag his country into modernity at the beginning of the eighteenth century. While introducing Western military and naval weapons and tactics, schools, Swedish administrative organization, and Western manners and styles of dress, he not only maintained but strengthened the bonds of absolutism. He had himself practically deified, tightened the bonds of the mercilessly oppressed peasantry, massacred those whom he suspected of disloyalty, and reduced the Church to a department of government. In industrializing, he set the permanent pattern for the dependence of industry on the regime. Catherine the Great dabbled in the contemporary fashion of radical philosophy and befriended French thinkers without the slightest idea of granting political rights to her subjects. To enliven her realm, she set up local self-government organs modelled after those of the West, but she endowed them with no real powers, and they withered for lack of support. Her nobles ruled despotically over a primitive peasantry while they tried to dress and talk like Frenchmen. Alexander I toyed with a constitution, but the separation of powers in his interpretation became a bureaucratic separation of functions for more efficient administration. Finally, he reverted to mysticism. After the Western-inspired Decembrists had troubled the beginning of his reign, Nicholas tried to reduce his troubles by isolating Russia. But the Crimean War revealed such dangerous decadence and weakness that a serious attempt followed to renovate the regime. The outdated institution of serfdom was abolished; local self-government organs, the *zemstvos*, were introduced to supplement the creaky administrative mechanism; and the judicial system was overhauled. Again, however, change was more apparent than profound. Emancipation did little to improve the condition of the peasantry; the bureaucracy began almost immediately to whittle down the scanty powers of the *zemstvos*; and the anomaly of an autocratic regime with a liberal court system was shadowed by giving powers of administrative punishment to the police.

In tsardom's last decades, the age of iron, steam, and burgeoning science, the contradictions became more acute as Russia was driven to keep up with the accelerating technical progress of the West; it was necessary not only to build armouries but to import the foundations of a modern society while keeping a pre-modern political system. Industrialization was promoted to strengthen the state against foreign dangers and internal discontent, not to foster but to prevent political

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change. The autocracy, even though an increasing barrier to improvement, seemed nonetheless necessary to preserve the empire against the buffeting of modern ideas and incipient nationalist stirrings infiltrating from the West. At the same time, a class of alienated intellectuals was growing up. Even in Peter's day, those sent abroad to study military arts often returned with undesirable ideas; by the latter part of the nineteenth century, the number of those badly infected with Western ideas was large and important enough to pose a major problem for the regime. In the borrowing of military techniques, methods of production, and the intellectual equipment of modernity, it has never been possible fully to separate and exclude subversive political and social ideas, partly because they are not entirely separable from technical ideas, partly because the Russian upper classes have always wished to feel themselves abreast of the modern world, equals of the world's best.

The contradictory needs of imperial authority and speedy modernization also confronted the intelligentsia with acute dilemmas. Men who wanted to be modern, enlightened, and scientific remained attached to authority and basically mystical in outlook; they looked to the tsar or a new autocratic power to bring perfect freedom. As the material superiority of the West became more blatant, admiration was blended with hatred and offset by claims of Russian moral superiority, strongly stated, for example, by Dostoievsky. The Russian intellectuals derived their theories from Western thought, but they rejected the liberal-capitalist society which had engendered it as corrupt and decadent and looked to a utopia which would fulfil the imperial ideals of universal harmony, equality, and the complete subordination of private wealth to social purpose, under Russian leadership. Meanwhile, the growth of industry was undermining the cohesion of traditional society, producing new inequality, and increasing the role of private property.

Defeat at the hands of Japan in 1904 showed the inadequacy of the post-Crimean War reforms and of the government-sponsored industrialization of the preceding decades. To save itself from the wave of revolutionary discontent which followed, the monarchy put on a Western disguise and granted a pseudo-constitution. The elected Duma endeavoured at first to act as a real parliament; but as the emergency passed its powers were clipped, and it could do little to check the regime. Although far more effective than the present Supreme Soviet, it was largely a showcase. Court and bureaucracy continued to rule the only way it seemed Russia could be ruled.

BEFORE 1914, however, Russia appeared to be evolving toward genuine Westernization, which would presumably have meant the transformation of the empire into a loose structure or perhaps its breakup. More serious defeat nearer home brought Western-minded constitutionalists or liberals to power in 1917. But they could not master the turbulence as Russian society was suddenly released from its bonds; they never grappled with the more difficult or impossible problem of

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governing the empire constitutionally or democratically. As Russia, semi-isolated, impoverished, and shocked, slipped backward toward political primitivism, the liberals were swept aside without a serious struggle. With a keener sense of political needs and fewer inhibitions, Lenin saved the empire by using Western ideas more effectively than ever before to support Russian authoritarianism. He found a new basis for universalism in the rationalistic idea of 'class', and made Moscow the capital of a Third International of the workers instead of the Third Rome. He transformed an originally democratic and libertarian creed into the philosophic rationale of a new type of despotism and the legitimation of a multinational empire. He made a political party, an adjunct of representative government in the West, into the agency of refurbished absolutism. He used a scientific-sounding Western ideology to affirm Russian political strength and to protect it from Western influences while fostering unprecedentedly rapid modernization.

Soviet government thus came to show in a much heightened degree the ambivalence inherent in the Russian situation of universal empire threatened and influenced by the looser, more liberal, and more inventive societies of a state system. An elitist, disciplined and hierarchic organization ruled in the name of an ostensibly rationalistic, equalitarian, and democratic faith; an absolute dictatorship proclaimed a utopia of absolute freedom; more coercive power than ever exercised by tsarist governments was coupled with exemplary forms of constitutional freedoms and the world's allegedly most democratic elections.

Much of this dualism may be summarized as imperial ('oriental') substance overlaid by Western appearances designed both to ornament and protect the former; a democratic façade is a good defence against demands for real democracy. But the effects penetrate more deeply into the political system. The dualism appears in the contrast between Party and government, the one ruling with arbitrary and unlimited powers, like a priestly caste mystically possessing and sanctioned by a mandatory interpretation of history and the universe, much as Confucianism supported the role and authority of the Son of Heaven in the grand harmony of things, the other administering and exercising legal sovereignty, theoretically impartial, limited, based on law and the formal constitution, yet lacking real political authority.

A parallel dichotomy has run through Soviet thought and political controversies, with one side corresponding roughly to economic and strictly practical, the other to political, utopian-imperial imperatives. Such have been the incompatible demands for revolutionary communist mobilization vs. relaxation and concessions to private enterprise for the sake of reconstruction in the early 1920s; 'Permanent Revolution' vs. 'Socialism in One Country'; collectivization and forced industrialization vs. gradualism in the late 1920s. Subsequently, a similar 'left' vs. 'right' division has repeatedly come to the surface, in such divisions as of steel-eaters and proponents of light industry, centralizers and decentralizers, neo-Stalinists and de-Stalinizers, proponents of 'Socialist

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Realism' and modern artists, etc. In recent years, controversy has become more subdued and hidden, as the Soviet system has settled down and become more conservative. But the argument continues as to how far managers are to be given free rein to produce or are to be checked for essentially political reasons, whether writers should be free to create or should fulfil primarily ideological duties, whether contacts with the West should be encouraged or limited to the necessary.

The relative strength of the contrary tendencies has varied according to political needs and moods and practical pressures. Stalin brought the control aspect to the fore in oriental-despotic fashion, as he made his power more absolute in the economic and cultural transformation of the country. Collectivizing agriculture in the name of socialism and modernization, he restored the obligations of the peasants to serve the state, which had been the original rationale of serfdom. As the purges were moving toward their terrible climax and Stalin was building up a cult of personality beyond that of Nero or Peter the Great, he introduced a constitution which, except for mentioning the role of the Party, would serve fairly well for the most democratic of states. Khrushchev, in reaction after Stalin's passing, went in the opposite direction of slackening reins and opening doors to the West for the sake of renovation. He insisted, however, on the role of Party and ideology, as his successors have done more emphatically. The Party (somewhat shadowed by the police in Stalin's day) has at all times remained superior to the formal government, just as the problem of rule has always had precedence over the problem of production.

Russian foreign policy has been similarly two-sided, mingling universalist-ideological motives with practical considerations of security and advantages from intercourse with equal and independent states. Even in the nineteenth century, when Russia was most fully a member of the concert of powers, non-national causes, such as panslavism and the protection of Orthodoxy, overlay more direct urges of national interest; and support for a social order was a prime motive in tsarist dealings with the outside world. The 1848 intervention in Hungary was comparable to that in 1956. As Russia was becoming more Westernized towards the end of the tsarist period, nationalist motives were coming to prevail over ideological, as the autocracy allied itself with republican France and permitted itself to be drawn into war for nationalistic reasons.

IN Soviet times, the dichotomy of universalism and statecraft has become deeper. The Bolshevik Revolution began ostensibly not as an effort to change the government of a country but as the opening of a sacred world revolutionary movement, the spread of which to more advanced countries was assumed to be essential to its survival in Russia. But Lenin at Brest-Litovsk accepted peace and diplomatic relations with a class-enemy state, and it became the permanent policy of the Soviet state to seek advantages in dealings with 'bourgeois'

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states while theoretically or actually seeking to overthrow them. Practical needs overcame ideological distaste; the battered young Soviet state badly needed trade, especially for machinery; and it did not hesitate to solicit credits from 'imperialist bandits'. Lenin also recognized better than some of his more consistently idealistic colleagues how advantageous it was for the Soviet position to work diplomatically on the divisions of antagonists or potential antagonists. These and related motifs have remained prominent in Soviet foreign policy. Yet the sovereign organization of the Soviet Union is, according to its rules, 'an integral part of the international communist and workers' movement', which is overtly dedicated to revolutionary transformation everywhere and for which 'capitalist' governments have no legitimacy and state borders have no intrinsic significance.

One aspect of Soviet foreign policy is utopian and normative, bespeaking long-term goals and modes of perception; the other is pragmatic and operative. The one is Party-oriented, largely directed through sections of the Central Committee; the other is carried out by governmental machinery. The one prevails in relations within the Soviet sphere, where 'proletarian internationalism' supersedes 'bourgeois legalism'; the other treats 'bourgeois' states as formal equals, recognizes traditional rules of international conduct, and ordinarily ignores the interests of local communist parties. The one is conditioned primarily by needs of order and unity within the Soviet domain and is concerned with the structure of society. The other responds to exigencies and opportunities of the international environment and is concerned with advantages of the state. Ambivalence is most pronounced in dealing with leading countries of the West which may represent some political danger; it is less in policy towards weak and non-Western states. In the early years when Soviet relations with European countries were dominated by ideological preconceptions, the approach to Asian neighbours, for instance, Kemal's Turkey and royalist Afghanistan, was flexible and realistic. Since Stalin, the Soviet Union has shown a similarly forthright attitude towards Third World countries, freely ignoring doctrinal considerations in the search for strategic or other gains.

The relative prominence of these aspects of Soviet foreign policy has varied according to political exigencies, usually in close step with changes in outlook of domestic policy. In the first years, Lenin and other leading Bolsheviks (except Stalin) hovered over the Comintern, while the Foreign Commissariat was left to a second-rank technician, Chicherin. Stalin turned away from the promotion of world revolution, yet he raised the ideological pitch of the communist movement abroad in harmony with his 'Second Revolution' at home. In the 1930s, when he perceived real dangers from militaristic Germany and Japan instead of the bogies of intervention raised in the 1920s, he largely dropped dogmatism in foreign policy to espouse collective security and the United Front. When this failed he turned to realpolitik to take advan-

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tage of the opportunities for expansion offered by the disturbed international situation. In the war, when the Russians had their backs to the wall and unity was hardly a problem, ideology nearly disappeared from view. As Stalin summarized in his victory speech, 'The centuries-old struggle of the Slav people for their existence and their independence has been concluded by victory over the German invaders and German tyranny'.

As control of the Soviet domain came to seem threatened in 1947 and afterwards, ideology was brought forward again, and foreign contacts were curtailed. Khrushchev in turn felt able or driven to shift towards a more open, Western-style approach, and his view of opportunities in the formerly Western-ruled Third World led him to policies of increasing Soviet influence by non-ideological means and with little regard for the communist movement. Yet his doctrine of 'Peaceful Co-existence' was practically an epitome of the Soviet ambivalence: the Soviet Union should work pleasantly with 'bourgeois' states for trade and cultural advantages while working for their destruction by all means short of large-scale violence.

Trends under the post-Khrushchev collective leadership have been contradictory and mixed. The new rulers seemed to fear that the ferment of intellectuals which Khrushchev had tolerated was getting dangerous, and they were disturbed by the erosion of Party authority in the Soviet Union and of Soviet authority in Eastern Europe. Apparently in consequence, from the first part of 1965 they began gradually restoring ideology and the leading role of the Party, re-emphasizing 'class' and the worldwide struggle of 'socialism' and 'imperialism'. This trend was much accentuated by the threat of Czechoslovak liberalization in 1968 and the desire to rationalize the repressive Soviet reaction. On the other hand, the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime felt more need for Western economic co-operation as the economy slowed. They hence pushed the importation of Western productive technology as never since the early years of the five-year plans, outwardly untroubled that the state which had been upheld for more than half a century as immeasurably the most progressive of mankind should secure its factories from backward class-enemy states. They also saw inviting opportunities for expansion in areas of weakness, where they go as bearers of Western technology to less developed peoples. Primarily in the Near East, mostly by military means and with even less concern for ideology than Khrushchev showed, they have secured a vast new sphere of influence in fulfilment of historical Russian ambitions.

THE old Russia was an awe-inspiring success in its use of Western technology to make a non-Western empire. The Soviet Union, intensifying its borrowing while hardening its political organization, has been even more so. In revolutionary Soviet form, Russia has enjoyed a profound renewal and strengthening of purpose. It acquired a rejuvenated, forceful, future-oriented, and uninhibited élite. A tremend-

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ous burden of dead wood, old prejudices and worn-out ways and institutions were thrown away; and society was reconstructed on a new and more rationalistic basis. Thus the followers of Lenin could reforge the huge multinational empire, no small achievement in an age of nationalism, order it more effectively than their predecessors, and raise it to great economic and military potency. They have been able to achieve something almost self-contradictory yet very potent, a stable qualified despotism with universal education. They have gone on to assert their dominion over a series of formerly independent and still nationally conscious countries, making themselves if not loved at least feared and respected.

That they are able to lead their vast domain as an effective political unit suffices to give the Leninist-Stalinists tremendous weight in the world. They have other immense advantages. Their speciality is large-scale organization, and theirs is still probably the best organized of political movements. They offer a recipe for peace and the harmony of the universal order as a release from the tensions and distractions of rootless individualism. The doctrines and basic approach developed by Russia to meet the challenge of the West are in large part applicable for many societies of the non-Western world, faced with the problem of grafting modern and Western forms onto basically authoritarian politics and of governing and holding together societies ungovernable by Western liberal or democratic means. For such reasons, the Russians usually profit from disorders outside their sphere.

The special strength of the Soviet Union is consistent motivation. Whatever the conflicts of long-term and immediate aims, there is a coherence and directedness to Soviet foreign policy; the two aspects serve in different ways the fundamental Russian interest, just as ideology supports the state, and the state sponsors ideology. Deep purposefulness gives self-confidence and self-righteousness. Russia concentrates its energies, never hesitates to secure advantages and can hardly be brought to surrender any, so the growth of its power should be, like that of the empire for these several centuries, practically irreversible. The universalist drive is an enormous asset in an age of growing uncertainty, when the nation-state is seemingly obsolete, and there is imperative need for new integrations, new means of government and ways of bringing people together. In this situation, a great pseudodemocracy can promise firm order while ostentatiously offering satisfaction of modern democratic-libertarian urges. Probably this could be achieved only by a state arising at the edge of the European state system, growing into Asiatic empire, and blending these opposites.

At the same time, there are grave weaknesses inherent in the Soviet way; if there were not, the whole earth would by now have bowed to the leadership of Moscow. The revolutionary renewal (supplemented by the cathartic and stimulant effects of the Second World War) has largely spent itself. The promise of radical change has faded; the Soviet order is no longer very inspiring either for its friends abroad or for its

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citizens and leadership. The revolutionary and lower-class values of Marxism-Leninism can no longer appeal to the increasingly fixed, status-conscious elite. With little emotional appeal for a people whose capitalists were supposedly overthrown more than half a century ago, Marxism-Leninism is refreshed by no new ideas; and it seems to be on the way to obsolescence, as the ideological foundations of tsarism (summarized as Orthodoxy, Autocracy, Nationality) were outworn before 1917. The Soviet Union is no longer jettisoning encumbrances of the past but has apparently become one of the most conservative of states, with very limited capacity for institutional reform. The Revolution was a rupture and remaking of the stiff old state, but patterns of power remained beneath and the new state in turn becomes stiff, mentally and organizationally, as imperial regimes regularly have shown themselves to be.

Conflict of purposes also limits achievements. Political imperatives have again and again overruled economic rationality, from the days of 'war communism', when there was an attempt to run everything by command, through the follies of collectivization and liquidation of the better farmers as class enemies, the distortions of forced and over-centralized industrialization, down to the fetters still laid upon productivity in agriculture, industry, and trade for political reasons. Such conflicts of purpose may be getting worse. It seems increasingly difficult to manage a modern economy by political command, as Stalin was fairly well able to do. The present leadership, vacillating between relaxation of controls for further modernization and their affirmation for the security of the political system, seems unable to translate political power into rapid growth. For some 40 years, the Soviet Union made great strides toward the secular goal of catching up with the West in technology; recently it has been unable to narrow the gap any further. If the historic Russian pattern is followed, it may again begin slipping farther behind until shocked into another renewal.

CONTRADICTIONS between appearances and reality become more acute with the rising self-awareness of peoples and heightened demands of a growing class of intellectuals, essential to the progress of the state but difficult to fit into its basically primitive political framework. Western-inspired currents of thought made trouble in the nineteenth century, but it was not then necessary for the tsar to try to act like a democrat. The present democratic façade becomes less effective as ideological inspiration wanes and contacts with the outside world threaten to make its thinness more obvious. It becomes more difficult in all realms for censorship and propaganda to cover the gap between promise and reality, as the outwardly libertarian and rationalistic ideology raises expectations, as for real elections, autonomy for nationalities, or a consumer-oriented economy, which cannot be satisfied within the authoritarian system. Cynicism or rejection by many of the educated

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may be expected, and the Soviet Union seems on the way to having, like its tsarist predecessor, to live with a large alienated intelligentsia.

The Soviet Union suffers, however, a more important and perhaps decisive weakness. As an absolutist, essentially despotic state, it suffers the central ailment of such states, the inability to regulate power and to choose and change leadership in an orderly fashion. By 1938, it could hardly be denied that at the centre of power the Soviet Union was more primitive than the regime it had replaced; Stalin rightly compared himself to Ivan the Terrible, and Moscow seemed to have turned the clock back to the sixteenth century. Since then, despotism has been tempered and leadership has been made collective, but there has been no sign of any institutions developing whereby outworn, incompetent or over-aged leaders can be replaced or whereby anyone but the ruling nucleus itself can influence the admission to the highest places. But the self-perpetuation of the leadership clearly invites the decadence which has regularly and often rapidly overtaken all great universal empires; and the perfection of political controls, permitting greater self-confidence and abuse of power and the reducing of all checks, invites more rapid and thorough decadence. On this basis, one might suppose the Soviet Union, with its more effective concentration of power and lack of effective feedback, to be more liable than the preceding regime to the abuses of power and ensuing rot.

Marx was probably right in assuming that the 'higher' political condition would have to grow out of the most advanced—a thought taken for granted in the nineteenth century. It would seem prima facie unlikely that a rather backward empire should have found a real solution, in its severe travails, to the fundamental problem of authoritarian government; and there is not much evidence that Russia did so. The Soviet state was not even intended as a permanent system of rule. Lenin's programme was to smash the old state, not to engineer a new one; and his 'dictatorship of the proletariat' was envisaged only as a transition to the utopian condition of perfect communism, wherein there should be total harmony because all opposition and sources of conflict would have been eliminated with the fulfilment of the mission of empire. He never supposed that the Soviet order could exist indefinitely unless his revolution could prevail over the world. Soviet decades have stretched out far beyond his expectations, but he may have been right. If technology continues to shrink and integrate the world, the contradictions of the Soviet system and the troubles inherent in its dual nature must be expected to increase. The strains seemingly might be relieved in either of opposite directions, by external success compensating for internal difficulties, fortifying the system and its mission and reducing or ending the ability of the West to trouble it; or by radical change, acceptance of political pluralism internally and in the world.

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Dissidence in Moscow

Pietro Sormani

THE last person I talked to in Moscow, apart from the policeman at the door, was Piotr Yakir. He telephoned me shortly before I left to say goodbye and give me his best wishes. I felt guilty thinking that I was going back to the West while he was staying in the Soviet Union exposed to threats and persecutions. Yet he was more serene than I. Fourteen years in a concentration camp have given him a tranquillity in the face of sufferings and a zest for life that many apparently more fortunate Westerners lack.

Yakir is one of the main Soviet dissidents and the one who keeps most contact with the foreign journalist community. I don't think I am revealing any secret in saying this: the KGB (the secret police) know all about it, and if they leave him in peace it is because they have their reasons. Probably he is useful to them in finding out who among the Western journalists is most active in this clandestine activity; or they would have liked to take him out of circulation some time ago but haven't yet done so since he is the son of a well-known general who was shot by Stalin. In any case, the last word has not been said. Others before him have been able to carry on undisturbed for a number of years before tasting the severity of the law. One of these was Andrei Amalrik. His immunity had given rise to suspicions among the foreign journalists—suspicions which were dissipated only by his arrest and recent condemnation.

The phenomenon of dissent has characterized these recent years. When I came to Moscow in the summer of 1965 it did not exist. Not that people were more satisfied with the regime than they are today; but discontent expressed itself in other ways and at different levels. And one can understand why. Under Khrushchev, who had uncorked the energies repressed by 30 years of Stalinist dictatorship, dissent showed itself in political circles and was even encouraged and made use of by the regime. Khrushchev, so it was said, was at one and the same time head of the government and head of the opposition, and in his wake writers, scientists, and economists could make their ideas heard in relative freedom. Those were the days of the publication of Solzhenitsyn's *One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich*, of the denunciation of Yevtushenko, of the public readings of poetry in Mayakovsky Square, of the debate on the economy. The journalists had nothing to do but register these attitudes, and their chief fear was lest they might be outdone in their criticisms of the Soviet system by the Party leaders themselves.

With the fall of Khrushchev a brake was applied to the critical trend and conformity returned to dominate Soviet life. Official culture,

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despite its attempts at resistance, had to keep in step with ideology: today the great protagonists of the 'thaw' following the Twentieth Congress have been silenced (when they are not, as in the case of Ehrenburg, already dead). Dissent has taken refuge in clandestinity. Denied the platform of the press and other regular methods of information, it has sought its form of expression in the *samizdat*, or clandestine publication. This process of adapting to the new political situation has been a long one. I still remember clearly the atmosphere that surrounded the trial of Sinyavsky and Daniel in February 1966: few people lingered outside the hall of the tribunal, which was crammed with plain-clothes police and Komsomol activists. We Western journalists were few in number and we kept apart not daring to enter into any discussion.

But it was that trial, with its obvious aim of intimidation, that provided a remarkable impetus to the movement of dissent, provoking dozens of letters of protest and inducing many people to come out into the open. Two years later, at the trial of Ginzburg and Galanskov, the atmosphere had completely changed. Dozens and dozens of young people crowded outside the tribunal and tried to talk to foreign journalists under the embarrassed eyes of the KGB police who were taking photographs of us to bring their dossiers up to date. A relationship was established then that has lasted till today and has enabled the *samizdat* to find its way abroad: and from those countries abroad, through the transmissions of the BBC and the Voice of America, it has rebounded back to Russia, reaching ever widening strata of the population.

There was in those days a veritable boom of dissent. The letters of protest could be counted in hundreds, and they were written not only by friends of the condemned men but by all sorts of people, writers, scientists, professional men, even workers, concerned about the repressive character that the regime was taking on. Unhappily the extension of the phenomenon alarmed the authorities, and they tried to check it by every available means. They say that when, in 1967, Andropov replaced Semichastny as head of the secret police he said to Brezhnev: 'Give me full powers for six months and I will eliminate every trace of dissent.' He was not given full powers, but he had quite enough to deal the movement a serious blow. The phenomenon coincided with the 'Prague Spring' which contributed to alarming the Soviets, who saw in what was happening in Czechoslovakia a foretaste of what might happen also in the USSR if adequate measures were not taken to restore the Party's authority.

Dissent has become rarer, but it is by no means dead, as can be seen from the reactions aroused by the consignment to an asylum of the biologist Medvedev (he was later set free) and the persecution of Solzhenitsyn. It has, rather, been transformed, extending to other parts of the Soviet territory outside Moscow and absorbing other elements which had hitherto remained aloof. The most obvious aspect of this

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transformation is the diminishing part played in dissent by literary men, who in the past were its promoters and had become its chief representatives: today their place is taken by scientists, who are increasingly emerging in Russia as the most effective force for renovation and democratic development. The physicist Sakharov, regarded as the father of the Soviet nuclear bomb, has developed further the argument begun a couple of years ago with his notorious 'manifesto' on freedom and peaceful coexistence.

It was Amalrik, the historian of the movement, who gave the most exact description of it, in his essay 'Will the USSR survive until 1984?' which recently won him a sentence of three years' imprisonment. He divides what he calls 'the democratic movement' into three groups: a Marxist-Leninist group, to which General Grigorenko belongs; a liberal group, headed by Litvinov and Sakharov; and a Christian group. This last is the least known in the West, with which it has few contacts: it is in fact inspired by typically Russian ideologies and traditions whose superiority it maintains. But it is possibly this group which has the largest following among certain sections of the Soviet intelligentsia particularly sensitive to the nationalistic appeal, and which is therefore the most dangerous to the regime. The regime realizes this and is fighting it with special ruthlessness, as can be seen from the exemplary sentence of 15 years' imprisonment inflicted in 1968 on Professor Ogurtsov of Leningrad, one of the principal exponents of the 'All-Russian Social-Christian Union for Liberation of the People'.

BUT as well as the groups mentioned by Amalrik there are, in my view, others which also participate, if in different ways, in the present phenomenon of dissent. One of these could be classified as 'nationalist' and includes all those elements in the Ukraine, the Baltic countries, and the Central Asian regions for whom greater autonomy vis-à-vis Moscow is identified with a wider political and civil freedom. Examples of it are the Tatars of the Crimea, Chornovil and the other intellectuals in the Ukraine, and the officers in Tallin who were arrested late in 1969 for having plotted against the state. A group which has come into prominence in recent years is that of the Jews, which combines nationalistic, religious, racial, political, and cultural elements. It is distinguished from the other groups by its particular aims, which are summed up in the recognition of the right to go to Israel.

In the years I spent in Moscow I have seen the dissident movement come to birth, develop, and change its character. I have entered the houses of some of its most important exponents and had long and impassioned talks with them. I have heard the despairing lament of the Crimean Tatars, a noble people snatched by Stalin from their lands to which they have tried in vain to return for 25 years. 'Help us', said one of these Tatars with impossible names, 'talk about us, make our problems known in the West.' When I promised I would, he wrung my hand, his eyes glowing beneath his thick dark brows. Alas, neither I

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nor others of my colleagues managed to keep the promise: the West was too much occupied with other problems to concern itself with what it regarded as a marginal affair in the Soviet context, or at any rate not interesting enough to be treated in the pages of a large-circulation newspaper.

I also heard the appeal, less pathetic but no less vibrant, of a group of Jewish intellectuals—writers, doctors, lawyers, and a film director. The atmosphere was gripping: Hebrew music, manifestos on the walls in Yiddish, tales of suffering and persecution. And their too warm handclasps and thanks for our promises of help. The Jews are the proudest of all the dissident groups and the most determined on action. 'No matter if they put me in prison, if they take away everything or make me die', one of them said to me, 'I shall go on fighting until they let me go to the land of my fathers.'

On the other hand, I have seen some dissident intellectuals waver beneath the blows of the authorities and finally give in. The instruments of pressure are infinite, and prison is the most extreme form and not always the most effective. They range from verbal admonitions, threats, refusal of holiday permits, expulsion from the co-operatives for a new flat, down to dismissal, with the spectre of withdrawal of the residence permit and an accusation of 'parasitism'. It is not surprising in these conditions if many dissentients have decided to give up, at least until better times come. One of them, a doctor, whose career has got stuck over the years despite his undoubted professional capacities, confessed to me not long ago: 'I can't go on. I want to marry, and I must think of my wife and my future family. If I keep quiet, bit by bit I can work my way back and make a fresh life.' It was on this same occasion that his fiancée looked at me and said, 'You Westerners have different faces from ours, more open, more serene. Haven't you noticed how Russians in the street never smile?' I felt ashamed of my privileged state as a Westerner.

I have often asked myself in the course of my conversations with these dissident intellectuals whether their action is of some use on the practical plane or has only a moral significance. Many of them have the same doubts, and the transformations that the movement has undergone over the years are the result of this rethinking as well as of repression by the authorities. Some have become convinced that action by legal methods, appeal to the principles sanctioned by the Constitution, respect for the rules of the game have not produced the hoped-for results and they must therefore move over to other, more direct and violent forms of action. The situation recalls that of the last century when the Populist movement split into two factions, one liberal and evolutionary and the other (the famous 'narodnaya volya') more pronouncedly revolutionary. Dissent today has not yet reached the same degree of maturity and organization, but there is no doubt that there are people who think of terrorism as the most effective method of political struggle. It is interesting to note that the group of Baltic

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officers arrested in the autumn of 1969 was organized according to the 'troika' system (cells of three persons, unknown to and independent of each other) familiar in nineteenth-century Russia.

The movement of dissent which came to birth and developed in these years has had a great importance in the formation of a democratic consciousness among certain strata of the Soviet population. But its extent must not be overestimated, as people are perhaps inclined to do in the West. It is still a limited phenomenon, which does not seem strong enough to threaten the regime, for the present at any rate. Side by side with intellectual dissent, however, a popular atmosphere of discontent has shown itself which may in the long run prove more dangerous. It is an indeterminate discontent which does not assume political forms: it is chiefly directed towards certain economic difficulties or towards the many inconveniences of daily life which still exist in the Soviet Union, such as housing shortages, the periodical disappearance of some particular goods from the shops, or the poor quality of clothes or shoes.

During these years I have seen signs of the population's growing dissatisfaction and even intolerance about such things: people protesting about bad service and rudeness from shopgirls, a housewife insisting that her bread should be wrapped up, a customer refusing fish that wasn't fresh. Small episodes, which in other countries would have no special significance, but which in the Soviet Union, inured by centuries of resignation to poverty, represent something new. The most interesting and seemingly paradoxical aspect of the phenomenon is that today conditions of life for the population have improved even as compared with five years ago. You only need to walk along Gorky Street to realize this: there are far more cars about, the shop-windows display a greater variety of goods, and the passers-by are better dressed. Today the clothes of many Russians are no different from those of foreigners, and but for certain whimsicalities of Western fashion it would be difficult to distinguish between them.

Yet discontent has grown. There is a so-to-speak technical reason for this, in other words the increase in industrial and agricultural wages, which has not been matched by a corresponding increase in the production of consumer goods. But the main reason, to my mind, is psychological. In Stalin's day the masses had nothing and had no hope of getting anything: life was a matter of sheer survival. Today conditions have improved, but expectations have increased much more. The same kind of thing is happening in the more highly developed Western countries, where the more one has the more one wants, in accordance with an ever-expanding spiral. The Soviets have only just begun to touch on the consumer society, but they have already experienced its fascination, and therefore today they ask for more than they did in the past. They will do so even more in the future, and if they are not satisfied they will express their discontent in more acute forms.

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The two phenomena, intellectual dissent and popular dissatisfaction, are not separate, and both correspond to a single state of mind. In the long run the problem, whether concerned with freedom or with bread, is the same, and is linked with a democratic conception of society in which the will of the people prevails over that of an authoritarian elite. For this reason there must also be a single solution, and the Soviet leaders cannot hope indefinitely to improve the standard of living of the people while at the same time stifling their aspirations for freedom. This is what they are trying to do at present; but this ambiguous attitude of theirs is the main reason for the low esteem in which they are held by public opinion. They must restore consistency to their actions, and to do this they can only embark on one or other of two courses: either return to a strict Stalinist type of regime, suppressing both freedoms and commodities, or introduce a more democratic system in political, economic, and cultural life.

Many people in the West, believing in the evolutionary theory, think it is no longer possible to 'turn back' and that the Soviet Union is destined to advance towards increasingly tolerant ways of life. The experience of these recent years unfortunately shows that it is not a question of an inevitable advance. We journalists have had to admit, often through our own bitter experience, that the margin of liberty has gradually diminished and at the same time repression has increased. The rehabilitation of Stalin has not been a purely academic process but has constituted a prelude to the restoration of his ideas. The ideological tightening of brakes has been paralleled by greater strictness and discipline on the practical plane.

It is nevertheless asserted that it will not be possible to revive some of the particular aberrations of the Stalinist regime. Here too I feel doubtful. Western journalists live in an artificial world and have few contacts with the actualities of the Soviet scene; but, through my relations with the intellectuals of the dissident movement, I have been able to catch a glimpse of certain police practices that are still widespread in the USSR. A young friend whose mental balance and good faith I can guarantee was shut up in an asylum for having signed letters of protest: he lived for weeks among raving maniacs and chronic drunks. Another acquaintance whom I happened to meet in the street was terrified at the idea of being seen in the company of a Westerner and put his hand over his face every time we passed a policeman. A third friend thought up cloak-and-dagger methods of meeting me, going in and out of Metro stations, being picked up by a passing car, and giving a password.

But the most illuminating episode for me was when two young Italians in January 1970 were distributing protest leaflets in the big store, 'TsUM', about the arrest of some intellectuals. Together with other Western journalists I was stopped by a policeman and taken into a room. 'Are we arrested?', we asked. 'Goodness, no', answered the policeman, 'it's only a formality, you can go in a few minutes.' They

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kept us for three hours without letting us ring our families or our embassies. We asked to go to the lavatory: a policewoman accompanied us to the door and stayed there till we came out. While we were waiting two policemen came in dragging a screaming youth: they threw him to the ground and began to hit him and kick him. 'You've broken my arm', the unfortunate victim cried. We asked what he had done. 'He was trying to steal', they told us. At last an official from the Foreign Ministry turned up and we were set free.

Our adventure had a happy ending. But I wonder what would have happened if instead of being officially accredited foreign correspondents we had been ordinary Soviet citizens. I realized then the absence of any legal guarantee, and how completely lost a person in Russia can be when confronted with the authorities. The dissident intellectuals invoke respect of the Constitution, which recognizes freedom of speech and association: but it is constantly negated by a practice of absolutism and police repression which has its roots in the Stalinist past. The gap is so wide that it is hard to see how it can be bridged. Even if the Soviet leaders really intended to reform Soviet public life in a democratic direction, it would take years before it could come about. And the Soviet leaders, as things are today, have no such intention.

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Samizdat: Troubles of Recent Times or The Amazing Adventures of Vanya Chmotanov

The publication in September–December 1969 of a new novel by the editor of the Soviet journal Oktyabr, *Vsevolod Kochetov,* Chego Zhe Ty Khochesh?—What Do You Want?—*was greeted with horrified amusement by the Soviet liberal intelligentsia and Sovietologists abroad. The book reflected the Stalinist* Weltanschauung *in its most primitive form, and its author—a notorious hardliner—was now still more discredited. (See the article by Stuart Hood, 'Comrade Bulatov's Italian Journey', in the Winter–Spring 1970 issue of* SURVEY, *No.* 74–5.)

One reaction to the novel's publication was the prompt appearance in samizdat *of a series of satires. Many were no more than brief sketches, some of them scurrilous.*

The present work differs in that its narrative and 'ideological' content bear no relation to Kochetov's novel. Indeed, a more improbable subject for his weighty pen would be hard to find. Hence the author's postcript attached to Troubles of Recent Times, *in which the anonymous author claims to be a new, inspired Kochetov who has seen the light of liberalism and repudiates his previous run-of-the-mill work.*

Troubles of Recent Times *is rich in imaginative humour, picturesque provincialisms and punning. A great deal is inevitably lost in translation. It can be viewed as a bitterly satirical but nonetheless affectionate look at the Soviet mentality. It is also evidently the work of a well-informed and erudite person, and one with obvious experience of the less agreeable aspects of life under the Soviets.*

> What think you? How will this alarum end . . .
> Heard you ere
> Of corpses rising from the grave
> To question tsars, the lawful tsars,
> Appointed, elected by the general will? . . .
> Alexander Pushkin, *Boris Godunov.*

THE suburban train was carrying an inconspicuous passenger with a small leather zip-case gripped firmly between his heels. It was Vanya Chmotanov. The very man who was the cause of the events that shook the whole of the civilised world in the year 197–.

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The train was bound for Golokolamsk.[1] There were not many passengers. As usual they were nodding off, waking, yawning and looking out at the countryside that lay under the February snow.

Many of them gave a start when the compartment doors opened and the ticket-collectors came in clicking their punches. 'Tickets!' said a genial, corpulent inspector with a straw-coloured moustache. The second man was lean, with a tubercular face. He was driving along before him a 15-year-old girl passenger without a ticket. She argued that she had not had time to purchase one. The lean man said nothing, and kept prodding her in the back with his punch.

The passengers felt a cold shiver run through their entrails. A ticket-check—that was nothing, but if it came to documents . . .[2]

Vanya Chmotanov had no ticket. For a moment he panicked, but then he recalled the pile of wallets in his coat pockets and prepared himself to listen to a burst of public indignation and pay his three rubles. Suddenly Vanya had a brain-wave. Unzipping his case he looked into the fat inspector's blue eyes and beckoned with one finger.

The inspector pursed up his lips haughtily. All right, he'd get a ruble, but he wasn't going to lose his own dignity in the process. He inclined himself towards Vanya. Chmotanov opened the case. There, on a thick layer of wadding, frozen in the sleep of death, lay . . . a head. Its facial characteristics were painfully familiar. The beard, the prominent cheekbones, the huge, high forehead, and the bald expanse. Vanya gave an impudent laugh.

The inspector opened his mouth and began to sway. For an instant his face turned purple as if with asphyxia and his cheeks bristled.

'Well there's a ticket for you . . .' he mumbled, and clipped his own nostrils with the punch. Staggering, the fat man went up to the lean man, seized him by the shoulders and, with superhuman strength, dragged him out of the coach. The lean man nonchalantly submitted.

Vanya zipped up his case, turned to gaze out of the window, and became lost in a stream of reminiscences. It seemed a hundred years ago, but only that morning . . .

IN his youth Vanya had studied at a technical school for bakers. He'd been a good student—the teachers never tired of praising him. Naturally, he couldn't live on his grant, but somehow he made ends meet. Before defending his thesis, Vanya had put in some practical work at the Uritsky Model-Experimental Semi-Automatic Mechanical Bakery. Suddenly he'd hit on a way of improving the food situation. Every evening, there was a delivery of packets of yeast in cardboard boxes. Every morning, Vanya took out under his clothing a delicate, light brown substance kneaded into a flat dough. The warm fragrance of yeast

[1] Literally: 'Hungerville'.

[2] Documents such as identity card, travel visa, etc., play a vital part in the lives of Soviet citizens; consequently a great deal of evasion is practised.

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wafted from him but the porters, poisoned with samogon [3] (brewed on the spot in their hut on an adapted 'Chudesnitsa' stove), were insensible of the removal of the product for off-licence consumption. One day the 'Chudesnitsa' broke down. The porters stood ill-tempered and sober, and there came an end to Vanya's innocent [source of] enrichment.

'What've we got here, eh? Swollen like a woman!' said the porter, prodding Vanya's excessively ample bust. His fist left a permanent imprint.

'It's muscles! I'm a sportsman!' cried Vanya, turning cold; but they had already divested him of his coat and disembowelled his torn shirt. They extracted 74 kilograms 250 grams of yeast, and a bread roll.

It was the bread roll that aroused the judge's and spectators' especial indignation.

'The people's yeast isn't good enough for the accused!' thundered the public prosecutor, 'he wants bread rolls too! He's never around when there's work to be done, but he's always there for his desserts!' Indignantly he poked the roll which had been itemized in the case as material evidence.

The judges were struck by Vanya's obscenely close resemblance to the young Vladimir Ulyanov [Lenin]. They all remarked the Tatar-Mongol set of his eyes, the cheekbones, the thick lashes—an amazing image of that great man who had taken a different path. This they could not forgive Chmotanov, although not one of them so much as alluded to it. Vanya got 10 years.

In the camp Vanya went through his universities.

On the occasion of every [public] holiday, a *tableau vivant* was staged with his help: a simulated armoured-car was built of resinous logs; Vanya was issued with an old-fashioned greatcoat and a cap by the camp's Cultural and Educational Department in place of his torn quilted jacket; then he was made to pose on the logs, his arm extended out towards the fields and forests beyond the barbed wire. The red flag was hoisted and the searchlight from a nearby watch-tower picked out the inspired countenance of Vanya-Ilyich, while the camp administration intoned the leader's favourite songs.

The camp thieves chuckled noiselessly but good-humouredly, nudging one another, and after the ceremony they instructed Vanya in their own skills. It was Vanya's fingers that aroused the sincere admiration of his barrack-companions: [they were] long and slender with convex, almond-shaped nails.

'He'll be a good worker, will Vanya. With fingers like that he'll be able to take belts off and put them on without anyone noticing—they're not bread rolls.'

Chmotanov was released after serving half his term, but three years later he was back in again: he'd tried to steal the wallet of the ambassador of a foreign power while that gentleman had stood admiring Rublev's [icon] 'The Trinity' in the Tretyakov Gallery.

[3] Home-brewed liquor.

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AND so on that day in February 197–, Vanya had been on the job amongst the queues in GUM [4] where there was a sale of imported suspender belts and a vast crowd had collected consumed with a single passion: to get to the counter and buy a pair for themselves, with that heavenly colour and those shining steel clips. Vanya took 13 wallets and then decided it was time for his lunchbreak. He ate slowly and unhurriedly on the top floor of the Moskva hotel. Then he went for a stroll, and was drawn by an enormous queue stretching out of the Alexandrovsky Gardens. Chmotanov wandered about sniffing out a customer, but it was a poor, not to say poverty-stricken crowd. Working his way up the queue he did a job on a Balt who happened to cross his path. Suddenly it dawned on him that that he was rather too close to that granite cube,[5] and if he got out now he would attract undesirable attention. Cursing mentally, Vanya followed the crowd.

'Keep to the line!' a police sergeant ordered. 'Strictly in twos! Strictly in twos!' Vanya shivered. 'Just like queuing for the disinfection room',[6] he thought bitterly.

'Further to the right!'

At the approach to the Mausoleum the queue took a right-angled turn and doffed its hats. Silently entering the semi-darkness they cleared their throats and descended the steps.

'Keep up! No stopping! Strictly in twos!' they were gently cautioned by an officer with a blue armband. After two series of steps Vanya turned right and began ascending a staircase. Pink light streamed out of a glass box, while above him towered an iron pyramid duplicating the contours of the Mausoleum. Its glass sides were adorned with emblems and flags in cast iron. Inside [the pyramid], in a reddish light, lay Himself. The citizens involuntarily slackened their step but the officers silently pushed them away from the granite barrier back to the wall, hurrying them on and signalling to one another by raising two fingers.

. . . He lay in his dark-olive field jacket, his attitude and expression of weariness exactly as they had been at the moment when death had overtaken him.

'Move along more quickly!' muttered the guards.

"Must be at least 12 guards on duty', thought Vanya. As he came out and up the stairs Vanya noticed some curtains and yellow, brass doors. Breaking away from the stream of people surging up the steps Vanya, stunned not so much by his vision of Him and the sensations he had experienced as by the lightning speed of his visit, stepped behind the curtain and stood there unobserved by anyone. He didn't understand at the time why he had needed to do this. He'd checked,

[4] GUM: State Universal Store—Moscow's largest and most famous department store.
[5] i.e. the Lenin Mausoleum.
[6] 'sanpropusknik'—in prisons, labour camps, etc. See for instance the description in chapter 83 of Solzhenitsyn's *The First Circle*.

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just to be on the safe side, to see if they'd notice. They hadn't. Vanya came out hastily and joined the crowd.

As he was walking alongside the Kremlin wall Vanya realized what the idea was that had suddenly taken shape in his mind.

Under that glass there lay millions . . .

'It says in the papers', he reflected, 'that Rockefeller collects mummified heads of the inmates of Buchenwald. And pays hundreds of thousands for them in foreign currency. I could buy a little house with a vegetable garden in the Caucasus. Get married to Manyasha. Hundreds of thousands for the head of some obscure convict—that means billions for the head of the architect of genius. They'll give 40 billions, maybe even 200.'

THE next day Vanya returned to the building whose contours are so amazingly simple and yet so sublime, and within whose doors lay the entire combined capital of America and Africa. He had on him a knife, a surgical saw, a small plastic balloon of compressed laughing gas (he'd picked it up on the cheap in the Minaevsky market), an excellent set of skeleton keys for bank jobs, an electronic mine-detector, and what is described in other countries as inspiration.

With an unaccustomed sense of skill and power, Chmotanov took his place quietly at the end [of the queue].

The officer turned to see if there was still anyone in the granite vestibule. Vanya tiptoed down to the sarcophagus. The silent sentries posted at the corners were asleep, just as they had been the day before, unblinking and breathing evenly. Behind one of them Chmotanov concealed himself.

The officer checked the seal on the underside of the sarcophagus. Lynx-like, the thief of the century watched him. The officer lifted the telephone receiver and dialled a number.

'Hello, hello, Zhorik? It's me, Shcholkin. I've done the rounds. Everything's O.K. What? Ha-ha. Hairs in his beard! You're on tomorrow, count them yourself then. Ha-ha. Cheerio.'

Then the officer made another call.

'Get me Ninelle. Hello, Ninelle? Hi, sweetie. I'm on my way to your place, chicken. Ringing from work. Fine. Everyone's gone, there's only me left. To the Operetta? Very nice. And then to your place? I'm on my way. See you.'

The officer yawned and after plugging in the security alarm system went out through the yellow, brass doors.

Chmotanov stirred himself, crept over to the socket and switched off the foreign machination. He settled himself a little more comfortably by the telephone desk behind the curtain and became immersed in a torrent of thoughts about the future.

The guard changed; [he heard] the stamping of boots. The corporal gave the command in a quiet voice.

Midnight struck.

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One o'clock.

Two o'clock.

'Hey!' said the sentry outside. Echoes of the soldier's voice rumbled through the dungeons like the inside of a barrel. Chmotanov froze.

'Uh?' someone answered in an undertone.

'He's a bastard, that Shcholkin.'

'[Yes], a bastard', the other agreed.

'If you miss your political information class just once more, he says, you'll be on outside duties for the whole winter. You'll be standing there every second hour.'

'I got my nose frostbitten in December thanks to him—three hours I did, every second hour. It was 30 degrees below.'

'He loves doing that.'

'A-aargh . . . are we near changeover?'

'It's struck three-quarters.'

At three o'clock precisely Chmotanov donned his breathing-mask and released the gas from the balloon. There was a hissing sound in the vault. The sentry's slumber became a narcotic one.

Quarter past three struck.

Chmotanov got to his feet thinking 'Ought to loosen up'. He climbed on to the sarcophagus, did a handstand and walked up and down for a while. Then he jumped down and quickly prised off the seal. He examined the lock and gave a short guffaw. In place of some mechanism for a triple-locking Japanese key, the thief of the century came upon an ordinary office-desk keyhole. 'They couldn't afford it!' the looter laughed, opening the lock with a pin. He lifted the glass lid on its hinges like the back of a lorry and crawled in on to the couch. Getting down on his knees beside Ilyich, Vanya whipped out his saw. Carefully, as though handling a mine, he raised the head from its time-worn place, and . . . there it was, the head, in his hands. Placing it by his side Vanya thrust his hand, with the feverish haste of a gold-digger, into the opening that the head had concealed, and felt something powdery. He fished out a handful of ordinary, crumbling cork.

'How can it be . . . ?' said the stunned Vanya. Tears welled up in his eyes. He grasped the wrists like a drowning man, and they dropped off, hard and cold as iron. Powdered cork began to trickle from the sleeves.

Vanya Chmotanov was seized with a terrible anger. He looked about him with unseeing gaze—oh, how he longed to wreck everything, smash everything! What a dirty trick they'd played on him!

The sobering sound of the [Kremlin] chimes reached his ears. There was still half an hour to go to the changing of the guard. Vanya wrapped the head in a rag and shoved it inside his clothing. Hiding on him the instruments he hadn't needed he closed the lid of the sarcophagus.

Vanya felt sick at heart. He went up to the snoring sentry and jabbed his fist into the man's stomach.

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'Whaa . . .?' the sentry enquired. He stood peaceably, staring unblinkingly at Vanya.

'You've been neglecting your duty! Someone's been here before me!'

'Yes, comrade captain.'

'You'll stand trial tomorrow.'

'I serve the Soviet Union', said the sentry hoarsely, emitting a nasal wheeze.

Chmotanov made his way up the staircase and pulled open the chill bronze door. Through the crack he could see the frost-covered cobblestones of the square. Searchlights hummed. In the slanting shadow stood a sentry—at ease, even tapping his heels.

'Look how they've let themselves go', thought Vanya, suddenly bitter. 'Four in the morning, and they're glad there's no one to see them. That one looks as though he's queuing up for sunflower seeds!'

Vanya reached into his pocket for his wide-peaked cap, pulled it down over his ears and turned up his collar.

. . . The sentries were stricken dumb. There, edging his way diagonally out of the black slit in the door, was Vladimir Ilyich. Squinting in the bright light he looked up askance at the face of the fair-haired soldier and deftly snatched up the carbine that had fallen from the latter's hands:

'Be more careful, comrade! Keep your powder dry!'[7]

Ilyich placed the carbine in the sentry's limp hands, ran his finger carefully along the bayonet blade and shook his head:

'In our days the Red Army treated its weapons with more respect. Admit it, old chap, isn't your bayonet a little blunt?'

'A little, comrade . . . Vladimir Ilyich', the fair-haired lad croaked. And then he suddenly forgot that he had to breathe. His comrade, a dark-skinned boy, edged his way slowly up to them, his back up against the black labradorite wall, rolling the whites of his eyes.

'From which parts might you be, comrade?' asked Chmotanov, grasping the lapels of his coat and peering at the fair-haired one.

'We're from Vologda . . .' stuttered the sentry.

'That means you don't go in for jokes!' Lenin summed them up. 'In that case, forgive me. And remember—the imperialists don't go in for jokes either! Tell that to your comrades . . .' Deftly saluting, Ilyich strode off at a businesslike pace past the tribunes towards the Historical Museum.

'Wake up, you fool!' said the fair-haired boy, kicking his companion with his boot. The latter moaned, opened his eyes painfully and, with the help of his carbine, got to his feet.

'Did you hear me talking to Lenin just then?' asked the Vologda lad. 'You know his wishes—guard everything, and not give anything away to anyone . . .'

[7] Lenin, in the various guises in which he appears in this work, is portrayed complete with his well-known speech defect—the pronunciation of the letter 'r' as 'g'. The present translator has not attempted to carry this over into English.

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'Are we going to report it?' moaned the dark-skinned one.

'Who to? The Lieutenant? He's just a kid, report it to him? I've seen Lenin, what's *he* ever done? Let him report it at the political class . . .'

. . . Chmotanov drew near to the Historical Museum. A man in plain clothes stepped out from the wall and marched up to him. He took a look at Chmotanov's face, opened his mouth—and froze on the spot.

'Greetings, comrade!' Chmotanov nodded to the agent, keeping his hands in his pockets, and went on round the corner.

The agent stood rooted to the pavement. 'I'm in a bad state', his brain registered with a momentary flicker of awareness. 'The old woman's right, nagging me to give up the bottle. I'm already fancying I see Kuzmiches!'[8]

CHMOTANOV was passing the Lubyanka[9] when he heard four o'clock chiming in the distance.

Vanya had been disappointed by the simplicity of the robbery. What use had all his preparations been when the custodians of antiquities had not catered for the refinements of his ingenuity?

'In Egypt it was a bit more difficult', he brooded, feeling himself insulted. 'You're in the tomb, creeping up to the Pharaoh, and suddenly—crash!—down comes a stone slab behind you! Or you end up in a labyrinth howling till you peg out . . .'

Weary and apathetic, Vanya took the train to Golokolamsk to visit a widow of his acquaintance, his faithful friend Manyasha, to rest himself and to think about the future. He had a difficult task ahead of him. Once again Chmotanov felt his heart burning with the passion for risk-taking and success.

THE guards changed. With their habitual high-stepping march the two drugged by Chmotanov reached their barracks and flaked out onto their bunks.

[The Mausoleum] opened at 11 o'clock as usual. There was a crush of people in the Alexandrovsky Gardens but as they drew near to the Mausoleum they were silent, doffed their hats and walked in pairs past the glass box. An old woman cried softly as she peered dimly at the immortal figure of Him who had shaken the globe within the space of 10 days. Many people, not seeing a face, assumed that that was how it was meant to be. Others mentally filled in those dear, missing features.

'No stopping! Move along more quickly!' Zhorik, the duty officer, commanded.

The last visitors on that day were a husband and wife. They must

[8] Kuzmich—a popular, affectionate/ironical way of referring to Lenin (Ilyich).
[9] The prison described in the final chapters of *The First Circle*.

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have come up from the provinces. Both of them wore old-style Chinese dyed oilskin capes.[10]

'Hurry along!' Zhorik cautioned them. The pair dashed ahead, obedient to the command. Rushing forward they banged headfirst into the sheet-brass door. The door reverberated like a guitar that had been dropped.

'Quiet!' said Zhorik roughly.

Trembling, the pair came up onto the observation platform and, screwing up their eyes after the snowy brightness of the square, gazed dimly at the mummy.

'Pasha!' his wife asked in a whisper. 'Why hasn't he got a head?'

'Shut up, you fool!' The husband scrutinized the couch intently. Yes, the most vital part of the body was indeed absent. Sweat began to pour down the husband's spine. Lying there he could see no less than three heads, then six, then they multiplied to fill the entire glass box like a lorry with a bulk cargo of cabbages.

'Damn!' the husband gave a muffled cry.

'Damn!'

He reeled and hit his head on the sharp edge of a granite parapet.

'Pasha!' the woman screamed and fell onto her knees beside him. 'Pasha! Forgive me! It must have rolled off somewhere, I mean, anything's possible!'

'Visitor's taken ill—sal-ammoniac', Zhorik ordered, trained for all life's contingencies.

'Don't take on, madam', and, committing a breach of the regulations, the officer took hold of the griefstricken lady's arm. 'Your husband will be given the necessary assistance.'

'But there was no notice, nothing . . .' the woman sobbed. 'A headless man, and my husband with his nerves, shell-shock, a second-category invalid. . . . You only get to Moscow once in a lifetime, we don't know the way, we don't know anything . . .'

'Who is headless?' Zhorik enquired icily.

'Headless, headless!' the woman burst into weeping, pointing her finger in the direction of the sarcophagus. Zhorik turned to look. A sudden blindness darkened his vision. He ran down the steps and, standing on tiptoe, pressed his nose to the glass.

Reddish light. Field-jacket. Boots. Everything according to the rules. He rubbed his eyes. There was no . . . head. 'What would a true officer do in my place?' thought Zhorik very slowly. He pulled out his pistol and inserted the sour steel into his mouth.

'Comrade captain . . . er . . . I think the comrade's dead.'

The sound of a shot pierced the hallowed silence. Over the glass block of the shattered sarcophagus, quivering in scraps of jelly with tiny veins and blood vessels, trickled the brains of the duty officer.

[10] Evidently an allusion to the days of large-scale trade between the Soviet Union and China.

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THE government passed that night in conference. The garrison was dismissed and put under lock and key. A list was drawn up of persons admitted to this Extraordinary State Secret. Tank divisions were moved in closer to the capital. Streets and public places were patrolled by plain-clothes men and soldiers in disguise.

They awaited the development of hostile rumours and they made ready to arrest the entire population.

They conferred.

It was as if the threat of smallpox hung over the city. They brought in Academician Zbarsky in his pyjamas and nightcap.

They conferred.

The Secretary-General cried like a child, smudging the paint on his eyebrows. All of them cried. Nobody knew what to do. And there was no one to prompt them. There were 12 hours to go until the Mausoleum opened.

'It's impossible to reconstruct it in such a short time', said Zbarsky when he had recovered from his fit of horror. 'If we make an effort we can do it in . . . six months.'

'Half a year!' groaned the Politburo.

Genius is always simple.

'You know what', said the Secretary-General, 'Let's put an actor there for the time being.'

'Hurrah!' cried the intimate circle.

'Have the actor Robert Krivokorytov [11] brought!' ordered the Chief of the Arts.

Half an hour later the actor was delivered, trembling, and with a bruise under one eye.

'Where did he get the black eye?' asked the persons admitted to the secret with annoyance.

'The citizen attempted to resist!' rapped out the agent. 'He shouted that we had no right.'

'Damn you! You're incapable of doing a single clean job!' screamed the Chief of the Arts. 'Get Krivokorytov made up!'

The actor mumbled something and struggled to escape. They virtually carried him out, and a little while later they led in . . . an elderly and bewildered Ilyich.

'He'll do!' they said, to a man.

'Robert!' began the Secretary-General in a soft, paternal voice, taking the text of his speech from the hands of an assistant. 'To you there has fallen a difficult and vital, but an honourable, noble task. The fact is that the body of Ilyich has been removed, so to speak, for restoration. . . . But it would be inconvenient and politically incorrect to close the Mausoleum. It would be ideal food for rumour and hostile speculation . . .'

[11] Literally: Crooked-trough—not exactly a complimentary name for an actor selected for the honour of playing Lenin!

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'Don't tell me someone's pinched old Kuzmich?' thought Krivokorytov apprehensively. 'Impossible.'

'. . . And so you, Robert, are going to have to lie for a while instead of his remains. Are you equal to it? Will you be able to recreate the image of the eternally living, but at the same time, as it were, lifeless Ilyich—that is, he is eternally alive, of course, but in the Mausoleum he lives eternally not exactly alive, doesn't he? You'll be fed at the Kremlin's expense for the duration of the job.'

'I must think it over', said Krivokorytov, mentally deciding: 'Someone's pinched him, obviously.'

'Yes, it will be a hard test for the Stanislavsky method, but I am convinced that it will pass! Konstantin Sergeyevich [Stanislavsky] demanded that everything on the stage should be . . . as it is in real life. . . . But the Mausoleum is only a stage in a certain sense. . . . I shall have to create a not exactly living image of the lifeless . . . that is, I meant, a lifeless image of the eternally living . . . or, more precisely, a living image of the non-eternally . . . excuse me . . . the eternally lifeless!'

Krivokorytov became confused and started to sweat. The Chiefs of Art and Security gazed fixedly at him.

'Well that's fine then!' concluded the Secretary-General with a feeling of relief and nodded to the Chief of Security.

'Get the comrade actor to sign an undertaking not to leave the district [12] and a promise of non-divulgence, and his place of work will just have to get used to the idea.'

It was a beautiful winter's night. At the Spassky gate the persons escorting Krivokorytov unlocked a small door in the wall and descended a long marble staircase. Then they went along a narrow corridor under the square and came up again. On a brightly-lit manhole-cover there gleamed the inscription 'Emergency Exit'. The officer opened it and they came out inside the Mausoleum.

The workmen hastily busied themselves flinging back the lid of the sarcophagus and installing air-conditioning vents.

'Here, comrade Krivokorytov!' rapped an officer of the guard. The actor looked round. He felt his soul curdle in a nauseating paroxysm of anguish. 'O ye gods, ye gods of art—why have you abandoned me? Must I really lie in a coffin according to the method of Stanislavsky?' the actor groaned inwardly.

And he lay down to rehearse.

He concentrated and positioned his hands, the left flat across his chest, the right clenched slightly. His eyelids slackened piteously.

'Magnificent!' the voice of the Chief of Arts came over the radio concealed under his pillow. 'But a little too alive. Can't you die a bit?'

It was the Chief commanding.

Krivokorytov obeyed.

'That's the way!'

[12] Usually a prelude to interrogation, arrest or other form of administrative surveillance.

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The Mausoleum opened at 11 o'clock that morning.

The intimate circle discussed what to do.

'Not the best solution, that Krivokorytov.'

'I've got an idea!' exclaimed the Chief of Arts, rolling his eyes wildly. They huddled round and listened to his plan. They laughed and patted their stomachs.

VANYA CHMOTANOV got off the train at the quiet [little town of] Golokolamsk. His soul rejoiced in the beauty of the wintry day and the provincial calm.

He walked through the town. Beside the ruined church stood a cottage, neat and spruce. Smoke curled from the chimney. 'What an unexpected pleasure—it's me', thought Chmotanov vainly, and whistled. A face appeared at the window. The bolts clattered open.

'Vanechka!' cried Manya. 'My extraordinary little falcon!'

Manyasha was snub-nosed and round as a ball: she came out to meet her friend wearing a delightful cardigan the colour of a frog in spring.

They kissed in the doorway.

'And there I was thinking like a fool: they've caught my little falcon, I shan't be seeing him for many a day.'

'No, Manyasha, your little falcon's alive and flown home with a fortune.'

Manya flushed, and with truly Golokolamskian passion flung herself on Chmotanov's lips.

'What an arch-kiss, Manyasha!' Vanya teased her, twining himself about her like an ivy-branch.

They seated themselves at a table in the front room under the icons.

Gulping down samogon, Chmotanov kissed his lady-friend and said: 'Ah, Manyasha, we'll soon be living a new life . . .'

KRIVOKORYTOV toiled by the sweat of his brow. He lay through the first day with difficulty but then gradually became so adept and so immersed in concentration that he had to be woken up at closing time. The barely audible shuffle of the crowd soothed Krivokorytov; at first he had found the piercing gaze of thousands of eyes devouring those eternally precious features distressing, but then he had got his second wind. They had the idea of transmitting music over the radio. Robert lay there listening with pleasure to a slow tango. They kept a tireless watch too on the actor's ideological rectitude. 'Today I shall give a lecture,' Robert once heard the ingratiating voice, '. . . on why one ought not to believe in God.'

'All men are mortal,' said the earphones in sugary tones, 'and each one has to die. But not completely. Man is transformed into atoms and electrons, and they are imperishable. Immortal too is the cause of the proletariat, its dictatorship. In the long-decayed West people believe that it will gradually relax!' the lecturer announced in a confidential

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tone. 'That will never be! Dictatorship has been established once and for all and will gradually spread over the entire infinite universe. Lie quietly, Robert.'

At the request of some unseen person the journalists began to take an interest in him. Naturally, the enquiries they made and [the articles] they wrote concerned the official half of the activities of this venerable actor—in the theatre, at home, amongst his colleagues. Krivokorytov's fame spread. Envious persons circulated a rumour that he had been bribed by a certain firm.[13] Krivokorytov replied indignantly by quoting the poet's verses, written in an innovatory style, as proof of the contrary: 'Yes, I am won over. I am won over by the white birch trees. . . I am won over by the eyes of my sweetheart . . .' Envious persons jeered: 'Birch-tree!'[14] But in our age of rationalism which confuses arithmetic with poetry these verses won over [their listeners] by their sincerity of feeling.

One day in mid-March Krivokorytov woke up and took his bath. He decided to do a few exercises in front of the mirror, as was his wont as an actor. He looked at himself and gave a groan; upon his forehead had sprouted a huge, violet pimple. 'But I have to be lying there in three hours!' thought the agonized Robert.

Hastily he summoned his make-up assistant, who coped somehow with the problem. One might even have said that now the face of the admirer of the 'Appassionata' had been enriched with the seal of contemplation [as befitted] a great philosopher who had meditated not in concepts but in continents.

Krivokorytov did not appreciate his new trait, and even became upset. He walked along the secret underground passage in a terrible humour.

But when he lay down and the thousands of people began filing past, he was filled anew with a sense of the importance of his task, and he began to feel a little more benevolent.

Everything went well.

As the last stroke of midday died away Krivokorytov became aware of a discomfort in his left nostril. Gradually he realized the cause. A single unshaven hair was tickling his nose. Quietly but disastrously, his every breath hastening the catastrophe, Robert summoned up all his experience as a professional actor. Oh, if only he could scratch his nose. But after all, he had been in situations of this kind before. Robert recalled how he had had to burst into sobbing when the positive heroine in one play fell into a lavatory and drowned. And he had covered his face with his stage-prop-silk sleeve and transmuted his Homeric laughter into a touching lament.

The hair moved. Cities crumbled, women shrieked, governments fell, and the entire globe was engulfed in the flames of a new world war.

[13] A euphemism for the KGB, the Security Police.

[14] 'Beriozka' in Russian; an untranslatable double-pun on the Beriozka Dance Ensemble and 'Beriozka' foreign currency souvenir-shops in the USSR.

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The foxtrot went off the air.

'Hello, hello, Krivokorytov!' snapped the voice of the Chief of Security. 'What game d'you think you're playing?'

Krivokorytov strained with his actor's iron will.

'That's enough of your tricks!' thundered the Chief, and the moment of [Krivokorytov's] betrayal of the Fatherland drew inexorably nearer. Something in his head clouded over and he began to inflate like a frog. The earth shot out of its orbit and fell irrevocably onto the searing sun.

'Ah—tishoo!'

'I'll have you shot, you cur! Traitorous wretch! Fascist!' roared the Chief inside the false mummy's pillow. The actor realized that it was all over. With a howl he leaped up on to all fours and began hopping about and sobbing under the glass.

Hitting his head against the lid, Krivokorytov fell and split open the feather mattress with his heel; the crystal sepulchre became choked with eiderdown. The actor struggled inside his glassy cage like a goose in a plucking machine.

For an eternity the visitors stood in a daze. Some went out of their minds and broke into a dismal wail. The crowd rushed towards the sarcophagus.

'He is risen! He is risen indeed!'

'He's going to pass out!'

'Help!'

The wonderful news sped along the queue like an electric current. The popular masses surged into the crypt, pouring down the steps and trampling over the guards. In an instant the lid was torn off. To the accompaniment of the wailing and cackling of those afflicted by insanity. Krivokorytov got to his feet, gazing round like a hunted animal.

'He is risen!' they roared all around him, and wept, grasping at the flaps of his dark olive field-jacket.

Officer Shcholkin went pale and forced his way over to the telephone booth. He reported to the Secretary-General what had occurred and then, methodically glancing at his watch, shot himself.

The guards hidden beneath the blue fir-trees were alarmed at the noise and the running crowds.

'Must be a mutiny,' decided Major Razumny. He tried and tried to get through to Command. No one was answering the telephone. The Major's heart contracted in an awareness of his isolation. He assumed that the Kremlin had been captured, recalled his responsibility and issued an order:

'Company! Disperse the mutineers!'

There was a burst of machine-gun fire from under the fir-trees. They heard the shooting on the roof of GUM, on the Spassky tower and on the Pokrov Cathedral, and they answered Razumny with supporting fire. They struck with their large-bore guns, they fired their carbines and their sub-machine-guns from the ancient peepholes in the walls.

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THE Secretary-General wept like a child, snatched up the telephone and called in an armoured division from the outskirts [of the capital].

'A Pretender! . . .' he cried, wiping his eyes with his fist. 'Miserable wretch!'

Having succeeded in contacting Sleptsov, he set off at a run down the echoing corridor, summoning his comrades in the class struggle.

He tripped and fell on the carpet and ducked his head between his shoulders, convinced that a platoon of mutineers had rushed upon him from the rear. But the corridors were empty. He dashed up a staircase. He flung open the unobtrusive door to the conference chamber. He stood stock still, his eyes goggling: the Chiefs of Security and Arts were hanging by their belts from the window-catches.

'Help! Murder!' cried the Secretary-General, recoiling, and unable to take his eyes off the convulsively twitching legs of his confederates.

'SPEAK! Speak to us!' the crowd roared.

'If I tell them I'm here by accident, they'll kill me', flashed through Krivokorytov's brain. Slowly, as if in a dream, he raised his right hand and held it out over the crowd.

'Comrades!' the actor began (imitating Lenin's accent), 'Yes, I am risen. Perhaps it may appear nonsense, moonshine. But no, my resurrection in no way invalidates the teaching of Marx. I was frequently tormented in the other world by the thought of how much I had left uncompleted, how much I had failed to anticipate. As you know, the electron is imperishable. And the atom also. To avail oneself of all one's opportunities, to summon all one's strength—that is the task within the power only of him who is prepared to devote all his strength to the proletariat. And here I am amongst you, dear comrades. Together we will overcome all the difficulties, and all the bureaucrats!'

Krivokorytov concluded, and in the silence that had fallen they distinctly heard the sound of a shot.

'Some people are going to catch it now!' someone shouted hysterically. 'We shan't let our Ilyich be insulted!'

'Forward, comrades!' cried Krivokorytov jubilantly.

The crowd surged towards the exits.

Slipping back, the actor lifted the cover of the secret entrance. In his haste to descend, he missed his footing and disappeared with a thud into the dungeons. The echo of the heavy iron slab as it slammed shut reverberated for a long time above the Pretender as he lay there unconscious.

GENERAL GLUKHIKH[15] immediately guessed [the intention behind] General Sleptsov's[15] manoeuvre when the latter moved his tanks into the capital. 'Aha! So here's our junta, is it? Fool, you won't make it!' he thought; but just to be on the safe side he rang Sleptsov.

[15] Literally: General Deaf and General Blindman.

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'Looks as if you're on the move, Grigory Borisych?', he enquired in honeyed tones.

'S.G.'s orders', replied Sleptsov evasively.

'Well I wonder why I haven't had any orders!' Glukhikh giggled gleefully.

'Obviously it doesn't concern you . . .'

'Doesn't it? Well, good health to you, Grigory Borisych.'

Glukhikh moved up his flanks and attacked Sleptsov's division, closing in from the north-east and the south-west. There ensued heavy and exhausting fighting.

'Give me Peking! Peking!' the Secretary-General screamed into his white government telephone.

'I'm putting you through', answered the girl operator nonchalantly.

'Hello! Who's that?'

'Siao-siao? Fai tung fo?'

'It's me, Moscow! Feo sheng chin chi!'

'Who—linging?'

'Moscow, Secretary-General! Give me Chairman Mao!'

'Chairman—busy. Ling next week.'

'Impossible! I've got a revolution here!'

The receiver was silent. He could hear other conversations and arguments in Chinese.

'You got levolution?' came the response from Peking.

'Yes!'

'I am told to leply: serves you light.' And the line went dead.

'Traitors!' The Secretary-General was writhing with rage. 'Betrayed us, the lot of them! We're done for!'

He wrenched off the receiver and trampled the telephone underfoot. He rushed out.

'To Ulbricht!'—the blood hammered in his temples.

GROANING and yawning, Vanya Chmotanov awoke to find himself lying beside Manya on the hot feather mattress. The heat from the stove was terrible; his tongue was so parched by samogon that it barely moved in his mouth. He crawled out of bed and made his way barefoot into the passage. On the bench there stood, thoughtfully prepared, a bowl of ice-cold cucumber brine.

'Lovely!' croaked Vanya; he drank it at a gulp, and then clutched at his cheek. He was seized with a monstrous toothache.

His lady-friend got up and prepared the samovar.

'Manya', said Vanya, glancing round, 'where's my case?'

'Your case? Ah, I remember, I remember, I hid it . . . it's over there on the stove, go and look under the felt boots.'

'I forgot to tell you, Manya, to take it out into the cold instead. Let's hope it hasn't started to smell . . .'

'Why, what's in it then?'

'A souvenir, Manyasha, worth hundreds of billions.'

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Vanya climbed up on to the stove, and raked through the heap of homemade felt boots, and onion peelings. He jumped down with the case.

'Take a look, Manyasha.'

The zip was jammed. Vanya tugged and tugged. Manya watched expectantly. Finally she peeped in. And went numb. There, in the case, on the wadding, lay a skull. Vanya gazed dully at it. Manya crossed herself.

'Well, well . . .' Chmotanov uttered in a hoarse voice, 'So that's what ashes look like . . .'

The hairs had melted into a yellowish crust that covered the skull. In one socket there was an unpainted wooden eye. The china nose protruded pathetically like a teapot spout. Vanya pulled away a corrugated cardboard ear.

'For a relic . . . There's your billions, Manyushka . . .'

'Vanya!' said his lady-friend in alarm, 'have you been going poking about in graveyards?'

'Yes, a sacred relic.' He picked up the skull and idly turned it in his hands. In the back of the head he noticed a small, neat hole.

'How come? . . . I mean, they did shoot him, of course, but . . . well, not there . . .'

Vanya became agitated. His toothache worsened.

'Pour me a drop, Manyasha. What's going on here?'

Chmotanov downed his drink and sat for a long time pensively flicking open the skull's spring-attached jaw.

'A shady business, Manya, history is. It's beyond us, the whys and the wherefores.'

There came a knock at the door. Vanya hid the skull under the bedclothes and looked out of the window. Standing on the porch was his old crony Arkasha.

'Open up, Manya.'

The friends embraced and had a drink. There was a bitter taste in [Vanya's] mouth—no, it wasn't his mouth, it was his heart.

'Back to pickpocketing again', he was thinking despondently. But he paid attention to Arkasha's words.

'We'll get in through the garret, Vanya. I've had a look, one of the floorboards is loose—we take it up and—down we go. Don't worry, it's a cinch. And then off to the Caucasus. And a bit later we'll send for Manya.'

'We'll think it over, Arkasha. Pour us a drop, Manya.' He groaned. 'Oy, my tooth's killing me!'

'Let me bandage it with a kerchief', said Manya, fussing over him. 'Gargle with some spirit, it'll quieten down . . .'

The friends went off to survey the terrain—should they do the savings bank job now or not?

'Vanyushka!' Manya called after them. 'What shall I do with . . . the bones?'

'Oh!' Chmotanov waved his hand. 'Shove 'em on the fire.'

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Although it was a weekday, the streets of Golokolamsk were swarming with excited crowds. The police had retreated in a huddle into the police station, and were shouting feebly from afar:

'Go to your work and stop wagging your tongues!'

'And then 'e got up and 'e says: enough of oppressing the people! You got rid of a few bourgeois, 'e says, and now, 'e says, it's you who're round our necks.'

'Quite right, quite right. All ministers, he says, on to the shop-floor by tomorrow.'

'So he's risen, has he? But he didn't believe in God!'

'Fool? He's an afeist worth ten of your righteous men!' said the best carpenter in the town.

'Well, Tomka, so what happened next?'

'Well, then all the bosses beat it. They say the chiefs 've gone off to America in a tank.'

'What, over the sea?' said Bosyakov, a lecturer in the dissemination of knowledge, sceptically.

'They think of everything, don't you worry. And then 'e says: wages, 200 rubles for everyone, and 10 metres of material each, and everyone'll get an apartment. No tyranny, 'e says, over the population. And let there be NEP,[16] 'e says, completely.'

'And the conductor was saying that he's made some arrangement regardin' vodka.'

'First thing 'e did. The old money's back in again, 'e says, and 'alf a litre's goin' to cost five rubles. Fifty kopeks in new, that is.'

'Fantastic!'

'Then the military got together and rolled out their tanks on 'im. But there 'e goes, smiling. One wave of 'is 'and, and 'alf the tanks vanish—'e waves the other and one of the generals starts fighting the other. So 'ow about that!'

'And then what did he do?'

'Made his arrangements and set off across Russia to see 'ow the people live. "I shall return in a short time", 'e says, "and begin my work in earnest".'

'It is all gossip and hostile rumours', explained the lecturer Bosyakov. 'How can a mummy rise from the dead?'

'Who's a mummy?' babbled the old women. 'Here's a mummy for you! Deceiving the people—and look at 'is well-filled belly! When you go shopping you get your soap and your tinned food. You even go to Moscow for your coat, but we don't 'ave time, we go to work! You and your fine feathers! Just show your face 'ere and we'll find you some work!'

'Clear off, kid', said a peasant in a quilted jacket to the lecturer. 'Talk like that an' you'll get your teeth knocked out.'

'But what have I said?' asked the bewildered disseminator, adjust-

[16] NEP: New Economic Policy, introduced in the twenties in the Soviet Union.

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ing his muffler and deerskin cap. 'It is merely that by all the laws of physics such a thing cannot happen.'

'And what physics keeps sausages out of the shops?' the peasant persisted. '"I know it all, I know it all"', he mimicked him. 'What is there you don't know?'

A crowd had collected and was swarming around the lecturer, surreptitiously poking him in the ribs with their fists.

'Police!' the disseminator of knowledge uttered a harrowing cry. 'Murder!'

And that was how it all began.

A human caterpillar bore down upon the three terrified policemen. The forces of law and order turned deathly pale and took to the fields.

THE Chairman of the town soviet, Chlenikov,[17] his trembling fingers having difficulty in dialling, called up the [local] military unit.

'Who's speaking? Snegirev? Just the man I need. Send in a battalion—the devil only knows what's going on in the town.'

'I can't', said Snegirev, 'We're off to the bath-house.'

'Bath-house be damned! I've got an uprising!'

'So what?' said Snegirev with malicious delight. 'Remember when I asked you for a lorryload of wood, what was it you said to me, uh?'

'Snegirev! I shall lodge a complaint! I shall go to the obkom![18] I have no wood.'

'My soldiers are human beings too.'

'Snegirev, understand me, I haven't got any wood, I haven't got any! . . . Well, all right, I'll let you have two cubic metres!'

The cabinet door flew open with a bang, knocking Chlenikov to the floor.

Out of the windows of the executive committee-room came flying chairs and typewriters. Close behind, and raising a blinding white dust, came the Workers' Deputies. Two comrades who scampered off down a side-street in their underwear were gleefully identified as the chief of police and the first secretary of the town soviet.

Having dispersed the authorities, the inhabitants stormed into the shops. Vanya and Arkasha roared with laughter, delighting in the abolition of order: our friends had a fondness for anarchy.

Suddenly the crowd rushing past the 'headnapper' stopped in its tracks and stared at Vanya and Arkasha.

Both were alarmed.

The town gazed and saw the dear, immortal features of The One who had brought Russia to her feet.

'It's He!' shouted a primary school teacher hysterically. 'And his cheek's bandaged so the detectives won't catch up with him!'

There on the square in front of the general store they broke into a stormy ovation. There were shouts of: 'Ilyich is with us!'

[17] Literally: comrade Littleprick.
[18] Obkom: Regional (Party) committee.

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'Let's get out of here, Arkasha.'

'They'll lynch us, Vanya. Make a speech for appearances' sake.'

Vanya got up on to a beer barrel. He hadn't often had to make speeches, only twice, and they had been final pleas.

'Comrades!' he thundered in a mighty voice, 'Yes, I am risen. The time has come to put things in order . . .'

('Your rr's, Vanya, your rr's, they'll lynch you!' hissed Arkasha.)

'And put things in order we will. Our own working people's order. To the devil with the police and the procuracy! Down with the organs of investigation! We can live without jailers. And we *will* live without them, the parasites.'

'And are we going to close the sobering-up stations,[19] Vladimir Ilyich?'

'Of course!'

'And is vodka definitely going to be cheaper?'

'Fifty kopeks a bottle.'

'Hurrah!' yelled the crowd, causing jackdaws and pigeons to fly off in a fright.

And thus it was entered in the resolution drawn up by Arkasha.

A WEEK passed in celebrations. Vanya signed a vast number of decrees, each one more permissive than the last. A trio of local intellectuals sneaked in a decree on freedom of the press; Chmotanov dashed off his signature to it. [The paper] 'Golokolamskaya Pravda' began appearing under a new name 'Leninskaya Pravda' with a giant-sized announcement 'Ilyich is with us!' and an enormous portrait of Vanya Chmotanov.

They had eaten their way through a month's rations. The burden of power lay upon Vanya. The first supplicants came timidly knocking at his door.

'Er, Volodimer[20] Ilyich, would you be making arrangements so that there is some food? We are suffering from slight hardship. Some unbaked bread, tins . . . Could you be doing something regarding potatoes?'

Vanya opened up the Party supply[21] and fed the town for another week. Tobacco and vodka had run out. The hidden seeds of popular resentment began to ripen.

THE heavy fighting had exhausted Sleptsov and Glukhikh. The generals, equal in training, education and military strength, were

19 'vytrezvitel', or, as it appears here in popular or peasant form 'vytrezvilovka', is the sobering-up station to which drunks picked up by the police are taken. For a detailed account, see the article 'Alcoholism in the USSR' by David Powell in *Survey*, No. 78.

20 Volodimer: popular, 'uneducated' form of Vladimir.

21 'Partraspredelitel': one of the economic privileges at the disposal of some Party officials, civil servants, etc.: a special supply of foodstuffs and goods generally unavailable to the public.

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unable to overcome one another. Heroes were found in the divisions to hurl themselves under the enemy's tanks with grenades.

The forests were on fire. The local population turned partisan. Moscow was silent.

The generals threw their last reserves into battle.

THE bitterness and the anger were mounting in Vanya's heart.

'I went and stirred up his ashes and now he's taunting me', thought Chmotanov. 'Who could it be? Not Lenin, with that hole—Dzerzhinsky would never have allowed it . . . An unknown leader?'

Vanya tossed the remains of the ashes into his leather case and left his house without informing the guards.

The suitcase burned and tugged at his hand. He came out onto the market-place. Stalls, grain-tables . . . Two men came up to him, wild-eyed, their trembling fingers clutching crumpled one-ruble notes:

'Will you be third man?' [22]

'They haven't recognized me . . .'

Vanya nodded.

They drank from the bottle, sniffing crusts of bread [23] and spitting.

Vanya's boon companions livened up and grew more cheerful.

'Making a bit on the side?' grinned one of them, prodding the case with his finger.

'Open up, let's have a look', growled the other, reaching for the handle with his paw.

'Go to . . .!' Vanya snatched the case and made off along an unfamiliar street. The two men trailed after him, bawling threats.

Vanya hurried on, turning corners, and somehow came out into the open country. Telegraph poles stretched tree-like down the hillside, their wires humming. The two men were still at his heels. Over the firm crust of snow Vanya clambered, up the slope and down into a gully.

Vanya had only a dim recollection of what happened after that.

He went from one village to another. He glanced round continually, and there behind him someone was always following; Chmotanov floundered on. 'That was samogon we had, not vodka', he thought dully. 'What a swindle.'

Night was falling when Vanya found himself seated upon a hump of frozen earth. All around him, wooden crosses tilted crazily. At his feet [there was] a shallow pit, smouldering twigs. At the bottom of the pit—a rusty spade. Vanya stepped into the grave and began digging. At first it seemed to him that he had to dig for some treasure. But then he became aware that he was sitting beside the pit holding his loot from the metropolis in his hands.

'Poor devil, poor devil!' Chmotanov lamented. He knelt down; out

[22] A reference to the very common procedure of joint purchase of liquor (the cost of vodka, approx. three rubles, being prohibitively high for one person).

[23] A traditional accompaniment to hard drinking!

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of the corner of the grave another skull came rolling, and another, and another . . .

'And a hole in every one of 'em . . .' Vanya ascertained, examining the skulls in speechless amazement.

The metropolitan ashes were consigned to oblivion with the rest.

Over them all Vanya shovelled a little hillock of earth.

Then he went, kicking over the crosses, gesticulating wildly. The pale glow of evening faded on the horizon.

CHMOTANOV awoke to find himself in a small hut illuminated by a 15 candle-power bulb. A decrepit, bald-headed old man in a patched and re-patched waistcoat was standing beside a homemade bookshelf. The entire library consisted of 55 volumes with identical covers and a few ragged pamphlets with the letter 'yat' [24] in their titles.

'The return of the prodigal son!' said the little old man, pronouncing his rr's in a particular way. He dragged off Chmotanov's mud-spattered coat.

'Please do sit down, old chap. I'll put the tea on at once! Are you actually, by any chance . . . to a certain degree . . . a relative of mine? There is a superficial resemblance, and quite a strong one . . .'

Chmotanov goggled and made an effort to understand: 'Can't say his rr's and must be a hundred if he's a day.'

The old man was pottering about by the electric stove and muttering angrily:

'Fused again! Never mind, we'll mend it. But what hair-splitting—so many turbines built and power still at four kopeks a kilowatt. There's no pension large enough. And there's only one solution—illegal activities again.'

The old fellow deftly inserted a wire into the meter. The latter ceased to tick and the hotplate took on a crimson glow.

They sipped their tea. The old man rambled on about his friend Sashka [25] who lived in America and as always hadn't the faintest idea about world politics.

'Lives to a hundred, and doesn't learn a thing. Never did understand why they kicked him out of Russia.'

'What's he talking about?' thought Vanya, puzzled, and asked warily: 'And you, old fellow, what's your line?'

'I look after the graveyard—it suits me fine. Full pension and wages on top of it. In summer I earn a little extra guarding the hay in the meadow. That's something I've long been familiar with . . . You might say there are more important things. Fifty years or so ago I would have agreed with you, but now—spare me, old chap. Do you be drinking your tea or else it'll go cold. Well, and some fair troubles there were, my poor old health cracked up—panic all round, the doctors nagged at me, and

[24] *Yat* a letter in the Old Orthography abandoned after the revolution.
[25] A reference to Alexander Kerensky.

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I can't stand doctors. I'd always longed to go underground in Russia. And one fine morning I left my house. Just like Count Tolstoy. For a few years I lived incognito. I wrote, I thought . . . Unfortunately I can't show you any of it, it's not on the shelves—I keep it in a hiding-place. So. When I realized, it was too late: the comrades had already decided for me. My appearance would have been simply inappropriate. I spent my time looking after my health. I studied yoga, stopped reading the papers—something was going on around me that I couldn't make head or tail of . . . Sasha and I wrote to each other from time to time—we've known one another ever since high school. On the whole it's not worth thinking about, you can't bring back what's gone . . .'

Vanya's eyes were glued to the aged apparition . . . The head, the shoulders . . . excruciatingly familiar . . . The shadow stirred . . . The glass clinked prosaically in its saucer . . .

Vanya's hands started shaking with a nervous tic . . .

HE recovered consciousness to find himself in Manyasha's cottage, his forehead covered with a wet towel. He could recall only that he had gone, clutching and fingering sticks of wattle, and he had seen the sorcerer's sickle moon suspended in the sky, and a pair of green flames glittering in the blackness behind him, half dog's, half wolf's eyes . . .

THERE came a day when Vanya Chmotanov was awakened by a muffled murmuring and buzzing. He looked out of his window. The square was packed full with the inhabitants of Golokolamsk. They stood uncertainly, holding discussions and waiting for the leader to appear. It was 12 o'clock.

Chmotanov sensed that all was not well, and wondered whether he ought to call the police. He recalled with annoyance his rash and ill-considered liquidation of the organs of investigation.

'Vanyushka! What's going to happen?' said the frightened Manya, standing at the window in her linen nightgown.

Arkasha, the one and only commissar, ran in panting heavily.

'Vanka!' he shouted. 'Run for it! They're going to attack!'

'What do you mean?'

There was a sound of glass shattering at the far end of the conference chamber.

The murmuring of the crowd grew louder. Quickly Vanya pulled on his trousers. From the ground floor came the sound of mighty blows being aimed at the door.

'The time has come to talk with the people', said Vanya resolutely.

He stepped out on to the porch of the town soviet building. The crowd fell silent. So familiar was that dear image that they were ready to turn back and suffer.

'Comrades!' Chmotanov bleated. 'What brings you hither? Why

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are you not in your very own factories and plants? They belong to you —go to your work! '

'There's no fags! ' someone in the crowd whimpered incoherently.

'Not enough grub! ' bellowed the bass voice of a peasant woman in a dirty sheepskin.

'What do you mean—not enough? ' Vanya sternly inquired. 'Why, you mean you've gobbled it all up? '

The crowd heaved an affirmative sigh.

'There's no food, as you might say, Vladimir Ilyich! ' impudently shouted an engineer from the needle combine.

Vanya was at a loss. There was a lengthy silence.

'You ought to ring the centre and make them send a trainload! ' the woman advised him.

'Feed us, feed us! ' wailed the throng. 'There are five thousand of us, work a miracle so that there are still some provisions left! We are yours, we'll march on the capital if we have to.'

'Or don't you believe us? ' said the number one carpenter, elbowing his way forward. 'Why, for you I'd . . . cut off my hand! Want me to? '

'Cut it off! ' said Vanya fatuously.

The carpenter faltered, turned pale, and took out his axe.

'Comrades! ' he said, 'See, for dear Ilyich I shall not spare my own hand! . . .'

There was a hush. The carpenter walked up on to the porch and spat on his palm. He placed his right hand over the porch railing. Then he thought a while and substituted his left. The master carpenter raised the flashing blade high above his head and—thwack!—swung a blow. He missed.

The crowd, uncomprehending, broke into a muttering and cowered. The carpenter collapsed unconscious.

'Have you ever seen the like? Maiming people! ' the women began to wail, and most dreadful of all was the shrieking of Polina, the carpenter's beautiful wife.

'Oi, what a craftsman he was! Oi, how will he earn his living now? Oi, the wretched man won't be able to knock together a coffin! '

'It really is very odd, comrade chief ', remarked a strapping fellow in a track-suit. 'There you were lying in your rightful place, and now you suddenly turn up in our town and bring trouble to the people . . .'

A window in the house opposite the town soviet flew open with a bang and the disseminator [of knowledge], Bosyakov, thrust his head and shoulders out.

'Long live Lenin! ' he proclaimed to the entire square.

'Scum! ' yelled voices in the crowd. An accurately aimed clod of frozen earth struck the forehead of Bosyakov. He fell back with a howl into the house.

'And I'm inclined to think that . . . if . . .' began the sportsman, and then, leaving his intentions unstated, he punched Vanya in the ear. People in the crowd crossed themselves.

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Vanya's ears were filled with pealing bells.

'. . . my ear? ' the Pretender's consciousness registered with some delay. Instinctively he swerved to avoid the second blow, and the lad's fist went flying into a two-metre-high oaken post that supported the roof of the porch. It twanged like a string and flew out of its slots.

The porch came down with a roar and buried Chmotanov. The audience was shaken into sobriety.

'Eh, they set a cuckoo to catch a hawk! ' the inhabitants of Golokolamsk wept, rushing up to clear the rubble. Vanya was dragged out half-suffocating and blue in the face. They gave him artificial respiration. Some loaders from the railway station treated the sportsman to a thorough cudgelling.

Lecturer Bosyakov appeared in the doorway of his new Finnish cottage, holding on to the doorpost, his head in bandages.

'I told you', he began querulously, 'there cannot be any resurrection: physics, Party and government teach us . . .'

'And we'll teach you! ' roared the inhabitants of Golokolamsk. They fell upon Bosyakov and trampled him underfoot.

Chmotanov gave a moan and slumped. They bore him away in their arms.

They went, grim-faced.

THE two agents who had been dropped that night onto a marsh outside the town woke up, consumed their breakfast calorie ration, rolled up their inflatable mattresses and set off for the town.

'Buratino', said one of the agents to his comrade walking at his side. 'Zvezda calling. How are you receiving me? Over.'

'Fine', said Buratino.

'There's a gathering of the popular masses on the road ahead. What is it? Over.'

'They're carrying someone', said Buratino.

'Let's check. Over.'

'We'll go and have a look, certainly.'

The agents strode over the snowy field in their white synthetic jackets.

They walked towards the oncoming procession. Zvezda went in front as arranged.

'Burying someone? ' Buratino whispered to a peasant woman who was staring spellbound at the agent's imported uniform.

'Where did you get it? ' she asked, also in a whisper, fingering the material.

'What? '

The woman's eyes blazed with a demoniac fire: 'Did you have it made or get it like that? '

'Oh! ' the agent waved his hand. 'We get them at work, they're special work-clothes.'

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'Are they indeed!' the woman sneered. 'They give us work-clothes too, [just] padded jackets, it's a disgrace, that's what it is!'

'And where are all these workers, peasants and working intelligentsia going?'

'Why, Lenin turned up here in Golokolamsk and got trodden on in the heat of the moment. We're taking him to hospital.'

'Lenin?' said Buratino agitatedly.

'Yes, Lenin. Why?'

The agent elbowed his way forward. The woman seized hold of him and pulled at him from behind: 'D'you get your coats cut-price or are they expensive?'

'Let go of me!'

It was true: there, in the arms of the members of the local [trade-union] committee of the Pavlik Morozov Needle Combine, lay Lenin.

'Zvezda, Buratino calling!' the agent whispered hoarsely into a miniature microphone sewn into his handkerchief. 'I'm on target, on target! Are you receiving me? Over.'

'Receiving you perfectly!' blared the hat on Buratino's head. Cursing, he tore off the hat and frantically fumbled with it in his hands, twiddling the volume control.

Zvezda loomed up along the road in front of him.

'Call in the transport, mate, we're taking him!'

'O.K.!' bellowed the hat.

Leaving the road, Zvezda threw himself down into the snow below the embankment and whipped a small antenna out of his stomach.

Buratino clicked the catch of the 12-bore colt in his pocket and walked on behind the local committee, devouring Vanya with his gaze.

'The spitting image. Where on earth could he have sprung from?' thought the agent joyfully.

With the keen eye of a professional he noticed a dragonfly hovering, almost motionless, on the horizon.

'Comrades!' Buratino ran out in front and halted the procession. 'Your excellency the working class! Will we manage to get comrade Lenin [to the hospital in time]? Let us call for first aid! The leader of the proletarian revolution is in peril!'

There was a drone of engines in the sky. Buratino waved his handkerchief.

Zvezda fired a rocket flare. Slowly the helicopter descended. The inhabitants of Golokolamsk gazed in wonder at the transport of the future. A rope ladder was thrown out. Jumping up and perching on one of the rungs. Zvezda was carried over to the local committee-members. His feet gripping the ladder, the agent leaned down and put his arms around Vanya's waist.

At this juncture the inhabitants of Golokolamsk caught sight of [an inscription] on the helicopter's pale green undercarriage—in foreign letters: UdSSR.

'Spies!' shrieked the committee vice-chairman Barashkov at the

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top of his voice (the actual chairman was lying trembling in his office in a drawer full of drawing pins). He leapt up and grabbed Chmotanov by his boots. Four of the trade unionists seized the vice-chairman, and to the last of them clung Buratino.

'Help!' yelled Chmotanov.

'Ignorant louts!' screeched the lecturer Bosyakov, springing out of the crowd. 'Man differs from the atom in this respect, and only in this respect: he is indivisible!' In a trice they had trampled him underfoot.

Buratino did not lose his presence of mind. Up the human ladder he climbed, using against the local committee members the world-famous Chinese wrestling techniques.

Chmotanov and the agents hung on to the ladder dangling high in the air. Vice-chairman Barashkov fell off and hit the ground heavily. Whizzing down after him came one of Chmotanov's boots.

Aggeich, the town storekeeper, snatched from his shoulder the double-barrelled gun he always carried with him and took aim at the helicopter's bulging undercarriage.

'Shoot, Aggeich! They'll fly off, shoot, for Christ's sake!' yelled the weaponless chairman of DOSAAF [26] down into his ear.

'I've got salt in one barrel and peas in the other!' moaned Aggeich like an old woman, still glued to his butt.

'Hurry up, will you! Fire!' ordered the chairman, turning pale and dashing his hand through the air.

Aggeich pressed the trigger.

A shot rang out. The helicopter spun round in the sky. The rope ladder broke, bodies came hurtling down and—

The efficient waiters from the 'Wayside' restaurant caught Vanya Chmotanov in the tautly stretched cloth of [their] Red Challenge Banner.

'Fire!' the DOSAAF chairman thrashed the air once more and the storekeeper Aggeich sent a pea flying into the helicopter's motors.

The machine plunged to the ground. There was a deafening explosion. The heap of splintered wood by the roadside went up in flames.

'F— their mothers!' hissed the chairman. 'That'll teach'em to steal Lenin!'

The crowd clustered round the valiant anti-aircraft gunners. They shook their hands and tried to throw them into the air. Aggeich proudly twirled his moustache and cried: 'We're your boys!'

The foreign vulture burned low in the field.

Stern-faced and 'standing' to attention Vanya Chmotanov lay on the crimson cloth. The people pressed in closer and closer to him, grasping at the hem of the banner. The fallen boot was placed carefully by Vanya's side.

Barashkov started applying snow to his swollen nose.

[26] DOSAAF: *Dobrovolnoye Obshchestvo sodeistviya armii, aviatsii i flotu:* Voluntary society for army, airforce and naval assistance.

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'All right, let's go back', he said. 'It didn't work. The rogues miscalculated. Let us be more vigilant in future.'

'Our own dear protector!' intoned a woman in a peasant jacket, stretching out her hands to Vanya. 'Lead us! We will endure cold and hunger, only don't be angry with us, and grow well quickly!'

Vanya recovered his senses, smiled feebly and, struggling to overcome a monstrous headache, saluted.

'ARKADY', said Chmotanov, 'it's time I quit. Find an engine-driver at the station and tell him he has to drive to Razliv. Or whatever you like. But get an engine. I'm leaving tonight.'

'And I?' Arkasha said wistfully.

'You'll remain here as Commissar Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary! Shall I write you a mandate?'

'We can spill blood in the right quarters without a mandate', *Arkasha laughed scornfully, squaring his shoulders.* 'I'll *give it to them* good and proper—I'll let them know who they've lost. Do you want me to give a speech for a send-off? "In leaving us, comrade Lenin ordained us . . ."'[27]

'Stop playing the fool!' said Vanya, frowning. 'It's like delaying death. Get to work on the engine.'

AT the dead of night an engine moved silently, mouselike, out of a siding in Golokolamsk-I station. And although the whole thing was carried out incognito, the historic event did not pass without witnesses. In their dyed sheepskin jackets, headscarves, and felt boots they thronged around the locomotive as it spurted white steam. Dry snowflakes were falling; the station searchlights shone dazzlingly from an unseen mast.

Old Stakashkin the engine-driver pulled the reverse handle and the town lights slowly receded. Chmotanov, unable to restrain himself, looked out, cap in hand.

They recognized him at once. Someone gave a strangled cry: 'Long live . . .' but they knocked him over and smothered him under a sheepskin. People clapped silently. A correspondent of the paper 'Leninskaya Pravda' scratched away frantically with a dud ballpoint in his miniature notebook. Alongside the footplate of the engine as it gathered speed ran the primary school teacher, her tearstained face straining upward as she devoured for eternity the beloved features of the leader.

Chmotanov was touched by this spontaneous display of feeling. He realized he must do something now, this minute, for this woman, make her happy for the rest of her life . . . The keen wind cut Chmotanov's face and brought tears to his eyes. He fingered the heavy packet of money from the Golokolamsk savings bank in his bosom, but

[27] A quotation—all too familiar to the Soviet reader—from Stalin's oath of allegiance to Lenin, read at the Second Congress of the Soviets on 26 January 1924, five days after Lenin's death.

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was immediately aware of a stabbing pain in the very depths of his soul: 'No, that's not quite the thing . . .' He leaned out of the window and, gazing into the eyes of the panting schoolmistress who had dropped behind by now, he shouted:

'Here, take it!' And he tossed his historic cap into her outstretched hands.

The engine clattered over the points, became enveloped in steam and vanished into the distance.

'YOU'RE holding the shovel wrong, mate . . .' engine-driver Stakashkin started to say, but he stopped short. 'Forgive me, Vladimir Ilyich . . .'

'Nikolai Ivanovich', Chmotanov gently corrected him. 'My name is Nikolai Ivanovich now. That's how it has to be', he explained, noticing that Stakashkin was scratching the back of his head.

'Well if it has to be then it has to be', the engine-driver agreed good-humouredly. 'There's only one thing I don't understand: how will we get to Razliv? I looked on the map and I couldn't find it . . .'

'We'll get there, dear comrade, we'll get there for sure', Chmotanov reassured him, remembering that he must pronounce his rr's in the right way.

'And what are you going to be doing there, comrade Lenin? Writing a book again?' asked the youthful assistant to the engine-driver, the whites of his eyes gleaming with excitement.

'I've certainly landed a well-informed crew, dammit! Looks like they haven't missed a single political class', thought Chmotanov, entering into the spirit of his role [thinking in Lenin's accent].

'You mind your own business, Garka', Stakashkin cut him off. 'Keep your eyes out in front and hold your tongue.'

'I haven't got much business', Garka muttered sheepishly. 'Whether I look or not there's never anyone—the trains haven't been running for a week'.

The flickering beam of the engine-lamp picked out of the gloom the silver strips of rail that disappeared into the white haze.

At the 101st kilometre Stakashkin halted the engine.

'UH? What? Where are we?' Chmotanov, who had dozed off on the footplate gazed about only half-awake. Snow was falling more and more thickly. Stakashkin picked up a crowbar and went out and off into the blackness.

In the open tender the coal glowed brightly.

'The old man's godfather lives here, he's a linesman', explained Garka, observing the passenger's uneasiness. 'We always have a glass of tea at his place, and sometimes we eat too. It's convenient, there's a siding here. They say we're soon to be transferred to an electric loco—I don't know what we'll do then . . . We'll have to fix up cables ourselves

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along the siding or we shan't be able to turn off the main track and there'll be no grub.'

'But why the crowbar?' Chmotanov asked suspiciously.

'To switch the points, of course', said Garka, lighting his cigarette from the coals. 'There used to be a lever here like there is everywhere else, but the inspectors swooped and unscrewed it so that we shouldn't indulge ourselves. We'll spend the night here and press on [tomorrow]. There's no timetable, the signals aren't working, you never know what may happen—we might ram into someone on a bend.'

'Scatterbrained and corrupt, and not a flicker of enthusiasm for his work', thought Vanya, outraged, but he kept silent.

IT was warm and peaceful in the linesman's cottage. The clock ticked away cosily. Outside, snow was falling thickly in soft, wet flakes.

Chmotanov was accommodated on a hot, dry mattress on the stove.

'No, I don't like the look of these engine-drivers at all. I'm willing to bet they'll land up in some sort of trouble and get me into it too. What a gang Arkady [picked]. Settling down here on the line and living their lives oblivious of the fact that the locomotive of history is speeding along it. Well, to hell with history, I must get out of here—and get the money out too. Whew, I nearly threw it away to that idiot woman. She doesn't need anything now, she's completely satisfied. But I'm still not. We'll take action.'

'GOOD morning, children!' the radio awakened him. 'Young Pioneers' breakfast show!'

It blared out a fanfare.

By now wide awake, Vanya stared at the ceiling trying to recollect [what had happened]. Golokolamsk, the anarchy among the popular masses, the cemetery, the engine-ride . . . oh, and the money!

The packet was still in its place under his pillow.

The radio was living a life of its own.

In his hosts' room he could hear a samovar hissing.

Vanya dressed himself, opened the door, and stopped short.

Seated at the table was an elderly policeman with junior lieutenant's stripes. He was blowing through his pursed-up lips on to a saucer of tea. On the table lay a battered black holster . . .

The company sat with dispassionate countenances. The driver had buried his face in his cup. Garka, and the master of the house in his cotton shirt, were listening earnestly to the policeman.

'I've been out almost the whole night. It's a big area, and there are dozens of bald-headed men with high cheek-bones here. Look, here's the search warrant.'

The policeman unfastened his holster. A reel of thread came rolling out of it and down onto the floor fell buttons ('Why women's?' Vanya wondered inappositely), a bottle of acidol and 150 grammes of cheap

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pale green caramels. The constable was visibly embarrassed at the sight of the sweets: 'I'd quite forgotten . . . have some, lads . . .'

He looked round in confusion. In the doorway stood Vanya Chmotanov. The policeman fixed his expert eyes on Chmotanov's face; slowly they turned blood-red.

'Citizen!' he called out in his official voice, 'step this way!'

'That's our guest, Nikolai Ivanovich', the host explained eagerly. 'Let me introduce you, Erofey Kuzmich . . .'

'I'm not Erofey Kuzmich', snapped the policeman. 'I am constable Usyakin!'

'Come with me, citizen!' he motioned with his head to Chmotanov, buckling his holster round his waist.

HAVING lost his personal aides, General Glukhikh struggled on through a thicket. Coming upon a clearing where the snow had melted, he collapsed famished and exhausted. Suddenly he heard the sound of swearing in the wood. Glukhikh raised his head and listened, straining his ears. At the opposite end of the clearing stood Sleptsov, wiping the mud from his tunic. Glukhikh felt a slowly rising tide of noble wrath. Sleptsov had come out into a patch of sunlight and lay stretched voluptuously. Glukhikh could contain himself no longer. With a fearful grunt he rushed at his opponent, stumbling on his little legs and thrusting out his powerful forehead like a wild boar charging at a hunter.

Sleptsov recognized his infamous rival in a trice. His small slit eyes glittered like Golem's. When Glukhikh, grunting, rammed his head into the stomach of the dictator manqué, Sleptsov dealt the betrayer's fleshy neck a mighty blow. They leapt apart.

'So you wanted to fix up a junta, Grigory Borisych?' screeched Glukhikh.

'Traitor!' Sleptsov snarled.

They came together again. Growling like two bears they moved back and forth over the glade, locked in each other's arms, tripped, and went flying . . . Sleptsov tore open the traitor's collar and sank his fangs deliciously into the sinewy neck. His adversary squirmed beneath him and struggled to extract a Finnish dagger from his pocket.

Sleptsov's fangs had gradually closed together when the right hand of Glukhikh, acting of its own accord, plunged the savage steel up to the hilt in the mutinous general's back.

ON the platform of the Palace of Congresses a somewhat depleted Presidium sat solemnly in state. The hall, equipped to the last word in technology, was filled with 1,000 people. Their resemblance to one another led one to imagine the gargantuan bed that had managed to engender so many offspring so appallingly alike. Sitting in the hall

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with their red notepads were Uzbeks and Turkmens, Kazakhs and Russians, Azerbaidzhanis and Birobidzhanis.[28]

It was a Lenin forum.

One of the delegates, number 666, was Vanya Chmotanov.

IN the silent capital, subdued by the thunder of the six-day war between Sleptsov and Glukhikh, and by the curfew [that had been imposed], rumour was rife. [The rumour of] a resurrection, however, was thought by the citizens to be slightly unwarranted. A version spread like wildfire that the remains had to all appearances been sold abroad for foreign currency.

'Why not?' the inhabitants argued. 'Do we sell gas? We do. Oil? Wood? Caviar? Vodka? Furs? Paintings? Icons? Old manuscripts? Books? Films? Novels?'

'Why not, indeed?'

'What are you saying, Pyotr Khristoforovich! It's a sacred relic. The emblem of the nation.'

'Ho-ho, Pal Palych, look what things have come to, ho-ho . . .'

The Mausoleum had lost its tenant. Naturally, the fact was greeted with an official silence.

'COMRADES! Brothers and sisters! I am appealing to you, my friends!' began the Secretary-General. '[The day of] the great celebration is drawing near. We must approach it, as always, and [approach it] unanimously. We are eternally grateful to that great and genial, but at the same time that most ordinary man. He is the most ordinary genius of all time and all peoples. The light of His ideas, on the one hand, has illumined all continents and, on the other hand, has eclipsed all other ideas. All of us must be fully cognizant of this. If he had not lived, where would we be today? I myself would be working as a common navvy. It is thanks to His new ideas that I acquired all that I have now. We see before our very eyes the all-conquering power of His teaching, because it is true.'

'And here we are on the eve of the greatest holiday on earth. It will be observed by all peoples. One might say that if one were to take any other man, even one who has handed his name down to posterity, he would be nothing but a bed-bug in comparison with Him, you couldn't make him out with a telescope. All of us must be fully cognizant of this. You are faced, comrades, with an important and indispensable task, and that is, to find, here in this room, the man whom nature has made in the likeness of Him, as like as two peas. He must be an ideologically mature comrade and of crystalline morals. Yes indeed, comrades, He has a tough job to do.'

[28] Birobidzhan is the Soviet attempt to create an Israel within its own territory, a supposedly Autonomous Jewish Region with Jewish cultural facilities. One of the rumours circulating in Leningrad following the recent arrests of Jews and the trial of the alleged hi-jackers was of a mass deportation to this Region.

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The delegates and experts broke into stormy applause. The hall literally burst into the song 'Lenin is in you and me'.

In the interval there was a rush to the buffet. In a flash, satchels, briefcases and bags were stuffed with a variety of edibles. Many of the delegates introduced themselves to one another and made friends.

'And where are you from?' a reddish-haired balding delegate with Tatar eyes enquired of a greyish-haired balding delegate with a pointed beard.

'I'm from the Urals, I am. One day I got my call-up papers from the recruitment centre [to come] with my things. My old woman got the wind up, it's war with the Chinese, she says. Never mind, I says. Anyway, there was no war—they brought me here in a plane. They're going to try me, I thought. Well, how are things in your part of the world?'

'Short of meat.'

'It's saucepans with us.'

'Well we're short of vodka too.'

'That's nothing! We haven't even got any wine, we're making our own.'

'You just try buying a pair of boots down our way.'

'Boots! I've been going the whole winter in this cap, can't find a hat for love or money.'

'Hats! You go and try getting potatoes in our place!'

'Potatoes. Huh! We had a burst water-pipe and it took 'em three months to melt the snow.'

The third bell rang. By the hall doors experts stood watching. Gently they stopped the clearly unsuitable [candidates] and signalled to their comrades in plain clothes.

There was a wailing in the lobby. Provisions were mercilessly shaken out of bags and briefcases and returned to the buffet. Outside the Palace limousines stood revving up. The candidates judged unfit were driven off to railway stations and airports, after being presented with three rubles and a ticket home.

The Lenin from the Urals expressed violent indignation when they relieved him of his hat, his boots and seven kilogrammes of sausage. The more astute Ilyiches carried their food out under their clothing

Altogether only 200 survived the selection procedure.

One at a time they were led into a room where a committee sat chaired by Academician Zbarsky. Doctors, artists and old Bolsheviks had been invited. If the candidate was unsuitable (that is, if he scored less than 20 marks) the chairman raised a small red flag; the candidate was escorted out into a corridor on the right. In the case of a favourable result [he was taken] up a staircase to the left.

At last they brought in Vanya Chmotanov.

'A beautiful specimen!' whispered Professor Sukhin in a loud voice.

'Uncommonly so', agreed Doctor Lunts.[29]

[29] Doctor (in reality Professor) Lunts is the head of Moscow's Serbsky Institute of Forensic Psychiatry. Lunts is notorious for his active involvement in the 'diagnosis'

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'A jewel!' chimed in the painter Trezorkin.

'And what is your opinion, Maria Konspiratovna?' Sukhin enquired of Prolezhnyova, an old Bolshevik.

'The very image of Vladimir Ilyich!' said the old lady, raising her lorgnette to her nose.

'It's he. And that reminds me. . . . Ah, I was young then and a handsome cavalry captain was courting me. . . . I've forgotten his name. . . . You know what they were like in the old days, with a moustache and a sabre. And once in the Mariinsky theatre, just imagine it, the stage was lit up and the auditorium was in darkness. And I was sitting with him in a box . . .'

Zbarsky leaned over to Prolezhnyova and whispered something in her ear.

'Yes, yes, of course', Maria Konspiratovna recollected herself. 'And so I decided that I simply must meet Ulyanov, come what may. I left for Paris. I came there and they told me: Tulin's in Paris. Tulin was Vladimir Ilyich's code-name. I went to Paris, I was terribly excited but they told me: he's in Baden-Baden. I boarded a train and went to Baden-Baden . . . alas! He's in Geneva, they said. I left for Geneva immediately on the night express. I went to the socialists' club and there coming out of it I met a wonderful man with a moustache, and it was my cavalry captain, the very same! I said: hallo! And all the passwords, of course, in the proper order. He questioned me about the mood in Russia, the life of the proletariat. We had a marvellous talk. And he saw me to my hotel, a real gentleman! We said farewell, he kissed my hand—oh, it was wonderful, wonderful—and I said to him: "Goodbye, Vladimir Ilyich." And he laughed and said: "I'm Krasin." "What?" I said. "I assume you mean Vladimir Ilyich?" "Yes!" "But he's in London at present." Can you imagine? I hadn't enough money left to go to London so I had to come back to Petersburg.'

'So you never met Vladimir Ilyich?' asked Zbarsky with annoyance.

'I regret to say so, but I never had occasion.'

Lunts ground his teeth.

'Next!' shouted Zbarsky, and following Chmotanov with his gaze he remarked: 'I doubt whether we will come across a finer specimen.'

The committee had rejected about 10 people when a thickset, broad-shouldered man entered, hand thrust in pocket—Toktobolot Abdomomunov.

'He's the one, he's the one . . .' there was a rustling amongst the committee members. Yes, it was Himself incarnate. The slanting eyes gazed shrewdly. The small wedgelike beard bristled.

'Could be make-up', thought Zbarsky and asked on an impulse: 'Would you like to have a wash?'

and 'treatment' of 'mentally disturbed' political dissenters (for instance, the poetess Natalya Gorbanevskaya, now in a mental asylum. For a revealing and detailed account of Lunts' 'medical findings' in her case see issue No. 15 of *Chronicle of Current Events*, the Soviet clandestine publication).

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'Vat for? I am qvite clean', answered Toktobolot, smiling a broad, Leninian smile.

'Your mandate?' said Sukhin kindly.

Abdomomunov's mandate was No. 317. He scored 40 marks.

'Very good, Toktobolot. You should have been born a hundred years earlier. We still don't know which of you could be Lenin . . .' said Zbarsky to candidate No. 1.

. . . In a blank, windowless room with a locked door, seven Lenins had collected.

'I don't like it, boys. We're in jail.' Chmotanov broke the silence.

'Hardly! We've got enough grub to last a month.'

'They'll probably take us to the authorities . . .'

The door flew open. In came the white-coated doctors.

'Comrades. We are giving you a short medical examination. Strip, all of you', Doctor Lunts ordered in a low voice.

'Completely?' asked Chmotanov sullenly. 'So that's it', he thought furiously, 'they're going to frisk us'.

'Yes. Be quick.'

Naked, the replicas of the leader stood before the doctors.

They measured their height. They weighed them. They sounded them.

'Have any heart trouble?' Sukhin jovially enquired of No. 317.

'A leetle', answered Toktobolot.

'Nothing to worry about, nothing to worry about', the doctor reassured him.

'No. 666! Kindly bend down. That's right. Now . . .'

But Chmotanov anticipated the command and spread his buttocks thinking: 'Squat!' [30]

Doctor Lunts peered intently into the hairy darkness and made a note in his log-book.

'Next!'

The doctors examined all the candidates and left with a wealth of empirical material.

EACH member of the elimination committee had been given seven cards, with the names of the candidates, and instructed to mark the appropriate card with a cross.

In the presence of an inspection committee the ballot-urns were opened and the result declared.

Five of them had scored one cross each. Chmotanov had collected three. Abdomomunov had 37. The competition for the vacancy had reached its conclusion.

[30] The author of this work is obviously familiar with prison admission routine and possibly with the excellent description by Solzhenitsyn of Innokenty Volodin's admission to the Lubyanka (see *The First Circle*, chapter 83).

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A MULTITUDE of guests was gathered in the banqueting-hall. The government, the committee members, the seven candidates, representatives of public opinion . . .

Many toasts were proposed. Great quantities were eaten. Lackeys scurried hither and thither.

A SEPARATE tray with seven glasses stood in the kitchen.

Doctor Lunts came in accompanied by an assistant, carrying a small portmanteau.

'Be so good as to fill these glasses up with champagne', Lunts ordered the butler.

'Yes, sir, at once, sir.'

The golden wine sparkled as it poured out of the thick-lipped bottles.

An agent entered disguised as a waiter.

Doctor Lunts opened his portmanteau and took out a wide-necked phial of orange glass with a ground stopper. Donning his rubber gloves, he extracted with a pair of tweezers a translucent crystal.

The tweezers hovered for a split second . . . and let the substance fall into the glasses. It dissolved into strings of bubbles like [the petals of] a lily. The crystal vanished. Streams of vinous gas rose from the bottoms of the glasses. It was impossible to tell the difference.

'Young man, have you memorized which is the right one?' the doctor asked the agent, giving a short laugh.

'Yes, sir! Second on the right going clockwise.'

'Lead on, Maestro!' said the white-gowned doctor smilingly to the agent, indicating the tray.

A dapper young waiter appeared in the doorway to the banqueting-hall. Academician Zbarsky became animated.

'Dear comrades! Allow me to propose a toast to Him whose name lives in perpetuity!'

Corks popped. Elegantly manoeuvring his way, the waiter came towards the cluster of candidates. In the plush surroundings of the Palace they had been feeling somewhat ill at ease.

'Please take one!'

They each took a glass. Chmotanov was gloomily smoking.

'And you?'

'I only drink the hard stuff', said Vanya. 'I can't take this.'

'Damn you! Just what we needed, you cur!' The agent cursed mentally but smiled [and said]:

'But you would be offending us. . . . Try it . . . it's from the finest cellars of friendly France. And anyway . . . it's a special toast. To Lenin!'

Chmotanov stubbed out his cigarette and downed the champagne at a single draught.

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IT was late at night when they staggered off to sleep, still in the Palace. The doctors had drunk almost nothing and were gathered in the observation cubicle.

'I think Abdomomunov is ready already. Let's wait another half-hour just to make sure', remarked Doctor Lunts, trimming a hangnail on one of his exquisite nails.

At five o'clock that morning a party of six white-coated adult males walked single file along the dimly lit corridor.

'Here he is', said Zbarsky languorously, pushing the door. It was locked. Doctor Lunts whipped out his master keys and in a trice had the lock open. With a disagreeable sensation the doctors switched on the light in the anteroom. There, sprawled out on the divan, lay Kapa, the charwoman for that floor.

'What the hell!' Sukhin whispered.

'Quiet!' said Lunts, squeezing his hand.

Alongside Kapa, beneath the blankets, they could see the shape of another person.

'Poor wretch. It's just as if he sensed it and hurried to taste his final joys', whispered Zbarsky with affectionate tenderness.

'But think of the poor woman. Waking up suddenly beside a corpse', said Sukhin.

'Yes, death in one's bed. A terrible thing', agreed Lunts.

The doctors approached the bed and carefully raised the blanket. Lying with his face buried in the pillow and his legs planted incongruously apart was No. 317, Toktobolot Abdomomunov.

'Seize him!' Zbarsky gave the order.

With feverish hands the experts seized the corpse and made off. In the semi-darkness they clumsily banged its head against a cupboard.

At that moment the corpse came alive in their arms and broke loose. The white-gowned doctors, who never lost their presence of mind, began cursing at the tops of their voices. The experts staggered and fell upon Toktobolot from above in a seething scrum.

'Provocation!' cried smothered voices.

The first to crawl out was Toktobolot Abdomomunov, stark naked. He stared in horror at the disorderly mêlée. Academician Zbarsky, moaning and clutching his sides, emerged from the litter of luminaries. Kapa the cleaning woman dived naked under the bed in a panic. No. 317, clutching his heart, took refuge there too.

'What is the meaning of this, esteemed colleague Lunts?' Sukhin demanded of Lunts in venomous tones when the doctors had straightened their dress and got to their feet.

Lunts stood in dispirited silence.

'Answer me, Lunts!' said Zbarsky insidiously. 'Sabotage, eh? Wanted to go on trial, did you? We'll have you put away in that nice little institute of yours!'[31]

[31] See note 29, the Serbsky Institute of Forensic Psychiatry.

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'What are you saying . . . for God's sake! . . .' Lunts' face turned green. 'I prescribed a real sublimate . . . I am pledged . . . to fulfil . . . to exceed . . .'

White-coated Lunts fell on to his knees and stretched out his arms imploringly to his colleagues. Nothing could save him.

O smiling fortune! How often, having robbed man of his last hope, you grant him salvation!

There came a hideous, hollow cry from behind the wall. The slow but potent poison had finally triumphed over the iron organism of Vanya Chmotanov.

ON 22 April at precisely 11 o'clock the Mausoleum opened to the public. Thousands of people, both the uninitiated and those who had got wind of the incredible rumour, flocked in their boots and shoes, with galoshes and without galoshes, to Red Square.

He lay on the pillows. All the parts of His body were present and correct.

Ushered along by the guards, now in higher spirits, the people filed past and tried to linger a few seconds longer in order to engrave eternally upon their memories the dear features of that most humane, that most ordinary and most genial of men, the features of—Vanya Chmotanov.

THAT evening a salute was fired. There was dancing in Moscow. There was singing and dancing in all the cities of the world. Barrels of free beer careered along the former Tverskoy [32] [Boulevard]. In the squares trays of free sandwiches stood in piles.

The entire globe rejoiced.

Stop. Here we stray into fantasies inadmissible as historical evidence; for I hold my honest, untarnished name dearest of all.

Author's Postscript

It is probable that admirers of my work, aware that I have long since equated the pen with the rifle, will find this piece unusual and out of the ordinary. 'What are these fantasies?' the reader will ask. 'Instead of his former clarity of purpose, there is utter confusion and even obscurity of intention.'

Well, here is what happened to me.

During the night of 1 February of this year, I woke up and was unable to sleep for a long time. My heart was causing me pain. Even before, an obscure feeling had been hindering me from writing. Now it was even hindering my sleep. I switched on the light and took my cardiac drops.

In the morning I woke up, telephoned the editorial office and the

[32] The author's use of the pre-revolutionary name of this famous Moscow street is perhaps symbolic.

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publishers, and sat down to work. No sooner had I taken up my pen to write one of my regular novels than I was seized with a pain in the heart and suffered an infarction.

Since [I came out of] hospital I have been writing differently.

I sleep well, my heart does not trouble me, and I am in splendid spirits. Such is the healing power of literature.

I beg you to consider me the author solely of this work, as yet my only one. I beg you to forget that I previously wrote numerous and even popular novels.

Such are my authorial wishes

Vsevolod Kochetov.

Moscow, April 1970.

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The 24th Congress: Personalities and Issues

Gerald Segal

THE argument of this article is that the 24th Congress of the Soviet Communist Party was not the non-event that Western press coverage and other, academic, discussion has made it out to be. I hold on the contrary that the Congress represents an important turning point in the evolution of Soviet policy in regard to both internal and external affairs.

The first point to consider is the announcement of the membership of the top ruling body—the Politburo. It was done in a manner similar to but not quite the same as after the 23rd Congress in 1966. Moscow Radio broadcast Brezhnev's final speech to the Congress on 9 April and in this he announced the membership of the Politburo and Secretariat listing them in a deliberately contrived and presumably meaningful non-alphabetical order. The following day *Pravda* carried what was described as the verbatim text of this Brezhnev speech and the membership lists were set out in alphabetical order and in effect put into Brezhnev's mouth in that order. It is however Brezhnev's original listings which reveal the in-fighting and it is these which must be analysed with a view to determining policy differences and attitudes.

Brezhnev's listings for Politburo and Secretariat in 1966 and 1971

Politburo		Secretariat	
(1971)	1966	(1971)	1966
Brezhnev	Brezhnev	Brezhnev	Brezhnev
Podgorny	Kosygin	Suslov	Suslov
Kosygin	Podgorny	Kirilenko	Shelepin
Suslov	Suslov	Kulakov	Kirilenko
Kirilenko	Voronov	Ustinov	Demichev
Pelshe	Kirilenko	Demichev	Ustinov
Mazurov	Shelepin	Kapitonov	Andropov
Polyansky	Mazurov	Ponomarev	Ponomarev
Shelest	Polyansky	Katushev	Kapitonov
Voronov	Shelest	Solomontsev	Kulakov
Shelepin	Pelshe		Rudakov
Grishin			
Kunayev			
Shcherbitsky			
Kulakov			

A COMPARISON of both lists reveals that the man who has lost more ground than anyone else is Shelepin who in spite of his

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comparative youth (he is now 52) has been a Central Committee member since 1952. Since the last Congress he has lost his position in the Secretariat and is currently the last ranking member of the original 1966 Politburo complement. If we recall too that at the time of Khrushchev's fall, which he is believed to have engineered, he was also the chairman of the Party-State Control Committee which, prior to its abolition, to some extent transcended both Party and State organs, it is clear he has fallen a long way. Is there an explanation? The suggestion that his colleagues object to him on personal grounds will not suffice not only because it is inherently improbable but also because it would fail to explain his rise in the first place. Some political explanation must be sought and it is in my view to be found in a speech which Shelepin made in June 1970 when standing as a candidate for his Leningrad constituency for the Supreme Soviet. To get the full savour of his speech one has to recall that at the time the 24th Congress was due to be held within a few weeks—in July—and it was subsequently postponed. Moreover these elections were one of the few occasions the Soviet leaders have had since Khrushchev's fall to express their individual approach to world and Soviet problems bearing in mind that none of the leaders spoke at the 23rd Congress (nor indeed at the 24th) in their capacities as individual Politburo members and all the congresses got were the consensus reports of Brezhnev and Kosygin.

Shelepin in the three to four years prior to making his speech had been responsible within the Central Committee for light industry and consumer goods and had then become the Chairman of the Soviet Trade Union Movement; but instead of devoting his speech to these matters the text as published in *Pravda* deals mainly with ideology, defence and foreign policy. Shelepin's positions on the issues differ from those of all the other leaders as revealed in their electoral speeches.

At a time before the visits of the West German Chancellor Willi Brandt to Moscow and Warsaw and when all Soviet propaganda was aimed at emphasizing the threat of West German and other imperialism, Shelepin told his Leningrad constituents:

> 1. The Soviet people for the first time in history have enjoyed 25 years of peace—the imperialists would not dare to test the military strength of the USSR.
>
> 2. The USSR confronts the entire world as a powerful, invincible warrior (Russian—*Bogatyr'*) whom the world of imperialism is already now not in a position to measure swords with.

Is this not in fact to adopt the Chinese argument of the late fifties and early sixties that the Soviet camp is stronger than the West and that upon the West must rest the burden of the choice between war and peace?

> 3. Precisely in the past 25 years has occurred the greatest world historical event since the October revolution. Lenin's scientific forecast of genius has come true. The system of socialism has been transformed from a national system victorious in one country into an

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> international world system of socialist states, their proportion in the world amounts to: territory—25·9 per cent; population—about 34 per cent; industrial production—around 39 per cent and in national income more than one third.

In other words, Shelepin was including China and to make his meaning quite clear he adds in the next sentence 'the world system of socialism is today the decisive revolutionary force of the contemporary world'. Apparently considerations of left and right deviationism do not bother Shelepin and it may be noted that Brezhnev in his speech a few days later talked of a 'recent sharpening of differences with China' but none of this appears in Shelepin.[1] And what follows policy-wise from the above analysis? Shelepin continued:

> True to the great Lenin our Party and State see their duty first of all in
>
> (1) comprehensively strengthening the world system of socialism;
>
> (2) by pursuing the principles of Proletarian Internationalism give help and support to
>
> —Vietnam and *the other peoples* of S.E. Asia against US imperialism (my emphasis—G.S.)
>
> —firmly stand on the side of the Arab peoples in their struggle against Israeli aggression,
>
> —give help to all oppressed nations in their sacred struggle for freedom, national independence and social progress.

Unquestionably a tough, positive, forward military policy. And Shelepin makes no mention of peace or peaceful coexistence which all the other Soviet leaders do and favourably. Suslov's version is of interest in that he is normally thought of in the West as a hardliner and he was also speaking to a Leningrad constituency but a few days after Shelepin. He said:

> as far as our foreign policy is concerned it is clear and remains unchanged. It is known that the USSR has always struggled and is struggling for the carrying out of the principle of peaceful coexistence with all countries independently of their social systems, is doing everything necessary to rid humanity of the nightmare of the occurrence of a new war . . .

Suslov was repeating word for word the formula of the 20th Congress and I would argue that when Brezhnev in his report to the 24th Congress asserted against the Chinese that 'they wanted us to abandon the 20th Congress' he was hinting at rather more than the rehabilitation of Stalin.

[1] Compare Shelepin's statement with the following excerpt from the resolutions of the 24th Congress as printed in *Izvestiya* on 10 April 1971—'the Congress fully supports the principled Leninist course and concrete steps of the CC CPSU and the Soviet Government in Soviet-Chinese relations. In conditions where the Chinese leaders put forward their own ideological-political platform which is incompatible with Leninism and directed to a struggle against the socialist countries, to the splitting of the international communist and entire anti-imperialist movement, the CC CPSU has taken the only correct position—the position of the consistent defence of the principles of Marxism-Leninism . . .'

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He meant that the Chinese had been demanding the retraction of the policy of the 'three peacefuls'—peaceful coexistence, peaceful competition and peaceful transformation from capitalism to socialism—which they had always argued underlay Khrushchevite revisionism. It would appear from Shelepin's speech that he and he alone in the top leadership could envisage a common platform with the Chinese based upon the abandonment of the 'Three Peacefuls' policy. The 24th Congress rejected this possible platform or, more accurately, publicized a previous rejection, and the Chinese, realizing that there could never be any reconciliation, took the first opportunity after the Congress, namely, the ping-pong match, to adopt a new approach to the West.

SO far as the economy is concerned at least three interesting developments occurred. (1) The five-year plan directives adopted by the Congress provided for the priority growth of the consumer goods industries, if only marginally (industrial production is to rise by 42–46 per cent and this is to include production of means of production by 41–45 per cent and of consumer goods by 44–48 per cent). (2) Any possible move towards market socialism was ruled out both by the nature of the directives and by Kosygin's statement that the law of value (Marxist coding for a market economy under either socialist or capitalist ownership conditions) cannot be a regulator of the Soviet economy. (3) A programme for the restructuring of industrial management was adopted (I will henceforth call this the Industrial Management Reform to distinguish it from the 1965 economic reform although I do not suggest that to re-form something is necessarily to improve it). The question arises what relationship do these developments have—if any—to preceding economic and political developments and to the placings of the Politburo members?

So far as the consumer goods programme is concerned Podgorny has all along been its most consistent advocate. In 1964–65 he argued that whilst it was once necessary for the Soviet people to bear the burdens of the priority development of heavy industry, now conditions had changed. In this he was resisted by Suslov, and Kosygin vacillated with the escalation of the Vietnam war and moved towards the Suslov position (see Michel Tatu, *Power in the Kremlin*). It is possible to see in Podgorny's rise to No. 2 in the Politburo not only the support of the consumer goods lobby but also a deeper political meaning. The consistency of his 'liberal' position—it seems he was not a member of the anti-Khrushchev conspiracy and apparently favoured the *détente* efforts of the latter's last months of power—puts him at the other end of the political spectrum from Shelepin. Neither is he any less an economic reformer than Kosygin. In the early fifties it seems it was Podgorny as the Kharkov first secretary and with the economist-reformer A. M. Rumyantsev as his ideological secretary who fostered Liberman's profit-orientated economic reform thinking. Further in 1965 he came out for the Czech economic reform. Moreover his advocacy in recent years of

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more 'socialist democracy' through an expansion in the power of the Soviets as opposed to the power of the Party apparat within the Soviets (Suslov's view) would enhance his support amongst the liberally inclined.

Whether Podgorny or Kosygin are wholehearted supporters of the the Industrial Management Reform 1971 is an open question—although it seems unlikely in either case. Under the IMR industry will be concentrated in vast ministerial sectors which will be organized on a three-tier and sometimes two-tier basis—ministry (including departments)—association—enterprises, or ministry (including departments)—enterprises. Overall control of the enforcement of state and Party is, quite extraordinarily, by Section X of the Directives put in the hands of the hierarchy of Party committees ranging from the primary organizations to the central committees of the republics. To make the system function efficiently it is planned to introduce 1,600 Automated Management, i.e. computerized systems, by 1975. Bearing in mind the shocking state of the Soviet computer industry it is doubtful if these systems will have much effect for at least three years. In short, the Party will be left to set the pace; it seems a fair judgment that Brezhnev is trying to get the Party to work on the economy via the new ministerial system in a manner analogous to Khrushchev's attempts in the late fifties to use the regional economic councils with the same end in view.

This reassertion of Party control of the economy began around 1967–68 when it became clear that the reform as enacted at the September 1965 plenum could have only a limited effect. In the discussions leading up to the reform the market socialist school of thought was rejected in favour of those who supported a change in the existing planning system; it was to this latter school that Kosygin belonged and presumably still belongs. Both schools of thought accepted the need for a profit criterion and allied market criteria but in the view of Kosygin and Liberman (although the latter seemed at one point in 1967 to vacillate) such criteria could only be instruments of a renovated centralized planning system. In so far as this model by imposing capital charges forced a utilization of existing stocks, some effect was felt in the years 1965–67 but thereafter it was virtually played out and 1968 and 1969 were years of falling production and productivity.[2] In these circumstances Brezhnev seized the initiative at the December 1969 plenum and got the Party, by enforcing a new labour discipline and raising the banner of socialist competition, to some extent to reinvigorate the economy. In the ensuing six months Brezhnev was making the running and in May–June he made a 'major speech' at the Council of Ministers; bearing in mind that he had publicly affirmed that the 24th Congress would be held in July it is more than possible he was making a bid to take over the chairmanship of the Council of Ministers.

In the final reckoning the reassertion of Party control was not suffi-

[2] The market socialism alternative was unacceptable because Czechoslovakia had shown that this ended with revisionist politics; so the only option was the Party and in modern conditions the Party plus computers.

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cient to save the eighth five-year plan which failed in a whole range of production targets and also in terms of productivity. Moreover, the admission by Kosygin that the problem of the introduction of the latest techniques into industry, which was one of the main reasons for the 1965 reforms, had not been solved by the reform as adopted meant that the post-1965 programme had failed in this basic respect. In view of all these failures Kosygin's loss of position is not surprising as he was in fact responsible for the economy. It would be too rash to attribute his decline to the abandonment of the reform philosophy not only because he was not totally committed to it but also because that struggle in fact continues. It is doubtful if the Party-ministries-computers solution will provide a viable model and there are strong forces resistant to the Brezhnevite solution. They can be seen in the differences shown in the speeches to the Supreme Soviet elections by K. Mazurov and his fellow first deputy prime minister D. Polyansky in June 1970. Mazurov —' The Leninist Party as the living soul of all communist transformations is continuously perfecting its many sided activity. The present day is characterized by a deeper penetration of the Party organizations into the essence of all processes which arise in the economy.' Polyansky— ' the clear cut separation of the functions of Party and Soviet, economic and social organs and organizations, as Lenin demanded it—is the most important condition for the successful building of communism '.

The fact that Mazurov takes precedence over Polyansky in the listing although the latter is the senior in terms of length of service in the Politburo suggests that so far Mazurov and the Brezhnev trend have won and that Mazurov must be regarded as the likely successor to Kosygin.

But by the very nature of contemporary economic life the issue cannot be regarded as finally settled no matter what the 24th Congress has decided.

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Document: Soviet Union Political Forces in the CPSU

S. Razumny

AFTER the liquidation of the last—the so-called rightist—opposition, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union finally ceased to exist as a *political* party and became an instrument of personal dictatorship. Then, in the early thirties, the Party's purpose began to consist in the blind implementation of the leader's directives, in control of the masses and in placing its members in all key positions in the country's administrative, economic and ideological apparatus. All political life within the Party came to an end. Now its members were not required to 'discuss' but to obey orders from above without question.

It is obvious that the change in the Party's functions was accompanied by a change or, more correctly, a reshuffle in its membership. Now, most of the people who joined the Party did so not much because they agreed with its programme as because they hoped to achieve positions of power or simply make a career with its help, and there was no other way.

In turn, only those Party members of relatively long standing, on whose devotion the dictator could count, advanced to high office in the Party and state apparatus.

Here the main criteria were not a person's intellectual or practical qualities but his degree of devotion to Stalin. Therefore, from the 1930s onwards, the intellectual and cultural level of the Party's top cadres was in continuous decline.

Moreover, Stalin could not stand having people who were in any way outstanding or even simply popular around him, seeing in them potential opponents and enemies. Nor could he tolerate people of high ideological principle, people who really believed in the ideals of communism. He considered such people unreliable.

When we speak of Stalin, we certainly do not mean just one man. Many people in the upper and middle echelons of the apparatus supported and had a personal investment in Stalin. It was they who created the notorious 'cult', through which they hoped to acquire power and make a career. Some actually succeeded in doing so, others did not. . . . Stalin himself had long ceased believing in the ideals of world communism and sacrified individual communist parties in the state interests of the USSR with an easy mind. However, he also totally and completely identified state interests with his own person. Stalin had more justification than the King of France to utter the famous phrase: 'L'état, c'est moi'.

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IN this context the purpose of the notorious purges of 1935–38 becomes understandable. Stalin and his entourage knew perfectly well that the people who were liquidated in these terrible years were not guilty of anything. Nobody 'misled' Stalin or his entourage. Stalin and the people around him knew very well what they were doing at that time. At all costs Stalin had to get rid (and that *completely*) of his *potential* opponents, of the 'old guard', of people who had rendered a great service to the Revolution, people who were popular in the Party and the country. Among these officials there were some people (by no means all, of course) who were truly dedicated to communist ideology—people who would never have agreed to the system of personal dictatorship and arbitrary political action that Stalin established and exercised in those years. Among the potential opponents were also unprincipled people without ideological convictions but powerful and popular people whom Stalin had every reason to fear.

One can take the Tukhachevsky 'affair' as an example. What the official sources now say about certain 'documents' 'planted' by the Gestapo in which the unsuspecting Stalin believed is utter nonsense! The documents, if there were any, took the course of a 'boomerang', i.e. they passed from the NKVD to the Gestapo and back again. When he destroyed Tukhachevsky and his group, Stalin was perfectly aware of what he was doing and, from his 'Stalinist' viewpoint, acted quite rightly, perhaps even more 'rightly' than on many other occasions.

Tukhachevsky really represented a *potential* danger—even more so than anyone else. Comparatively young, talented, extremely ambitious, very popular and sufficiently unprincipled, he might have, if circumstances had developed in his favour, played the role of a Bonaparte. Stalin knew this and Stalin drew the necessary conclusions. . . . That was all.

The object of the 'purges' was not only to destroy potential enemies physically but also to compromise *all* extant and latent opposition. Hence the monstrosity of the accusations, the endeavour to compromise the 'enemies', to charge them with contacting foreign intelligence services, of planning to split up the USSR (a charge made to raise the population's patriotic spirit and stimulate hatred of the 'enemies'), and of maintaining contacts with provocateurs and criminals. The opposition had to be compromised completely . . . and made to serve the further augmentation of the cult of Stalin's personality.

In the course of the purges Stalin got rid both of his potential enemies and of those who actually managed the purges (Yagoda and Yezhov). We have to give Stalin his due: the purges were excellently prepared and masterfully conducted both from the political and organizational viewpoint. If Stalin had a vested interest in destroying his personal enemies, the pack surrounding him was no less interested in, first, occupying the vacated positions and, second, consolidating them. But they could only be consolidated if there were guarantees that their

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'former occupants' would not return and there was a minimal likelihood of being replaced.

The old semi-democratic system of elections was not sufficient to fend off the threat of replacement. At the congresses and the plenary sessions there was some possibility of exercising criticism, if only of a practical nature. When the 'autocracy' was established, the possibility of even that sort of criticism vanished. Now everything depended on the autocrat alone. Of course, that also had its disadvantages ('you never know if you will make it home after a reception'), but it was a question of choosing the lesser of two evils. Even if there had been a modicum of free competition at the congresses the people around Stalin would surely never have managed to get into the leadership at all, let alone consolidate their positions there. Their main merits were surely their shameless toadying, 'readiness to do anything', lack of principles and thirst for power. True, all this was offset by a low cultural and intellectual level and practical qualities. It is obvious that it was beyond the powers of people like this to compete with the 'old guard' openly.

IF the Party ruled over the people and the country, then the Party leadership had total and unlimited sway over the Party. From this 'leadership' a new ruling and privileged class was formed. With the years this class turned more and more into a closed caste living a completely different life from the people. For them 'communism' had already arrived. They had their own special stores, trained servants, luxurious health resorts. . . . They began to look on the 'masses' with increasing contempt and . . . to fear them. To fear them with an animal fear.

This New Class of managers occupied all the key positions in the Party, the state and ideological apparatus, the army and the state security organs. People were taken in on personal recommendation. People with strong 'ideological' convictions and 'intellectuals' were not tolerated, and if they got in by chance were either liquidated or thrown out again.

The morals and laws of this class were those of the jungle. Neither friendship nor family ties counted. Yesterday's 'pals' quietly destroyed each other today. The main object was power—power and the luxury and privileges associated with it.

The life of the top leadership was carefully concealed from the people. Nobody knew anything about their personal life. As a result of the ever-increasing suspicion of the leader (which turned into a real mania) on the one hand and of the continual in-fighting on the other, the intellectual and practical qualities of the cream of this class were in constant decline. Any sign of the most modest brilliance was considered sedition. The leader carried out new purges and gathered people devoted to him alone.

However, by the 1950s, when the ruling class had finally crystallized

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and consolidated, the 'autocracy' began to weigh it down to an increasing degree. The class was expanding. It was no longer just the top Party oligarchy. Its members also included middle echelon workers. Those who had 'made the grade' were afraid of new purges—and such purges had been in progress or preparation almost continuously.

Stalin's death could not have come more opportunely for this group. This death was so timely (on the eve of a terrible new purge) that doubts arose about whether it was natural. These doubts have not yet been dispersed. Incidentally, everything in history is 'timely', and revolutions are certainly not only made against weak kings. . . . The government formed immediately after the leader's death was a government of the ruling class, a government of compromise among all its clans.

At first the power of the Party and the state were divided. The new class gave a sigh of relief: it did not want to admit a new dictatorship; it did not want a new Stalin.

A comparatively small number of persons in the so-called new guard, i.e. the people whom Stalin was preparing to replace his entourage, were 'removed'. Among them were S. D. Ignatev and the demoted Brezhnev, a man who had risen fast in the 1940s and 1950s. However, the peace and harmony soon gave way to a fierce power struggle among the clans. The first to be destroyed was the all-powerful Beria, who was hated, who was feared, who *knew too much*. The instigator of this act of reprisal was his personal friend and comrade-in-arms, the quondam Party secretary responsible for cadre policy (a post immediately and directly related to state security), Malenkov. But Malenkov's number soon came up, too, and he was replaced in this post by Bulganin.

At first the struggle was one of personalities. Nobody wanted to change the form and methods of government. The new class wanted to run the country in Stalin's style but without Stalin. It wanted 'freedom' for itself only, and under freedom it understood the protection of its status and rights from the infringements of any one person. This was why the 'principle of collective leadership' was proclaimed.

However, the clans' personal struggle soon turned political. The old Stalinist leadership, which had a majority in the Central Committee Presidium, did not want to change anything, but when Khrushchev made his play for power with the support of new people (mainly from the middle echelons), he was forced to change both domestic and foreign policy to justify his takeover. In his struggle against the 'oldsters', Khrushchev relied on oblast committee officials who wanted to become Chekists and on Chekists who wanted a seat in the Presidium. He was supported by economists who saw the need for certain reforms and by a section of the Party intelligentsia who expected him to improve the creative climate—if only moderately. The economy, and science, too, were certainly in a state of profound crisis and decline at the end of Stalin's rule. . . .

Khrushchev was an extremely cunning, forceful and impudent man,

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but also a weak and stupid one who kept falling under various influences and had a panic fear of revolution.

Nevertheless, his speech against Stalin, which 'openly and courageously unmasked the shortcomings and abuses that occurred during the personality cult', but which, was actually delivered in camera and read, also in camera, at Party meetings, played a role so tremendous that it cannot be overrated. Millions of pamphlets spread over several years would not have achieved a hundredth part of what this speech achieved. This speech opened a new page in the history of Soviet society. A reassessment of all values began.

It was only after Khrushchev's speech, after the secret political amnesty and rehabilitations of 1956, and after the Hungarian people's revolution that public and political life began in our country, that groups and arrays of forces began to emerge.

The year 1956 is a dividing line in our history. It was the year *when communism began to wane.*

KHRUSHCHEV'S ouster was a consequence of his political insolvency. Khrushchev was too weak to become a Soviet Tito. He did not justify anyone's hopes—neither those of the 'liberals' with his reprisals against the creative intelligentsia nor those of the Party *apparatchiks* with his 'voluntarism', i.e. his attempts to establish a new cult. Khrushchev turned out to be no Tito but a parody of Barras.

Almost always drunk, frankly venal in his pleasures, making important political decisions at the family table, Nikita Sergevich merely compromised the ruling class. Truly popular at the beginning of his 'reign', Khrushchev made himself a laughing stock at the end. In turn, the Stalinist left-overs did their utmost to compromise him. His famed 'outbursts' were largely 'prompted' by the Stalinists.

As after Stalin's death, the new leadership which replaced Khrushchev was the fruit of a compromise among the various clans in the CPSU. On the one hand, there were the secret Stalinists like Brezhnev—people totally and entirely linked with the Stalinist era whom only personal considerations prevented from rehabilitating Stalin completely. At the time it was necessary to yield pride of place to the more illustrious and famous Stalinists. Brezhnev cuts the most vivid and loathsome figure among these people. While Khrushchev gained prominence as Stalin's toady, Brezhnev made his career as Khrushchev's toady—as the most unprincipled and basest toady of them all. He began his career with unbridled praise of his 'dearly beloved' and continued it with equally unbridled praise of those who dethroned this 'dearly beloved'. People who have known Brezhnev personally speak of him as 'a man of below-average intellect but always ready "to go the whole hog", extremely unprincipled, limited, infinitely base and possessed of an unquenchable thirst for power'.

As regards intellect, the 'technocrat' Kosygin is somewhat superior to Brezhnev. At heart, Kosygin has always remained an admirer of

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Stalin. He was certainly the youngest member of Stalin's Politburo. His entire *Weltanschauung* and all his experience of life and politics were shaped under Stalin. Those who have known Kosygin personally say that he condemned Khrushchev's de-Stalinization, that he took an even more reactionary stand on political issues than Khrushchev, and that he advocated a decisively repressive domestic policy.

As opposed to Brezhnev and the Party *apparatchiks,* Kosygin championed, and still does, a more 'liberal' course on economic issues. As for Brezhnev and his cronies, they see a threat to the existing system and a first hint of revolution in the economic reforms (which, incidentally, are very modest).

From the time he came to power, Brezhnev made a sincere attempt to harmonize relations with China. The fact that he did not succeed is certainly not Brezhnev's fault. The Chinese set obviously impossible conditions: a full Soviet admission of blame for the Sino-Soviet conflict, and total and irrevocable rehabilitation of Stalin. For Brezhnev to have accepted these conditions would, in fact, have meant renouncing power. He would have done anything: he could have foresworn his father and mother, but he could not foreswear power. This was the only thing he could not do. . . .

Another political group (or, rather, a group with vested 'personal' interests) which came to power, held its position for a while, and then lost it, is the Shelepin-Ilichev group. In the West this group is incorrectly considered Stalinist. This is not so. This group is not Stalinist but careerist. Shelepin did enough to compromise himself in the eyes of the loyal rightist Stalinists with his blatantly anti-Stalinist speech at the 22nd Congress.

He differs from Brezhnev and Kosygin only in respect of age. Shelepin is very ambitious and aspires to power at any price and under any banner. He does not give a cent for any programmes. The main thing is to get to the top, to displace his competitors among the 'oldsters'. He is supported by a young Party *aktiv* of former Komsomol and KGB workers and youthful Party *apparatchiks*. Their slogan is: power now—programmes later.

Suslov heads the Stalinist group. This group is now very heterogeneous. On the one hand, it includes the surviving 'old cadres', who have their people in both the government and the Central Committee, in the KGB and the Party apparatus. These people are mainly among the embittered 'pensioners'. As a result of the continual reshuffling of the government and Central Committee, their importance and weight are in constant decline. However, they have their own following—the Soviet 'Chinese'—young and middle-aged Party workers who believe in a 'cultural revolution' as a means of rejuvenating the Party, giving it revolutionary significance again and, the main thing, putting them in power. . . . The number of these people is very small, but they have a large number of their supporters among the workers and minor officials. However, the bulk of the Stalinists are pensioners, former con-

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centration camp workers, secret agents, retired Party officials and people who fear retribution for their crimes.

The Brezhnev-Kosygin government came about and continues to exist as a result of the compromise among these groups. For the time being the Shelepin group has lost its leading position in the course of the internal struggle. Time will show for how long.

The so-called liberal communists remain an opposition group. This group is also very heterogeneous.

It is mostly made up of Party intellectuals, some military men, writers, critics, Party workers and even a few KGB men. This group's objective is to lend the regime greater respectability. They consider Khrushchev's and the present leadership insufficiently dynamic, flexible and modern. This group also has a mortal fear of revolution, but it considers that certain, albeit most limited, reforms are necessary to avert it. This group is growing constantly stronger and larger. It has illegal and semi-legal contacts with Western communist parties and enjoys their support.

On the other hand, this group has a radical wing (albeit a relatively weak one at present) which advocates a decisive democratization of the country's whole administrative and economic system. This wing is close to the underground communist right-wing groups, who in turn collaborate and maintain contacts with the democratic revolutionary movement. There are different shades in liberal communism ranging from Titoist (whose representatives have links with Western communist parties and now hold the upper hand) and even more moderate (whose representatives also have contacts with Western communist parties and want to maintain the Party dictatorship at all costs) to 'neo-Shlyapnikovian' views (whose representatives are affiliated with or close to the radical wing). In recent years and, particularly, months, the conviction of the need for a new change of leadership has been constantly increasing in Party circles, especially in the growing 'liberal communist' group. The continual failures and political blunders of the ruling group have set not only the Party rank-and-file (not to speak of the people!) against it, but also many middle and even upper echelon officials.

The immense moral and political setback which the present leadership suffered as a result of the invasion of Czechoslovakia can hardly be overrated. This invasion demonstrated not the strength and firmness of the ruling group but its weakness, cowardice, confusion and inability to think in modern political categories. It was a *major political error* and was not prompted by any real necessity to preserve Soviet positions in the CSSR—positions which no one threatened. It was not seen through to its intended end and resulted in the new compromise with Czechoslovakia's current communist leadership, thus demonstrating the weakness and inconsistency of the ruling Soviet group.

The Brezhnev-Kosygin government is incapable of running things by modern methods requiring flexibility, dynamism and new political

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and economic decisions. But it is also too weak to revert entirely to Stalinist methods.

Therefore no one is satisfied with it. Neither the Stalinists nor the 'liberals.' So far the only thing saving the government from a new palace revolution is the ruling class's fear of the revolution which might follow a new 'shaking of the foundations'.

The extent of this fear is borne out by the fact that, during the celebrations marking the fiftieth anniversary of the Bolshevik coup, all military units throughout the country were put on a Red Alert.

The government may have to resort to new domestic political provocations to hold onto its power. The January shots at the Kremlin wall were a sinister reminder of this possibility.

The near future will show how long the government will manage to frighten the Party malcontents with the threat of revolution and how far it will be able to go in its policy of provocations and reprisals.

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After Ulbricht: The End of an Era?

Melvin Croan*

NOW that Walter Ulbricht has stepped down as First Secretary of the East German Party, it is necessary to review the accomplishments of the final decade of his rule in order to see clearly the prospects facing his successors. Just last year, in his New Year's Message marking the turn of the decade, Ulbricht declared: 'We enter the seventies full of optimism, with self-confidence and energy'.[1] More than mere ritualized rhetoric, the sanguine note sounded by the veteran communist leader also reflected a certain measure of official satisfaction at East Germany's political consolidation at home and self-assertion in the international arena. Even the most cursory retrospective glance can serve to illuminate the basic factors making for such apparent self-congratulation and a closer examination will provide the basis for an assessment of the durability of East Germany's accomplishments under Ulbricht.

A decade ago, at the beginning of the sixties, the German Democratic Republic (DDR) still appeared to be little more than an artificial political construct. Its communist political system, forcibly installed by the Soviet military occupation in the course of Germany's post-war division between East and West, seemed to lack a viable social base. In fact, East Germany's rulers had constantly to contend with widespread popular disaffection and potential unrest, cutting across all segments of society. Evidence of mass dissatisfaction was only too acutely registered in the statistics which recorded the ebb and flow of an unending tide of refugees to the West. Today, the picture is quite different. Once the Berlin Wall went up, it not only immediately arrested the damaging exodus but also set the stage for a slow and rather subtle process of enforced reconciliation between the population and the regime. And this process, almost all reliable observers agree, seems fairly well advanced.[2] As for the regime itself, the East German Communist Party (SED) gives every present sign of being quite solidly entrenched. Under the leadership of Ulbricht and his old guard Party cohorts, the SED's top cadres enjoyed long-term tenure and apparent political cohesion, unmarred by any public eruption of elite in-fighting. Moreover,

* This paper is a chapter in a forthcoming book, *The Communist States in Disarray*, edited by A. Bromke and T. Rakowska-Harmstone, to appear in the Carleton University Soviet Studies Series.

1 *Neues Deutschland*, 1 January 1970.

2 Cf. Ernst Richert, *Das zweite Deutschland* (Gütersloh, 1964) and Wolfgang Nette, *DDR Report* (Düsseldorf and Köln, 1968). For an attempt—albeit a methodologically dubious one—to measure the development of this process, see Hans Apel, *DDR 1962 1964 1966* (Berlin, 1967) and the same author's less systematized observations, *Ohne Begleiter* (Köln, 1965).

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the ranks of the top leadership were augmented by the steady advancement of a new generation of younger men, commanding considerable technical knowledge and managerial know-how.

A decade ago, East Germany's lop-sided economy, torn out of a larger national whole and still a long way from effective integration into a substitute international structure, was performing sporadically. At times it functioned so poorly in certain sectors as to convey the impression of an economic system doomed to chaos if not actually on the verge of collapse. To aggravate matters still further, the westward exodus carried with it some of the most productive elements of the population and, as long as the flight remained unchecked, it served permanently to becloud the DDR's economic prospects. Today, things are entirely different. For once the regime had 'secured the frontier' and initiated certain economic reforms, the DDR embarked upon a period of sustained growth and development. As a result, East Germany has attained a level of productive output that makes it a major economic power, ranking ninth or tenth among the industrial giants of the entire globe. It can boast a standard of living that is the highest of all in the communist world and easily surpasses that of the Soviet Union. With understandable pride and a measure of shrewd psychological insight, East German commentators now point to the DDR as a German 'economic miracle' in its own right and that designation has been seconded by many Western students of the East German economy as well.[3]

A DECADE ago, East Germany's international position was utterly unenviable. Except for the communist camp, the DDR's credentials as a legitimate 'second German state' went unrecognized. Indeed at that time, the Ulbricht regime's pretensions may not even have enjoyed very widespread acceptance at home, where they were challenged by Bonn's counterclaim that the Federal Republic of Germany alone was entitled to represent the entire German nation. Once again, the situation is much changed today. Although the DDR's drive for international diplomatic recognition may still be some distance from attaining its goal, real progress in the desired direction has been achieved and more is to be expected. Even short of general diplomatic recognition, the DDR's political influence has grown unmistakably. Within international communist councils, especially those still dominated by the Soviet Union, East Germany's voice has steadily gained in importance. Once Moscow's abject satellite, the DDR has turned into at least a junior partner and just possibly something more. Vis-à-vis its arch-rival, West Germany, the DDR's competitive position has also markedly improved and, as implicit acknowledgment of that change, Bonn's once seemingly unalter-

[3] For the official East German presentation, see Hans Müller and Karl Reissig, *Wirtschaftswunder DDR* ([East] Berlin, 1968). From the Western side, cf. Joachim Nawrocki, *Das geplante Wunder* (Hamburg, 1967) and Fritz Schenk, *Das rote Wirtschaftswunder* (Stuttgart, 1969).

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able stance against East Germany has undergone modification. In sum, to paraphrase a commentary carried by the prestigious Hamburg weekly, *Die Zeit*, on the occasion of the DDR's twentieth anniversary, no one can realistically dismiss the DDR as merely a passing 'phenomenon'.[4]

This state of affairs, in itself, constitutes sufficient cause for the official tone of self-confidence emanating from East Berlin. It also helps explain the belated attention, some of it rather favourable, that East Germany has recently attracted in the English-speaking world.[5] Far from being the 'major political paradox' that the present writer depicted earlier,[6] the DDR may perhaps now appear to be a paragon of progress and possibly even a model of communist political development.[7] And yet, while the progress is undeniable, the paradox persists. How else to describe a regime which, although it has become the most advanced in the communist world, economically, remains one of the most reactionary, politically? With what better word to connote a state which for all its new found presence in the international arena, clings tenaciously to the oldest of vestigial cold war orthodoxies?

There can be no better place to commence a closer examination of this paradoxical state of affairs than by recalling the character of the East German political leadership during the sixties. Throughout the entire decade, as for so long before, that leadership bore the indelible stamp of its ranking personage, Walter Ulbricht. His position at the apex of the entire East German system proved so deeply entrenched as to be immune to the kind of factional challenge that had erupted several times during the fifties. Despite advanced age, he continued, up to that very day of his retirement, to display the same qualities of energy, drive, and scrupulous attention to detail that had characterized his career throughout. Untainted by blood purges in the ouster of his erstwhile opponents within the SED leadership, Ulbricht's personal power developed a measure of genuine political authority enabling him to stand above and quickly to resolve divisions of opinion within the East German ruling elite and to strike something of a pose of *Landesvater* with respect to the population as a whole.[8] While demonstrating far greater flexibility in dealing with novel problems than might have been forecast for a sometime Stalinist subaltern, Ulbricht nonetheless continued to manifest intransigence on matters he deemed crucial for the survival of the SED regime. The latter reflex

[4] Joachim Nawrocki, 'Ein deutsches Jubiläum', *Die Zeit* (North American ed.), 13 October 1969.

[5] Among recent English-language accounts, the following deserve mention: John Dornberg, *The Other Germany* (Garden City, 1968), Jean Edward Smith, *Germany Beyond the Wall* (Boston, 1969), and David Childs, *East Germany* (London, 1969).

[6] Melvin Croan, 'East Germany', in Adam Bromke (ed.), *The Communist States at the Crossroads* (New York, 1965).

[7] Cf. Zbigniew Brzezinski, 'The Soviet Past and Future', *Encounter*, vol. XXXIV, no. 3, March 1970, pp. 3–16.

[8] Carola Stern, *Ulbricht: Eine politische Biographie* (Köln and Berlin, 1963), especially the concluding chapter.

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was informed by an unerring respect for the regime's intrinsic precariousness as the result of Germany's national division as well as by an uncanny sensitivity to each and every potential threat to its domestic political stability. Although the Berlin Wall served to cement Germany's partition much more tightly than ever before, it could not by itself fully allay Ulbricht's anxieties. During the second half of the sixties, two major fears were once again in evidence. These were, first, a dread that international developments beyond the SED's immediate control might lead to the political isolation of the DDR and, secondly, but no less importantly, anxiety lest internal liberalization within other communist countries either contribute to the same result or else infect East Germany domestically and thus serve, in either instance, to undermine the Ulbricht regime.

These basic concerns helped to shape official East German attitudes towards the Eastern bloc as a whole as well as to determine its policies towards individual communist states and parties. As a consistently outspoken partisan of 'socialist internationalism' under Soviet aegis, the SED has always reacted adversely to manifestations of disunity in the communist camp and to signs of erosion of Soviet political authority. With respect to the major fissure involving China, the DDR early fell into line behind the Soviet Union, although careful scrutiny of the evolution of the SED's position on the Sino-Soviet conflict reveals some interesting differences of emphasis.[9] In the nature of the case, Ulbricht must always have found the protracted polemics between Moscow and Peking deeply distasteful and feared the wider international ramifications of the struggle between the two communist giants. Thus, Ulbricht sought to utilize the leeway that the Sino-Soviet conflict itself afforded, if not to moderate the dispute, then at least to assure that it did not lead to any weakening of communist positions vis-à-vis the German question. Leeway for arbitrating the dispute was never very great as far as Ulbricht was concerned and it all but disappeared with the onset of Mao's Cultural Revolution during which, incidentally, East German diplomatic personnel were among those physically assaulted in Peking. What remains as a symptom of the SED's basic concern, however, is the degree to which its spokesmen have warmed to the theme of an ostensible 'Bonn-Peking' axis. It was therefore entirely in character for the East Germans to react to the bloody clashes that broke out on the Ussuri as a dire Chinese provocation deliberately designed to divert Soviet attention from the 'menace of West German imperialism' in Europe.[10]

With respect to the situation in Europe, where vital East German interests are directly involved, the SED's reaction has been practical as well as rhetorical. While official endorsement of Soviet leadership is no

[9] See the insightful analysis of Carola Stern, 'East Germany', in William E. Griffith (ed.), *Communism in Europe*, vol. II (Cambridge, Mass., 1966), pp. 97–154.

[10] 'Aus dem Bericht des Politbüros an die 10. Tagung des ZK der SED', *Neues Deutschland*, 29 April 1969.

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less strong, something that can be illustrated by countless official pronouncements, running from denunciation of Rumania's independent economic course in the early sixties to today's repeated endorsement of the Brezhnev Doctrine,[11] the point has always been to forge a co-ordinated Eastern bloc policy towards West Germany on terms thought appropriate by East Berlin. With this objective in mind, the DDR has in recent years pursued a much more active, if largely negative foreign policy, thereby also demonstrating the degree to which Ulbricht himself had outgrown his erstwhile status of Soviet viceroy in Germany.

ALTHOUGH the groundwork had been laid before, East German assertiveness vis-à-vis Moscow gained immeasurably from Khrushchev's political downfall in October 1964. As long as there had been a single strong man in the Kremlin, Ulbricht, out of consideration for the security of his own political tenure, deemed it inadvisable to exert untoward pressure on the Soviet leadership. Accordingly, he had to swallow his disappointment at Khrushchev's post-Cuban missile crisis decision to relax Soviet pressure on Berlin and in place of the long-promised separate Soviet peace treaty, he had to content himself with a politically insubstantial friendship agreement. Although Krushchev's final foreign policy venture, anticipating a personal visit to West Germany, may have loomed especially foreboding, Ulbricht's objections were carefully guarded. When Khrushchev actually fell from power, however, Ulbricht exhibited a different kind of restraint. Far from applauding the ouster or waxing enthusiastic about the new Kremlin leadership, Ulbricht remained masterfully ambiguous. In effect, he used the political transition in Moscow to serve quiet notice on the Soviet Union that henceforth the SED could be expected to be heard from much more forcefully where its own interests were involved.[12]

These interests were quite obviously at stake when the Grand Coalition Government, formed in Bonn at the end of 1966, inaugurated a new and much more active *Ostpolitik* on the part of the Federal Republic. For several years before that departure, the SED had already

[11] Cf. Hermann Axen, 'Proletarischer Internationalismus in unserer Zeit', *Einheit*, October 1968, pp. 1203–19. For a general discussion of the defence of the thesis of 'limited sovereignty' in socialist international law on the part of East German jurists, see Jens Hacker, 'Die SED und die Breshnew-Doktrin', *Deutschland-Archiv*, vol. III, no. 2, February 1970, pp. 198–203. The SED's position on this and related matters has brought it into open conflict with the Italian Communist Party and the League of Yugoslav Communists. In May 1969, the SED circulated a confidential memorandum to East German Party functionaries which present a comprehensive indictment of Yugoslav domestic and foreign policy. For the text, see 'Zur Politik des Bundes der Kommunisten Jugoslawiens', *Informationen*, Nr. 31, 1969, as reproduced in *Deutschland-Archiv*, vol. II, no. 11, November 1969. The publication of this document in the West (initially in the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 26 September 1969) led to a sharp Yugoslav rejoinder to the SED and a belated (and unpersuasive) denial from East Berlin as to its authenticity. See Ilse Spittmann, 'Die Sed und Jugoslawien', *Deutschland-Archiv*, vol. II, no. 11, November 1969, p. 1237.

[12] Cf. Ilse Spittmann, 'Soviet Union and DDR', *Survey*, no. 61, October 1966, pp. 165–176.

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made a display of its special sensitivity to West German policy towards Eastern Europe by warning its allies of the ostensibly disruptive political designs behind Bonn's quest for better trade relations. Faced with the prospect of a concerted West German drive aimed at a rapprochement with Eastern Europe, Ulbricht did not bother to wait for the Kremlin to make up its mind about how to handle Bonn's new overtures. As far as Ulbricht was concerned, they were unacceptable. His spokesmen lost no time in denouncing them in these terms and the DDR swung into immediate action to counter West Germany's fresh approach to the East.[13]

Demanding full diplomatic recognition from West Germany and refusing to negotiate with Bonn about anything less, Ulbricht also pressed acceptance of this demand as a precondition for diplomatic relations between the other East European states and the Federal Republic. Much to his chagrin, Rumania agreed to enter into formal relations with West Germany in January 1967 without particularly concerning itself with East German objections. To prevent any repetition of such fractious behaviour, Ulbricht concentrated his efforts on reinforcing the 'iron triangle' linking the DDR to Poland and Czechoslovakia and further sought to enlist the support of other East European countries to solidify the DDR's rear flank as far as possible. Towards that end, during the course of 1967, East Germany concluded a series of bilateral treaties of 'friendship, co-operation, and mutual assistance' with Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Bulgaria. Whatever the views of the individual East European signatories East German commentators hammered home the point that these pacts were meant to constitute a solid phalanx against West Germany. Moreover, this interpretation obviously enjoyed Soviet support, especially after Rumania's *démarche* towards Bonn. The Karlovy Vary conference of East European Communist Parties held in the spring of 1967 laid heavy stress on the need to strengthen both military preparedness and political unity against the danger of West German 'revanchism, militarism, and neo-Nazism' and thus signalled an unmistakable triumph for Ulbricht's position. In shelving, at least for the time being, its own previous proposal for an all-European security conference in favour of a rigid anti-West German front, the Kremlin may have been motivated by the desire to utilize the German issue in order to arrest fissiparous tendencies in Eastern Europe. By so doing, however, it had in effect aligned itself squarely behind East Berlin.

This alignment of interest grew even closer during 1968, both in the period of Czechoslovakia's 'experiment with freedom' and in the immediate aftermath of the Soviet-led invasion. If the Kremlin reacted to Dubcek's course between January and August 1968 with increasing

[13] For the general international background, see Richard Lowenthal, 'The Sparrow in the Cage', *Problems of Communism*, November–December 1968, pp. 2–28 and Melvin Croan, 'Bonn and Pankow: Intra-German Politics', *Survey*, no. 67, April 1968, pp. 77–89.

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displeasure, Czechoslovak developments served almost from the very outset to reawaken all of Ulbricht's deep-seated anxieties concerning domestic infection and international isolation. Repeated East German charges purporting to detail the preparation of a 'counter-revolution' in Prague masterminded by 'West German imperialism' make this only too clear. Given such an interpretation of Czechoslovakia's reformist course, it was inevitable that relations between Prague and East Berlin should have deteriorated rapidly. Given the fears that lay behind it, it makes sense to conclude that Ulbricht himself came rather early on to press for the most stringent measures against the Dubcek regime and that his insistence upon forceful action must be accounted a significant contributory factor in the Kremlin's fateful decision to intervene in Czechoslovakia.[14]

Immediately after the August invasion, it appeared as if Ulbricht now believed that the SED had secured for itself a decisive role in Socialist bloc affairs in Europe and thus also in East-West relations. Certainly, the East German leader's pronouncements concerning both international relations and domestic affairs reached a new level of schoolmasterly self-confidence. Thus, while calling for tightened international co-ordination and discipline under Soviet leadership, Ulbricht found repeated occasion to single out Soviet-East German economic and scientific ties and their military co-operation as shining examples of socialist internationalism in action. Moreover, he took it upon himself to proclaim the necessity of constructing socialism 'on the basis of one's own resources' as a doctrinal imperative. By no means did this signify endorsement of national autonomy, a concept that he dismissed as 'ridiculous drivel'. Rather it constituted a call to end economic dependence upon the West and to pursue closer integration among the communist states along the lines followed in relations between the DDR and the Soviet Union. Finally, with particular reference to Czechoslovakia but also in more general rebuttal to Marxist revisionists elsewhere, Ulbricht held up the DDR (not the USSR) as a model of economic efficiency and political stability.[15]

IT may well be that an intimate awareness of the Kremlin's Czechoslovak tribulations together with a sense of exaltation over the application of his own harsh prescription for dealing with the situation actually persuaded Ulbricht that henceforth the DDR would share in the primacy enjoyed by the Soviet Union, at least with respect to the European theatre.[16] If so, he was shortly to be proved mistaken. While

[14] This is not, however, to argue that Ulbricht was the 'prime mover' behind the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. See Melvin Croan, 'Czechoslovakia, Ulbricht and the German Problem', *Problems of Communism*, January–February 1969, pp. 1–7.

[15] *Neues Deutschland*, 25 October 1968. For further discussion, see Croan, 'Czechoslovakia, Ulbricht and the German Problem', loc. cit.

[16] David Binder, 'The New Ulbricht Wins a Key Role in Soviet Bloc', *New York Times*, 18 November 1968. This article attracted considerable attention in West Germany and elicited favourable mention in *Neues Deutschland* (6 December 1968).

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Moscow could not tolerate any unilateral *démarche* to West Germany by a liberalized Czechoslovakia, neither was it prepared to countenance a veto over its own approaches to the West by a rigidly inflexible East Germany. In order to overcome the stigma that attached to the occupation of Czechoslovakia, the Kremlin found it useful to go over to the diplomatic initiative. Accordingly, at the March 1969 Budapest meeting of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Treaty Organization, the Soviet Union revived its previously shelved proposal for an all-European security conference and considerably softened its anti-West German polemics, thereby confirming signs of a changed attitude towards the Federal Republic that had been manifest from late 1968. Indeed, in March 1969 Moscow made something of a display of improving relations with Bonn by demonstratively briefing the West German Government on the Sino-Soviet conflict while simultaneously playing down the crisis in Berlin that the SED sought to provoke in connexion with the convocation of the West German presidential election assembly there. By the end of the month signs of tension between Ulbricht and the Soviet leadership were incontrovertible. At a Moscow meeting held to commemorate the fiftieth anniversary of the establishment of the Third International, Ulbricht spoke out in defence of the Comintern's 1928 indictment of Social Democracy as the 'main enemy' while the Soviet ideologist, Mikhail Suslov, in company with Boris Ponomarev, CPSU Party Secretary in charge of relations with foreign communist parties, criticized it as sectarian in character and harmful in consequence.[17]

At stake, of course, was not merely the proper interpretation of Comintern history but also the quite topical matter of the correct approach to present-day West Germany, whose Social Democratic leader, Willy Brandt, had served as Foreign Minister from late 1966 and was to accede to the Federal Chancellorship with the formation of a new government in October 1969. Persisting in his détentist *Ostpolitik* and broadening it to acknowledge the existence of 'two German states in one nation' thereby effectively conceding *de facto* recognition to the DDR, the Brandt Government received a favourable response from the Soviet leadership, as well as from Poland's Gomulka, who had broached the prospect of bilateral negotiations with West Germany as early as the spring of 1969. As for the other East European states, the principle of bilateral negotiations with the Federal Republic proved distasteful to the DDR alone. Yet, by the end of 1969 Ulbricht appeared to have no alternative to associating himself with a change of Soviet bloc attitude that he did not approve. This is not at all to suggest that within the course of a single year the DDR had been transformed from an active force whipping the Eastern bloc into line against West Germany to a passive pawn in Soviet-East European relations with the Federal

[17] See the *International Herald-Tribune* (Paris), 27, 28 March 1969, and Anatole Shub, 'A Guide to Soviet Policy—"Social Fascism" 1928', ibid. 28 March 1969.

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Republic. On the contrary, while accepting bilateral contacts between individual East European states and West Germany and, in fact, entering upon top-level contacts itself, as exemplified by the Stoph-Brandt meetings at Erfurt and Kassel in March and May 1970, the DDR continued actively to pursue its own interests in a manner that still bespeaks Ulbricht's fear of a genuine *détente* in Europe and his determination to employ all available means to counter it.

Much as before, the Ulbricht regime today still clamours for bloc solidarity behind its own position on the German question. Indeed, Ulbricht himself has actually gone beyond his prior demand for full diplomatic recognition by Bonn to insist upon West Germany's renunciation of its membership in NATO and sweeping political changes within the Federal Republic as essential preconditions for any normalization of East German-West German relations.[18] Such intransigence was put to the acid test with the signing of the Soviet-West German Treaty of August 1970. While the longer-range political consequences of that agreement cannot be accurately gauged, the hopes expressed by some quarters in Bonn that it would lead directly to an acceptable Berlin settlement and a concomitant reduction of the DDR's influence on Soviet policy have proved premature, to say the least. Basically out of sympathy with the Soviet-West German Treaty, Ulbricht has fought tooth and nail against the détentist conception of it held by Bonn. In so doing, he has sought not merely to limit its inroads with respect to the DDR's position but also to engineer, if possible, a major political defeat for the Brandt regime in Bonn. There is abundant evidence that Ulbricht has carried his fight for a German policy at once unyielding as concerns the DDR's interests and also politically offensive against the West into the highest councils of the Kremlin and done so with considerable success, at least so far.

Underlying this tough international stance was an assessment of the East German domestic scene which while officially boastful of economic efficiency and political stability nonetheless remains fearful of the possibly disruptive consequences of a genuine relaxation of international tensions. Before venturing an assessment of the DDR's future prospects, we must, therefore, first turn to a consideration of the internal sphere.

IN the first instance, there can be no mistaking the impressiveness of East Germany's economic growth during the sixties. Several key

[18] Cf. Ulbricht's statement to an international press conference, *Neues Deutschland*, 20 January 1970. See also Ulbricht's remarks of 17 March 1970 on French television as quoted in Ilse Spittmann, 'Deutscher Gipfel in Erfurt', *Deutschland-Archiv*, vol. III, no. 4, April 1970, p. 432. In view of the domestic political utility of international tension over Germany and the economic advantages accruing from Western non-recognition of the DDR (which permits trade between East Germany and West Germany to be treated as domestic German trade and thus confers upon the DDR certain EEC privileges), it can be questioned as to whether the DDR is really interested in *de jure* recognition from Bonn. See Joachim Nawrocki, 'Viele wollen die Anerkennung—will sie auch Ulbricht?' *Deutschland-Archiv*, vol. III, no. 1, January 1970, pp. 35–7.

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indicators will suffice to convey a sense of the overall picture. The annual growth rate of the gross national product which had fallen to 3·7 per cent in 1961 and 3·3 per cent in 1962 attained the following levels in subsequent years: 4·2 per cent (1963), 7·4 per cent (1964), 9·5 per cent (1965), 5·5 per cent (1966), 8·3 per cent (1967), 7·1 per cent (1968). Between 1964 and 1968 industrial production increased at an average annual rate in excess of 6 per cent. Agricultural production which in the wake of the brutal collectivization of 1960 showed a negative growth rate of –1·5 per cent for 1961 and –2·3 per cent for 1962 experienced a dramatic recovery and recorded the following annual percentage increases: 12·3 per cent (1963), 13 per cent (1964), 11·5 per cent (1965), 10·6 per cent (1966), 6·1 per cent (1967), 6·5 per cent (1968).[19] Considering East Germany's dismal economic performance earlier, this record could not have been compiled without some fairly major changes. The erection of the Berlin Wall in August 1961, with its stabilizing effect on the labour force, was an essential condition but scarcely a sufficient one as the continued downward spiral experienced in 1962 clearly indicates. Something more was required to attain the foregoing growth record and it came in the form of a major overhaul of previous economic practices. As first introduced in 1963, these changes seemed to involve such a sharp departure from established Party orthodoxy as to suggest to many Western observers the strong possibility of widespread ideological erosion and a concomitant relaxation of the SED dictatorship. Yet nothing of the sort has yet happened. If anything, political control and ideological discipline are more strongly in evidence today than at the outset of the new economic programme. To understand why this is the case is also to appreciate how little the theory and practice of East Germany's economic development have had in common with the ideas espoused by Ota Sik and his school in Czechoslovakia or, for that matter, with the liberalizing practices now quietly unfolding in Hungary. In fact, it is a moot question as to whether the East German economic programme deserves to be dignified with the designation 'reform' or ought rather to be termed a case of rationalization and modernization.[20]

As initially unveiled at the Sixth SED Party Congress in January 1963, the East German economic overhaul owed much to the Liberman discussions in the Soviet Union. The New Economic System of Planning and Management (NES), as it was originally designated, never really sought to do away with central planning but rather to combine it with certain market economy principles. With that goal in mind, the NES called for a thorough overhaul of the entire price system to take realistic

[19] Calculated on the basis of East German statistical annuals by Joachim Nawrocki, 'Auferstanden aus Ruinen. Zwanzig Jahre DDR-Wirtschaft', *Deutschland-Archiv*, vol. II, no. 9, September 1969, table 3, p. 948.

[20] Cf. Richard V. Burks, *Technological Innovation and Political Change in Communist Eastern Europe*, Rand Corporation Memorandum, August 1969 and, for a general background discussion, Michael Garmarnikow, *Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe* (Detroit, 1968).

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account of the actual value of capital equipment and the economic costs of all productive processes. Moreover, the original East German blueprint also envisaged administrative decentralization of decision-making authority and unprecedented reliance upon various material incentives. All these announced objectives seemed to sanctify economic practices that had long been officially castigated as 'revisionist' and, perhaps for that reason, many Western observers looked to the implementation of such measures as a harbinger of the eventual relaxation of the Party's ideological grip over society.

So far all such expectations have been disappointed, although it would be more accurate to report that in the East German case, they have never really been permitted to come to the test. For no sooner had the pressing task of revamping the price structure been successfully completed than the regime began to reverse direction with respect to more basic structural changes in the economy. This became evident with respect to the degree of autonomy to be accorded to individual enterprises (VEB) and industrial branch combines (VVB). As originally formulated, the New Economic System seemed to accord a considerable degree of autonomy both to individual enterprises and industrial combines. As if to sanctify this novel autonomy and underscore the acceptance of certain free market principles, the VVBs were officially heralded as 'socialist concerns' whose task it was to serve as 'the leading economic organs' and their managers received the imposing but previously abjured title of 'General Director'. Yet, although precise regulations governing the rights, duties, and responsibilities of the VVB and the VEB were drawn up, they were never promulgated. Indeed, at the end of 1965, the 'General Directors' of the 'socialist concerns' had to forfeit many of their freshly granted decision-making prerequisites. The VVBs lost their financial autonomy and were once again subordinated to their respective industrial ministries. At the same time, the National Economic Council, which had been initially charged with providing overall economic co-ordination under NES, was abolished. Its functions reverted back to the State Planning Commission whose role was thereby considerably strengthened. At the Eleventh SED Central Committee Plenum in December 1965, Ulbricht announced a transition to the 'second stage of the New Economic System', but in retrospect it is clear that what he actually had in mind were more narrowly restrictive practices aimed at maintenance of central direction and control of the economy. Thus, when the Seventh SED Party Congress, meeting in April 1967, rechristened the New Economic System as the Economic System of Socialism more was involved than merely a change in name. As the economic discussions at the Seventh Congress repeatedly emphasized, the accent was henceforth to fall upon 'mastering the scientific-technical revolution'. This entailed a novel imperative which the Chairman of the Council of Ministers, Willi Stoph, formulated as the need 'to study thoroughly and apply the newest findings in the field of cybernetics, information theory, input-output and systems

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analysis and other specialized fields of knowledge'.[21] In other words, the point had become to streamline central planning and economic administration so as to improve further overall economic performance, but essentially from the top down and in a manner that had very little to do with any prior intimation of decentralization.

If any doubt remained on this score, it was entirely dispelled by the Ulbricht regime's highly explicit reaction to the economic reforms that had been projected for Czechoslovakia. Not only did the SED leadership see fit to engage in personal vilification of individual Czechoslovak economists of the reformist persuasion but it has also subjected their doctrines to close scrutiny, all of it harshly critical. Particularly heavy fire has been concentrated upon certain free market principles which the SED itself had seemed to endorse at the outset of its own New Economic System. All such notions have now become anathema, for they are held to embody 'petty bourgeois ideas of spontaneity', forming part and parcel of 'modern revisionism' and, as such, detrimental to the very survival of socialism. In this connexion, Ulbricht himself provided an unwitting illustration of the degree to which some of his own previously expressed thoughts concerning the DDR's NES had undergone change. In 1964, the East German leader had spoken of the need to realize 'a certain self-administration in the economic system on the basis of the plan'.[22] In 1968, however, he had this to say:

> So-called self-administration—or I ought to deal with the concept more exactly and say bourgeois self-administration of enterprises—embodies a renunciation of the concentrated energetic drive led by the state as a whole for the highest scientific attainment on structurally determined bases; it expresses renunciation of the aim of systematically developing the economic foundations of the freedom and independence of the socialist states.[23]

The SED party organ, *Neues Deutschland*, summarized the gist of Ulbricht's remarks in even blunter language when it evoked the venerable but almost forgotten Stalinist motto: 'Plan discipline is state discipline'.[24]

Recent pronouncements have gone so far in the direction of extolling central planning and the politically controlled economy that one must guard against the unwarranted conclusion that actual practice has entirely reverted to the bad old days of the pre-NES period. Despite the recrudescence of ideological appeals in place of economic laws and

[21] As quoted in Nawrocki, 'Zwanzig Jahre DDR-Wirtschaft', loc. cit. p. 950.

[22] Concluding remarks to the Seventh SED Central Committee Plenum, December 1964 as quoted in Walter Ulbricht, *Zum neuen ökonomischen System der Planung und Leitung* ([East] Berlin, 1966), p. 116. Cf. Kurt Erdmann, 'Das Ende des Neuen Ökonomischen Systems', *Deutschland-Archiv*, vol. I, no. 9, December 1968, pp. 998–1001.

[23] Walter Ulbricht, *Die weitere Gestaltung des gesellschaftlichen Systems des Sozialismus* (Report to the Ninth SED Central Committee Plenum, October 1968) ([East] Berlin, 1970), p. 49.

[24] 'Plandisziplin', *Neues Deutschland*, 13 November 1968.

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recent signs of stagnation in certain industrial sectors, the phenomenal growth of the sixties remains an accomplished fact. Given the overall achievement, it is small wonder that the standard of living should have risen so steadily and that this should have contributed to the process of reconciliation between the population and the regime. Moreover, the great premium still placed upon economic expertise, administrative skill, and scientific talent also serves the same purpose. By opening up new avenues of social mobility, the drive for economic growth has increasingly stamped the DDR as a 'career oriented society', something that has offered an additional basis for rallying popular allegiance, especially on the part of the younger generations.[25] Finally, for all its doctrinal rigidity, the SED too has had to bow to some practical imperatives of the new economic course. Toward society as a whole it has greatly de-emphasized political terror, which, while always held in ready reserve, has come to be augmented by a network of institutionalized controls. Within the Party's own ranks, no less than within other administrative structures, new scope has been provided for careers based on talent.

The latter development has been examined in great detail by a West German political sociologist whose findings led him to the conclusion that rather than qualifying as a 'totalitarian' political system, the DDR might better be characterized as a case of 'consultative authoritarianism'.[26] In his view, a managerial-technocratic 'counter-elite' has arisen in juxtaposition to the 'strategic clique' composed of ageing Party functionaries around Ulbricht. There is, of course, ample evidence to support such an argument. One need only consider the meteoric rise of such previous political unknowns as Günther Mittag, Politburo member and Central Committee Secretary for Economic Affairs, Werner Jarowinsky, Politburo candidate and Central Committee Secretary for Trade and Supply, George Ewald, Politburo candidate and agricultural specialist, two Central Committee members, Günther Klieber, a data processing expert, and Walter Halbritter, a financial specialist, and the late Eric Apel, Politburo candidate and the reputed mastermind of the NES until his suicide in late 1965. These are only a few of the more prominent members of the new breed of men of high competence in the special fields who have been co-opted into the top echelons of the SED. One can point to their counterparts at lower levels throughout both Party and state bureaucracies, especially in the field of economic administration. Yet, nothing would be wider of the mark than to suppose that such specialists comprise a self-conscious managerial-technocratic faction, much less that they constitute a force necessarily making for liberalization. To be sure, none of the members of the 'counter-elite' has manifested any special concern for ideological matters. By virtue of their background, training,

[25] Cf. Ernst Richert, *Das zweite Deutschland*, and Peter Christian Ludz. 'Die Zukunft der DDR', *Die Zeit*, 10 October 1969.
[26] Peter Christian Ludz, *Parteielite im Wandel* (Köln and Opladen, 1968).

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and above all else occupational responsibilities, they are always susceptible of neglecting 'fundamental ideological positions' and thus may possibly come into conflict with more narrowly political decision-makers. Yet, it has been characteristic of the Ulbricht leadership that it has fostered the advancement of managerial-technocratic talent without surrendering one iota of the Party's claim to political primacy. Indeed, given the Ulbricht regime's political psychology, it is not surprising that it has remained on the alert to any even implicit challenge to the political authority of the 'strategic clique' on the part of the 'counter-elite'. If individual technocrats ever aspired to play a greater political role, they received a sharp rebuff in connexion with Czechoslovakia. For once the Prague reformers were overwhelmed by force of arms, Ulbricht began to hammer home a point that may well have been insufficiently stressed in the DDR's preoccupation with economic growth, namely that the Party's primacy had to be vigorously exercised, if it were not to be lost. Significantly enough, it fell to Günther Mittag, the very member of the political elite who seemed most to embody managerial-technocratic attributes to champion the Party as 'the leading force and not some kind of societal interest group representation'.[27] This he did in the course of a stinging rebuke to Günther Kohlmey, a prominent East German economist who found himself in trouble in the fifties for a 'revisionist' attitude toward political control. The larger lesson of this personal rebuke was only too obvious. Whatever their individual predilections, members of the 'counter-elite' would henceforth be required to show a healthy respect for the disciplinary value of ideological guidance and supervision.

As for the Party old guard itself, it certainly takes its own ideological professions with dead seriousness. In this respect, as in so many other, Czechoslovak developments proved a catalyst for a sustained counter-offensive on the part of the SED. Maintaining that Dubcek and company had fallen victim to notions of convergence between East and West as well as to a host of other revisionist currents allegedly fostered by the West as a particularly sinister form of psychological warfare against the socialist bloc, Party spokesmen now called for uncompromising ideological purity. In order to counter the appeals of 'humanistic socialism', the SED has devoted considerable energy to developing its own image of the future under what is now officially termed 'the developed social system of socialism'.[28] Premised on a distrust of individualism and a fear of pluralism, the official concept amounts to a blueprint for an integrated network of social subsystems tied to the 'economic system of socialism' with the entire elaborate monolith motored by sophisticated techniques of social control operated by the Party as the repository of political authority and ideological

[27] *Neues Deutschland*, 27 October 1968.

[28] See Ulbricht, *Die weitere Gestaltung des gesellschaftlichen Systems des Sozialismus*. The new official textbook, *Politische Ökonomie des Sozialismus und ihre Anwendung in der DDR* ([East] Berlin, 1970) is especially instructive.

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truth. This is the sense in which Kurt Hager, the SED's ranking ideologist, boasted that the DDR is 'correctly programmed' and yet also emphasized how the 'programming' should function in relation to political goals:

> cybernetics, systems theory, operations research, etc. are in their scientific discoveries in complete agreement with the fundamental principles of dialectical materialism. But they are not indentical with the Marxist-Leninist world view and cannot substitute for its specific task. That must be most decisively asserted. *The specific task of the scientific world view of the working class cannot be replaced by any other science.*[29]

To round out this picture of ideological orthodoxy linked to the mystique of technology a word should be said about the role of official nationalism. Given Germany's national division and the psychological predisposition of many veteran SED functionaries to 'proletarian internationalism' the problem of nationalism has always been a particularly touchy one. Reflecting tactical uncertainties of the moment, there has also been considerable ambiguity, even in official pronouncements, as to whether East Germany could be said to constitute a separate *nation.* Nonetheless, a doctrine of the DDR as the 'better, truer' Germany has been heavily propagated both for purposes of additional social cement at home and as a weapon in East Germany's rivalry with the Federal Republic. For purposes of enlisting foreign Germanophobia against West Germany, the contrast between the DDR as an ostensibly peaceful, progressive, and humane society has sometimes been pushed to the point where the East Germans are depicted as not really German at all. For domestic consumption, needless to say, the emphasis is entirely different and historical continuity is particularly stressed. Laying claim to all the towering figures of classical German culture, as well as, of course, to its pre-Marxist and Marxist revolutionary traditions, DDR official nationalism also seeks to inculcate a pride in East Germany's own achievements of economic reconstruction and industrial development. But most striking of all has been the incorporation of Prussian virtues into the official doctrine, such that its rhetoric and symbols, together with the regime's rigid authoritarianism, increasingly serve to convey the image of a distinctive Prussian brand of communism.

Nowhere has the official combination of 'ideology, technology, and nationality' taken a greater toll than in the cultural field, where the regime has never been inclined to show any real permissiveness. Even during the relatively mild period, 1963–65, the Party's cultural watchdogs always remained on the alert. At the international literary conference, held at Liblice near Prague in May 1963, they had fought hard to prevent the 'rehabilitation' of Franz Kafka whose protagonists the SED today counts among the 'intellectual forerunners

[29] *Neues Deutschland*, 30 April 1969.

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of counter-revolution' in Czechoslovakia.[30] At home, they banned unpalatable foreign authors, including the Soviet writer, Solzhenitsyn, and pounced upon a wide variety of heterodox expression. As a result, the Party declared war on East Germany's best-known intellectual figures and hounded individuals as diverse as Stefan Heym, the novelist-essayist, Robert Havemann, the scientist-philosopher, and Wolf Biermann, the unconventional ballad-singer.[31] The denouement occurred at the Eleventh SED Central Committee Plenum in December 1965 which, incidentally, was the very same forum at which Ulbricht announced the transition to a second, more restrictive stage of the New Economic System. Only the novelist, Christa Wolf, then a candidate member of the Central Committee, rose to champion the claims of intellectual creativity and for her temerity she was subsequently dropped from that Party body. When the authoress of the internationally acclaimed novel, *Divided Heaven*, completed a new book, *Thoughts About Christa T.*, in 1969, the edition authorized for publication was so tiny as to earmark it entirely for cultural functionaries who promptly attacked its concern with the human condition as propagating 'false ideological concepts'.[32]

Christa Wolf's difficulties constitute only one illustration among many of the official straitjacket in which the regime continues to hold East German culture. Quite apart from the total prohibition on any expression of political dissidence, the SED insists upon Party-mindedness in the most narrowly restrictive sense. Consider the following guidelines, laid down by the Kurt Hager, preparatory to the Sixth East German Writers' Congress in 1969:

> The Marxist artist and scientist must not forget for a single moment that aesthetic-artistic pursuits involve ideological processes and that these ideological processes decide the essential core of a work of art and also that its 'structure' is to be determined by that fact and by its function in the society process.[33]

To reduce the possibility of further annoyance from intellectuals more concerned with depicting the fate of the individual than with meeting ideologically determined requirements relating to 'the societal process', the regime has multiplied its control mechanisms on the cultural front. The precepts of the so-called 'Bitterfeld Way', first introduced in 1959 under Ulbricht's personal imprimatur, have once again been extolled as the correct method to overcome the division of labour between

[30] See the remarks of Klaus Gysi, DDR Minister of Culture, in *Neues Deutschland*, 29 August 1968 and the three-part series, 'Die geistigen Vorbeiter der Konterrevolution', ibid., 10, 11, 12 September 1968 as well as the remarks of Ulbricht to the Ninth SED Central Committee Plenum, ibid. 25 October 1968.

[31] For a general discussion, see M. Reich-Ranicki, 'The Writer in East Germany', *Survey*, no. 61, October 1966, pp. 186–195. On Biermann, cf., Margaret Vallance, 'Wolf Biermann: The Enfant Terrible as Scapegoat', ibid. pp. 177–185.

[32] 'Kunstwerke entstehen nicht in Selbstlauf', *Neues Deutschland*, 1 May 1969.

[33] 'Grundfragen des geistigen Lebens in Sozialismus', *Neues Deutschland*, 30 April 1969.

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intellectuals and manual workers. In practice this means that Party functionaries with scant understanding and less sympathy for the life of the mind are to take individual writers and artists in hand so as to put an end to their social isolation and sense of alienation. In line with this approach, the regime has now struck upon the novel device of 'social editors' to be drawn from the production line to instruct authors as to what is socially useful and what must be censored.[34]

Given so repressive an atmosphere, it is scarcely surprising that almost all critical voices have fallen completely silent. The sole exception is that of Professor Robert Havemann, whose public lectures attacking dogmatism and Stalinism and calling for greater freedom of opinion, information, and criticism in East Germany caused official scandal in 1963 and resulted in his ouster from the SED and enforced retirement. Although subject to repeated harassment, and recently under police surveillance, Havemann has remained defiant and, remarkably enough under the circumstances, also managed to send out to the West repeated statements of his personal beliefs. While it obviously is impossible to ascertain with any degree of precision how widespread these beliefs may be, there are good grounds for supposing that something akin to Havemann's position is shared by many other critical East German intellectuals. However this may be, Havemann's personal beliefs add up to an extraordinary profession of 'modern revisionism' of precisely the kind the SED ideologues purport so greatly to fear. Already on record with an endorsement of the 1968 Czechoslovak reforms as the right way to achieve 'a radical and uncompromising breakthrough to socialist democracy',[35] Havemann recently elaborated upon the same basic theme. In an essay, entitled 'Tomorrow's Socialism', he took the DDR to task for 'its political contradictions, the Wall, its tutelage of literature and its petty bourgeois puritanism' and offered the following alternative perspectives: 'Economic democracy, that is, popular rule over the economy, requires the realization of political democracy, that is, the transition to democratic socialism. And only this achievement will signify, politically and socially, completion of the socialist revolution.'[36] The contrast between Havemann's aspirations for socialism and the official conception currently propagated by the SED could hardly be more complete.

WHAT future, then, can one predict for East Germany? If the DDR's present domestic rigidity and international intransigence bear the unmistakable stamp of Ulbricht's personal leadership, can major changes be anticipated now that he has departed from the scene? Certainly, there is no single successor on the horizon who seems to combine

[34] For a detailed discussion and analysis of the 'Bitterfeld Way' and the latest control mechanisms, see Dorothy Miller, 'The East German Literary Scene', Radio Free Europe Research Report, 4 June 1969.

[35] *Svet v Obrazech* (Prague), 21 May 1969.

[36] Robert Havemann, 'Der Sozialismus von morgen', *Die Zeit*, 10 October 1969.

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Ulbricht's tactical agility with his purposeful firmness nor yet any individual who appears politically powerful enough to lay effective claim to the mantle of Ulbricht's personal authority. Unless all present signs are misleading, East Germany after Ulbricht seems destined to have its first experience of collective leadership, most likely to be shared by Erich Honecker, the newly appointed First Secretary of the SED, Willi Stoph, the Chairman of the Council of Ministers, and, perhaps, Günter Mittag, the Politburo's economic specialist. Collective leadership invariably means weakened leadership and it is always susceptible to further impairment as the result of personal rivalries and factional in-fighting. Given the distinctive political styles of the leading candidates for the East German succession as well as the different interests they appear to stand for, disputes over domestic policy matters are a distinct possibility. If, as some recent signs clearly suggest, economic growth stagnates, latent tension between managerial-technocratic elements, exemplified by Mittag, and the professional Party functionaries, led by Honecker, could well erupt into open conflict. Yet, it would be premature to anticipate a direct challenge to the Party's primacy on the part of the managerial-technocratic 'counter-elite'. Members of the new elite must be presumed to have developed a full sense of vested interest in the SED regime and consequently a sensitivity to the threat to their own position which might arise from any dismantling of its authoritarian structures. For these reasons as well as by virtue of their narrow professional concerns, it would be grossly misleading to expect the 'counter-elite' to emerge as a champion of 'humanistic socialism', whose appeals have been largely restricted to members of the humanistic intelligentsia. And the latter group, it should be stressed, has always been far removed from the centres of actual power. For better or worse, it is only in keeping with the tradition of German political culture, as distinct from that of Slavic Europe, to expect a perpetuation of the classic cleavage between *Geist* and *Macht*.

This is not to rule out a future extension of various 'small freedoms' to the population as a whole, if only in the interest of further economic growth or else for purposes of streamlining the dictatorship at home and improving its image abroad. With as tightly controlled a political system as that of the DDR, however, a serious problem is bound to arise with respect to managing the unintended consequences of any such concessions. Contrary to the currently fashionable supposition in the West, the East German population cannot be written off as either so materially satisfied or else so stupefied and submissive as to be permanently immunized against the lure of major political change. The incalculable number of protests, undertaken at great individual risk, against the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 and the more recent spontaneous outburst of popular acclaim for Willy Brandt when the Federal Chancellor visited Erfurt testify to a climate of opinion that is potentially quite volatile, reason enough, from the point of view of all aspirants to power after Ulbricht, to practise the greatest restraint in

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tampering with existing political controls. Finally, all ranking members of the political elite realize as did Ulbricht the implications of Germany's national division for their own hold on power. As long as they continue to feel insecure by virtue of the absence of a genuine national base for their rule, none of East Germany's future leaders seems likely to venture too boldly upon the path of relaxation at home.

In the final analysis, therefore, the future of intra-German relations may exert greater influence on internal East German developments than vice versa. While progress on the German question as a whole still depends first and foremost upon agreement between the two superpowers, the scope for initiative on the part of the two German states is considerable. So far Ulbricht has used the leeway available to him to try to block movement towards *détente*. It is at least conceivable that his successors may prove more flexible or else more susceptible to pressures from Moscow, should the Kremlin deem it in its own interest to resume diplomatic initiatives with respect to Germany. Should that in fact come to pass, the range of possible longer-term consequences is truly vast. At one extreme, if the DDR's long-standing international demands were gradually satisfied and if its domestic structures were simultaneously streamlined without impairing the regime's institutional controls, that might encourage a more self-confident successor leadership in East Berlin to attempt to play an increasingly active role in West German political life, perhaps even to the point of advancing the DDR and its 'socialist achievements' as something of a German Piedmont from which to propagate appeals for a revivified German national communism. At the other extreme, a gradual reduction of tensions between the DDR and the Federal Republic might contribute to a political rapprochement between the two German states in such a way as to induce major internal changes in East Germany that might ultimately produce a political order more nearly in line with West German aspirations. In either instance, as in other, shorter-term and more plausible scenarios, the political interaction between the two parts of divided Germany seems destined to increase rather than to diminish. If, mindful of this likelihood and, much like Ulbricht, fearful of its potentially disruptive domestic consequences, the East German leadership of the seventies resolutely sets its face against any inner-German rapprochement, it remains in its power to prevent it. For the immediate future, the transition of leadership in East Berlin itself militates against any fresh initiative on the German question. The ingrained instincts of Ulbricht's successors dictate caution and their reactionary reflexes are certain to have powerful backing from Brezhnev and company in the Kremlin. Whether Moscow can successfully pursue the twin objectives of political consolidation in East Germany and diplomatic flexibility with respect to West Germany remains extremely doubtful. Any Western policy that offered the Soviet leadership an opportunity to attempt to do both things simultaneously would surely prove self-defeating.

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Chile under Allende

Luis Mercier Vega

THOUGH the Chilean revolution is most frequently presented in the press in an impressionistic fashion in order to exalt or disparage, it deserves a less emotional analysis. Primarily because it illustrates a particular aspect of a more general movement which can be discerned in several Latin American countries; secondly because the methods used and the trend followed correspond to what one might call—recent though it is—a national tradition.

Under cover of dissimilar, often opposing phraseology, various regimes, ill-defined by formulas based on European and Anglo-Saxon phenomena, are pursuing identical courses. A military junta may decree agricultural reform, intervene in the running of private enterprise, nationalize several foreign companies, establish control over credits, and outline an ambitious programme for industrial development. This is in fact happening in Peru, a country considered a classic example of the oligarchic system a few years ago. Another military regime is carrying out expropriation measures affecting North American companies, and gropes, yet in a resolute fashion, towards fostering the birth of a national industry. This is the case in Bolivia less than 20 years after a popular revolution which, after its initial impetus, became bogged down in corruption and disarray as the various parties jockeyed for power.

Even if the situation in other regions is less clearly defined, it is easy to list a series of governmental decisions which follow the same trend; this is even true of Venezuela where the spirit of free enterprise is extolled, but where the powerful community of interests represented by those who depend directly on the state exercises a constant pressure to reduce the privileges of the big North American companies.

As for Mexico, where the bourgeoisie remains dependent on the state, close economic ties with the United States do not in any way hinder the extolling of nationalist feelings. Luis Echeverria's new term as president will probably introduce a programme to bring the banking system under control by nationalizing a series of financial concerns, and by creating new industrial enterprises on state initiative. Within the Institutional Revolutionary Party, the 'licenciado', that is the politician-intellectual, is giving up some of his power to the technocrat.

There would be no point in trying to interpret these tendencies and decisions according to classified ideologies. The Peruvian President, Velasco, has held office effectively under both conservative or slightly reformist regimes. General Torres took part in the elimination of the guerrillas in east Bolivia. Similarly one can be sure that no leftist opposition would be tolerated by the Mexican regime were it to act in defiance of the rules laid down by the official party.

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THE Chilean revolution, resulting from the presidential elections of September 1970, bears the standard of the Popular Union, that is a coalition of left-wing parties, ranging from the Communist and Socialist Parties right to the Radical Party and including dissent Christian Democrat and independent groups. Thus politically the situation is clearer. A president and a programme was chosen.

One must also stress that if this programme had not corresponded to a current of opinion which was of greater significance than the President's personality and with a wider appeal than the Popular Union has itself, the choice of Salvador Allende would have been impossible. In fact the Popular Union candidate received 36·30 per cent of the vote; the 'National' candidate, Jorge Alessandri, received 34·98 per cent and the standard-bearer of the Christian Democrats 27·84 per cent. If Allende had a comfortable majority in the industrial centre of Concepción, he was behind Alessandri in Great Santiago and behind Rodomiro Tomic at Valparaiso.

Thus the parliamentary groups of Christian Democrats had to cast their votes, decisive as they were, for the leader of the Popular Union in order for him to become President. This, it would seem, has a greater significance than a simple electoral calculation or a concoction of the parliamentary kitchen. This is especially so if one remembers that the National candidate, Jorge Alessandri, publicly advised his friends on the eve of the Chambers' decision not to stand in the way of the election of Allende as President.

The traditional respect in Chile for constitutional procedures would not have been able to resist the violence of fundamentally conflicting interests. It would have been theoretically and legally possible to give the victory to the Christian Democrat candidate when the Chambers met, for the National votes would have gone to him; though the candidate in question, Rodomiro Tomic, would probably have refused, followed by an important faction of the Christian Democrats.

It is therefore clear that the essential points of Allende's programme, quite apart from their presentation in propaganda terms, reflected solutions accepted by a real majority and also related to problems which all politicians regarded as important.

A close look at the programmes of the three candidates reveals several similarities; obviously these are most evident between the Popular Union and the Christian Democrats. Above all there is the emphasis on the role which the state is to play in initiating essential economic development. The state is to plan, control foreign investment, regulate credits, stimulate the spirit of enterprise on behalf of Alessandri whose main aim is to create and foster a dynamic industrial class which will take over from the landed proprietors ill-adapted to a modern economy. Thus there is to be agrarian reform, but without haste or upheavals.

In the Christian Democrat programme, the state must instigate efforts towards capitalization—work and savings—necessary for an economic upsurge, but in such a way as to avoid foreign debts and to bring about

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real national independence. It will be a question both of pruning dead wood, such as the oligarchy of lazy landowners, and of doing some grafting. It will entail nationalizing the main resources, creating such institutions as are necessary for an 'industrial take-off', by demanding of private enterprise a level of efficiency indispensable in a planned economy, by financing concerns which are co-directed by the workers and also others administered by public authorities.

For the economists of the Popular Union, the lack of a national bourgeoisie lends a decisive importance to 'social property' which will become the economy's leading sector, and will be formed 'by the business concerns already owned by the state, by nationalizing those which exploit the country's basic resources (the big mining industries in copper, iron, and nitrates) and by expropriating further business concerns, especially in the manufacturing industry and in the distribution and finance sectors'.[1]

It is a matter of mobilizing the national resources in such a way as to regain full sovereignty for the country, by eliminating the costly burden of any foreign presence as well as the privileged classes which 'make money' in a way detrimental to the country, in close relation with foreign interests, especially the United States.

It should be noted that there is a curious similarity in these three trends in that they all stress either the incapability or non-existence of an industrial bourgeoisie. For the Nationalists it is a question of bringing this class back to life—to the position it held for a brief period in the nineteenth century—by demanding state support; for the Christian Democrats it is a question of giving it a chance though within the limits of an organized and directed society; the Marxist left on the other hand consider it as incapable and harmful and would substitute state ownership and state initiative in its place.

THIS is not in any way a new discovery. At the time of the Pacific war, which was waged and won against Chile's neighbours to the north with a view to adding provinces rich in nitrates to the national heritage, the right to exploit these resources was given . . . to British companies. The propertied class's glaring lack of imagination and boldness was already evident.

More recently, under Aguirre Cerda's government, the Corporación de Fomento (CORFO) was created to make up for the deficiency of the moneyed class in the business sphere. This state concern, which unfortunately has not yet been properly analysed, has survived changing governments. CORFO, set up at the same time as the Popular Front at the end of the thirties—a Popular Front which wanted nothing to do with agricultural reform and in which the Radical Party, closely connected with the big landowners of the south, was the dominant force —has frequently initiated the forming of new companies and industries.

[1] *Panorama Economico*, no. 56, August 1970, Santiago, Chile.

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It has played a constant and important part despite various necessary adaptations to the programmes of the changing leading parties. Today, it is an essential part of the new regime's plan. It is CORFO which acts as buyer and administrator to the controlled, expropriated or nationalized firms.

For President Allende's programme is being put into practice with great rapidity. This racing pace is not confined to agricultural reform under Jacques Chonchol (which is especially felt in the south, as all farms exceeding 80 hectares of cultivable land are to be expropriated) for the nationalization of concerns is also well under way. Four banks are already under state control: the Continental Bank, the O'Higgins Bank, the Israeli Bank, and the National Work Bank. Bargaining of a delicate nature is going on in order to enable the president to propose by legal means—which requires a modification in the Constitution—the total nationalization of the copper mines which are already 51 per cent 'Chileanized'. There have been 'interventions' in many businesses, especially in textiles. The big firm Zig-Zag, the main publishers in Chile, has been bought by the state. Many other projects are being put into practice which will all lead to centralization, to the concentration in the hands of the administration of commercial activities, such as tourism for example.

A solid phalanx of economists, directed by the Minister for Economic Affairs, Pedro Vuskovic, lead the way. Educated in the international studies centres, of which there are many in Santiago (United Nations, CEPAL, FLASCO, etc.), they are firmly resolved to try out an experiment which they believe will be decisive. Despite a divergence of methods, and despite different political affiliations, this group of intellectuals, anxious to be involved in the practical side of things, represents an important element of the rising class. It includes Christian Democrats, Socialists, independent technicians who, according to governmental changes, go from public administration to research institutes without their personal or professional relations being adversely affected.

IF there is unity between the parties and movements which form the victorious electoral coalition, it is mainly based on their common enmities: the ageing oligarchy and North American imperialism. Aware that they could not attain power on their own, Socialists, Communists, Radicals and dissident Christian Democrats closed rank to do battle. This obviously does not mean that the allies have lost their individual personality nor that their taking part in governing has paralyzed their internal struggles.

The Socialist Party, to which President Salvador Allende belongs, is far from homogeneous. Its history abounds in splits and regroupings. It harbours followers of the Jaurès tradition, old political groupings based on the regions, representatives from working-class boroughs, union groupings, revolutionaries of pro-Castro tendency. Just recently the extreme left faction got the lead over the former leadership and Aniceto Rodriguez

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has been replaced by Carlos Altamirano, whose political views are closer to those of MIR (that is the Movement of the Revolutionary Left) and less favourable to a socialist experiment which respects constitutional legality.

The Communist Party, with its solid organization and discipline seems to be the only political machine capable of manoeuvring and exploiting to the full the various possibilities offered by the present combination of circumstances. This Party is a product of the never-ceasing Stalinist gymnastics and it is probably the communist party of Latin America which is the most unquestioningly faithful to Soviet foreign policy. It holds key posts in the Chilean Workers' Union and it has also managed to win key posts in the student movements. Its rank and file is mostly composed of workers whereas its leadership is made up of old apparatchiks and obedient intellectuals.

The Radical Party, now that it has lost its former electoral power, worn out by sharing power and cut off from its best known leaders by internal crises, is no longer the axis of Chilean political life as it had been for decades. Its rank and file, composed of officials and petits-bourgeois, has diminished and is increasingly reluctant to follow leaders who can no longer offer protection and promotion.

As for MAPU, it is a little organization born of a split in the Christian Democrats at the end of Eduardo Frei's term as president and is made up of politically active people who were dissatisfied with the timorous nature of official policy. This party has also been undergoing changes: Jacques Chonchol has been replaced as head by Rodrigo Ambrosio, who has a more revolutionary outlook.

One can imagine how much bargaining and pressurizing the nominations for the various governmental posts entailed, thus reflecting the rivalries and ambitions of clans and clients. To such an extent that President Allende had to give a timely reminder that the Chilean revolution was to mark not only a transformation of the structures but also of ways of behaving.

It must be admitted that the forces of opposition do not give an example of unity. This is not only because the Christian Democrats agree partly with the new regime's programme of reforms and must be discerning with criticism and support but also, and especially, because it is feeling the repercussions of gaining power. The victory of 1964 had swelled the party to such an extent that its active members were often paralysed by the flood of new 'supports'. Tomic is more favourable to supporting the Allende experiment, even taking part in it, than the majority of the Party's active members are. On the other hand, Eduardo Frei is striving to reassemble and unify the party with the view in the near future of presenting himself as presidential candidate. This is a delicate business which would be threatened by the alienation of one or the other faction.

The National Party, revived by the important results obtained in the presidential election, knows all the same that it will be severely

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affected by the current reforms and by the dismantling of its bastions in the southern districts as a result of the agrarian reform.

The opposition of the Nationals is direct and constant, fed by the 'drivel' of certain governmental measures in the legal and agricultural spheres, in the press or in industry. It aims to involve the Christian Democrats in common activities and to emerge as a parliamentary front which would hold a majority in the Chamber as well as in the Senate.

Before casting its votes with those of the parties forming the Popular Union, the Christian Democrats negotiated a sort of pact with President Allende, which did not in any way modify the Popular Union's programme but which aimed to guarantee the maintenance of democratic freedoms (of the press, of association, of the unions) and respect for constitutional methods.

It is on the basis of this agreement that the Christian Democrats intend to criticize certain decisions or to take a stand against procedures which they consider contrary to the rules of the political game. Briefly, both the Nationalists and the Christian Democrats have adopted the tactic of reminding Allende that he is President of all the Chileans, the guarantor of freedoms, and that he must forbid, even to his friends and allies, any infringement, blackmail or violence which might put strains on the functioning of parliamentary democracy.

OBVIOUS though the nature and extent of the problems seemed—underemployment and unemployment, low agricultural production, heavy foreign debts, inflation, dependence on international markets, low salaries, the housing crisis, mediocre progress in industry, businesses directly or indirectly controlled by foreign capital—it is difficult to make a comprehensive list of the social forces aspiring to change or rather to define to what extent these forces are really involved in the transformations being carried out.

Considerable pressure, inspired by dissatisfaction and aspirations of varying social origins, is being exerted in favour of a reorganization of Chilean society. No one can now present himself as a conservative. Yet this current of popular feeling only shows itself by the intermediary of parties which appeal to no specific class, simply on the electoral level.

The growing participation of voters in this form of political life (in 1970 there were two million more voters registered than in 1952) does not, or does not yet, mean the appearance of classifiable social forces. Thus the working class does not have a party of its own and its unions are meagre, divided and manipulated by the various parties. Similarly the peasantry which entered social life a few years ago, having been excluded from it previously, has not yet found an appropriate form of organization, although the state administration created various structures to bridge the gap.

The social composition of the parties remains heterogeneous and the big currents of popular feeling which can be felt at election time cannot be defined precisely. This lack of precision is representative

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of a type of society where the masses on the margins of society and in the third estate (lowest classes) drown the more clearly defined social classes.

The lack of a numerous proletariat with independent unions, or of an organized peasantry which expresses its will, only reinforces the role of the 'middle classes', the contours of which are also blurred. These factors conspire to give a predominant role to politicians or professional people who staff the state administration and whose behaviour is not only that of officials following orders and implementing policies but increasingly also that of directors responsible for decision-making.

This situation should be compared with the figures given by the Bureau for National Planning. The workers, who constitute 45 per cent of the labour force, receive 21 per cent of the national revenue. The employees (salaried workers), who constitute 24 per cent of the labour force, receive 32 per cent of the national revenue. The 'rest', independent people, businessmen, industrialists, landlords, etc., that is, 31 per cent of the labour force, obtain 47 per cent of the national revenue. Of this 'rest' it must be borne in mind that employers and people with private means (5 per cent) absorb 25 per cent.[2]

Thus the question arises, all ideology apart, whether the Chilean revolution does not in fact mean the elimination of the numerically sparse privileged class, and an attempt to use the 25 per cent of the national revenue allotted to them till now, to further development.

The question which then immediately follows is which criteria will be applied to the reallocation of these revenues. Will the working class be kept in its present position of absolute inferiority, by assuring the 'white collar workers' of their relatively privileged positions? In other words, one must ask, despite the proletarian and peasant phraseology used by the popular parties, whether we are not confronted with a 'revolution of the tertiary sector?'

THE first weeks of Allende's term as President have offered many illustrations of this problem. Many official speeches have been made, warning the 'privileged people' against their 'corporate egoism'. A threatened strike of the workers in the copper industry—mostly Chilean engineers and technicians, dissatisfied with the calculated payment of salaries, based on the American dollar—had to be forestalled. Another example was the occupation by families, who were homeless or from the shanty towns, of cheap flats which were still being built or just finished, intended for various categories of salary earners.

The rise of wages (presented as a measure of great social significance because it entailed a rise of 60 per cent in the basic wage) was in fact only intended to 'consolidate' a minimum wage which corresponds to the theoretical value of one dollar per day, but its practical value is half a dollar, hardly enough to buy two sandwiches in a 'fuente de soda'

[2] 1970 figures.

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in Santiago. Indeed this rise has already provoked serious discussion in the political bodies and many of the supporters of the Popular Union have advocated a general rise applicable to all categories of salaries and wages.

The scope of the Popular Union's programme no doubt exceeds the resources of which the President disposes or will dispose. The high rates for copper which favoured the Frei experiment fluctuate, and if the most recent trend is towards a rise, it is partly due to the delayed development of Chilean production.

A programme of austerity should be introduced as swiftly as possible, but the main problem is at whose cost this will be. The class contradictions actually within the conglomeration forming the Popular Union will doubtlessly make themselves felt. One may well feel sceptical about the enthusiasm of the little and middle bourgeois districts of Santiago, that may vote left, but that would not lightly agree to changing their style of life which depends to a large extent on the public administration itself. On the other hand, the many promises made in the course of the electoral campaign have raised justifiable hopes in the poorest sections of society, who will not accept from a popular and revolutionary government the type of arguments offered to them by regimes of the right or of a Christian Democrat nature.

These facts have not been overlooked by any of the political groups on the scene, whether in power or in opposition.

At the moment the Popular Union's programme is methodically put into practice and, one might even say, amplified by the thrust of the left-wing parties who followed their relative success in the presidential elections by a far greater triumph in the recent municipal elections.

These latest elections, at which each political group had to present itself alone, witnessed the upsurge of the Socialist Party, a less marked improvement for the Communist Party, and the consolidation of the Christian Democratic Party (which remains the most numerous). Each of the Popular Union parties can therefore congratulate itself.

If we take together all the votes of the parties allied in the Popular Union, they have nearly reached 50 per cent of the votes cast. But doubts persist whether the most important aim of the Allende programme, a constitutional reform which will institute a single Assembly, can be achieved.

The MIR, which maintains that revolution cannot take place within the narrow framework of bourgeois legality and that a clash between the popular forces and the financial powers is inevitable, relies on such confrontations taking place in the near future. Its followers are not numerous, except perhaps in student circles, but it has a discernible influence in the Socialist Party. Efforts have been made to organize pioneer groups in the vast shanty towns of Santiago, to win over and put to use a social force which is still fluid.

It is the Communist Party which opposes this trend most strongly. No doubt because it does not fit in with the Soviet Union's orders to act

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prudently. More decisive perhaps is the Communist Party's full awareness of the danger to itself embodied by an organization, sympathetic to the Cuban experiment, which claims to be Marxist, condemns shillyshallying and proclaims itself to be 'in the swing' of the great changes under way in Latin America. Thus it is a question of differences concerning tactics, but it is also essentially a struggle to preserve or break the monopoly of power over the popular organizations.

The district committees and those dealing with badly housed people, which were organized by the communists, denounce adventurism and the irresponsibility of the committees organized by the MIR and other 'leftists'. This all ended with the main MIR activist, Victor Toro, being arrested by the police (the Minister of the Interior is a Socialist, but the Under-Secretary of State is a member of the Communist Party). Similarly, during the various confrontations which took place between the different political groups over the control of the University of Concepción, a member of MIR was killed by a member of the Communist Party. (Two days later, the Communists proclaimed the necessity of 'saving the unity of the left', and an electoral list was issued, grouping the MIR and the Communist Party together.)

On the level of the unions, the communists have succeeded in getting the CUT, which they dominate, recognized as the only representative organization, and they are trying to restructure it in a way which would include all still remaining professional organizations with their own traditions. Thus according to tactical necessity the union's organization could be used to put a brake on the workers' demands or to deflect the government's policy.

The communists' success in infiltrating public positions and functions is almost complete. They achieved this not only by making full use of the period when the winners harried the highly-placed Christian Democrat officials, but also by securing for themselves a distinct lead over the coalition members in acquiring public posts (provincial administration, heads of public services, posts as under-secretaries).

Any attempt to go beyond the official or indeed semi-official limits would present grave problems. For example, reactions to the project for creating popular district tribunals were immediate and unyielding, not only from the opposition parties but also from the magistrature. Up till now President Allende has known how, and has been able, to avoid the occurrence of partisan actions in circumstances when he considered them inopportune, clumsy or dangerous for his own reform plan. Any break with constitutional procedure would provoke a counter-attack not only from the Christian Democrats and the Nationalists. It might also stir the Armed Forces into action, who, though prepared to accept and defend all reforms which are introduced and put into practice legally, would be very loath to see any form of direct party-power replacing the public administration and services.

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The Post-Industrial Society: the Evolution of an Idea

Daniel Bell*

THE sociologist is always tempted to play the prophet—and if not the prophet, the seer. From 1850 to 1860, as he sat each morning in the reading room of the British Museum, Marx thought he heard in every faint sound of riot or each creaking downturn of the trade cycle the rumblings of revolution and the abrupt transformation of society. In this respect, Marx's anxious awaiting was squarely in the centre of the preoccupation that attended the rise of sociology since its beginnings in the nineteenth century: namely, the scanning of the historical skies for the portents of 'the new class' which would overturn the existing social order. Henri de Saint-Simon, the master of August Comte and one of the fathers of modern sociology, initiated this quest in 1816 when he began publishing, irregularly, the periodical *L'Industrie* (popularizing there the word *industrialism*) and describing in it the society of the future. Past society, said Saint-Simon, had been military society in which the chief figures were priests, warriors, and feudal lords—the 'parasites' and consumers of wealth. The new industrial society, he said would be ruled by the producers—the engineers and the entrepreneurs, the 'coming men' of the times.

Different times, different men, different images. Writing in 1840, de Tocqueville predicted the possible outcome of the new mass democracy:

> A multitude of similar and equal individuals are working to procure themselves petty and vulgar satisfactions. . . . Above these men there rears a monstrous tutelary power [the state] which provides for their security, foresees and supplies their necessities, directs their industry, regulates the descent of property and subdivides their inheritances: what remains, but to spare them all the care of thinking and the trouble of living.[1]

Thirty years later Jacob Burckhardt, observing the transformation of German society, wrote in a letter to a friend:

> the military machine . . . is bound to become the model of existence . . . the military state will have to turn 'industrialist'. These agglomerations of men in the great factories [will live under] a degree of definite and superintended poverty where everyone

* This article is a continuation of our symposium on Post-Industrial Society (see *Survey*, No. 78).

[1] Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America* (New York, 1966), Part IV, Chapter 6, 'The Sort of Despotisms that Democratic Nations Have to Fear', pp. 666–667. I am indebted to J. P. Mayer's *Alexis de Tocqueville: A biographical study in political science* (Harper's Torchbook, 1960), pp. 121–122, for this and the following citation, but in both instances, in checking the original sources, I have extended his quotations.

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would wear the uniform and where the day would begin and end with the drum-roll; logically this is what should come.[2]

Fifty years after Burckhardt, Thorstein Veblen returned to the Saint-Simonian theme. Revolution in the twentieth century, he said, could only be an 'industrial overturn', and *if* a revolution came in the United States—the *if* is italicized for as a practised sceptic he was highly dubious of that prospect—it would not be led by a minority political party, as in Soviet Russia, which was a loose-knit and backward industrial region, nor by the trade unions, who were only 'votaries of the dinner pail', but by the production engineers who were the indispensable 'General Staff' of the industrial system. 'These main lines of revolutionary strategy', he wrote in *The Engineers and the Price System*, 'are lines of technical organization and industrial management; essential lines of industrial engineering; such as will fit the organization to take care of the highly technical industrial system that constitutes the indispensable material foundations of any modern civilized community.'[3]

What is extraordinary about these efforts to sketch the contours of the new age is the glimpse of truth each contains but also the shadow of complexity which falsifies the prediction. As Burckhardt added wryly, immediately after his own prediction of what 'logically' should come: 'I know enough history to know that things do not always work out logically.'[4]

OUR time, too, has not lacked for sociological seers. The habits of the past have been compelling, and even though previous experience warns of caution, the sense of social change is so vivid and the changes in social structure so dramatic that each sociological theorist of any pretension carries a distinctive conceptual map of the social terrain and a set of signposts to the society ahead.

For the new states or underdeveloped countries the prognosis has been standard: they will become industrialized, modernized, and westernized, even though it is less clear that they will be communist or socialist, socially transformed by elites (military or political) or revitalized by masses. One sceptic, Clifford Geertz, has remarked that the category 'transitional society' may become a permanent category in the social sciences. Yet for the *tiers monde* there is a sense of a turning point in history and the beginning of a new age.

For the advanced industrial societies the picture is more clouded. Every seer has a sense that an age is ending (how many 'crises', oh Lord, have we experienced), but there is little agreement as to what may be ahead. This common apocalyptic note of a 'sense of an ending' is, as Frank Kermode has noted, the distinctive literary image of the time.

[2] *The Letters of Jacob Burckhardt*, edited by Alexander Dru (London, 1955). Letter to Von Preen, 26 April, 1872, pp. 151–152.
[3] Thorstein Veblen, *The Engineers and the Price System*, Harbinger edition with an introduction by Daniel Bell (New York, 1963), p. 4.
[4] Op. cit. p. 152.

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In sociology this sense of marking time, of living in an interregnum, is nowhere symbolized so sharply as in the widespread use of the word *post*—a paradox since it is a prefix denoting posteriority—to define, as a combined form, the age in which we are moving.

For Ralf Dahrendorf, we are living in a *post-capitalist society*. What counts in industrial society, he says, is not ownership but authority, and with the diminution in the legal ownership of the means of production, there is, in consequence, a break between the economic and the political orders. The old industrial conflicts of bourgeoisie and proletariat are 'institutionally isolated' and there is little carry-over from the job to other areas of life. ('If it is correct that with industry itself industrial conflict has been institutionally isolated in post-capitalist societies, it follows that his occupational role has lost its comprehensive moulding force for the social personality of the industrial worker, and that it determines only a limited sector of his social behavior.') Authority is autonomous in each realm.

> (. . . in post-capitalist society the ruling and the subjected classes of industry and of the political society are no longer identical; that there are, in other words, in principle two independent conflict fronts. Outside the enterprise, the manager may be a mere citizen, the worker a member of parliament; their industrial class position no longer determines their authority position in the political society.)

It is post-capitalist society, in short, because relation to the instruments of production no longer decides dominance or power or privilege in society. Economic or property relations, while still generating their own conflicts, no longer carry over or become generalized as the major centre of conflict in society.

Who, then, constitutes the ruling class of post-capitalist society? 'We have to look for the ruling class', writes Dahrendorf, 'in those positions that constitute the head of bureaucratic hierarchies, among those persons who are authorized to give directives to the administrative staff'. But while there may be managerial or capitalist elites, real power is in the hands of the governmental elites. ('It is necessary to think of this elite in the first place, and never to lose sight of its paramount position in the authority structure of the state.') Conflicts occur primarily in the political arena; changes are introduced or prevented by the government elites; and when managerial or capitalist elites seek to exercise power outside their domains, they do so by seeking to influence governmental elites.

Who are the governmental elites? The administrative staff of the state, the government ministers in the cabinet, the judges. But since governments represent interests, there are 'groups behind' the elites.

> In abstract, therefore, the ruling political class of post-capitalist society consists of the administrative staff of the state, the governmental elites at its head and those interested parties which are represented by the governmental elite. This insistence on governmental elites as the core of the ruling class must be truly shocking

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> to anybody thinking in Marxian terms, or, more generally, in terms of the traditional concept of class,

Dahrendorf writes, but 'if it sounds strange . . . this strangeness is due to the strangeness of reality'.[5]

'The reality is', according to George Lichtheim, that 'the contemporary industrial society is increasingly "postbourgeois", the nineteenth-century class structure tending to dissolve along with the institution of private entrepreneurship on which it is pivoted. Hence the uncertainty that afflicts so much of current political thinking.' The reason is, says Lichtheim, that social welfare legislation and income redistribution 'are aspects of a socialization process' that circumscribe the operation of a market economy, while at the same time the spread of public ownership creates a new balance between the public and private sectors. 'Least of all does it follow that industrial society retains a "bourgeois" complexion. There cannot be a bourgeoisie without a proletariat, and if the one is fading out, so is the other, and for the same reason: Modern industrial society does not require either for its operation.'[6]

For Amitai Etzioni, we are in a 'post-modern' era. He opens his book. *The Active Society*, with the portentous pronouncement, 'The modern period ended with the radical transformation of the technologies of communication, knowledge and energy that followed the Second World War'. But nowhere else, literally, in the 670 pages of text, notes, and glossary that follow, is there a discussion of the technologies of communication, knowledge, and energy, or a specification of what, exactly, 'post-modern societies' are like. In the end we have to return to the intention, at the opening lines of the preface:

> A central characteristic of the modern period has been continued increase in the efficacy of the technology of production which poses a growing challenge to the primacy of the values they are supposed to serve. The post-modern period, the onset of which may be set at 1945, will witness either a greater threat to the status of these values by the surging technologies or a reassertion of their normative priority. Which alternative prevails will determine whether society is to be the servant or the master of the instrument it creates.

So, the post-modern, period or society, is not a definition, but only a question.[7]

For Kenneth Boulding, we are at the start of the *post-civilized* era. Since civilization, as Mr. Boulding points out, has had a favourable connotation and post-civilization may strike one as unfavourable, one might use the 'word technological or the term developed society'. But the distinctive characteristic of this new period for Mr Boulding is the con-

[5] Ralf Dahrendorf, *Class and Class Conflict in an Industrial Society* (Stanford, 1959). See Chapters VII and VIII, 'Classes in Post-Capitalist Society (I) Industrial Conflict, (II) Political Conflict'. Quotations above are from pp. 272, 275–276, 301–303.

[6] George Lichtheim, *The New Europe: Today and Tomorrow* (New York, 1963), p. 194.

[7] Amitai Etzioni, *The Active Society* (New York, 1968), p. vii.

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sciousness of, using Teilhard's phrase, the *noösphere,* the sphere of knowledge, as the premise for the social direction of society and the achievement of social, as against individual, self-consciousness. Thus, the thrust of Boulding's term is to emphasize the possibility of the guidance of society in the new, emerging period of social or mental evolution rather than the adaptive biological or social evolution of the past.[8]

In the epilogue to the 1969 (Vintage) edition of *British Politics in the Collectivist Age,* Sam Beer talks of a 'post-collectivist' politics. He feels that the collectivist model of British politics which was Party-divided, functionalist, and oriented to the welfare state may be coming to a close. The post-collectivist tendency is a 'reaction to the increasing scale and intensity of rationalization in both government and society. And even though it would not create a basic rupture in the political mode, it could form a readjustment of the polity in England (p. 426).

And so it goes. It used to be that the great literary modifier was the word *beyond*: beyond tragedy, beyond culture, beyond society. But we seem to have exhausted the beyond, and today the sociological modifier is *post*: a theologian, Sydney E. Ahlstrom, has described the religious scene in the United States in the 1960s as 'post-Puritan, post-Protestant and post-Christian'.[9] Lewis Feuer has subtitled his book on *Marx and the Intellectuals* as a 'set of post-ideological essays', and John Leonard in the *New York Times* has talked of the 'post-Literature Culture' as being heralded by the McLuhanite age[10]; for S. N. Eisenstadt, the sociologist, the new states have become 'post-traditional' societies for though they are no longer bound by the norms of the past and they seek consciously to change, they live in a suspended world with little approximation to the modern societies of the West[11]; earlier, Roderick Seidenberg, foretelling the victory of rationalism, had described a *post-historic man* in which we move from prehistory, in which instinct dominated intelligence, through the transitional period of history into posthistory, in which intelligence dominates instinct,[12] just as in *Zarathustra,* man—suspended on the rope above the abyss— is the transition between the animal of the past and the superman to come; and finally in this inventory (only by virtue of humility) we have the theme of the *post-industrial society,* which has been the theme of this symposium.[13]

[8] Kenneth Boulding, *The Meaning of the Twentieth Century: The Great Transition* (New York, 1964).

[9] Sydney Ahlstrom, 'The Radical Turn in Theology and Ethics', *The Annals,* January 1970.

[10] *The New York Times,* 26 November 1970.

[11] This was the theme of a *Daedalus*-sponsored seminar in Paris, 9–10 June 1970. Eric Hobsbawm has written of 'post-tribal societies', arguing that social classes only begin at such stages of social development. See his essay, 'Social History and the History of Society', in *Daedalus* issue entitled *Historical Studies Today,* Winter 1971, p. 36.

[12] Roderick Seidenberg, *Post-Historic Man* (North Carolina University Press, 1950).

[13] Tom Burns, of Edinburgh, though scoffing at the phrase 'post-industrial' society, talks of the 'post-market society and post-organization society phase of industrialism' in 'The Rationale of the Corporate System' (p. 50), unpublished mss.

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The Two Schemas of Marx

We are all *epigones* of the great masters.[14] Edward Shils was quite right when he commented recently:

> One of the great difficulties is that we cannot imagine anything beyond variations on the theme set by the great figures of nineteenth and twentieth century sociology. The fact that the conception of 'post-industrial society' is an amalgam of what St. Simon, Comte, de Tocqueville and Weber furnished to our imagination is evidence that we are confined to an ambiguously defined circle which is more impermeable than it ought to be.[15]

The one figure which Professor Shils left out, strangely, is Marx, perhaps because we have all become post-Marxists. St. Simon described stages of history in alternating spirals of organic and critical (which foreshadowed Sorokin's ideational and sensate mentalities), and Comte

for the Harvard Programme on Technology and Society, 1970. And to this litany of the word we should also add 'post-economic', a possibility envisaged by Herman Kahn of a time when incomes will be so high that cost would be of little practical matter in any decision. (See his briefing paper, 'Forces for Change in the Final Third of the Twentieth Century', Hudson Institute, 1970). And, in the logic of the situation, some radicals (vide the discussions in *Social Policy*, vol. I, nos. 1, 4) have talked of a 'post-scarcity' society, while Gideon Sjoberg and his collaborators have written of a 'post-welfare' society. And in his new book *Freedom in a Rocking Boat*, Sir Geoffrey Vickers talks of a 'post-liberal era'. In all, I have catalogued eighteen different uses of the word *post* to denote some new phase in our society!

[14] It would be unfair and presumptuous to assume that all the *epigones* of Saint-Simon or Marx have gathered under the banner of the word *post*. There have been more daring adventurers who have tried to define in more forthright fashion the character of the new age.

Thus Ralf Dahrendorf, in a later foray, describes a 'service class society': 'Sociologists have given many names to this new society: post-capitalist and managerial, leisure-time and consumer's, advanced industrial and mass society are but a small selection. It cannot do much harm therefore to add one further name and claim that Europe is well under way toward a service class society'. The service class, for Dahrendorf, is essentially the white collar and particularly the professional and technical stratum in the society. (See 'Recent Changes in Class Structure', in Stephen R. Graubard (ed.), *A New Europe?* (Boston, 1964), esp. p. 328.)

Zbigniew Brzezinski writes of a 'technetronic' age in which 'technology and especially electronics—hence my neologism "technetronic"—are increasingly becoming the determinants of social change, altering the mores, the social structure, the values, and the global outlook of society'. Brzezinski writes that he prefers the neologism 'technetronic' to 'post-industrial' because 'it conveys more directly the character of the principal impulses for change in our time'. (See *Between Two Ages: America's Role in the Technetronic Era* (New York, 1970), esp. p. 9.)

Jacques Ellul has called his vision the Technological Society, Marshall McLuhan the Global Village, and on a more trivial level Bertram Gross talks of the 'mobiletic revolution', while popularizer Alvin Toffler, after hovering over 'transindustrial' and 'post-economic', settles on the term 'super-industrial society'. It is intended to mean, he writes, 'a complex, fast-paced society dependent upon extremely advanced technology and a post-materialist value system'. (*Future Shock* (New York, 1970), p. 434.) With Toffler it would seem that all the permutations and combinations of the 'post' idea have been exhausted.

[15] Edward Shils, 'Tradition, Ecology and Institutions in the History of Sociology', in *Daedalus*, Fall 1970, issue on *The Making of Modern Science: Biographical Studies*, p. 825.

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saw a rationalist progression of society from theological to metaphysical to a scientific stage, yet the source of our interest in social change is Marx. Marx rooted social change in social structure or institutions (rather than mentalities, even though he treated ideas too cavalierly or as epiphenomena), and he charted social change in determinate fashion seeking to lay bare the sources of that determinism in the social relations between men. Few of us would claim that the social changes we forecast arise out of the blue, or come solely from men's imaginative design. Even when they emerge first as ideas they have to be embodied in institutions; and to chart social change is to chart the changes in the character of axial institutions. If, then, there is some pattern of determinism that one has to identify, one has to come to terms, again, with the ghost of Marx. If we seek to chart the stages of development of capitalist industrial society, we have to begin with the predictions of Marx. But in so doing we are confronted with a conundrum, for in this view of the future, there is not, as I shall try to show, one but two schemas, and it is out of these two schemas that most of the branches of theory have developed.

IN *Capital* (especially vol. I, chapter XXXIII, on the 'Historical Tendency of Capitalistic Accumulation') Marx sketched his basic scheme of social development: the structure of the new society, namely, the socialized organization of production, lay fully developed within the womb of the old; this new structure reflected the increasing contradiction between the socialized character of production and the 'fetter upon the mode of production' created by the 'monopoly of capital'; society was becoming polarized in two classes, a diminishing number of magnates of capital and a steadily growing working class; the character of the new society becomes incompatible with the capitalist form of the old, and finally, the 'integument is burst asunder', and a socialist world has arrived. The metaphor is biological, the process is immanent, the trajectory of development unilateral.

And yet, of course, it did not turn out that way. Whatever the extraordinary power of Marxism as a social appeal, it was in backward countries, not advanced capitalist countries, that Marxist movements have been most successful. More importantly, the social structures of advanced capitalist societies have evolved in a fashion far different from that envisaged in the sketch in volume I. And yet Marx, in the later years, particularly in sections expressed in volume III of *Capital* did glimpse accurately the shape of things that did come. It is this set of differences between *two different schemes* of Marx which is the true, starting point for the analysis of social developments in capitalist and advanced industrial societies of the West.

Let us begin with *schema one*. Marx's analysis of the capitalist process rests, initially, on two spheres of production: large-scale manu-

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facture and agriculture.[16] With the expansion of the capitalist system the distinction between land and capital, and between the landowning and capitalist classes, disappears. The fusion of these two classes leaves in society two main classes: the capitalists, owners of the means of production, and the proletariat. Our assumption, says Marx, is the continuing spread of capitalist production to absorb the entire society, accordingly there are only these two classes (volume II, p. 401). All *dritte personen* are excluded. As Abram Harris writes:

> *Dritte personen* is a term which Marx used to designate two different but more or less related categories of people. The first category includes such independent producers as small farmers, independent handicraftsmen and all other hangovers of an earlier mode of production who function outside the capitalist process proper. The second category includes two groups (1) priests, shopkeepers, lawyers, state officials, professors, artists, teachers, physicians and soldiers who exist on the basis of the capitalist process but who do not participate in it; and (2) merchants, middlemen, speculators, commercial labourers (white-collar employees), managers, foremen, and all other officials who 'command in the name of capital.'[17]

Why should these *dritte personen* be excluded? For Marx, the independent farmers and artisans are outside the capitalist process, though they assume the character of the process. (As owners of their means of production they are capitalists; as owners of their labour power they are wage earners.) In any event, as a class they will tend to disappear. The artists, physicians, professors, *et al.*, are 'unproductive workers'. To be productive labour must replace the old value advanced by the capitalist by new value in the form of surplus product and new capital. A cook or a waiter working in a hotel is 'productive' because he has created profit for the hotel owner; as house servants they are unproductive even when paid a wage. Unproductive labour receives its income from the expenditures of the two dominant classes involved in production. If the worker-capitalist relation were to spread to medical service, amusement and education, the physician, artist and professor would then be wage earners and 'productive'.

In all this, Marx assumed a model of 'pure capitalism'.[18] As Marx wrote:

> Such a general rate of surplus-value—as a tendency, like all other economic laws—has been assumed by us for the sake of theoretical

[16] I follow here the argument and evidence laid out by Abram L. Harris in 'Pure Capitalism and the Disappearance of the Middle Class', *Journal of Political Economy*, June 1939, with further elaboration from the passages in Marx he has identified. All page references to *Capital* indicated in the text are from the Kerr Edition, Chicago.

[17] Ibid. pp. 339–340.

[18] The first writer to explicate this model of 'pure capitalism', was Henryk Grossmann in his *Das Akkumulations und Zusammensbruchsgesetz des kapitalistichen Systems* (*The Law of Accumulation and Collapse of the Capitalist System*) (Leipzig, 1929). Paul Sweezey makes the same assumption about the use of abstraction in his *The Theory of Capitalist Development* (Oxford, 1946).

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> simplification. But in reality it is an actual premise of the capitalist mode of production, although it is more or less obstructed by practical fictions . . . in theory it is the custom to assume that the laws of capitalist production evolve in their pure form. In reality, however, there is always but an approximation (volume III, p. 206).

This assumption of a 'pure form' is fundamental, then, to Marx's analysis. It assumes that all non-capitalist spheres of production either would be eliminated by the expansion of the system or become subordinate to it. Whether the capitalist process is considered from the standpoint of commodities or from that of the distribution of income, 'there are only two points of departure: the capitalist and the labourer. All third classes of persons must either receive money for their services from these two classes . . . or in the form of rent, interest, etc.' (volume II, p. 384).

Within the relation of capitalist and labour, a double process ensues, which is the 'absolute, general law of capitalist accumulation'. The progressive accumulation of capital leads to a concentration of capital and its centralization in the hands of the 'gigantic industrial enterprises' at the expense, principally, of the 'many small capitalists whose capital partly passes into the hands of their conquerors, partly vanishes' (volume I, p. 687). On the other hand, there is a disproportionate employment of constant capital as compared with variable capital, or labour. This produces a relative 'surplus population' through the displacement of labour and causes the rate of profit to sink. ('The rate of profit sinks, not because the labourer is less exploited, but because less labour is employed in proportion to employed capital in general', volume III, p. 288.) Out of this comes the grand passion play of the economic apocalypse:

> 'Hand in hand with this centralization, or this expropriation of many capitalists by few, develop, on an ever extending scale, the co-operative form of the labour process, the conscious technical application of science . . . the entanglement of all peoples in the net of the world-market. . . . Along with the constantly diminishing number of the magnates of capital . . . grows the revolt of the working-class, a class always increasing in numbers . . . . Centralization of the means of production and socialization of labour at last reach a point where they become incompatible with their capitalist integument. This integument is burst asunder' (volume I, pp. 836–837).[19]

Marx's *first* schema of social development is derived from his model of 'pure capitalism'. Yet 'pure capitalism' itself was a theoretical simplification, and by the time Marx had begun to write the third

[19] Like all laws, Marx wrote, this 'is modified in its working by many circumstances'. There were, Marx wrote, various 'counteracting tendencies', principally the rise of new industries created by the growth of luxuries, the refinement of wants, the creation of new ones, etc., and these new industries absorb displaced labour and expand 'unproductive' employment. Modifying as these are, they do not alter the basic features and nature of the capitalist economy.

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volume of *Capital*, the growth of a large-scale investment banking system and the emergence of the corporation had begun to transform the social structure of capitalist society. If in the first stages of capitalist society there had been an 'old' middle class of farmers, artisans, and independent professionals, what was one to say of the emerging 'new' middle class of managers, technical employees, white collar workers, and the like. This is the basis of *schema two*. Marx observed this phenomenon with extraordinary acuity.

Three crucial structural changes were taking place. With the rise of a new banking system, the accumulation of capital no longer rested on the thrift and savings of the individual entrepreneur engaging in self-financing, but on the savings of the society as a whole. Marx comments: 'This social character of capital is promoted and fully realized by the complete development of the credit and banking system. It places at the disposal of the industrial and commercial capitalists all the available, or even potential capital of society. . . .' (volume III, p. 712.)

The second change was the revolution wrought by the corporation, the effect of which was to separate ownership from management and bring a new category of occupation—if not a new class—which Marx calls 'the labour of superintendence' into society.

> That not the industrial capitalists, but the industrial managers are 'the soul of our industrial system', has already been remarked by Mr Ure. . . . The capitalist mode of production itself has brought matters to such a point, that the labour of superintendence, entirely separated from the ownership of capital, walks the streets (volume III, pp. 454–455).

And finally, the expansion of the banking and credit system and the growth of the corporation would necessarily mean the expansion of office personnel and white-collar work.

> . . . it is clear that commercial operations increase to the extent that the scale of production is enlarged. . . . The more developed the scale of production is, the greater, if not in proportion, will be the commercial operations of industrial capital. . . . The calculation of prices, bookkeeping, managing funds (accounting), all these belong under this head. . . . This necessitates the employment of commercial wage workers who form the office staff (volume III, p. 352).[20]

[20] In the *Theorien über den Mehrwert*, the uncollected materials which Engels had not included in *Capital* but which was edited, after Engels' death, by Kautsky (and which is sometimes called volume IV of *Capital*), Marx says explicitly, in fact, that the middle class, standing between labour on the one side and the capitalists on the other, constantly grow '[weighing] heavily on the labour sub-stratum and [increasing] the social security of the upper ten thousand'. More specifically, he writes: 'The size of the middle class increases and the proletariat will always form a comparatively small part of the populace (although it is still growing). This is indeed the true course of bourgeois society'. Cited by Hans Speier, *The Salaried Employee in German Society*, mimeographed translation, W.P.A. Project No. 465–97–3–81, Columbia University Library, New York, 1939, pp. 9–10. (For a description of this W.P.A. project, see note 31.)

A. L. Harris's essay (op. cit.) contains detailed references to these sections in the *Theorien* which contain Marx's discussion of the role of the middle class both outside and within the capitalist productive process.

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And yet, while these three structural changes would seem to modify considerably or challenge drastically the theory of polarization which is so strong in the *Manifesto* and at the end of volume I of *Capital*—and which was the dominant idea of classical Marxism—Marx felt that the basic sociological tendency—the deepening of economic crises and the spread of a socialized character to property—remained. Of the banking system, rather than seeing the institutionalization of credit as a source of stability in the system, he thought it would hasten crises.

> By means of the banking system the distribution of capital as a special business, as a social function, is taken out of the hands of the private capitalists and usurers. But at the same time banking and credit thus become the most effective means of driving capitalist production beyond its own boundaries, and one of the most potent instruments of crises and swindle (volume III, p. 713).

As for the managerial function, he saw this as much, if not more, an aspect of socialism as it is of capitalism. The managerial function ' arises from the social form of the labour process ' and ' to say that this labour is a capitalistic one . . . amounts merely to saying that the vulgar economists cannot conceive of the forms developed in the womb of capitalist production separated and freed from their antagonistic capitalist character ' (volume III, p. 455). ' A director of an orchestra need not be the owner of the instruments.' ' The co-operative factories furnish the proof that the capitalist has become just as superfluous as a functionary.'

In fact, writes Marx shortly afterwards, in a startling analysis, the rise of the manager is one of the key elements in transforming profits into ' social property ', for with the introduction of the manager (' skilled labour the price of which is regulated in the labour market, like that of any other labour '), the capitalist becomes removed from the process of production, the manager is alienated from his own labour, and profits assume a social character. Marx writes:

> . . . this total profit is henceforth received only in the form of interest, that is, in the form of mere compensation of the ownership of capital, which is now separated from its function in the actual process of reproduction in the same way in which this function, in the person of the manager, is separated from the ownership of capital. The profit now presents itself . . . as a mere appropriation of the surplus labour of others, arising from the transformation of means of production into capital, that is, from its alienation from its actual producer, from its antagonism as another's property opposed to the individuals actually at work in production, from the manager down to the last day labourer.
>
> In the stock companies the function (of production) is separated from the ownership of capital, and labour, of course, is entirely separated from the ownership of the means of production and of surplus labour. This result of the highest development of capitalist production is a necessary transition to the reconversion of capital into the property of the producers, no longer as the private property

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of individual producers, but as the common property of associates, as social property outright (volume III, p. 517).

As for the white-collar worker, Marx foresaw that the number of such employees would spread, but he felt that the extension of capitalism would lead to the proletarianization of the white-collar worker because the division of labour in the office and the growth of public education would depreciate their value. As he put it:

> The commercial labourer, in the strict meaning of the term, belongs to the better paid class of wage workers: he belongs to the class of skilled labourers, which is above the average. However, wages have a tendency to fall, even in proportion to the average labour, with the advance of the capitalist mode of production. This is due to the fact that in the first place, division of labour in the office is introduced; this means that only a one-sided development of the labouring capacity is required. . . . In the second place, the necessary preparation, such as the learning of commercial details, languages, etc., is more and more rapidly, easily, generally, cheaply reproduced with the progress of science and popular education, to the extent that the capitalist mode of production organizes the methods of teaching, etc., in a practical manner. The generalization of public education makes it possible to recruit this line of labourers from classes that had formerly no access to such an education and that were accustomed to a lower standard of living. At the same time this generalization of education increases the supply and thus competition. With few exceptions, the labour-power of this line of labourers is therefore depreciated with the progress of capitalist development. Their wages fall, while their ability increases (*Capital*, volume III, p. 354).

These new structural tendencies, therefore, are discounted because Marx believed, implicitly, that *schema one* would be decisive. Yet why the 'integument' would have to burst is not clear. As Paul Sweezey writes: 'In a real sense it can be said that Marx's entire theoretical system constitutes a denial of the possibility of indefinite capitalist expansion and an affirmation of the inevitability of the socialist revolution. But nowhere in his work is there to be found a doctrine of the specifically economic breakdown of capitalist production'.[21] And as Sweezey comments further, efforts by later Marxist writers, including Rosa Luxemburg and Henryk Grossmann, to posit such a *necessary* breakdown are unconvincing.

On the historical evidence, the *tendency* which Marx laid out in *schema one* has been modified, if not falsified, by the showing that there is no intrinsic tendency of the rate of profit to fall; that the state has been able to intervene and soften, if not prevent, economic crises; and that technology has been an open frontier for the reinvestment of capital. What, then, of the structure of the 'new society' within the 'womb' of

[21] Paul Sweezey, op. cit. pp. 191–192. See chapter XI for 'The Breakdown Controversy'.

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the old? What of the social developments which I have called *schema two*? What role have these elements played in social theory and the conceptions of social evolution since Marx? If one reads the sociological theories on the future of capitalism which were enunciated in the first half of the twentieth century, one sees that almost all were, in effect, a dialogue with *schema two* of Marx.

Post-Marxism: The Dialogue in the West

Few writers on capitalism have seen it as a 'permanent' system of society. The very self-consciousness that attended the coinage of the term in the nineteenth century—the fact that it was associated principally with socialist theoreticians [22]—from the start led to the belief that it was only a 'stage' in the evolution of economic society and the expectation that it would be replaced—shortly—by some successor economic system of some collectivist kind. (In fact, given all the predictions of an early demise, what is to be explained, if anything, is the relative longevity of the system.)

THE writer who first sought to chart the transformation of capitalism in some set of qualitatively different sociological periods—the first, actually, to make capitalism the centrepiece of economic history and analysis—was Werner Sombart. In *Der moderne Kapitalismus* (the final revisions of which were published from 1921 to 1927 in three volumes) Sombart sought to write a full-scale history of the transition of economic society from a pre-capitalist phase of a sustenance economy to the rise of modern capitalism and its deliquescence. While he dealt fully with the influence of technology and the creation of the capitalist enterprise as a

[22] What is startling to realize is that, because of the origin of the word, the concept of capitalism was accepted so belatedly in economic literature and, in the article on 'Capitalism' in the *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences* printed in 1930, Werner Sombart could point out that major economic texts of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century ignored the term. He writes: 'The concept of capitalism and even more clearly the term itself may be traced primarily to the writings of socialist theoreticians. It has in fact remained one of the key concepts of socialism down to the present time. . . . Despite the fact that capitalism tends to become the sole subject-matter of economics, neither the term nor the concept has as yet been universally recognized by representatives of academic economics. The older German economists and to a much greater extent the economists of other countries rejected entirely the concept of capitalism. In many cases the rejection was merely implicit; capitalism was not discussed at all except perhaps in connection with the history of economic doctrines, and when it was mentioned there was no indication that it was of particular importance. The term is not found in Gide, Cauwes, Marshall, Seligman or Cassel, to mention only the best-known texts. In other treatises, such as those of Schmoller, Adolf Wagner, Richard Ehrenberg, and Philippovich, there is some discussion of capitalism but the concept is subsequently rejected. In the newer economics it is recognized as indispensable or at least useful, but the uncertainty as to its exact meaning is generally expressed by quotation marks about the word.' 'Capitalism', *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences* (New York, 1930), volume III, p. 195.

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distinctive social form, his emphasis was principally on the capitalist spirit (or mentality) as its most unique characteristic, and on the entrepreneur as the key figure in capitalist development.[23]

For Sombart, economic epochs could only be understood within the framework of other historical systems. Thus the early period of any system overlaps with the late period of a retreating or disappearing economic system; the period of full development reveals a system in its singular purity; and the last period is identified when one can show the onset of a new, oncoming system. Applying this division of epochs to capitalism Sombart distinguished between early capitalism, the period from the middle of the thirteenth century to the middle of the eighteenth; full capitalism (*Hochkapitalismus*) from about 1750 to 1914; and late capitalism, the period after the First World War.

Early capitalism still bore the marks of the handicraft period. Traditionalism was still strong, economic life had a personal cast, buyer and seller allowed personal likes and dislikes to affect their relationships, and employers and workers were held together by patriarchal bonds.

In the period of full capitalism the principles of profit and economic rationalism permeated all economic relationships. Markets expanded, the size of business increased, scientific mechanistic technology was utilized, relationships became impersonal and institutionalized.

'The capitalistic spirit at its prime', writes Sombart, 'was characterized by psychological strains of peculiar intensity born of the contradictions between irrationality and rationality, between the spirit of speculation and that of calculation, between the mentality of the daring entrepreneur and the hard-working, sedate bourgeois.'[24] In the period of late capitalism two major changes are central. Within the society, 'the strength of specifically capitalistic elements of economic life' declines, while 'mixed' public-private undertakings, state and communal

[23] Sombart is an unjustly neglected figure today in sociological history in part because, in his last years, he expressed some sympathy with the Nazis, and in greater measure, perhaps, because his writings though extraordinarily suggestive were quite careless. This is probably best exemplified in his 'debate' with Max Weber on the spirit of capitalism. Where Weber emphasized the role of the 'Protestant ethic', Sombart singled out the Jews as the major element basing himself on both the religious rules of Judaism and the migration patterns of Jews in the fifteenth century, arguing that the shift in the commercial centre of the Western world from the Mediterranean basin to Antwerp and Holland followed the expulsion of the Jews from Spain. Yet his evidence about the Jews was sloppy.

Sombart's writings cover the rise of socialism, beginning with *Socialism and the Social Movement* (1896) and the development of capitalism from the first edition of *Der moderne Kapitalismus* in 1902. There is no English translation of *Der moderne Kapitalismus*, though a 'free hand' adaptation was published by F. L. Nussbaum in 1933 as *A History of the Economic Institutions of Modern Europe: An Introduction to Der moderne Kapitalismus of Werner Sombart* (F. S. Crofts, New York, 1933). Sombart's fascinating history and psychology of the businessman, *Der Bourgeois*, was translated and edited by M. Epstein and published as *The Quintessence of Capitalism* (Dutton, New York, 1915), and *Die Juden und das Wirtschaftsleben* translated by M. Epstein as *The Jews and Modern Capitalism* (London, 1913) and reissued with a new introduction by Bert F. Hoselitz by the Free Press (Glencoe, Illinois) in 1951.

[24] 'Capitalism', E.S.S., op. cit. p. 207.

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public works and non-capitalistic economic endeavours 'increase in number, size and importance'. Within the firm, 'there is a gradual decay of the entrepreneurial mentality'. In place of the entrepreneur comes the bureaucratic mentality, and the firm itself becomes bureaucratized.

In late capitalism, says Sombart, the major desire is for stabilization. The striving for profit grows less intense ('witness such symptoms as the fixed dividend rate, the reinvestment of surplus—in the United States, for example, some concerns provide 30 to 35 per cent of their new capital in this way'), the market mechanism is superseded by the price regulation of combinations or even of the government, the cyclical oscillations of the economic system become attenuated, and the interventions by government become more and more decisive. The features which had given capitalism its distinctiveness have begun to atrophy. If capitalism, as Sombart put it, could be characterized by three constituent elements, spirit, form and technology, the spirit was now gone and only form and technology remain.

ALL these themes of Sombart, with subtle shifts of emphasis, are present in Schumpeter who, in his *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy* (1942) predicts the end of capitalist civilization. The transformation is both on the level of mentality and social structure. For Schumpeter, three elements are at work to change the capitalist mentality. One is the fact that capitalism is too rationalistic. 'I have no hesitation in saying', writes Schumpeter, 'that all logic is derived from the pattern of economic decision or, to use a pet phrase of mine, that the economic pattern is the matrix of logic.' The capitalist process, he continues, 'rationalizes behaviour and ideas and by so doing chases from our minds, along with metaphysical beliefs, mystic and romantic ideas of all sorts'. But such rationality, says Schumpeter, is too stringent for society. 'The stock exchange is a poor substitute for the Holy Grail.' Second is the 'obsolescence of the entrepreneurial function'. The entrepreneur was the man who unsettled things, who innovated and got things done. But today, 'personality and will power' count for less in economic environments that have become routinized, where 'bureau and committee work tends to replace individual action' and economic progress becomes 'depersonalized and automatized'. Third is the corrosion of all established beliefs. Rationalism and empiricism foster a critical attitude which begins to question everything. Traditions begin to crumble. The desire for change and novelty become built into the system. The intellectual—the man 'who wields the power of the spoken and the written word'—becomes increasingly hostile to capitalism. ('Only a socialist or a fascist government is strong enough to discipline them.') Inevitably, the social antagonism to capitalism grows.

On the level of social structure, what sustained capitalism, said Schumpeter, was an institutional framework built on twin pillars, the institution of property and the freedom of contract. The political

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support for this framework is maintained by a 'host of small and medium-sized firms of owner-managers' who, 'together with their dependants, henchmen and connections, count quantitatively at the polls'. Yet for Schumpeter, this institutional framework has become brittle. Freedom of contract is hemmed in by various forms of regulation, from the powers of trade unions to that of government. The institution of property is undermined in two ways. One, the process of monopolization and the growth of the large corporation tends to eliminate the intermediate-sized firms. ('Economically . . . the case against concentration of economic control . . . misses the salient point [i.e.] the political consequences of concentration.') Second, the transformation of the owner-proprietor into the salaried executive diminishes the strength of property and the managerial group begins to adopt a set of social attitudes which are at variance with the stockholders' interests in the firm. Thus, for reasons parallel to Marx, Schumpeter, too, sees the walls of capitalism as crumbling and—in a century!—the 'civilization that slowly works deep down below' may then emerge.[25]

BUT what is 'the civilization that slowly works deep down below'? Marx had thought it was socialism. But Marx's great antagonist, Max Weber, had a far different vision. For Weber, the master key of Western society was rationalization, the spread through law, economy, accounting, technology, and the entire conduct of life of a spirit of functional efficiency and measurement, of an 'economizing' attitude (maximization, optimization, least cost) towards not only material resources but all life.[26] With the inevitability of rationalization, administration takes over, and the complete bureaucratization of all social institutions is inescapable: 'The future belongs to bureaucratization. . . . Where once the modern trained official rules, his power is virtually indestructible, because the whole organization of the most basic provisions of life is fashioned to suit his performance.'[27]

[25] Joseph Schumpeter, *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy* (New York, 1942). The quotations are taken from chapters XI–XIV, in sequence, pp. 122–123, 127, 137, 132–133, 140, 150, 162. Schumpeter, at the end, is careful to say that what he is describing is an historical tendency. As he says in the last paragraph of his section, 'Can Capitalism Survive': 'Things have gone to different lengths in different countries but in no country far enough to allow us to say with any confidence precisely how far they will go, or to assert that their "underlying trend" has grown too strong to be subject to anything more serious than temporary reverses. . . . The middle class is still a political power. Bourgeois standards and bourgeois motivations though being increasingly impaired are still alive. Survivals of traditions —and family ownership of controlling parcels of stock—still make many an executive behave as the owner-manager did of old. The bourgeois family has not yet died; in fact, it clings to life so tenaciously that no responsible politician has as yet dared touch it by any method other than taxation. From the standpoint of immediate practice as well as for the purposes of short run forecasting—and in these things, a century is a "short run"—all this surface may be more important than the tendency toward another civilization that slowly works deep down below' (ibid. p. 163).

[26] See Max Weber, *General Economic History* (London, n.d.), chapter 30, esp. p. 354.

[27] Max Weber, *Gesammelte Politische Schriften* (Munich, 1921), pp. 149–150, cited by Richard Pipes, 'Max Weber and Russia'. *World Politics*, April 1955, p. 377.

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But while this was a feature of capitalism, it would be, necessarily, a feature of socialism as well. In *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft* Weber writes:

> The primary source of bureaucratic administration lies in the role of technical knowledge which, through the development of modern technology and business methods in the production of goods, has become completely indispensable. In this respect, it makes no difference whether the economic system is organized on a capitalistic or a socialistic basis. Indeed, if in the latter case a comparable level of technical efficiency were to be achieved, it would mean a tremendous increase in the importance of professional bureaucrats. . . . capitalism in its modern stages of development requires the bureaucracy, though both have arisen from different historical sources . . . a socialistic form of organization would not alter this fact. It would be a question [Weber refers here to the rational calculation of the use of capital] whether in a socialistic system it would be possible to provide conditions for carrying out as stringent a bureaucratic organization as has been possible in a capitalistic order. For socialism would, in fact, require a still higher degree of formal bureaucratization than capitalism. If this should prove not to be possible, it would demonstrate the existence of another of those fundamental elements of irrationality—a conflict between formal and substantive rationality of the sort which sociology so often encounters.[28]

As Richard Pipes points out:

> Weber repeatedly criticized the Marxists for ignoring what to him seemed the central problem facing socialism: *who* will operate the nationalized enterprises? As for himself he felt certain that this function would be assumed by the groups technically best prepared for the task, that is, the bureaucracy 'from which nothing is further removed than [a sense of] solidarity with the proletariat'.[29]

The spread of technical knowledge, the rise of the manager in industry and the bureaucrat in government, rather than exemplifying in the St. Simonian image, which Marx had taken over, a role analagous to the 'director of the orchestra', meant for Weber a new form of domination:

> . . . the edifice for the new bondage stands everywhere in readiness. . . . All the *economic* weather signs point in the direction of diminishing freedom. . . . He who desires to be a weather vane of a tendency of development had better abandon these old-fashioned ideals as quickly as possible.[30]

[28] Max Weber, *Economy and Society* (New York, 1968), vol. 1, pp. 223–225. This was composed in 1913–14; Weber died in 1920.

[29] Pipes, op. cit. p. 378. The inner quote is from Weber's essay, *Der Sozialismus* (Vienna, 1918).

[30] Weber, *Zur Lage der burgerlichen Democratie in Russland*, cited by Pipes, ibid. p. 378. Ironically, Weber felt that there was only one rival to the bureaucrat, and that is the individual capitalist entrepreneur: 'Superior to bureaucracy in the knowledge of techniques and facts is only the capitalist entrepreneur, within his

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BEFORE the First World War orthodox socialist theory believed that the proletariat would expand and that the middle class was destined to perish. In Germany, the 'old' middle class of independent entrepreneurs, small farmers, and self-employed professionals did begin to decline, but so, too, did the industrial working class: from 1895 to 1925, the proportion of wage labourers in industry as compared to the labour force as a whole dropped from 56·8 per cent to 45·1 per cent.[31] Between the two a new stratum was emerging—the white-collar salaried employee, clerical and professional; and their number was growing steadily. How was this to be explained?

The first person to call attention to this new sociological phenomenon and to study it consistently was Emil Lederer, the social analyst and editor of the influential *Archiv fur Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik*. In an essay in 1912 Lederer called this group 'the new middle class'. Historically the bourgeoisie had been called the middle class because it stood between the landowning class and the working class. With the decline of the gentry the grand bourgeoisie became the ruling class of great financiers and the industrialists; but between them and the working class—and now taking over the term middle-class—was what Marx called the petty bourgeoisie: the small trader and independent small businessman, the self-employed professional and independent artisan. Now, within the enterprise, in the position between employers and workers was a new stratum. Lederer called it a 'new middle class', less from its function than from its social evaluation, based upon self-esteem and the esteem of others. 'This middle position between the two classes', he wrote, 'a negative characteristic rather than definite technical function, is the social mark of the salaried employees and establishes their social character in their own consciousness and in the estimation of the community'.[32]

own sphere of interest. He is the only type who has been able to maintain at least relative immunity from subjection to the control of rational bureaucratic knowledge. In large scale organizations, all others are inevitably subject to bureaucratic control, just as they have fallen under the dominance of precision machinery in the mass production of goods' (*Economy and Society*, op. cit. p. 225). Thus a socialist economy, by eliminating the capitalist entrepreneur, has no counterfoil to the bureaucrat.

[31] Hans Speier, *The Salaried Employee in German Society*, volume I, op. cit. p. 9. In 1937 the New York State Department of Social Welfare, together with the Department of Sociology at Columbia, jointly sponsored a W.P.A. project of translations of Foreign Social Science Monographs. In all, about 25 were translated, mimeographed, and deposited in the Columbia University Library as well as disseminated in limited distribution. One major topic was that of the 'white collar worker' in Germany, and in all about 10 such studies were translated including the major essays of Emil Lederer. Lederer and Marschak, Fritz Croner, Hans Speier, Carl Dreyfuss, Erich Engelhard, and Hans Tobias. An allied group of studies dealt with social mobility and its measurement in Germany.

[32] Emil Lederer, *Die Privatangestellten in der modern Wirtschaftsentwicklung* (1912), translated as *The Problem of the Modern Salaried Employee: Its Theoretical and Statistical Basis*, W.P.A. Project No. 465–97–3–81, Department of Social Science, Columbia University. Lederer, who came to the United States after the rise of Hitler, became one of the founding members of the Graduate Faculty of the New School for Social Research in New York: he died in 1939. He is best known, in

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A year later, in an essay on 'Zum sozialpsychischen Habitus der Gegenwert', Lederer spelled out the psychological differences between the classes in the context of the changover of society from a traditional to a rational mode of economic conduct. What was distinctive, he said, was the varied life 'rhythms' of the different social strata in modern economic organization. For the manual worker life is irregular, his existence atomized by external forces such as business conditions; the week, at best, is the unit of his economic life. For the salaried worker there is a steadiness of life which is shaped by the expectation of a yearly salary; his 'economic unit' is the month. The civil servant, too, regards the year as the axis of his life, but in addition he looks forward to regular promotions as his horizon for the future. It is in these different 'rhythms' that Lederer finds the sociological distinctiveness of the different strata.[33]

The major theoretical analysis of this new phenomenon was made by Lederer and Jacob Marschak in a famous essay, 'Der Neue Mittelstand', which appeared in 1926 in the *Grundriss der Sozialökonomik*.[34] Here the analysis was put in the framework of a 'theory of historical development', and on the basis of revising existing theory of 'historical classes'. 'The war and the revolution', the authors point out,

> gave a tremendous impetus to the growth of the salaried employees' class . . . for war economy means the expansion of big business, as well as extensive 'organization', or bureaucratization which multiplies the functions of the salaried employee. But neither the termination of the war . . . nor the abandonment of the war economy re-established the social stratification of the prewar period.

In addition,

English, for his theory of 'mass society', which is expressed in his last book *The State of the Masses* (W. W. Norton, New York, 1940).

[33] Emil Lederer, 'Zum sozialpsychischen Habitus der Gegenwert', in the *Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik*, vol. 46, 1918–19. (The essay, though written in 1913, was not published until five years later.) Translated as *On the Socio-Psychic Constitution of the Present Time*, W.P.A. Project 465–97–3–81, Columbia University (1937), pp. 8–9.

[34] Emil Lederer and Jacob Marschak, 'Der Neue Mittelstand', in *Grundriss der Sozialökonomik*, IX Abteilung, I Teil (Tübingen, 1926), translated as 'The New Middle Class', ibid. Columbia University (1937). Technically, it should be pointed out, the *neue Mittelstand* should not be translated as class, but estate. Marx himself, in generalizing the word class to cover all human history, has contributed a confusion about the meaning of the term. In pre-capitalist and pre-industrial society, social distinctions were ones of rank and position, reinforced by legal distinction and legitimized by tradition. Modern capitalist or industrial society swept away these distinctions, and created the bare, abstract materiality of 'class' based on market position. This is the basis of the historic distinction of estate society and capitalist society. As Dahrendorf writes: 'It is significant that in conversational German the word "class" is even today restricted to the two strata of entrepreneurs and workers. Neither the nobility nor the professions nor the older groups of craftsmen and peasants are called classes. They are "estates"—a concept which in the case of the "middle estate" (*Mittelstand*) has been retained even for the newer groups of white-collar workers and civil servants. An estate, however, is something else than a stratum or class, not only in everyday language but for the sociologist as well. *Class and Class Conflict in an Industrial Society*, op. cit. pp. 6–7.

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> both state and municipalities have extended their activities by operating industrial enterprises under direct management. These tendencies towards municipalization and nationalization have brought into being legions of public servants which, properly speaking, are neither the consequence of the capitalistic system nor of the industrialization of the national economy.

These tendencies, the authors pointed out, derive from the 'large expansion of the manifold functions which the modern "service state" performs'.[35]

After a detailed statistical analysis of the growth of the salaried employee—as a technical worker, clerical employee, salesperson and public employee—the authors conclude:

> It follows from the statistical data . . . that the rapid growth of the employees' class must be regarded as a consequence of a continuous economic development, particularly of big business, and of the new methods of business organization. . . . The rapid increase of the employees enhances their effective power and activity as a group, particularly in the large cities where we find them concentrated in large numbers. . . . All these facts have as a further consequence that the employees, by their sheer numbers, offer a counterweight to the increasing numerical strength of the labouring class.[36]

For more than a decade, a fierce debate raged in German sociology about the characterization of this 'new middle class'. Left-wing writers regarded the salaried employee as simply a 'white-collar proletariat' whose 'mass character' would lead to the adoption of working-class attitudes. Some optimistic sociologists saw in the 'new middle class' a factor for social solidarity which would act as a balancing group between the employers and industrial workers and provide cohesion for the enterprise, if not the society. Theodore Geiger predicted that the new middle class would be 'crushed' between the capitalist class and the industrial proletariat, while Schumpeter argued that because of the increase in the number of salaried employees, the world of the future would be a world of bureaucracy.[37] Those who saw the 'new middle class' only in economic terms, as did Lederer and Marschak, predicted that a position 'between the classes' was no longer possible and that in a society increasingly self-conscious of group interests so that employment relations were arbitrated by law, the new middle class would organize itself collectively and probably ally itself with the trade union movement.

[35] Ibid. pp. 8–11.

[36] Ibid. p. 16.

[37] The article by Theodore Geiger, 'Zur Theorie des Klassenbegriffs . . .' appeared in *Schmoller's Jahrbuch*, 54th Year, volume I; that of Schumpeter in *Bonner Mitteilungen*, no. 1, 1929. An influential book on the white-collar worker was Siegfried Kracauer's *Die Angestellen* (Frankfurt-am-Main, 1930), which portrayed the world of the white-collar worker in what we would call today Kafkaesque terms. The debate in German sociology is summarized in Hans Speier's book *The Salaried Employee in German Society*, op. cit. especially chapter 1, and Erich Engelhard, 'The Salaried Employee', cit. below, chapter 2.

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But the growing number of empirical studies made one thing clear: that the new middle class, in part because of its social origins (most of the white-collar workers were recruited from the declining older middle class), in part because of the ethos of 'clean cuff occupations' was stubbornly determined to maintain a self-image and a self-esteem which was 'middle class'.[38] And when the depression hit, and Hans Fallada asked the question in the title of his novel, 'Little Man, What Now?', the answer given by the new middle class, like the old middle class, when the centre and liberal parties collapsed, was by and large to shift their support to the Nazis rather than to the working-class parties.[39] Thus, the 'new middle class', an expected product of economic and social development, had an unexpected but distinctive political consequence which had not been anticipated either by the Marxists or by the sociologists in Germany.

MARX had defined the mode of production at any given historical stage as a correspondence between the forces of production (technical equipment and organization of labour) and the social relations derived from the character of the ownership of the means of production. The post-Marxist separation of manager from owner, the bureaucratization of enterprise, the complication of occupational structure, all made the once clear-cut picture of property domination and social relations ambiguous. Marx had asserted, further, that the centralization of production and its concentration would act as a 'fetter' upon the production of goods, but in the hundred years since *Capital* the Western world had seen a burst of productivity and technological growth undreamed of by any of the utopians of the time.

It was this very ambiguity of the character of the social relations, and the success of technology, which brought into focus the 'forces' of production and revived the concept of industrial society as an alternative to the distinction between capitalism and socialism. Just as on the problem of authority the concept of bureaucratization saw capitalism and socialism not as different but as variants of a common type, so too, on the issue of social development, the concept of industrial

[38] Summarizing a number of different studies by Otto Suhr, Erich Engelhard comments: '. . . his white collar is and remains the direct expression of his particular mode of life. This life is esteemed by him and others. Employees do their utmost to preserve the accepted standard of living. Beginning from a certain income figure the poorer they are, the more money they spend for rent in proportion to their income. Basically, pro-capita family expenses increase with income, but expenses for existential needs—food, housing, clothing—increase at a slower rate than those for life's other needs. The commercial employee spends most for clothing and haberdashery; he economizes on food, probably [because he] wants to make a clean-cut impression. It is just this outward style of life, too well-known for further comment, which leads to positively-oriented esteem. The mode of living is a more deciding factor for the development of the group towards an estate than "occupation" as such.' Erich Engelhard, 'Die Angestellten', in *Kölner Vierteljahrshefte für Soziologie*, translated as *The Salaried Employee*, W.P.A. Project, Columbia University, op. cit. (1939), pp. 57–59.

[39] The voting evidence is summarized by S. M. Lipset, *Political Man* (New York, 1960), chapter V, 'Fascism—Left, Right and Centre', esp. pp. 134–152.

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society subsumed the two social systems under a common rubric. As Raymond Aron, who, more than any other modern writer, is identified with the concept of industrial society, points out in his lectures:

> The sociological problem which has provided the main theme of this book is that posed by Marx and Marxism—especially as the latter is expounded in *Capital*. . . . [Marx] tried to understand the laws of its development . . . the central phenomenon in Marx's view was that of *accumulation*. He believed that the essence of capitalism was to be found in the accumulation of capital. By choosing economic growth as the central subject of this investigation I have taken up the Marxist theme of accumulation in the terminology and using the concepts of modern economics. . . .
>
> Instead of capitalism I have chosen industrial society (or technical, scientific or rationalized society) as the principal historical concept. . . . Beginning with this concept of industrial society I have then distinguished several different types of industrial society and have introduced the ideas of models of growth and phases of growth. These four concepts, industrial society, types of industrial society, models of growth and phases of growth represent the successive stages of the theory.[40]

If one focuses the problem on stages of development and economic growth, the paradox is compounded, for while there are communist states in the world today, none of them have replaced or succeeded any capitalist society (and none are socialist in the egalitarian sense envisaged by the founding fathers). And, having taken over power in economically backward countries, these communist regimes concentrate primarily on the function which Marx historically attributed to capitalism, namely the development of the productive forces—the technological equipment —of the society, and usually by forced modes of capital accumulation. (In any precise sense, since these are hierarchically stratified and politically co-ordinated societies organized around profit, they come closest to Marx's glimpse of 'state capitalism' as a possible social form which he hinted at in volume III of *Capital* than any other appropriate sociological designation.)

In that historical sense 'communism', then, is not a 'next' stage in history but simply one of a number of alternative modes of industrialization. What these regimes create are 'industrial' societies, by their specifically political, rather than market, modes.

[40] Raymond Aron, *18 Lectures on Industrial Society* (London, 1967), p. 235. The book was published in France in 1962, but as Aron notes in his foreword to the French edition, the lectures were given as a course in the Sorbonne in 1955–56 and, as is common with professorial courses at the Sorbonne, distributed in roneoed form by the Centre de Documentation Universitaire. The interest in the topic led to their book publication though as Aron points out the original form, as lectures, was maintained. In effect, as Aron points out, those choosing to emphasize the idea of industrial society pay homage to Marx by emphasizing the forces of production as the central idea, those who wish to emphasize the distinction of capitalism and socialism focus on social relations. For Aron's discussion of the alternating emphases in social thought on the 'forces of production' and the 'social relations of production' see ibid. pp. 2–3.

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The emergence since the end of the Second World War of more than 50 new states, most of them economically 'underdeveloped', committed to the goal of economic growth has tended to reinforce a distinction between pre-industrial and industrial societies. As Aron points out:

> My visit to Asia helped to convince me that the major concept of our time is that of industrial society. Europe, as seen from Asia, does not consist of two fundamentally different worlds, the Soviet World and the Western World. It is one single reality: industrial civilization. Soviet and capitalist societies are only two species of the same genus, or two versions of the same social type, progressive industrial society.[41]

Aron organized the concept of industrial society around the axis of economic growth. If one takes a broader, societal view, the sociological concept of industrial society may be seen as a compound of four themes which are associated, principally, with four thinkers: St. Simon, Durkheim, Weber, and Colin Clark.

For St. Simon (and Comte who followed him) industrial society was to be contrasted to military society. The latter was organized around plunder, waste, display; the former around the orderly output of goods. For St. Simon, there were four dimensions to an industrial society: it was concerned with production; its methods were those of order, certainty and precision; it would be organized by 'new men', engineers, industrialists, planners; and it would be based on knowledge. What one had here, in short, was the prescription of the 'new Atlantis' that Francis Bacon had once prophesied.

For Durkheim, the world of 'organic solidarity' was a world of specialization, complementarity, and interdependence. The ruling principle—in Talcott Parson's emendation of Durkheim—is 'structural differentiation'. There is a separation of the economic system from the family system, the work place from the home. With the breakup of the traditional 'collective conscience', core beliefs are to be organized around occupational codes and mediated through professional ethics.

For Weber, the theme is rationalization and universalism. A single ethic and style begins to pervade all society: these are the norms of impersonality, the emphasis on performance and achievement, the criteria of efficiency based on least cost, and the introduction of a rational calculus (a *Zweckrationalität*) in all areas of administration.

For Colin Clark (as first expressed in his *Conditions of Economic Progress*, 1940) economic sectors, as defined by the distribution of labour, could be classified as primary (extractive), secondary (manufacturing), and tertiary (services), and the weights of each sector in a society would be a function of the degree of productivity (output per capita) in each sector. Economic progress, thus, was defined as the rate of transfer of labour from one sector to the other, and this rate was a function of the differential productivity between the sectors. In this fashion Clark could

[41] Ibid. p. 42.

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account easily for the changeover to industrial society. If one added to Clark's proposition the theorem of the nineteenth-century statistician Christian Engel that, as national income rises, the greater portion of the marginal increments is spent on services, one sees, as well, an engine of change of economies into a tertiary phase.

While the phrase 'technological imperatives' is too rigid and deterministic, there are certain constraints which tend to shape like actions and force the use of common techniques. For all theorists of industrial society (and to this extent Marx as well) the locus (or primary institution) of the society is the industrial enterprise and the social relations which derive from the organization of labour around machine production. From this point of view there are some common characteristics for all industrial societies: the technology is everywhere the same; the kind of technical and engineering knowledge (and the schooling to provide these) is the same; classification of jobs and skills is roughly the same. More broadly, one finds that the proportion of technical occupations increases in each society relative to other categories; that the spread of wages is roughly the same (so are the prestige hierarchies); and that management is primarily a technical skill.

Industrial societies are *economizing* societies, that is, they are organized around a principle of functional efficiency whose desideratum is to get 'more or less' and to choose the more 'rational' course of action. Thus a decision to use natural gas rather than oil as an energy fuel will be dictated by comparative costs, and the decision of how to schedule work will depend upon an appropriate combination of materials and skills available. Ideology, to this extent, becomes irrelevant and is replaced by 'economics' in the guise of production functions, capital-output ratios, marginal efficiency of capital, linear programming and the like. To that extent, too, the distinction between 'bourgeois economics' and 'Marxist economics' fades; and if one is concerned with optimization and maximization, there is no distinction at all.[42]

[42] The most famous example is that during Stalin's lifetime, the Soviet economy used no capital pricing because of the ideological dogma that only labour, not capital, created value and that the interest rate was exploitative. The idea that the interest rate could be used to measure the marginal efficiency of capital and was essential for any accounting only gradually came into Soviet planning. Similarly, though the technique of linear programming was invented first by a Russian economist Kantorovich in the late 1920s, the idea was denounced as 'bourgeois economics' and not used until almost 40 years later after the technique had been 'reinvented' independently during the war by a Rand economist George Dantzig.

Some of this ideological dogmatism is present in the refusal of Russian planners to accept the market as a mechanism of economic allocation (though the major reasons today are primarily political). For many communists the market is associated with capitalism though actually it is only a technique whereby the user (consumer or intermediate producer) decides upon the basis of demand what is to be produced rather than the central planner. Paradoxically, in the 1930s discussion on the possibility of rational pricing under socialism, it was Marxist economists like Oskar Lange who insisted that only under socialism could the market freely operate to guide production whereas under capitalism the market was distorted by monopoly and unequal income distribution. (See Lange *et al., On the Economic Theory of Socialism* (University of Minnesota, 1938).)

Perhaps the most startling remnant of ideological infantilism in this regard is

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From this point of view socialism is a non-economic (or even anti-economic) philosophy in which other modes than functional efficiency, or goals other than 'economic growth' are sought. In this older, humanistic sense, the socialism, say, of a William Morris, the purposes of society are to increase satisfaction in work or to provide aesthetic pleasure. In this sense, socialism is not contrasted only to capitalism but to Soviet-style collectivism as well; it stands in contrast to the 'rationality' which is pervasive of industrial society.

INDUSTRIAL society, as St. Simon insisted, was the application of technical knowledge to social affairs in a methodical, systematic way. With industrial society, thus, has come the *technicien*—the French is more apt than the English 'technician', for its sense in French is much wider—the trained expert in the applied sciences. It has implied, too, that those who possessed such knowledge would exercise authority—if not power—in the society.

St. Simon's vision of industrial society, a vision of pure technocracy, was a system of planning and rational order in which society would specify its needs and organize the factors of production to achieve them. Industrial society was characterized by two elements, knowledge and organization. Knowledge was objective. No one had 'opinions' on chemistry or mathematics; one had knowledge or not. The metaphors St. Simon used for organization were an orchestra, a ship and an army, in which each person fulfils a function in accordance with his competence. Although St. Simon clearly outlined the process whereby a nascent bourgeoisie had superseded the feudal nobility, and though he predicted the rise of a large working class, he did not believe that the working class would succeed the bourgeoisie in power. As he tried to show in his sketch of historical development, classes do not rule, for society is always governed by an educated elite. The natural leaders of the working class would therefore be the industrialists and the scientists. He foresaw the dangers of conflict, but did not regard it as inevitable. If an organic society were created, men would accept their place as a principle of justice. The division of labour meant that some men would guide and others would be guided. In a society organized by function and capacity, doctors and engineers and chemists would employ their skills according to objective needs, not in order to gain personal power. These men would be obeyed not because they are masters but because they have technical competence; to be obedient to one's doctor, after all, is a spontaneous but rational act. For this reason the St. Simonians, in a set of phrases that later were used by Engels, gave their new social hierarchy the slogan, 'From each according to his capacity, to each according to his performance'; and the industrial society, as they

Fidel Castro's announcement that he hopes—soon—to bring socialism into Cuba by abolishing money, and that everything would then be 'free'—as if in so doing one does away with the problem of comparative costs of items and the reasons for the differential prices—and exchange—of products.

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describe it, was no longer the 'rule over men, but the administration of things'.

The administration of things—the substitution of rational judgment for politics—is the hallmark of technocracy. The evolution of industrial society has emphasized a double aspect of this role, of function, and of method. 'The technical employee', as Lederer and Marschak point out,

> was known neither to the handicrafts nor to industry in its infancy. For the master craftsman of old, as the independent proprietor of a manufactory, was totally different from the technical official of today's mammoth concern. These modern industrial concerns have devised a whole superstructure or mechanism, of which the technical employee must form an integral part. This mechanism removes and draws in all possible brain and routine work from the shops; everything is centered on the planning and laying-out department.[43]

And in the society, as Zbigniew Brzezinski states the case: '. . . social problems are seen less as the consequence of deliberate evil and more as the unintended by-products of both complexity and ignorance; solutions are not sought in emotional simplifications but in the use of man's accumulated social and scientific knowledge'.[44]

With the rise of the *technicien* has come the belief that advanced industrial society would be ruled by the technocrat. This is a belief held particularly in France where there has been a long tradition of administration from the Centre (reinforced, as de Tocqueville pointed out, by the French Revolution) and where the elite Corps de l'Etat is drawn from the Grandes Ecoles which were created for that purpose: the *Ecole Polytechnique* and, after the Second World War, the *Ecole Nationale d'Administration.* (August Comte, as Raymond Aron points out, is the 'symbolic patron' of the polytechnician manager.) A number of writers, principally Jean Meynaud, have argued that 'real power' has shifted out of the hands of the elected representatives to the technical experts and that there now 'begins a new type of government, neither democracy nor bureaucracy but a technocracy'.

The rise of technocracy, Meynaud argues, goes hand in hand with the expansion of the powers of the Executive, and already 'three important sectors have been taken over by the technocrats today: economic planning, national defense and the organization of scientific research'. We can 'safely postulate', he writes, 'that technocratic power tended to increase under the Third and Fourth Republics, if only because of the extension and systematization of state intervention in social and economic fields.' These powers were enlarged in the creation of the specialized bodies of the European Economic Community, such as the European Coal and Steel Community. The decline of parliamen-

[43] Lederer and Marschak, op. cit. p. 7.
[44] Brzezinski, op. cit. see Part II, Section IV, 'Ideas and Ideals Beyond Ideology'.

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tary influence in the Gaullist Fifth Republic, and the expansion of ministerial power—with many of the ministers drawn from the civil service—spread the role of technocratic influence in the 1960s. 'The technocrat's predominance in the Fifth Republic', writes Meynaud, 'may be partly attributed to some of the ways in which the regime functions, notably its power to prepare certain decisions or interventions in secret.'[45]

Much of the writing on the subject portrays technocracy as in contrast to, or undermining, the normal political framework of democracy; some of it borders on hysteria, *vide*, the late Georges Gurvitch, who defined technocracy as

> a formidable social power, absolutist and secretive in character, which threatens to devour the state. Organized, planned capitalism pushes this power in the direction of fascist structures, camouflaged or otherwise, which unite the system of trusts, cartels, the banks, employers, higher administrative personnel and the most senior career soldiers with a totalitarian state at their service.[46]

Much of the confusion on the problem arises from the failure to distinguish two functions and two kinds of technical intellectuals: the *technicien,* who corresponds to the function of knowledge; and the technocrat, who is engaged in the function of power.[47] Technical knowledge—the administration of things—is a necessary and growing component of many kinds of decisions, including political and strategic ones. But power—the relations between men—involves political choices that are a compound of values and interests and cannot always be 'ordered' in a technical way. The technocrat in power is simply one kind of politician, not a *technicien,* no matter how much he employs his technical knowledge.[48]

It is clear that in the society of the future, however one defines it, the scientist, the professional, the *technicien,* and the technocrat will play a predominant role in the political life of the society. But if any meaningful generalizations are to emerge about these different roles, a discussion of the power of this stratum or a section of it will have to clarify four questions:

1. The scope and limits of technical expertise in solving problems in society.

2. An assessment of the new kinds of industries which sell 'knowledge', not goods, and the weight of these industries (profit and non-profit) in the economy of the country.

[45] Jean Meynaud, *Technocracy* (London, 1968), pp. 95, 140–141.

[46] From *Quel Avenir attend l'homme?* (Paris, 1961), quoted in Meynaud, ibid. p. 146.

[47] This distinction is also made in an interesting book by two Marxist writers, Frederic Bon and Michel-Antonie Burnier, *Les Nouveaux Intellectuels* (Paris, 1966). See chapters IV and V, 'Les Intellectuels Technocrates', and 'Les Intellectuels Techniciens'.

[48] This argument is developed in my essay 'Post-Industrial Society: Technocracy and Politics', in *Survey,* no. 78.

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3. The basis of cohesiveness of any new social class based on skill, not property.

4. The likelihood of the *techniciens* and technocrats becoming a new, dominant class [49] (like the bourgeoisie, who preceded the development of large-scale industry), replacing the older capitalist class.

Marxism: The Problem of Bureaucracy

In the post-Marxist writing in the West, two themes have emerged as central for the transformation of capitalist or industrial society, one the bureaucratization of the enterprise, if not of the society as a whole, the other the rise of new classes, particularly the technical and white-collar occupations, to predominance in the society, altering thus the sociological character of the stratification system.

Marx had foreseen the rise of the new occupational strata, even though he felt that they would not affect the fundamental economic relations in society. But what of bureaucracy? In the mid-twentieth century it has become the central problem for all societies, socialist as well as capitalist. What role did it play in Marx's thought?

Strange to say, in only one essay, in the *Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right*, written in 1843, did Marx squarely confront the subject. Afterwards, other than marginal references, the topic seems to vanish from the centre of Marx's concerns.[50] The reason lies, perhaps, in Marx's fundamental vision of the relation of society to politics in modern times.

[49] One is not restricted to the specific focus of *techniciens*; if I read Dahrendorf's term 'service class' rightly (see note 13), he would include this group, and little more, as the core of what he sees as the ascending new class in society.

[50] Inevitably, Marxologues disagree on this, as on so many other interpretations of Marx's thought. Thus Martin Albrow, in his excellent little book, *Bureaucracy* (London, 1970) writes: 'The section devoted to bureaucracy constituted an important part of the *Kritik des Hegelschen Staatsrechts*. It was a topic on which Marx had clearly thought deeply. But thereafter he scarcely gave it any attention. He made occasional mention of the bureaucrats, but the *Kritik* was neither cited nor published and the Marxist theory of the state developed in independence of it (p. 69).

Shlomo Avineri, however, in his *The Social and Political Thought of Karl Marx* (Cambridge, England, 1968) argues: 'Most studies of Marx have neglected his concern with bureaucracy, and some have even accused Marx of wholly overlooking the fact that bureaucracy is one of the central phenomena of modern political and socio-economic life. But an insistence on the importance of understanding bureaucracy both historically and functionally runs through all of Marx's writings after 1843. For Marx, bureaucracy is central to the understanding of the modern state' (p. 49).

How to mediate this stark difference? By making a distinction. In the critique of Hegel, Marx discusses the role of bureaucracy, as the quotations below will indicate, as a quasi-independent force, standing between the State and Civil Society. In his later political writings, particularly in *The Eighteenth Brumaire* and *The Civil War in France*, bureaucracy becomes identical with the state apparatus, and it is the state, even though 'the instrument of the ruling class', which, at times, 'strove for power on its own', under the guise of representing the *general* interest.

Marx's Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right was published first only in 1927, by D. Riazanov, as part of his collection of Marx's early writings. A full English translation appeared only in 1971, edited by Joseph O'Malley. Excerpts appeared

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In the classical world, as Hegel had pointed out, there is no distinction between the social and the political, between society and the state. As Avineri writes: 'When the political state is just a form of socio-economic life, of the material state, *res publica* means that public life is the real content of individual life. Therefore anyone whose private life lacks political status is a slave: political unfreedom means social servitude'.

The Middle Ages reverses this relationship. Each person is defined by his sociological standing and is a member of a specific estate of *Stände* which defines his rights and obligations. It is a society which is the foundation of social as well as political status; the term *Stände* refers both to social stratification and to political organization.

In modern society, there is a fundamental distinction between state and civil society. As Marx writes, in his essays on *The Jewish Question*: 'The political revolution [i.e. the shattering of Estates and guild privileges] abolished the political character of the civic society. . . . The political emancipation was at the same time the emancipation of civic society from politics, from even the semblance of a general content.' [51]

For Hegel, from whom this basic distinction derived, the civil society was an assemblage of special interests, each pursuing its own individual aims while the state represented the 'general interest' ruling for 'all'. The responsibility for carrying out the monarch's decision—the monarch embodying the state—is the civil servant's; Hegel does not use the word bureaucracy. 'The nature of the executive functions', he writes in *The Philosophy of Right,* 'is that they are objective and that in their substance they have been explicitly fixed by previous decision.' For that purpose a special kind of person is required.

> Individuals are not appointed to office on account of their birth or native personal gifts. The *objective* factor in their appointment is knowledge and proof of ability. Such proof guarantees that the state will get what it requires; and since it is the sole condition of appointment, it also guarantees to every citizen the chance of joining the class of civil servants.

The misuse of power—the guarantee that officials will not overstep the bounds of the general interest—is guarded against by the 'hierarchical organizations and answerability of the officials', and the independence given to corporations and local communities with their own powers.[52]

For Marx this is sheer mystification. As he says in the *Critique*: 'What Hegel says . . . does not deserve the name of philosophical

in the US in the edition, *Writings of the Young Marx on Philosophy and Society*, edited by Loyd Easton and Kurt H. Guddat (Doubleday, Anchor 1967, pp. 152–202). The translations used below are from Easton and Guddat, modified in one instance by the use of a section from Avineri where it made more colloquial sense.

[51] Reprinted in H. J. Stenning (ed.), *Selected Essays of Karl Marx* (London, n.d.), p. 82.

[52] *Hegel's Philosophy of Right,* transl. by T. M. Knox (Oxford, 1949), pp. 190, 192. The discussions of 'the executive' are in paragraphs 287–297, pp. 186–193.

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exposition. Most of the paragraphs could be taken verbatim from the Prussian Civil Code.' The opposition between general interests and special interests is illusory for the state is itself a private purpose simply confronting other private purposes, and the impartiality of the bureaucracy—a word Marx does use, in a pejorative sense—is a mask for its own special interests. It is in this context that Marx develops his views about the nature of bureaucracy:

> Hegel proceeds from the *separation* of the 'state' and 'civil' society, from 'particular interests' and the 'completely existent universal'. And bureaucracy is indeed based on *this separation*. . . . Hegel develops no *content* for bureaucracy, only some general definitions of its '*formal*' organization. And indeed bureaucracy is only the 'formalism' of a content lying outside. . . .
>
> 'Bureaucracy' is the 'state formalism' of civil society. It is the 'state's consciousness', the 'state's will', the 'state's power', as a *corporation*, hence a *particular*, closed society in the state. . . .
>
> Bureaucracy is a circle no one can leave. Its hierarchy is a *hierarchy of information*. The top entrusts the lower circles with an insight into details, while the lower circles entrust the top with an insight into what is universal, and thus they mutually deceive each other. . . .
>
> Bureaucracy possesses the state's essence, the spiritual essence of society, as its *private property*. The general spirit of bureaucracy is the official *secret*, the mystery sustained within bureaucracy itself by hierarchy and maintained on the outside as a closed corporation. Conducting the affairs of the state in public, even political consciousness, thus appears to the bureaucracy as high treason against its mystery. Authority is thus the principle of its knowledge, and the deification of authoritarianism is its credo.
>
> . . . within bureaucracy spiritualism becomes a crass materialism, the materialism of passive obedience, of faith in authority, of the mechanism of fixedly formal activities, fixed principles, views and traditions. For the individual bureaucrat the state's purpose becomes his private purpose of hunting for higher positions and making a career for himself. In one respect he views actual life as something material, *for the spirit of this life has its separate existence* in bureaucracy. . . . Bureaucracy has therefore to make life as materialistic as possible. . . . Hence the bureaucrat must always behave toward the real state in a Jesuitical fashion, be it consciously or unconsciously. . . . The bureaucrat sees the world as a mere object to be managed by him.[53]

Acute as this is, one has to attribute the subsequent lack of attention to bureaucracy—and the lack of a systematic discussion of the political order—to the evolution of Marx's thought, from politics to sociology so to speak, an evolution reflected in the subsequent writings in the *Economc Manuscripts and The German Ideology*. Out of this came Marx's distinctive conception of sociology: the focus on society, not

[53] See Easton and Guddat, op. cit. pp. 184, 185, 186; Avineri, op. cit. pp. 23–24.

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the state; on the economy, not the polity. For him all basic social relations derive not from politics, but from the mode of production. Class relations were economic relations: there could not be autonomous political classes, or orders, such as bureaucracy and the military. For him, what was distinctive about modern society was not the creation of a national state, or a bureaucracy, but the *capitalist* mode of production. The crises which would shake modern society were primarily economic, deriving from the 'laws of motion' of the capitalist mode of production: the chronic underconsumption, the disproportion between the producers' goods and consumers' goods sectors with consequent overproduction, and the falling rate of profit—all derived from the murderous competition between capitalists, and the consequent changing ratios of the organic composition of capital in the society as a whole. What was unique about capitalism was the existence of an autonomous market society which was not dependent on the state.[54]

For Marx, it was not politics but social structure which was decisive. Politics is an arena where the social divisions of a society are fought out. Politics has no autonomy; it is a reflection of societal forces. What is the state? An instrument of force—the army, police, bureaucracy—used by the dominant classes. For Marx, there was no capitalist *state*, but a state used by capitalists. In fact, there is no theory or history of a *political order* in Marx, as in Weber, with his distinctions of patriarchal, patrimonial and legal bureaucratic political orders, or types of political legitimacy. For Marx, as in classical sociology, the focus is on the *underlying* social structure whose actual relations are obscured by formal relations (as in abstract exchange relations being social relations in Marx's discussion of the fetishism of commodities).

The capitalist mode of production was possible in a wide variety of political states, democratic or authoritarian (vide England and Imperial Germany), but, inevitably, since the capitalist was the dominant class in the society, the state would reflect and support capitalist interests.

But not always. The most vivid and striking of all of Marx's analyses of the ebb and flow of political power is *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte*. But *The Eighteenth Brumaire* is a study of an adventurer who was 'above' the classes, and used the state to manipulate one class against another. As Marx writes:

> This contradictory task of the man explains the contradictions of his government, the confused groping hither and thither which seeks now to win, now to humiliate first one class and then another and arrays all of them uniformly against him. . . .
>
> As the executive authority which has made itself an independent

[54] As Avineri well puts it: 'Civil society is totally emancipated from political limitations; private life, including economic activity, becomes completely independent of any considerations relevant to the commonwealth; and all political restrictions on property and economic activity are abolished. Economic individualism and *laissez faire* express this dichotomy between civil society and state, with human society now fully conscious of its alienation and of the division of human life into a private and public sphere', ibid. pp. 20–21.

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> power, Bonaparte feels it to be his mission to safeguard 'civil order'. But the strength of this civil order lies in the middle class. He looks on himself, therefore, as the representative of the middle class and issues decrees in this sense. Nevertheless he is somebody solely due to the fact that he has broken the political power of this middle class and daily breaks it anew. Consequently, he looks on himself as the adversary of the political and literary power of the middle class. *But by protecting its material power, he generates its political power anew.*[55]

'But above all,' as Marx writes, Bonaparte, in fact, as the chief of the Society of 10 December, is the 'representative of the *lumpenproletariat* to which he himself, his entourage, his government and his army belong', and their prime purpose is to enrich themselves. And yet, the political character of a regime is transitory. For a short space in history the state can be politically against the 'dominant' class; yet for Marx, in the end what counts is the underlying economic system on which 'material power' rests.

It is this theme, the underlying mode of production and the character of property relations, which is central and decisive for Marx; all the rest is secondary. Marx's early writings were the criticism of religion and of politics. The writing on bureaucracy, written before he turned to economics, came when Marx was still a democrat and not yet a communist.[56] In those writings, bureaucracy appears as a quasi-independent force, developing its own mode of existence, ruling the rest of society in its own interests. Yet two years after his essay on bureaucracy, when Marx has completed his *Economic Manuscripts,* he turned scathingly on a former friend, Karl Heinzen, and comments: 'The fatuous Heinzen connects the existence of classes with the existence of *political* privileges and *monopolies.*'[57]

The idea that the bureaucracy could become an independent force above a society was a theme that was central to all the sceptics of nineteenth-century progress, from anarchists like Bakunin to conservatives like Burckhardt.[58] Yet for Marxists, this would only contradict the proposition that class relations were economic relations and economic

[55] Reprinted in Karl Marx, *Selected Works,* vol. II (Moscow, 1936), pp. 423, 424.

[56] For an authoritative discussion of this point, see Leonard Krieger, 'The Uses of Marx for History', in the *Political Science Quarterly,* vol. LXXV, no. 3.

[57] The reference is in Albrow, op. cit. p. 70.

[58] As Bakunin observed in a famous passage: '. . . a strong State can have only one foundation; military and bureaucratic centralization. In this respect the essential difference between a monarchy and a democratic republic is reduced to the following: in a monarchy the bureaucratic world oppresses and plunders the people for the greater benefit of the privileged propertied classes as well as for its own benefit, and all that is done in the name of the monarch; in a republic the same bureaucracy will do exactly the same, but—in the name of the will of the people. . . . every State, even the most Republican and the most democratic State—even the would-be popular State conceived by M. Marx—are in their essence only machines governing the masses from above, through an intelligent and therefore a privileged minority, allegedly knowing the general interests of the people better than the people themselves.' *The Political Philosophy of Bakunin,* edited by G. P. Maximoff (Glencoe, Illinois, 1953), p. 211.

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relations were *au fond* property relations. It was an insight into history that became an ideological dogma; and like all ideology it served, in turn, to obscure reality. The irony of it was that the place where this paradox worked itself out was in the first socialist society where power was taken in the name of Marx—in the Soviet Union.

The Soviet Union: Bureaucracy and the New Class

In Czarist Russia a socialist revolution had taken place—private ownership of the means of production had been abolished and property relations, and consequently class relations had been transformed. Thus, in the most unlikely of circumstances, a Marxian theory of society and social development was to be tested.

Before the First World War, all Marxian theorists had predicted a revolution in Russia. This was based on Marx's notion, derived from the revolutions of 1848, that the *political* course of capitalist development would fall into two stages: the democratic revolution and the social revolution. The democratic revolution was essentially bourgeois; it was the achievement of political rights, such as the right of assembly, of franchise, etc., which the bourgeoisie itself needed to establish power, but which, in struggle, could be grasped by the working class as well. The social revolution was the action by the working class, using its political rights, to transform the economic relations of society.

From this point of view, Marxists drew a continuum: England and France had gone farthest in the democratic revolution; Germany's revolution was incomplete; Russia had lagged most behind. The agenda of history remained to be completed; Russia still had to go through its '1848'. Thus all socialists expected a revolution in Russia as an historical inevitability, but a 'bourgeois' revolution—February, not October.

Some Marxists, particularly Trotsky, thought it possible to make a socialist revolution in Russia on the basis of what Trotsky called 'the law of combined development' for backward countries. 'In the conditions of capitalist decline', wrote Trotsky, 'backward countries are unable to attain that level which the old centres of capitalism have obtained', and since such countries could not develop on a capitalist basis, only socialization could 'solve those problems of technique and productivity which were long ago solved by capitalism in the advanced industrial countries'.[59]

But in the Soviet Union, after the October Revolution, a new social force had arisen which had increasingly assumed autonomy and independent power—the bureaucracy. In *State and Revolution* Lenin had

[59] Leon Trotsky, *The Revolution Betrayed* (New York, 1937), pp. 5–6. (To save elaborate footnoting, further citations of pages are given in brackets after quotation; all references are to this edition.)

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argued that the old state machinery had to be smashed, but the new administrative apparatus would be, as in the Paris Commune of 1871, directly in the hands of the people: there would be officials, but they would not become bureaucrats, 'i.e. privileged persons divorced from the people and standing *above* the people. That is the *essence* of bureaucracy'. Workers' deputies were to supervise the management of the apparatus. They were to be elected and subject to recall. Their pay was not to exceed a worker's. There was to be 'immediate introduction of control and supervision by *all*, so that *all* may become "bureaucrats" for a time and that therefore, *nobody* may be able to become a "bureaucrat"'.[60]

But Trotsky, even from the start, had a more realistic view. Bureaucracy, he argued, is inescapable ('the tendencies of bureaucratism . . . would everywhere show themselves even after a proletarian revolution') for the obvious reason that no transition to socialism is ever immediate ('A socialist state even in America on the basis of the most advanced capitalism could not immediately provide everyone with as much as he needs, and would therefore be compelled to spur everyone to produce as much as possible'), so that both a state and some 'directing apparatus' in the society are still necessary (pp. 53, 55).

A bureaucracy, he says, inevitably tends to develop its own vested interests. But the counterweight to the bureaucracy is the Party ('the Party was always in a state of open or disguised struggle with the bureaucracy'). It was Stalin, in seeking his own power, who brought the two together. What Stalin did was to 'subject the Party to its own officialdom and merge the latter in the officialdom of the state. Thus was created the present totalitarian regime' (p. 279).

But bureaucracy has its own trajectory. 'The unlimited power of the bureaucracy is a no less forceful instrument of social differentiation', Trotsky writes (p. 133). It uses its power to guarantee its own well-being; it divides sectors of the population from each other, creating privileged strata in the working class and collective farms, it strangles criticism in order to reinforce its own power. In all respects it has 'the specific consciousness of a ruling "class", which, however, is still far from confident of its right to rule' (p. 135).

If a new ruling 'class' has emerged, what then is the character of Soviet society? Is it still socialist; and if so, in what way? If not what is it? These were the questions with which Trotsky wrestled in the book, questions crucial to one's assessment of the revolution.

Trotsky sought to give two answers, one political, the other sociological. The Stalin regime itself Trotsky called a form of Bonapartism,

[60] See V. I. Lenin, *The State and the Revolution*, in *Selected Works* (Moscow, 1951, published in England 1953), vol. II, part I, pp. 249–250, 280. 'Such a beginning', Lenin added, 'on the basis of a large-scale production, will of itself lead to the gradual "withering away" of all bureaucracy . . . to an order in which the functions of control and accounting—becoming more and more simple—will be performed by each in turn, will then become a habit and will finally die out as the special functions of a special section of the population' (ibid. p. 250).

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though 'of a new type not before seen in history'. Bonapartism arises when 'in moments of history' a sharp struggle between two camps allows state power to rise, momentarily, above the contending classes. But as a Marxist Trotsky could not accept Bonapartism as more than a political phase of a deeper struggle, that of contending classes. What, then, was the sociological character, i.e. the *class character*, of Soviet society?

Was it 'state capitalism'? Trotsky considers the question in detail, but rejects the formulation on two curious grounds: one that property had been 'socialized' in the Soviet Union, and two, that state capitalism was a device in declining capitalist states, such as Germany or Italy, to restrict the 'productive forces' of the society in order to serve reactionary purposes. Since, in the Soviet Union, the intention was to 'develop the productive forces' of society, the regime was historically progressive. How, then, could one group the two under a common rubric?

Is the bureaucracy a new class? Trotsky had more difficulty with this question. In bourgeois society the bureaucracy 'represents the interests of a possessing and educated class'. The fascists, 'when they find themselves in power, are united with the big bourgeoisie by bonds of common interest'. In the Soviet Union 'the means of production belong to the state. But the state, so to speak, "belongs" to the bureaucracy. . . . It is in the full sense of the word the sole privileged and commanding *stratum* in the Soviet society' (pp. 248–249).

But Trotsky shies away from calling the bureaucracy a *class* and accepting the fact that a new and different kind of social system had been created in the Soviet Union. When he uses the phrase 'ruling "class"', the word *class* is in quotation marks, to indicate its ambiguity; so, too, is the word 'belong' when he writes that the state 'belongs' to the bureaucracy. His chief argument is that the bureaucracy lacks the essential and distinctive feature of a class, i.e. property rights, and so it cannot 'transmit to [its] heirs its rights in the exploitation of the state apparatus'.

The issue, says Trotsky, is still open. The question of the character of the Soviet Union, he declares, is not yet decided by history. It is a 'workers' state, torn by the antagonism between an organized and armed Soviet aristocracy and the unarmed toiling masses', a '*contradictory society halfway between capitalism and socialism*' (pp. 278, 255). The alternatives are either a new upsurge by the proletariat to eliminate the privileges of the bureaucracy, or a 'bourgeois restoration'. Trotsky also considers a third variant, that 'the bureaucracy continues at the head of the state'. But his orthodox Marxism leads him to reject this as a likely permanent form since he cannot envisage a class becoming a ruling class without becoming a 'possessing class', and passing on its privileges 'by right of testament'.

And yet, in wrestling with these questions, Trotsky is led to a startling conclusion: 'To define the Soviet regime as transitional, or intermediate, means to abandon such finished social categories as *capitalism*

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(and therewith " state capitalism ") and also *socialism* ' (p. 254, emphasis in the original). Doctrinaires would not be satisfied, he notes, ' sociological problems would certainly be simpler if sociological phenomena had always a finished character.' But ' there is nothing more dangerous, however, than to throw out of reality, for the sake of logical completeness, elements which today violate your scheme and tomorrow may wholly overturn it ' (p. 255).

AS an orthodox Marxist, Trotsky could only envisage the Soviet Union, in his time, as tending either to capitalism or socialism. And yet, Trotsky did not throw out of his scheme the possibility that the bureaucracy could become a new class, even though it violated the ' logical completeness ' of the dichotomy of capitalism and socialism. In *The Revolution Betrayed* he wrote:

> If these as yet wholly new relations [i.e. bureaucratic privilege] should solidify, become the norm and be legalized, whether with or without resistance from the workers, they would, in the long run, lead to a complete liquidation of the social conquests of the proletarian revolution. But to speak of that now is at least premature (p. 249).

Three years later, in what was to be his last theoretical pronouncement, Trotsky acknowledged the distinct possibility of another *either/or*. Writing shortly after the Nazi-Soviet pact, Trotsky told his followers that a new historic caesura had been reached: since the ' further persistence of the disintegrating capitalist world is impossible ', either the proletariat would organize the world for socialism or a new social form, bureaucratic collectivism, would establish itself on the stage of history.

Trotsky took the phrase and the idea of bureaucratic collectivism from a book published in Paris in 1939 entitled *Le Bureaucratisation du Monde* by a man who signed it only ' Bruno R. No one knew Bruno R., although Trotsky called him ' an Italian " left-Communist " who formerly adhered to the Fourth International '. Even more curious, no one seemed to be able to find the book which, for Trotsky, represented the only real challenge to his ideas, and the argument about ' bureaucratic collectivism ' became known only second-hand, through Trotsky's account.

The thesis of the book, as reported by Trotsky, was sweeping in its stark and powerful simplicity. Not only did the bureaucracy in Russia constitute a new class but the men of this class—bureaucrats, managers, technicians—were the forerunners of a social revolution which was creating a new type of ruling class throughout the entire Western world: Stalin's Russia, Hitler's Germany, Mussolini's Italy, even Franklin D. Roosevelt's New Deal were all part of a common historical phenomenon.

For Trotsky there was a direct political corollary to this new *either/or* ' However onerous the . . . perspective may be ' he wrote, if

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the Stalin regime was not merely an 'abhorrent relapse' on the road to socialism but a distinct new social form, with permanent exploitative features of its own, then the proletariat everywhere would have to repudiate the Soviet Union and refuse to defend it against its enemies as progressive. In the longer perspective, if the larger thesis were true, that socialism was not the necessary stage after capitalism, then the idea itself would have to be considered as a 'utopia'.[61]

Trotsky, at his death, was still not prepared to accept the second perspective, and for him and his followers Russia was still a 'degenerated workers' state' which could yet be redeemed by a proletarian revolution. For left-wing schismatics, however, for whom the orthodox Marxist categories had become too constricting, the phrase 'bureaucratic collectivism' was a felicitous one. It congealed the gropings of independent radicals who sought a sociological category that was realistic about the Soviet regime. The dissident Trotskyite faction, led by Max Shachtman, adopted the concept and in a series of articles from 1940 on Shachtman sought to develop the idea that the Soviet Union was neither socialist nor capitalist but a new kind of society.[62] Shachtman's co-leader in the Trotskyite split, James Burnham (for whom schematism constitutes an ideological way of life) generalized the idea as Bruno R. had, and proposed the theory of *The Managerial Revolution* as the necessary outcome of Western social development.

[61] The article by Trotsky, entitled 'The USSR in War', appeared in *The New International*, November 1939. As he formulated the question: 'However onerous the second perspective may be, if the world proletariat should actually prove incapable of fulfilling the mission placed upon it by the course of development, nothing else would remain except openly to recognize that the socialist programme, based on the internal contradictions of capitalist society, ended as a utopia. It is self-evident that a new 'minimum' programme would be required—for the defense of the interests of the slaves of the totalitarian bureaucratic society'.

[62] The major argument was first summarized by Shachtman in 1943 in his long introduction to the publication then of Trotsky's *The New Course*, Trotsky's initial statement on the development of bureaucracy in Russia which he wrote as an internal document for the Party in 1923, and which Shachtman translated to establish the beginnings of the revisionist doctrine. Schachtman published a collection of his own writings on the subject as *The Bureaucratic Revolution: The Rise of the Stalinist State* (New York, 1962).

Inasmuch as when radical sects split each circle becomes squared, in the ideological break-up of the American Trotskyite movement in the early 1940s, while Schachtman declared that a new social form had emerged in the Soviet Union, at the other end of the quadrille the Johnson-Forest 'tendency' argued that the Soviet Union could only be a 'state capitalist' society. Johnson was the black writer C. L. R. James, who for a while went back to his first love, writing about cricket, on which he was an acknowledged authority. Forest was the pseudonym of the theoretician Raya Dunayevskaya, who had once been Trotsky's secretary. Miss Dunayevskaya retreated to Detroit, where she founded a matriarchal sect whose major theoretical effort was to convince workers that a knowledge of Hegel's *Science of Logic* was necessary to understand Lenin. Her book arguing this thesis in part, *Marxism and Freedom* (New York, 1958), carries an appreciative introduction by Herbert Marcuse. The two other corners were occupied by James P. Cannon, who defended the 'orthodox' Trotsky view of Russia as a 'degenerated workers' state', and James Burnham, who generalized the idea of bureaucratic collectivism into a sweeping idea of the managerial revolution.

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BURNHAM'S *The Managerial Revolution,* which, as an idea and a phrase, rather than as a specific set of definitions and categories, has had a continuing influence since its publication 30 years ago, has an artful simplicty. It was based on the assumption that *function* rather than *ownership* was the crucial category of power in a technical society, and it presented a seductive theory of historical class succession so that just as the oppressed peasantry did not succeed the oppressive feudal lords but both were displaced by an entirely different class, the bourgeoisie, who remade society to their own image, so the proletariat would not succeed the capitalist but both would be replaced by 'the managers', who would become a new ruling class, wielding power on the basis of their technical superiority, over the technical workers.

Though the idea of *The Managerial Revolution* may have been suggested by Bruno R. (however there are no references to him in Burnham's book), the historical lineaments of the conception were clear, and Burnham moved quickly to establish a patrimony in his next book, two years later, *The Machiavellians,* which he subtitled defensively 'Defenders of Freedom'. These fathers were Gaetano Mosca, who proclaimed that all societies are divided into elites and masses and that the political process is always a 'struggle for pre-eminence' on the part of determined minorities; Vilfredo Pareto, who saw political history as a 'circulation of elites' where in new vigorous forces in society manipulate the sentiments of the masses in order to gain power[63]; and Robert Michels, who argued that complex organization creates a need for technical specialization, that 'organization implies a tendency to oligarchy', and that the leadership places the defense of its interests ahead of its constituency, and that the extension of state bureaucracy 'alone can [satisfy] the claim of the educated members of the population . . . the discontented members of the educated classes . . . for secure positions' in the society.[64]

While the *phrase* 'the managerial revolution' had a large resonance, the analysis and categories proved feeble indeed. The central terms shifted constantly. By 'managers' Burnham said he meant the 'production managers', 'administrative engineers', 'supervisory technicians', but not the finance executives, a bastard version of Veblen's distinction between industry and business. But the managers were also in government, and there they were the administrators, commissioners, bureau heads and so on.

The managers 'will exercise their control over the instruments of

[63] As Pareto describes the mechanism of this process: 'Revolutions come about through accumulations in the higher strata of society—either because of a slowing-down in class-circulation, or from other causes—of decadent elements no longer possessing the residues suitable for keeping them in power, and shrinking from the use of force; while meantime in the lower strata of society elements of superior quality are coming to the fore, possessing residues suitable for exercising the functions of government and willing to use force.' Paragraph 2057, *The Mind and Society* (New York, 1935), volume III, p 1431, 'Class-Circulation'.

[64] Robert Michels, *Political Parties* (Glencoe, Ill., reprint edition, 1949), pp. 31–37, 185–189.

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production . . . through their control of the state which in turn will own and control the instruments of production'. In Germany and Italy there is a shift from capitalism to managerial society. In Russia, 'the nation most advanced toward managerial structure', the managers, who are the managers of factories and state trusts and big collective farms, are already getting the largest proportion of the national income.

In the West the managerial revolution had to come because capitalism itself will break down.

> Experience has already shown that there is not the slightest prospect of ridding capitalism of mass unemployment. . . . The volume of public and private debt has reached a point where is cannot be managed much longer . . . there has been in all major capitalist nations a permanent agricultural depression. . . . [And finally] Capitalism is no longer able to find uses for the available investment funds, which waste in idleness in the account books of the banks. This mass unemployment of private money is scarcely less indicative of the death of capitalism than the mass unemployment of human beings.

In the same apocalyptic vein Burnham writes: 'We are now in a position to understand the central historical meaning of the first two world wars of the twentieth century. . . . The war of 1914 was the last great war of capitalist society; the war of 1939 is the first great war of managerial society'. And, he continues: 'The general outcome of the second war is also assured. It is assured because it does not depend upon a military victory by Germany, which is in any case likely.' The general outcome is the collapse of capitalism, the consolidation of Europe ('The day of a Europe carved into a score of sovereign states is over') and the victory of managerial society.[65]

How viable is the theory of the managerial revolution? Although Burnham is quite fuzzy as to who are the managers, it is clear from the context out of which his theory developed that it is the economic administrators, not the political bureaucrats, who will dominate the society, though at one point he states that there is no sharp distinction between the economic managers and the political bureaucrats when he writes: 'To say that the ruling class is the managers is almost the same thing as to say that it is the state bureaucracy.'[66]

[65] James Burnham, *The Managerial Revolution* (New York, 1941). Citations, successively, to pp. 80, 72, 236, 159, 221, 32–33, 176, 247.

[66] A striking juxtaposition with Burnham is provided by Max Weber in an essay written in 1917 which contains a section called 'Bureaucratization and the Naïveté of the Literati'. Said Weber: 'A progressive elimination of private capitalism is theoretically conceivable, although it is surely not so easy as imagined in the dreams of some literati who do not know what it is all about; its elimination will certainly not be a consequence of this war. But let us assume that sometime in the future it will be done away with. What would be the practical result? The destruction of the steel frame of modern industrial work? No! The abolition of private capitalism would simply mean that also the *top management* of the nationalized or socialized enterprises would become bureaucratic. . . . State bureaucracy would rule *alone* if private capitalism were eliminated. The private and public bureaucracies, which now work next to, and potentially against, each other and hence check one another

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But in fact the economic managers and the state bureaucracy—if one thinks of managers as the men who run the economic *enterprises*—are often quite distinct and even often at odds with each other. As Kerr, Harbison, Dunlop, and Myers argue in their comparative study of management:

> . . . in all industrializing societies, the managerial class has neither the capacity nor the will to become the dominant ruling group. The managers are characteristically the agents of stockholders, of state bureaucracies, or in some cases of workers' councils. Since they are preoccupied with internal affairs of enterprise, which become ever more complex, the members of the managerial class are prone to become conformists rather than leaders in the larger affairs of society.[67]

To say all this is not to minimize the real changes which have taken place in the social structure of Western society if one looks at the enterprise in functional rather than formal terms. The power of technical management has forced a decisive change in many of the basic goals of capitalist corporations. The tasks of running a single enterprise in the 'socialist' economies often bring such managers into direct conflict either with the economic planners at the centre of the political controllers who make the key decisions about targets of planned growth, allocation between sectors and the like.[68] But this is to delimit the scope of a theory

to a degree, would be merged into a single hierarchy.' From the essay 'Parliament and Government in a Reconstructed Germany', reprinted as Appendix II, in Roth and Wittich (eds.), *Max Weber: Economy and Society*, vol. 3, pp. 1401–1402.

[67] Clark Kerr, Frederick Harbison, John Dunlop, and Charles A. Myers, 'Industrialism and Industrial Man', *International Labour Review*, September 1960, p. 10. As the writers say further, in their book on this theme: 'Although professional management is destined to sweep aside its political or patrimonial predecessors, it seldom becomes a ruling elite in any society. In other words, the state does not become the property of the professional managers, as James Burnham envisioned in his 'managerial revolution'. Rather the managers may be as much servants as masters of the state, as much subordinate as controllers of the market. The managers are a part of the ruling elite but they are not *the elite*. In the Soviet Union, for example, the industrial managers are clearly subservient to the political and government elite. In Japan the heads of the great *zaibatsu* were always conscious of their prior obligation to serve nationalist objectives and the interests of the state. . . . In the modern industrializing society, it appears, management can be supreme only within the orbit of the enterprise, and even here it must share its authority with others who demand and obtain a share in the making of the web of rules which governs industrializing man.' *Industrialism and Industrial Man* (Cambridge, Mass., 1960), pp. 145–146.

[68] The most important study of the changed practices of the private corporation is that of Robin Marris, *The Economic Theory of 'Managerial Capitalism'* (New York, 1964), who argues that the major objective of managers is not profit maximization but a 'sustainable growth rate' whose chief purpose is the maximization of assets. In effect the motivations of the managers, rather than the nature of the market, shape primary corporate objectives. Marris' work is the technical basis for the more popular argument, along the same line, by J. K. Galbraith in *The New Industrial State*. The Marris hypothesis is tested and elaborated by a number of prominent economists in the book *The Corporate Economy*, edited by Robin Marris and Adrian Wood (Cambridge, Mass., 1971). For the Soviet Union, the best study of the role of the managers *vis-à-vis* the political controllers is by Jeremy Azrael, *Managerial Power and Soviet Politics* (Cambridge, Mass., 1966).

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of managerial revolution rather than accept it as the *Leitmotif* of all structural changes in Western society.

ALTHOUGH Burnham's sweeping theory of the managerial revolution (a 'Marx for the Managers' was the biting appraisal by Gerth and Mills of Burnham's intentions) never took sociological root, the idea that the Soviet Union had become a new social form, neither capitalist nor socialist, was widely accepted by socialist and non-Stalinist Marxists in the forties and fifties and was one of the elements that contributed to the disillusionment with the old ideologies that was characteristic of that period.

The theme of the transformation of Soviet society into a new social form was given popular expression in 1957 by the publication of Milovan Djilas's *The New Class.* The book lacked the theoretical sophistication of Trotsky and evaded the complexities of the analytical issues that had been posed by earlier Marxist writers (Hilferding, Solomon Schwarz, Yugow, Cigila, Peter Meyer, Yvon), who had made the first statistical analyses of the class and occupational trends of Soviet society. Yet the book was a success for three reasons: it had been written in jail, and smuggled out, by one of the highest ranking former communists of the post-Second World War world, the vice-president of Yugoslavia, who had been expelled from the Party in 1954 for having called for its 'democratization'; it was published shortly after the Hungarian revolution which had given many socialists hope that the Soviet system might, surprisingly, begin to crack; and its simplified exposition was infused with a moral earnestness that was highly appealing.

Djilas was quick to say that his analysis was principally of the communist world, the only one he knew. ('I do not pretend to know any world outside the communist world, in which I had either the fortune or misfortune to live.') 'It is very difficult, perhaps impossible, to define the limits of the new class and to identify its members', he writes. But 'the new class may be said to be made up of those who have special privileges and economic preference because of the administrative monopoly they hold'. However, since the source of the privilege is the power of the Party, the heart of the new class is not the economic managers but the political bureaucracy. The very pattern of the Party, as a cadre of professional revolutionaries, itself foreshadowed the new class. Whereas in previous societies new classes attained power *after* new economic patterns had taken shape, in the communist world the reverse had happened. The new class 'did not come to power to *complete* a new economic order, but to *establish* its own and, in so doing, to establish its power over society'.

With an eye to the question of the managerial revolution thesis, Djilas writes: 'It is important to note the fundamental differences between the political bureaucracies mentioned here and those which arise with every centralization in modern economy'. In every advanced society there arises a new white-collar class and 'functionaries' who

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may be becoming a special stratum of society. Though 'such functionaries have much in common with communist bureaucrats . . . they are not identical'. Bureaucrats in non-communist countries 'have political masters, usually elected, or owners over them, while communists have neither masters nor owners over them'. In the communist world, 'The government both administers and distributes national property. The new class, or its executive organ—the Party oligarchy—both acts as the owner and is the owner. The most reactionary and bourgeois government can hardly dream of such a monopoly in the economy.' [69]

[69] Milovan Djilas, *The New Class* (New York, 1957). Citations, successively, to pp. v, 38–39, 43–44, 207. In the long wash of the discussion of Djilas's theoretical analysis there came a strange denouement. In the November 1958 issue of *Le Contrat Social*, a political bi-monthly edited by Boris Souvarine in Paris, there appeared an article by Georges Henein entitled 'Bruno R. and the "New Class"', which traced back Djilas's idea to *Le Bureaucratisation du Monde*. Unfortunately, said Henein, Bruno R. was dead.

In the March 1959 issue of *Le Contrat Social*, two pertinent letters appeared on the subject—one from Bruno R. himself, very much alive, the other from Hal Draper, the former editor of *Labour Action*, the Shachtmanite paper. Bruno R., identifying himself as a man named Bruno Rizzi, tells only sketchily about the writing of the book, and nothing about himself. He remarks that he first told Trotsky, 'who I loved and regarded even as my teacher', of his ideas in 1938. He also denounced Burnham for plagiarizing his book and in doing so taking only the 'negative side'.

But it is Draper's letter which, for the first time, provided some biographical detail about this elusive character. A member of the Shachtmanite faction, Draper had long sought and finally in 1948 had located a copy of Bruno R.'s book. That year, in *Labour Action*, he printed the only sections extant of Bruno R.'s work. In 1956, out of the blue, Draper received a letter from Italy, signed Bruno Rizzi, identifying himself as the author. Eight years after the *Labour Action* article he had first read it and was astonished to find that a group of socialists were espousing his theory. In April 1958 Draper and his wife, then in Europe, paid a call on Rizzi. A strange picture emerged. Bruno R., according to Draper, was not an anti-fascist Italian refugee but a commercial traveller who before the war journeyed freely between France and Italy. Rizzi was never a Trotskyite. In Paris, before 1938, Rizzi had sought membership in the Party, but the refugee Italian Trotskyites feared that he might be a fascist spy or, at best, a political eccentric.

These fears were understandable. In 1937, in Milan, he had published under his own name a book entitled *Dove va URSS* which contained the seeds of his theory but which was allowed to circulate, said Draper, 'because according to the theories of Rizzi, Fascism was in the line of social progress'. Such a view was not completely aberrant among some Marxists. The former French communist Jacques Doriot, the leader of the left wing of the Belgian Socialists, Henri de Man, and a wing of the French Socialist party, led by Spinasse and Rives, had supported Hitler at the outbreak of the war on the grounds that his victory would destroy capitalism and unify Europe. This historical amoralism permeated Burnham's book, when he wrote that, 'The general outcome of the second war is also assured. . . . There is no possible solution on a capitalist basis'. How often people confuse history—and progress—with necessity.

About the charge of plagiarism there was no proof, as Souvarine noted in an editorial coda, that Burnham actually 'plagiarized' Bruno R. Since no copy of the book was available, there could be no literal borrowing of text. The idea itself was 'in the air'. In fact, as Max Nomad often claimed, the source of many of these conceptions go back to the theories of the Polish anarcho-syndicalist Waclaw Machajski, who, in 1899, in his book *The Evolution of Social Democracy*, asserted that the messianism of socialism was a masked ideology of discontented intellectuals who were using the proletariat as a vehicle to gain power for themselves. And even before this one can go back to the origins of Russian socialism in the 1870s and 1880s in the disputes between Paul Axelrod and Peter Tkachev on the dangers voiced by Axelrod of depending only on a 'militant minority' as the leader of the

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FOR Djilas, the death of Stalin meant that an epoch had passed and that some 'normalization' of life would now be possible. The new class, he said, would not give up its power, but it 'is tired of dogmatic purges and training sessions. It would like to live quietly. It must protect itself even from its own authorized leader now that it has been adequately strengthened' (p. 52).

A decade later, the question was raised whether or not the new class was 'divided' and whether the growth of a new scientific and technical intelligentsia, a group whose creative elite had a stake in the freedom of enquiry, might not undermine the power of the Party over the society. The theme of an inherent conflict between the scientific intelligentsia and the Party bureaucracy was stated most sharply by Albert Parry in the book *The New Class Divided* (New York, 1966). Parry used the phrase 'the new class' to capitalize on Djilas, but where Djilas, with some ambiguity, thought of the 'new class' as the ruling Party bureaucracy, with an admixture of other elites, Parry was simply equating 'the new class' with the 'intelligentsia', which, he stated, 'constitute nearly one-fifth of all Soviet toilers'. Within this stratum which, as a whole, is more privileged than the working class and peasantry, there are about 600,000 'scientific workers', and it is the demands of this group, symbolized for Parry by the career and the writings of the physicist Peter Kapitza, that would constitute the challenges to the Party's monolithic control.

How extensive or effective such an opposition can be is problematic. That such a mood of challenge exists is evident most clearly from the text circulated by Andrei Sakharov, one of the designers of the Soviet H-bomb, who has become the conscience of the intellectuals. In a section of his manifesto entitled 'Intellectual Freedom is Essential', Sakharov states:

> This position of the intelligentsia in society renders senseless any loud demands that the intelligentsia subordinate its strivings to the will and interests of the working class (in the Soviet Union, Poland and other socialist countries). What these demands really mean is subordination to the will of the Party or, even more specifically, to the Party's central apparatus and its officials. Who will guarantee that these officials always express the genuine interests of the working class as a whole and the genuine interests of progress rather than their own caste interests? [70]

masses in the forging of a revolution. And earlier one can cite Michael Bakunin as predicting for the future 'the reign of scientific intelligence . . . a new class, a new hierarchy of real and pretended scientists and scholars . . . of the State engineers who will constitute the new privileged scientific-political class'.

For an earlier and more elaborate account of Bruno R. see my essay in *The New Leader*, 'The Strange Tale of Bruno R.', September 28, 1959, and the correspondence in the issue of November 16, 1959. The statements from Bakunin can be found in his 'Critique of Marxism', Part 3, Chapter 4, pp. 283–289 in *The Political Philosophy of Bakunin*, edited by G. P. Maximoff (Free Press, 1953). Bakunin's predictions regarding the new forms of domination that would come in the wake of a victory of Marxian ideas are quite striking and worth reading for the whole.

[70] Andrei D. Sakharov, *Progress, Coexistence and Intellectual Freedom* (New York, 1968), p. 30.

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And yet it is unlikely that the demands of a small elite, even though a strategic one, can be decisive in forcing the reorganization of power that would be necessary to assure the independence of the scientific community in the Soviet Union. Yet the necessity for some major structural changes does confront the Party leadership, for these needs derive, as any Marxist would know, from the changed socio-economic nature of the society. Zbigniew Brzezinski, for example, has argued that the monolithic Party control on politics, and of the command system on the economy, while once, perhaps, necessary for the industrialization of the country, is now increasingly 'disfunctional' because the heavily centralized structure is increasingly incapable of managing a complex 'technetronic society' which requires plural initiatives in order to keep on growing.

Brzezinski identifies five alternative paths of Soviet political development which he sees as logically possible. These are:

(1) *Oligarchic petrifaction*: the Party maintains its dominant role; ideology remains dogmatic; political leadership remains collective since the absence of deliberately imposed change does not require major choices. In effect, this would be a continuation of the present tendency.

(2) *Pluralist evolution*: the transformation of the Party into a less monolithic body, somewhat as in Yugoslavia, and the ideological erosion of the dogmatic Leninist-Stalinist tradition. In that situation the Party's 'role would be more that of a moral-ideological stimulant than that of a ruler; the state as well as the society itself would become the more important source of innovation and change'.

(3) *Technological adaptation*: The transformation of the bureaucratic Party into a Party of technocrats. The state would be led by scientific experts, trained in the newer techniques, and look to scientific innovation for the preservation of Soviet security and industrial growth.

(4) *Militant fundamentalism*: the rekindling of ideological fervour, a shake-up in the rigid bureaucratic structure, a smaller, more centralized leadership and a greater posture of hostility to the outside world 'along the lines of Mao Tse-tung's "Cultural Revolution"'.

(5) *Political disintegration*: an internal paralysis in the ruling elite occasioned by the rising self-assertiveness of key groups and splits in the armed forces and other major support sectors of the system.

'Looking approximately a decade ahead and using as a guide the present distribution of power in Soviet society', Brzezinski says the Soviet leadership will seek to strike a balance between the first and third variants. It would seek to maintain oligarchic control yet, as in East Germany, to bring more technocrats into the decision-making process. However, says Brzezinski, because of the Party 'style', the hugeness of the country which makes integration difficult, and because of military demands, this course is likely to be impeded. Yet if it were followed, 'the fusion of the first and third variants (striving to combine ideological

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rigidity with technological expertise) would . . . involve the transformation during the 1970s of the present communist Party dictatorship into a communist praetorian oligarchy '.[71]

Social Development: the view from Moscow

If we review where we stand, three major changes have emerged in the last 40 years in the development of Western industrial societies: the transformation of the industrial enterprise by the emergence of managers as controllers of the organization; the changing composition of the occupational structure by the relative shrinkage of the industrial proletariat and the expansion of a new technical and professional stratum; and the transformation of the political system through the extension of the state bureaucracy and the rise of political technocrats.

These processes are at work in both Western capitalist and Russian communist society. In the West, the extension of a state bureaucracy and the increasing technical nature of political decisions create a problem of balance between the managers of the political system by their response to the major interests (the politicians responsive to business, labour and other constituencies) and the bureaucracies and technocrats. In the Soviet Union, the existence of a large bureaucracy which has transformed itself into a new class threatens the validity of communist ideology and the promise of a future classless society. For both systems, the common transformation of the occupational and class structures (if neither capitalists nor working class will 'inherit the earth'), calls into question the 'historic images' of the future of industrial society and raises the fundamental issue of the congruence between the political structure and the new-type social structure, be it 'post-industrial', 'post-capitalist' or whatever other label one uses to designate an emerging society which is dominated by an educated professional-technical science class.

In Western sociology there has been a sustained enquiry into these trends and a vigorous discussion of the social categories and social theories which might best serve to explain these changes. In the Soviet Union, until recently, there has been virtual silence. There have been few, if any, serious discussions of the structural changes in Western society. (The continuing designation of these societies as 'capitalist' implies presumably that communist writers regard the characteristics of the system as defined by Marx and Lenin as still relevant.[72]) The

[71] Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Between Two Ages: America's Role in the Technetronic Era* (New York, 1970), Part III, especially pp. 164–172.

[72] It is noteworthy however that the talk of the inevitable *economic* crisis and the *economic* breakdown of capitalism has largely disappeared from Soviet scholarly writings. This has been replaced however by discussions of the social instability of Western society.

In 1969 the USSR Academy of Sciences created an Institute on the United States of America which, in January 1970, began the publication of its own journal, *USA: Economics, Politics and Ideology*. As Merle Fainsod notes in a review of the first six issues of the journal: 'The articles on contemporary American foreign policy,

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political nature of Soviet bureaucracy, and the theme of a 'new class', are, of course, tabooed. Only the changing composition of the Soviet occupational structure is a subject which Soviet sociologists have recently begun to investigate, and here there is a full realization of the delicate nature of the subject and the ideological hornet's nest it contains.

IF one turns to Soviet sociology, there are three levels of discourse that one can discern.

There is, first, the tattered realm of official ideology. On that level, theoretical sociology is equated with historical materialism, 'theory' consists of quotations from Marx and Lenin, and the standard textbooks repeat a simplified scheme of social development, vulgarizing Marx, as if nothing had changed in Western society in the last 100 years, or Soviet society in the last 40 years, to modify the proclaimed schemes.

Thus, Grigori Glezerman, in a book entitled *The Laws of Social Development*, writes:

> . . . modern bourgeois sociology denies the possibility of cognition and the very existence of the laws of social development and thereby denies in most cases the possibility of prevision in social life. . . . Their arguments about the impossibility of penetrating the veil of the future are primarily levelled against Marxism which has proved that communism will triumph. Marx proclaimed his thesis on the unavoidable downfall of capitalist society and its replacement by a socialist society over a hundred years ago.[73]

For theoretician Glezerman, there are 'general' laws and 'specific laws. The 'general' law of social development is that socialism as a new socio-economic formation is inevitable. But since each country in passing through or bypassing capitalism is not predestined to follow the same path, there are also 'specific' laws. Since in the course of history there are so many variants, in the logic of the argument we soon find that there is a specific 'law' for each case! Such is the quality of theory.[74]

as might be expected, faithfully mirror the current Party line. But, within these limits, one cannot fail to note that primitive sloganeering has given way to better-informed and more sophisticated analysis of the forces and factors that shape American foreign policy.' On other matters, particularly technical subjects, including economics, the articles tend to be largely factual, while American management literature and management practices are now thoroughly scoured for materials which may be utilized in the training of Soviet managers. See Merle Fainsod, 'Through Soviet Eyes', *Problems of Communism*, November–December 1970.

[73] G. Glezerman, *The Laws of Social Development* (Moscow, n.d.), p. 79. This book is a set of lectures for postgraduate students in philosophy at Moscow University and of the Philosophy Department of the Academy of Social Sciences of the Central Committee of the Communist Party.

[74] With theoretician Glezerman, confusion abounds. On one page, with abundant quotations from Engels and Lenin, we are told laws 'reflect an *essential* connection', 'a *universal* connection', and 'a *necessary* connection between phenomena' (p. 46, emphasis in the original). Yet some pages later we are told that 'Every law is incomplete, is limited. . . . In order to foresee any concrete process it is not enough to know one law, for it does not take into account all conditions, of which there are an *infinite* number. In this connection Lenin wrote in his *Philosophical*

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A second level is scholarly, but still identified with the Party. It is centred in the Academy of Science, rather than in the official Party bodies, and while making obeisances to the sacred fathers, is more interested in 'concrete' social research and in social forecasting. Much of this work is under the patronage of Aleksei Rumiantsev, vice-president of the USSR Academy of Sciences. In a paper delivered at the Varna meetings of the Sixth World Congress of Sociology, remarkable for its freedom from cant, Rumiantsev set forth the basis for the social forecasting movement which has become a prominent part of Soviet sociology. 'The lack of adequate knowledge and comprehension of the present social situation destines the prevision of the coming changes to failure', he wrote.

> The difficulty with prognostication . . . derives from the very nature of social processes that are multifactor, complex and probabilistic . . we confront the necessity to study not only the objective economic factors, but a number of subjective factors as well: those of tastes, fashion, preferences, etc. . . . The effectiveness of social planning depends to a great extent on the adequate consideration of both economic and noneconomic factors, as well as upon the knowledge of interests, motives, needs and inclinations. All that vast information can be effectively utilized only if statistical and mathematical methods, simulation and computer machinery are extensively resorted to in the process of cognition, planning and management.[75]

Rumiantsev reflects the thinking of the 'managerial communists' for whom the important change is the 'scientific technological revolution' which they see as transforming Soviet society. For Igor Bestuzhev-Lada, a working futurologist, the 'scientific-technological revolution' has 'extraordinarily complicated the management of social processes'. In

Notebooks that only the *infinite* sum of general conceptions, laws, gives the concrete in its completeness' (p. 82, emphasis added) One is told that 'Marxists are able to *foresee* the course of social development thanks to their skilful application of theory when analyzing specific historical conditions' (p. 86), for the general trend of scientific development 'is in *the last analysis* determined by the requirements of production. . . .' (p. 80, emphasis added). Yet it is not clear whether the 'last analysis' is by the analyst (which might mean the latest surviving analyst) or at the end of the historical epoch; but if the latter, how then could one know beforehand which of the many elements determining social development is the true one?

And finally, in our effort to find out what is a 'law', we are told that 'lastly, the . . . peculiarity of a law is that it expresses the *stable, constant* connection between phenomena. The objective world, nature and society that surround man, are constantly changing. But for all that, definite, relatively stable, constant connections are preserved. As Lenin noted in his *Philosophical Notebooks*, a law is the enduring, persisting in phenomena' (p. 47, emphasis in the original). Mr Glezerman's effort to define change and constancy reminds me of a reply by Professor Sidney Morgenbesser of Columbia who, when asked by a young radical in his philosophy class whether he believed in Mao's 'law of contradiction', answered: 'I do and I do not.'

[75] A. M. Rumiantsev, 'Social Prognostication and Planning in the Soviet Union', English language version, Moscow, 1970, presented by the Soviet Sociological Association at Varna, Bulgaria, pp. 9, 6, 12. While all of this is unexceptionable, it is clear that Rumiantsev's strictures are directed against the dogmatists in Soviet planning when he writes, after citing the need to study tastes, fashions and preferences: 'A long-term plan based on scientific forecasting' of population needs is much more adequate than plans neglecting the factors mentioned' (p. 6).

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his book, *A Window to the Future: The Present Day Problems of Social Forecasting*, Bestuzhev-Lada reviews the different approaches to social forecasting and concludes that the 'stochastic approach . . . is the most effective, if not the only possible way of their truly scientific study'. He makes the further point that in futurology there has been a lack of research on the developments of moral-ethical norms and the way these developments will shape the scientific-technological revolution.[76]

The third level of Soviet discourse is the large array of empirical social researches which take as their starting point the occupational divisions within the Soviet Union, and cautiously explore their meanings. As Leo Labedz points out, 'Ever since Stalin said in 1931 that "no ruling class has managed without its own intelligentsia", there has been the awkward problem of how to define this group and relate it to the general social structure'.[77]

The fact is, as Rumiantsev indicated in 1965, that the 'intelligentsia', defined roughly as 'mental labour', comprise 25 million persons, or about one-fifth of the Soviet labour force. More importantly, as a host of studies document, the inheritance of such a position (and of wealth) is becoming an important fact in the creation of the new class structure in the Soviet Union.[78]

A NUMBER of studies by Soviet sociologists indicate that in the land of 'workers and peasants' few of the children of the proletariat want to be workers, much less peasants and that the great majority want to go to college and to be members of the 'intelligentsia'. As Zev Katz comments, 'Though conducted independently in various parts of the Soviet Union, these studies show a remarkable uniformity in their major findings'. In the rankings on prestige, scientists, aeroplane pilots, and ships' captains are at the top, jobs in agriculture and services are at the bottom. Moreover, the children of the intelligentsia are disproportionately represented in the universities, and the children of the peasantry find it exceedingly difficult to enter the universities at all. As N. M.

[76] I. B. Bestuzhev-Lada, *Okno v budushchee: sovremennye problemy sotsialnogo prognozirovaniya* (Moscow: 'Mysl', 1970). In his comment on the need to take a probabilistic, rather than a deterministic, approach, Bestuzhev-Lada writes: 'The stochastic principles of the method of approach to the problems of the future, although, apparently, theoretically indisputable, require extremely complex scientific researches in order to be accurately utilized. For this reason, often the temptation to take the path of the least resistance takes the upper hand. This is facilitated by the inertia of thinking and by firmly established traditions (and even biases) connected with equating forecasting with divination.' The citations here are from a précis of Mr Bestuzhev-Lada's book made available to me by Fred Ikle. See, also, Mr Ikle's 'Social Forecasting and the Problem of Changing Values, with Special Reference to Soviet and East European Writings' *Rand Paper*, P-4450, January 1971.

[77] Leo Labedz, 'Sociology and Social Change', *Survey*, July 1966, p. 21.

[78] For a comprehensive review of these studies, see Zev Katz, 'Hereditary Elements in Education and Social Structure in the USSR', University of Glasgow, Institute of Soviet and East European Studies 1969 and 'Soviet Sociology: A Half-way House', Russian Research Center, Harvard University, 1971. I am obliged to Dr Katz for making these materials available to me and for several discussions which guided me to other relevant data.

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Blinov of the sociological laboratory at Moscow University reported in 1966:

> . . . . class differences still have a strong influence upon social advancement of the individual and, therefore, the class structure as a social element plays a leading part in the formation of individual personality. For example, the relatively small number of people in the village with higher education is explained, among other things, by the fact that the percentage of students from the country is ten times lower than students from the town.[79]

Under Khrushchev an effort was made to reverse this tendency by giving special preference for university places to children of workers and peasants and requiring those who sought to go on to the university to engage in a year of manual labour. By 1968 the 'reforms' had been dropped and ideas of egalitarian education have been scrapped in favour of a new 'meritocracy'. In Novosibirsk, for example, where a new 'scientific city' has been created, the Novosibirsk Physics and Mathematics School, an exclusive prep. school, selects 200 students annually from 100,000 likely candidates. In 1968 more than 500 such special elite preparatory schools had been opened. Previously, students in academic high schools spent up to 13 hours a week in manual labour; by 1968 the programme was halted. Previously, a young people who held jobs or served in the army had been allotted 80 per cent of the places in universities; now the figure is down to 30 per cent.[80]

Communist theoreticians had held that a socially homogeneous society would emerge in the Soviet Union. But this idea—at least for the present—has been abandoned by almost all serious Soviet sociologists, and various Western ideas of stratification, based on occupational divisions, are now being admitted. At Minsk, in 1966, some Soviet sociologists declared that Lenin's definition of class does not apply to present-day Soviet society and participants at the conference presented various criteria for reshaping the official views. Some even argued that those who are professionally engaged in administrative functions constitute a separate social group. And some have even viewed the Party, not in the original Leninist terms, as the vanguard of the working class, but as an instrument for resolving conflicts of interest among different social groups.[81]

[79] Cited by Katz, Glasgow, p. 4.

[80] See the report from Novosibirsk on 'Russia's New Elite', *Wall Street Journal*, 15 October 1968.

[81] About the Minsk conference, see *Voprosy Filosofii*, no. 5, 1966, *Filosofiya nauki*, no. 3, 1966, pp. 133–38, also Ts. A. Stepanyan, V. S. Semenov (eds.): (a) *Klassy, sotsial nye sloi i gruppy v SSSR*, (b) *Problemy izmeneniia sotsialnoi struktury sotsialisticheskogo obshchestva*, Moscow, Nauka, 1968. For material on new occupational and class classifications, see: M. N. Rutkevich: (1) 'The Social Sources of the Replenishment of the Soviet Intelligentsia', CDSP, no. 9, 1967; (2) 'O poniatii intelligentsii kak sotsialnogo sloya sotsialisticheskogo obshchevtva', *Filosofiya nauki*, no. 4, 1966; (3) 'Kolichestvennye izmeneniya v sotsialnoi strukture sovetskogo obshchestva v 60-e gody', *Sotsialnye razlichiya*, Sverdlovsk, v. 3, pp. 5–19; Stepanyan and Semenov: (a) *Klassy*, (b) *Problemy*, op. cit.; O. I. Shkaratan: 'The Social Structure of the

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Although Soviet sociologists have documented the expansion of a new stratum, most have shied away from exploring the consequences of this change for Party doctrine and ideological dogma. If there is a growth of a distinct intelligentsia and a relative shrinkage of the working class, what, then, is the role of the Communist Party as the vanguard of the 'dictatorship of the proletariat'. On the official level, no contradictions are admitted. V. Afanasyev writes fatuously: 'The Soviet intelligentsia . . . is a genuine people's intelligentsia with its roots in the working class and the peasantry. Having come from the people it serves them with devotion and dedication.'[82] Bestuzhev-Lada, in a popular article on 'Utopias of Bourgeois Futurology' in *New Times*, a popular weekly for foreign consumption, discusses the post-industrial society and admits that the number of persons employed in agriculture and 'some industries' is falling, while the proportion of persons 'employed in the service of industries and research and development is rising'. But this does not mean, he claims, the disappearance of the working class. 'The working class has been and remains the principal, decisive social force of modern times, the mainstay of modern production. . . .'[83]

On a more serious level, sophisticated young ideologists such as Eduard Arab-Ogly argue that the nature of the scientific and technical revolution is creating a 'new' working class of highly skilled or technical workers, especially in such industries as chemical, atomic energy, and machine tools, and that a new category of 'worker-intelligentsia' is coming to the fore to replace the old manual worker.[84] But the larger sociological questions posed by Trotsky and popularized by Djilas are, themselves, never confronted.

The Revision of the Future

In the East European communist world outside the Soviet Union, the period after the death of Stalin in 1953, the Khrushchev disclosures in 1956, and the Polish Thaw and the Hungarian Revolution in 1956–57, were times of extraordinary intellectual as well as political ferment. Old practices were sharply debated: the adequacy of the Leninist model of the Party, the merits of collectivization, the drawbacks of centralized planning. Traditional doctrine was challenged: historical materialism, the theory of class, the nature of alienation. Meaningless ideological dogmas were quietly discarded: the rigid conceptions of

Soviet Working Class', CDSP, v. XIX, no. 12; E. A. Arab-Ogly *et al.* (eds.): *Sotsiologiya i ideologiya*, Moscow, Nauka, 1969. These are cited from Zev Katz, Harvard paper, 1971.

82 V. Afanasyev, *Scientific Communism*, Moscow, 1967, p. 179.

83 Reprinted in *The Futurist*, Washington, D.C., December 1970, pp. 216–17.

84 Eduard Arab-Ogly, *Nauchno-tekhnicheskaya revolutsiya i ee sotsialnye posledstviya* (The Scientific and Technical Revolution and Its Scientific Consequences), Moscow, 1969.

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dialectical materialism, the theory of the interest rate as exploitative, the view of science as part of the 'superstructure' of society.[85]

In all this ferment, there was, curiously, little extended discussion of the vision of the 'future society' and what the changing nature of industrial social structure portended for the traditional communist view. Only in the early 1960s did some discussion of these problems begin and then, because of the reintroduction of ideological discipline, much of this discussion was aborted.[86]

The most important document to come out of these latter enquiries was the remarkable study by Radovan Richta and a research team of the Czechoslovak Academy of Science, entitled *Civilization at the Crossroads: Social and Human Implications of the Scientific and Technological Revolution*, which appeared in 1967. The Czech and Slovak editions of 50,000 copies were quickly sold out. An English translation was printed in Czechoslovakia in October 1968, and is available through an American distributor, yet curiously it has received little notice in the West. Yet the document, 'conceived in an atmosphere of critical, radical searching and intensive discussion on the way forward for a society that has reached industrial maturity while passing through a phase of far-reaching socialist transformation' (p. 21) is of major importance for the discussion of the changing social structures of communists and Western society.[87]

The starting point of the discussion is the 'scientific technological revolution' which has become the new hope of communist ideologists. But unlike the Russians, the Richta group see this as a process which includes Western society as well (most of the Russians shy away from discussing this question since it would challenge some of the assumptions about capitalism, and open the door to the concepts of industrial and post-industrial society) but more important, they do not burke the issue of the new class structure, and the rise of a new dominating class, which such a development portends.

The enquiry begins by posing 'an analytical contrast between the industrial revolution and the scientific and technological revolution', and asserts that the consequence of this change is the transformation not just of labour but of all productive forces into a continuous, mechanized production process in which man now stands 'alongside'

[85] For a review of some of these currents, see Leo Labedz (ed.), *Revisionism* (London, 1962), and Z. A. Jordan, *Philosophy and Ideology, A Review of Philosophy and Marxism in Poland*, Dordrecht, Holland, 1963.

[86] For example, the leading Polish communist Wladyslaw Bienkowski, the Minister of Culture briefly in 1956, wrote a book *Motory Socjalizmu* (The Motors of Socialism), dealing with the changes required in socialist ideology because of the new role of science. The book was offered to several publishing houses in Poland but was refused; it was published without the author's permission by the emigré publishing house, Kultura, in Paris, in 1969.

[87] Radovan Richta, *Civilization at The Crossroads*, English language edition, October 1968; Printed in Czechoslovakia, distributed in the US by International Arts and Sciences Press, White Plains, N.Y., 1969.

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the production process where formerly 'he was its chief agent'. In effect, not labour power (and the working class) but science (and knowledge classes) is the 'decisive factor' in the growth of the productive forces of society (pp. 27–28):

> In place of simple, fragmented work, which has so far been the basis of production, we now have the entry of *science* and its application in the guise of technology, organization, skills, etc. The sphere that used to be separated from industry and was merely brought in now and then from without in small doses is now penetrating the heart of production and the entire life of the community. This sphere, which not so long ago engaged a few hundreds of thousands of people, is growing into a vast *material force* comprising, alongside its wide technical basis, an army of over three-and-a-half million specialists and 11 million associated workers throughout the world. Some experts estimate that in an historically short span of time (by the next century) 20 per cent of the total labour force will be employed in science and research (p. 36).
>
> In other words, science is emerging as the leading variable in the national economy and the *vital dimension* in the growth of civilization. There are signs of a *new* ('post-industrial') *type of growth* with a new dynamic stemming from continuing structural changes in the productive forces, with the amount of means of production and manpower becoming less important than their changing quality and degree of utilization. Herein lie the *intensive* elements of growth, the acceleration intimately linked with the onset of scientific and technological revolution (p. 39).
>
> At a certain stage in the course of the technological revolution and of the changes in growth models evoked by it, all the laws and proportions of society's development appear in a new light. This is primarily true of the relationship between *science, technology and production proper*; one may say that a divide is reached beyond which these relationships assume a role as vital as that occupied between Departments I and II of the production proper in the age of industrialization [i.e. the schemes outlined by Marx in *Capital*]. In the circumstances of the scientific and technological revolution, growth of the productive forces follows a law of higher priority, that is, the *precedence of science over technology and of technology over industry* (p. 41).

The distinction which the authors accept between the industrial society and the post-industrial, or scientific-technological society, means, in effect, that some simplified Marxian categories no longer hold. The most important, clearly, is the leading role of the working class:

> An entirely new phenomenon, demonstrating the disparity between the scientific and technological revolution and industrialization, is the turn to a *relative* decline in the amount of labour absorbed by industry and associated activities—accompanied by a strong shift from the traditional branches to the progressive within industry. This tendency clearly refutes the standpoint giving absolute validity to the industrialization process and the structure of 'the industrial society'. . . (p. 120).

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> In general, we can assume that in the course of the scientific and technological revolution the volume of 'services' will grow to the point of occupying 40–60 per cent of national labour in coming decades, with a still bigger share in the long term. The civilization to which we are advancing might according quite well be called 'post-industrial civilization', 'tertiary civilization', 'services civilization', etc. (pp. 121–122).[88]
>
> The most striking effect is, however, induced by the growing numbers of *technical and professional* personnel in all sectors of the economy outside immediate production. In the fifties and sixties this group outpaced all others in the United States in its rate of growth, which was twice that for clerical workers (the category that held the lead in the forties) and seven times more than the overall rate for workers (p. 131).

But, perhaps, most important of all, the older Marxist conception of laws of social development' is no longer valid:

> The laws by which society develops are not predestined, they follow no set scheme. Flowing always from the matter of history, from the motion of society itself, they change with every turn in this essential substratum. The profound intervention in the civilization base of human life signified by the scientific and technological revolution in its entirety—viewing it in its intrinsic correlation with the whole complex of social revolution of our day—cannot fail to impinge on the *elementary laws of history*. In many respects the course of civilization acquires a new logic and time scale (p. 210).
>
> At least in the long view, we would then be led to expect history to lose the aspect of a natural process which in the traditional industrial civilization has obscured the unchallenged course of events, interrupted only from time to time by a convergence of change in civilization (p. 277).[89]

Even the ideas of planning, and the time cycle of planning, based as these were on the rhythms of capital formation and the turnover of capital, now comes into question.

> The rhythm of civilization is always determined by the decisive subjects of its development. Time was when the natural reproduction of the primitive community set the tone and to this day the natural yearly cycle of subsistence in these enclosed units provides the dominant time scale over a great part of the world. In the classical industrial civilization, the period of *capital turnover* in the process of expanded reproduction is known to have been the starting point for all surmises about the future and for speculations usually calculated some years ahead. Similarly the five- or seven-

[88] The references given at this point are to J. Fourastié, *Le Grand Espoir du XXe Siècle*, Paris, 1958; and D. Bell, 'The Postindustrial Society', in *Technology and Social Change*, New York-London, 1964.

[89] A footnote to the text at this point makes reference to the idea of history as a natural process as follows: 'Thus past history proceeds in the manner of a natural process and is also essentially subject to the same laws of movement' (Letter from Engels to J. Bloch, 21 September 1890, in Marx, *Selected Works*, vol. 1, Moscow, 1933, p. 382.

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year planning terms of socialism—although not often based on an awareness of the connection—correspond to the overall turnover period of *social labour,* of the assets concerned. Once *science* and its application start to determine growth, these outlooks based on the determinate subjectivity of stable economic relations are inevitably found wanting, although almost all practical perspectives continue to be drawn from them (p. 269).

Science itself has a distinct character which is different from other modes of activity, including labour; it is this character which sets apart a society based on science from industry:

> Science owes its new status primarily to its exceptional power of *generalization.* In contrast to other products, a scientific finding is not consumed by use, on the contrary it is improved on—and then 'it costs nothing'. Moreover, science possesses a peculiar *growth* potential. Every finding is both a result and then a starting point for further research; the more we know, the more we can find out. This intrinsically exponential quality distinguishes science sharply from all traditional activities of the industrial type (p. 217).

FROM all this, three crucial sociological problems emerge; first, the scientific and technological revolution cannot be led by the working class, so what, then, is the role of the working class in the future society; second, the stratification system of the new society inevitably will emphasize the dominance of the professional and technical classes; and third, if the production and maintenance of the scientific mastery of the future society requires the presence of a highly trained research elite, supported by a large technical staff, does not all this define the attributes of a new potential ruling class?

Richta and his associates write:

> Every revolution in production—including the industrial revolution—has hitherto been the work of the class that was instrumental in promoting it and which replaced another class in this role, carrying out the whole process at the expense of the class that represented the majority. If the model we have constructed of the scientific and technological revolution corresponds to reality, we should assume that, as a specific universal revolution in the productive forces, its progress will be impracticable—at least on the whole front—without the *positive,* independent participation of the *majority,* and ultimately of *all* members of the society (p. 245).
>
> As the class structure under socialism changes . . . the dominant feature in the social stratification starts to be differentiation primarily according to the content of work. The long-term existence of two distinct strata working side by side—people performing exacting creative work and others occupied in simple operative jobs—will then have to be foreseen as a serious problem. . . .
>
> So long as advances in science and technology are not rationally controlled in all their social and human implications, we shall be faced with a cleavage between the *professional* and *democratic* aspects. It may find expression in technocratic tendencies, which do

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not, however, stem from science and technology as such, but rather from conditions that heighten certain group and class interests to which science and technology are subordinated. The fact is that at the start of the scientific and technological revolution, the actual practice of management passes in many capitalist countries to a trained managerial elite, which under state monopoly acquires some degree of independence at least in relation to traditional capitalist groupings—although its status is still essentially one of servitude to capital (pp. 249–50).[90]

Under socialism this cleavage will arise because the working class is not the leader of the new society:

> Faced by the cleavage that industrial civilization has bestowed on us, one is led to the conclusion that even under socialism the working people will not be brought overnight into active participation in the scientific and technological revolution. The appropriate forms were lacking in previous social systems, and we cannot expect that the process will now be automatic and without problems, as indeed no stage of revolution has ever been (p. 252).

The problem will be between the new elites that might be created and the efforts of these elites to consolidate their positions of privilege:

> There is nothing to be gained by shutting our eyes to the fact that an acute problem of our age will be to close the profound cleavage in industrial civilization which, as Einstein realized with such alarm, places the fate of the defenceless mass in the hands of an educated elite, who wield the power of science and technology. Possibly this will be among the most complex undertakings facing socialism. With science and technology essential to the common good, circumstances place their advance primarily in the hands of the conscious, progressive agents of this movement—the professionals, scientists, technicians and organizers and skilled workers. And even under socialism we may find tendencies to elitism, a monopoly of educational opportunities, exaggerated claims on higher living standards and the like; these groups may forget that the emancipation of the part is always bound up with the emancipation of the whole (p. 250).

[90] This problem of characterizing the new managerial class, the scientific elite, and the new middle class clearly bedevils the Czech group even though they have moved away from dogmatic Marxist categories. Earlier, in describing the changing social stratification of capitalism, the writers remark of the tendency, described by a number of sociologists, of the rise of a 'new middle class', the 'levelling of the middle estate', the changing transformation of professional and technical personnel, and the like. This, however, they claim, is not a real change. Apart from a 'small section comprising executives living mainly from profit—that is a product of class differentiation within the intelligentsia' (sic!), the rise of a new specialist class is largely the expansion of a new working class. Yet clearly, when the writers turn to the discussion of socialism, as above, the problem of the distinction comes through quite sharply (see p. 247). The writers cited in relation to social stratification changes under capitalism are Michael Young, in *The Rise of the Meritocracy* (London, 1958), D. Bell in *Dun's Review and Modern Industry*, 1/1962, and Helmut Schelsky, *Die Sozial Folgen der Automatieirung* (Düsseldorf-Köln, 1957, and *Auf der Suche nach Wirklichkeit* (Köln-Düsseldorf, 1965).

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The age-old socialist dream of a harmonious new society, thus, is doomed to frustration. Instead, the new society itself will generate new conflicts and new struggles not necessarily along the old lines of class and power, but of attitudes to change and to science itself:

> In confrontation with the scientific and technological revolution all visions of a future free of conflict and struggle are doomed to disappointment. The idea that with socialism humanity will enter an epoch in which personal strain and individual effort will no longer be required, where society will care for all wants, is one of those illusions of industrial life that simply abstract from the two-edged manipulatory power of the industrial mechanism. . . . Frictions may emerge among the most varied groups of people, primarily—probably in their most persistent form—engendered by differences in work content and the resultant disagreement in ideas on life apart from work. . . . There may equally be a sharpening of misunderstandings among the generations, evoked by the widening gap between modes of life in the course of two to three decades.
>
> The signs are that society will undergo a repeated and ever stronger polarization between *progressive* and *conservative* attitudes. This throws into relief the role of social conditions under which this divergence of forces and opening up of paths for progressive trends are linked with an inexorable lifelong division of people by attributes of class, property and power, where, moreover, irreconciliable antagonisms no longer breed ruthless struggles. This calls for conditions allowing this divergence to assume mobile, functional forms adequate to the actual dialectic of conflict. The drama of pioneering efforts by individuals and groups will, of course, involve risk, genuine collisions, with real victors and losers—although arbitrary power for the victors and humiliation for the defeated can and must disappear from the scene. And, indeed, the historic mission of socialism lies just there—in meeting such opening and closing of social splits that are not founded in conflicts among classes with a system of new, appropriate forms of motion, while employing for this purpose all suitable instruments of former social forms—economic instruments, democratic, social and political institutions, etc. (pp. 257–58).

With the Richta study, we come full circle. The vision here, out of Marxist theory, is what might be called a post-socialist society. But such a society merges—*in its problems, not necessarily in its outcomes*—with the post-capitalist societies in that the new determining feature of social structure (but not necessarily of politics and culture) is the scientific and technological revolution, or what I have called in my writings the centrality of theoretical knowledge as the axial principle of social organization, while the character of the new stratification system will be the division between the scientific and technical classes and those who will stand outside.

The term *post* is relevant in all this, not because it is a definition of the new social form, but because it signifies a transition. What the new society will be remains to be seen, for the controlling agency is *not* the

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technology but the character of the political managers who will have to organize this new strategic resource and use it to buttress their political system.

In all this—if we face a new and puzzling kind of social change—we have to retreat from *theory*—if by theory one means a model of social structure which specifies the determinate interaction of the crucial variables of a system, establishes empirical regularities which predict future states of relation, and provides an explanatory principle of its history and operation. What we are forced back to is the creation of new paradigms in the sense that Thomas Kuhn has used the term, conceptual schemes which themselves are neither models or theories but *standpoints* from which models can be generated and theories developed.

The Post-Industrial Society: A Conceptual Scheme

A conceptual scheme is a selection of particular attributes from a complex reality and their grouping under a common rubric in order to discern similarities and differences. A conceptual scheme is neither true nor false but only useful or not. The terms feudalism, capitalism, and socialism are a sequence of conceptual schemas, in the Marxist framework, along the axis of property relations. The terms pre-industrial, industrial and post-industrial are conceptual sequences along the axis of production and the kinds of knowledge utilized. Depending on the axis, we can highlight similarities or differences. Along the axis of property there is a radical distinction between capitalism and socialism, between the United States and the Soviet Union. Along the axis of production and machinery, both the Soviet Union and the United States are similar industrial societies.

The concept, 'post-industrial society' emphasizes the centrality of theoretical knowledge as the axis around which new technology, economic growth and the stratification of society will be organized. Empirically one can try to show that this axial principle is becoming more and more predominant in advanced industrial societies.

This is not to suggest a principle of convergence. The idea of convergence is based on the premise that there is *one* overriding institution which can define a society. Thus, years ago, Sorokin and Mills thought that the Soviet Union and the United States were coming to be 'alike' because both were becoming centralized, bureaucratic societies mobilized around the single purpose of war. In a different way, Jan Tinbergen and his associates have argued that, because of the nature of economic rationality, both communist and capitalist countries are veering towards a common model of modified planning (direct or indirect) tied to the use of markets. And Marion Levy and, to some extent, Wilbert Moore, have argued that in their central features all industrial societies were becoming 'alike' because of the common requirements of factory production, the relation of education to occupation, and the

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character of technical knowledge.[91] But few societies, as distinct historic and political entities, can be defined completely around a single institution as Marx believed, i.e. that one could define a system as capitalist and that *all other relations*, cultural, religious, political, derived from that foundational base. Societies differ in the way they relate their politcal systems to social structure and culture. And within the social structure (as in the political order and culture) there are different axes around which institutions are built. And even when different societies may be compared in their economy or social structure along one axis, they may differ markedly along another. Thus, along the axis of property, different societies could be defined as capitalist, but along the axis of, say, political consensus, these societies would differ as democratic and authoritarian.

In sum, analytically speaking, society can be divided into three realms: the social structure (economy, technology, and stratification system), the political system, and the cultural order (the realms of expressive symbolism, of moral valuation and transcendental conceptions). The relations between the three are not linked along a single set of axes. *Specific* political entities, territorially organized, are historical *precipitates*, in varying combination, of different types of social structure, political system and cultures and are shaped, further, by history and tradition, distinct national styles, and specific national interests.

Further, one has to make a distinction between convergence and internationalization. One may have an internationalization of style, in painting or music or architecture, so that a 'modern' artist may paint

[91] On the thesis of a convergence of the Soviet Union and the United States as centralized, bureaucratized societies, see C. Wright Mills, *The Causes of World War Three*, New York, 1958, part I, section 3; Pitirim Sorokin, *The Basic Trends of Our Times* (New Haven, 1964). For a contrary view, see Bertram D. Wolfe, 'Russia and the U.S.A.: A Challenge to the Convergence Theory', *The Humanist*, September-October 1968. On the question of economic convergence, see Jan Tinbergen, 'Do Communist and Free Economies Show a Converging Pattern', *Soviet Studies*, April 1961; and H. Linnemann, J. P. Pronk and J. Tinbergen, 'Convergence of Economic Systems in East and West', Rotterdam, Netherlands Economic Institute, 1965. For a contrary view, see 'Will Market Economies and Planned Economies Converge?', by George N. Halm in *Essays in Honor of Friedrich A. von Hayek*, edited by Streissler, Haberler, *et al.*, London 1969.

On the question of industrial societies, the literature is vast. A major statement on convergence is that of Marion Levy, Jr., *Modernization and the Structure of Societies*, Princeton, N.J., 1966. A more cautious statement is by Arnold Feldman and Wilbert Moore, 'Industrialization and Industrialism: Convergence and Differentiation' in *Transactions* of the Fifth World Congress of Sociology, Washington, September 1962.

Though the concept of 'industrial society' is interpreted by Soviet writers as a prime example of convergence theory (for a short review of this issue, see Cyril Black, 'Marx and Modernization', *Slavic Review*, June 1970), and Raymond Aron is identified as the father of the theory of industrial society, Aron has voiced considerable doubts about the convergence thesis: see, *The Industrial Society* (New York, 1967), pp. 105–130.

For two major reviews of the literature and controversy on convergence, see Ian Weinberg, 'The Problem of Convergence of Industrial Societies: A Critical Look at the State of a Theory', in *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, January 1969; and Alfred G. Meyer, 'Theories of Convergence', in *Change in Communist Systems*, ed. by Chalmers Johnson (Stanford, 1970).

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the same way in France, England, Japan, and Mexico. And there may be an internationalization of scientific knowledge and technological processes, but *societies*, as specific historical entities, represent specific *institutionalized* combinations which are difficult to match directly to each other. On different dimensions (technology, architecture) they may resemble each other, or draw from a common fund of knowledge or style, yet on other dimensions (values, political systems, traditions)—and the ways these become formulated, say, in educational systems—they may differ. If there is a meaning to the idea of convergence it is that societies which resemble each other in some ways, along the same dimensions, may confront a *similar core of problems*. But this in no way guarantees *a common or like response*. The response will be relative to the different political and cultural organization of the specific society.

The idea of a post-industrial society, like that of industrial society, or capitalism, has meaning only as a conceptual scheme. It identifies a new axial principle of organization and defines a common core of problems which societies that become more and more post-industrial have to confront. The idea of a post-industrial society does not rest, as Jean Floud seems to think, on the concept of a social system. I do not believe that societies are organic or so integrated as to be analysable as a single system. In fact, my major theoretical preoccupation today is the disjunction, in Western society, between the culture and the social structure, the one becoming increasingly anti-institutional and anti-nomian, the other oriented to functional rationality and meritocracy. The concept of post-industrialism is an effort to identify a change in the *social structure*. But there is no necessary correlate, as I have argued repeatedly, between the changes in that realm as against changes in the other two analytical dimensions of a society.

I do believe that the major orders, or realms, of societies can best be studied by trying to identify *axial* institutions or principles, which are the major lines around which other institutions are draped, and which pose the major problems of solution for the society. In capitalist society the axial institution has been private property and in the post-industrial society it is the centrality of theoretical knowledge. In Western culture in the last 100 years the axial thread has been 'modernism' with its onslaught on tradition and established institutions. In the Western political systems the axial problem is the relation between the desire for popular participation and bureaucracy.

One of the difficulties for particular societies is the overlapping and conflicting nature of these principles. Thus, as I argued in my essay on 'Technocracy and Politics' (*Survey*, No. 71), in the stratification system there are now three overlapping principles regarding the base of power and the modes of access:

inheritance	education	mobilization
property	skill	political base

and it is the contradictory nature of the three that makes identification

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of consistent social groups and political interests so difficult. And, as I argue in a forthcoming work,[92] culture has replaced technology as a source of change in the society, and the tensions between the adversary culture and the eroded Protestant ethic has created a remarkable contradiction in the value system of American society.

IN what way does a post-industrial society differ from previous society? In an historical sense, Professor Tominaga is right: the post-industrial society is a continuation of trends unfolding out of industrial society, and many of the developments were foreseen long ago. Both St. Simon and Marx, for example, were obsessed with the transforming role of engineers (in the one case) and science (in the other), though neither of them had, or could have, any sense of the change in the fundamental relation of science to economic and technological development—the fact, for instance, that most of the major industries of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries—steel, telegraph, telephone, electricity, auto, aviation—were developed largely by talented tinkerers who worked independently of the fundamental work in science; while the first modern industry is chemistry, since one has to have a theoretical *a priori* knowledge of the properties of the macromolecules one is manipulating in order to create new products.

Yet for *analytical* purposes, one *can* divide societies into pre-industrial, industrial, and post-industrial and see them in contrast along many different dimensions. Thus, as I have tried to show in the accompanying schematic tables, along different dimensions, the three kinds of societies differ radically.

These are, of course, ideal-type constructions, yet the purpose of such constructs is to illuminate essential differences. Thus, the 'design' of pre-industrial society is a 'game against nature': its resources are drawn from extractive industries and it is subject to the laws of diminishing returns and low productivity; the 'design' of industrial society is a 'game against fabricated nature' which is centred on man-machine relationships and uses energy to transform the natural environment into a technical environment; the 'design' of a post-industrial society is a 'game between persons' in which an 'intellectual technology', based on information, rises alongside of machine technology. Because of these different designs, there are vast differences in the character of economic sector distribution and the slopes of occupations. The methodology of each society differs and, most important, there are distinctly different axial principles around which the institutional and organizational features of the society are draped.

Because of all this, there are crucial differences in the kinds of structural problems that engage each kind of society. In industrial society the chief economic problem has been the problem of capital: how to institutionalize a process of creating sufficient savings and the conversion

[92] An abridged section appeared in the issue, 'Capitalism Today', *The Public Interest*, no. 21, Fall 1970.

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The Post-Industrial Society

General Schema

	Pre-Industrial	Industrial	Post-Industrial
Regions:	Asia Africa Latin America	Western Europe Soviet Union Japan	United States
Economic Sector:	Primary Extractive: Agriculture Mining Fishing Timber	Secondary Goods Producing: Manufacturing Processing	Tertiary Services: Trade Transport Recreation Finance Insurance Real Estate Quinary Health Education Research Government Quaternary
Occupational Slope:	Unskilled Worker Farmer Miner Fisherman	Semi-skilled Worker Engineer	Professional and Technical Scientists
Technology:	Raw Materials	Energy	Information
Design:	Game against Nature	Game Against Fabricated Nature	Game between Persons
Methodology:	Common Sense Experience	Empiricism Experimentation	Abstract Theory: Models, Simulation, Decision Theory, Systems Analysis
Time Perspective:	Orientation to the Past Ad Hoc Responses	Ad Hoc Adaptiveness Projections	Future Orientation Forecasting
Axial Principle:	Traditionalism Land/Resource Limitation	Economic Growth State or Private Control of Investment Decisions	Centrality of and Codification of Theoretical Knowledge

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of these moneys into investment areas; and this has been done through the equity market, investment banks, self-financing, and state taxation. The locus of social relations has been the enterprise or firm and the major social problem that of industrial conflict between employer and worker. To the extent that the investment process has been routinized and the 'class conflicts' encapsulated so that the issue of class strife no longer acts to polarize a country around a single issue, those older problems of an industrial society have been muted if not 'solved'.

IN the post-industrial society, the chief problem is the organization of science, and the primary institution the university or the research institute where such work is carried out. In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries the strength of nations was their *industrial* capacity, the chief index of which was steel production. The strength of Germany before the First World War was measured by the fact that she had overtaken Great Britain in steel production. After the Second World War, the *scientific* capacity of a country has become a determinant of its potential and power, and research and development (R & D) has replaced steel as a comparative measure of the strength of the powers. For this reason the nature and kinds of state support for science, the politicization of science, the sociological problems of the organization of work by science teams all become central policy issues in a post-industrial society. There are other issues as well (see Schema Two: The Problem Issues of the Post-Industrial Society).

A major social change brings a major reaction. The student revolts of the late 1960s were, in part, a reflection of the new power of an adversary culture reacting against the growth of a science-based society.

Schema Two

The Problem Issues of the Post-Industrial Society

Axial Principle:	The Centrality of and Codification of Theoretical Knowledge
	Derivative Considerations
Primary Institution	University Academy Institutes Research Corporations
Economic Ground	Science-based Industries
Primary Resource	Human Capital
Political Problem:	Science Policy Education Policy
Structural Problem:	Balance of Private and Public Centre
Stratification Base——	Skill
Access—	Education
Theoretical Issue:	Cohesiveness of 'New Class'
Sociological Reactions	The Resistance to Bureaucratization The Adversary Culture

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But in greater measure the student revolt was a reaction to the 'organizational harnesses' which a post-industrial society inevitably drops on intellectual work, and this was signified by the increasing pressures on young people, at an earlier and earlier age, to choose a good college, the pressure to choose a main subject, and the anxiety about graduate school and a career.

Politically, the problem of a post-industrial society, as Francois Bourricaud rightly points out, is the growth of a non-market welfare economics and the lack of adequate mechanisms to decide the allocation of public goods. For technical and conceptual reasons one cannot measure the value of such goods in market terms; because such goods are distributed to all, there is a disincentive on the part of a citizenry to support such expenditures. Most important, the nature of non-market political decisions invites direct conflict: as against the market which disperses responsibility, in politics the decision points are open and visible, and the consequences of political decisions, as to who would lose and who would gain, are clear. Because there is such a focal point, conflict flares more readily when such decisions are to be reached.

In the broadest sense, the most besetting dilemma confronting all modern society is bureaucratization, or the 'rule of rules'. Historically, bureaucratization was in part an advance of freedom. Against the arbitrary and capricious power, say, of a foreman, the adoption of impersonal rules was a guarantee of rights. But when an entire world becomes impersonal, and bureaucratic organizations are run by mechanical rules (and often for the benefit and convenience of the bureaucratic staff), then inevitably the principle has swung too far.

All of these changes take place in the context of a society which is multiplying its constituencies (especially the scientific and technical claimants), which mixes technocratic and political decisions, and which sees the rise of a new class which may or may not be struggling to establish a corporate cohesiveness as a new ruling class in society. It is all these issues, which would (which may) take a book to spell out, that frame the problems of a post-industrial society.

TO conclude: the concept of a post-industrial society is not a picture of a complete social order; it is an attempt to describe and explain an axial change in the social structure (defined as the economy, the technology and the stratification system), of the society. But such a change implies no specific determinism between a 'base' and a 'superstructure'; on the contrary, the initiative in organizing a society these days comes largely from the political system. Just as various industrial societies—the United States, Great Britain, Nazi Germany, the Soviet Union, post-Second World War Japan—have distinctively different political and cultural features, so it is likely that the various societies that are entering a post-industrial phase will have different political and cultural configurations. The essential division in Western society today is not between those who own the means of production

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and an undifferentiated 'proletariat' but the bureaucratic and authority relations between those who have powers of decision and those who have not in all kinds of organizations, political, economic, and social. It becomes the task of the political system to manage these relations in response to the various pressures for distributive shares and social justice.

What the concept of a post-industrial society suggests is that there is a common core of problems, hinging largely on the relation of science to public policy, which will have to be solved by these societies; but these can be solved in different ways and for different purposes. The sociologist seeks those 'ordering devices' which allow one to see the way social change takes place in a society. The concept of the post-industrial society is one such 'ordering device' in the change of Western social structure.

Appendix

As this review may have established, the intellectual antecedents of the idea of the post-industrial society are clear. The particular strands which led to the congealing of the concept and the places where the ideas were developed may be of interest to the reader who wants to pursue the matter further.

The starting point of the idea for me was a section of a paper prepared in the spring of 1955 for the conference on 'The Future of Freedom' organized by the Congress for Cultural Freedom in Milan, that dealt with 'The Break-up of Family Capitalism'. The argument was, briefly, that capitalism had to be understood not only as an economic system but equally as a social system tied through the family enterprise which provided a social cement for the system by creating both a community of interest and a continuity of interest through the family dynasty. The rise of managerial capitalism, therefore, had to be seen not only as part of the professionalization of the corporation, but as a 'crack' in the social cement of the system. After a description of the process of the break-up of family capitalism in America (in part because of the intervention of investment banking) the essay argued that two 'silent revolutions' in the relationship between power and social class were taking place: the decline of inherited power (but not necessarily wealth) meant that the social upper class of wealthy businessmen and their descendants no longer constituted a ruling class; the rise of managers meant that there was no continuity of power in the hands of a specific social group. 'Today', I wrote, 'there is an upper class and a ruling group', but the two are not necessarily coterminous. Upper classes still have differential privileges which they can pass along to their children, but they do not rule. The break-up of family capitalism has sundered that distinction and disrupted the continuity of rule. Rule is largely in the hands of the technical-intellectual elite, including corporate managers and the political directorate.

To this extent, the perennial interest of a sociologist in scanning

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the historical skies for the 'new class' was the starting point of the argument.[92]

A second strand was a series of studies I did in *Fortune* magazine in the early 1950s on the changing composition of the labour force, with particular reference to the decline of the industrial worker relative to the non-production worker in the factory and the technical and professional employee. Here the influence of Colin Clark's *Conditions of Economic Progress* was apparent. Clark, as is known, put forth a classification of economic sectors labelled primary, secondary, and tertiary, and identified as an engine of change between them the differential productivity between sectors, and the change in spending patterns, based on the theorem of Christian Engel that as national income rises there is a shift in the slope of purchases to services. The more immediate influence, however, was an article, unjustly neglected, by Paul Hatt and Nelson Foote, in the *American Economic Review* of May 1953, which not only refined Clark's 'tertiary' category (setting forth quaternary and quinary sectors) but linked these sector changes to patterns of social mobility. In relating changes in sector distributions to occupational patterns, Hatt and Foote singled out as the most important development—the trend towards professionalization of work and the crucial importance of the quinary or intellectual sector.

A third influence was Schumpeter's emphasis on technology as an open frontier (ideas which were developed in the various studies by Arthur Cole, Fritz Redlich, and Hugh Aitken at the Harvard Center for Entrepreneurial Studies in the 1950s). The prevailing mood of liberal economists just before the Second World War had been summed up by Alvin Hansen in his *Fiscal Policy and Business Cycles* (1939) that capitalism had reached the end of a 'long wave' of expansion, particularly of electrification, and that the future was one of 'economic maturity' and even of stagnation. Against this point of view, Schumpeter argued that, 'Technological possibilities are an uncharted sea. We may survey a geographical region and appraise . . . the relative fertility of individual plots [but] we cannot reason in this fashion about the future possibilities of technological advance. . . . As a matter of fact . . . the promise held out by the chemical industry alone' would be sufficient to generate a new economic advance.[93]

Schumpeter's argument, re-read in the early 1960s, turned my mind to the question of technological forecasting. Capitalist society had been able to regularize growth when it had found the means to institutionalize the mechanisms of savings and credit which could be then transformed into investment. One of the problems of the post-industrial society would be the need to iron out the indeterminacy of the future by some means of 'charting' the open sea. The various efforts at technological

[92] The essay on Family Capitalism is reprinted in *The End of Ideology* (Glencoe, Illinois, 1960), chapter 2.

[93] See Joseph Schumpeter, *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy* (New York, 1942), p. 118.

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forecasting in the 1960s (summed up by Erich Jantsch in *Technological Forecasting in Perspective* (Paris, OECD, 1967), demonstrated the feasibility of the proposition.

And finally, in this inventory of influences, I would single out the work of the physicist and historian of science, Gerald Holton, in sensitizing me to the significance of theoretical knowledge in its changing relation to technology, and the codification of theory as the basis for innovation not only in science, as Holton demonstrated, but in technology and economic policy as well. Holton's paper, cited below,[94] presents a beautiful exposition of the development of science as a set of codifications and branchings of knowledge.

I FIRST presented many of these ideas, using the term 'post-industrial society' in a series of lectures at the Salzburg Seminar in Austria in the summer of 1959; the emphasis was largely on the shifts in sectors and the change from a goods-producing society to a service society.[95] In the spring of 1962, I wrote a long paper which was presented at a forum in Boston, entitled 'The Post-Industrial Society: A speculative View of the United States and Beyond'. Here the theme had shifted to the role of 'intellectual technology' and science as decisive for social change and as constituting the decisive features of the post-industrial society. The paper was unpublished, though it was circulated widely in academic and government circles.[96] A variant of this paper was presented in the winter of 1962–63 before the Seminar on Technology and Social Change at Columbia University and printed in truncated form a year later in the papers of that seminar edited by Eli Ginzberg. Different aspects of the concept were developed subsequently in a number of papers,

[94] See Gerald Holton, 'Scientific Research and Scholarship: Notes Toward the Design of Proper Scales', *Daedalus*, Spring 1962.

[95] The nature of an 'intellectual property' is always beset by doubt. In the notes and tables distributed to the seminar participants at the time, I had written: 'The term post-industrial society—a term I have coined—denotes a society which has passed from a goods-producing stage to a service society'. I knew that Ralf Dahrendorf had used the phrase 'post-capitalist society' in his book *Class and Class Conflict in an Industrial Society* published in 1959, and I had always supposed that I had used the phrase 'post-industrial' in contrast to his term. Subsequently I found that David Riesman had used the phrase 'post-industrial society' in an essay entitled 'Leisure and Work in Post-Industrial Society' printed in the compendium *Mass Leisure* published by the Free Press in 1958. Riesman had used post-industrial to connote leisure, as opposed to work, but did not in any subsequent essay follow up the theme or the phrase. I had, quite likely, read Riesman's essay at the time and the phrase undoubtedly came from him, though I have developed it in various writings in a vastly different way.

[96] I did not want to publish it at the time because I felt that the idea was unfinished. Sections of the paper, which had been circulated at the forum in Boston, were 'pirated' without permission by the public affairs magazine *Current* and by a business publication *Dun's Review* from which, inexplicably, it turned up as a citation in the Richta volume (op. cit.). The interest in government and academic circles led a writer in *Science* to comment: 'One of the prophets most honoured by quotation and imitation is Daniel Bell, Columbia University sociologist and a former labour editor of *Fortune* who drew a convincing and intimidating picture of what is coming, barring war, in a paper called "The Post-Industrial Society"' (*Science*, 12 June 1964, p. 1321).

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culminating in a monograph in 1968, on 'The Measurement of Knowledge and Technology' which was printed by the Russell Sage Foundation in the volume *Indicators of Social Change*.[97]

When I have used the concept of the post-industrial society in later writings I have meant it to include *five* dimensions which, any particular society might exhibit in varying degree; but these five dimensions for me would constitute the salient features of the post-industrial society.[98] Schematically put, the five dimensions would be:

1. Economic Sector: The Shift from a Goods-Producing to a Service Society.
2. Occupational Slope: The Predominance of the Professional and Technical Class.
3. Technology: The rise of a new 'intellectual technology'.
4. Pattern of Change: Self-Sustaining Technical Growth.
5. Axial Principle: The Centrality of Theoretical Knowledge.

[97] The different papers on aspects of the post-industrial society in print can be found as follows: in *Technology and Social Change*, edited by Eli Ginzberg (New York, 1964); in *Scientific Progress and Human Values*, edited by Edward and Elizabeth Hutchings, the papers of the Proceedings of the 75th Anniversary of the California Institute of Technology (New York, 1966); in *A Great Society?* edited by Bertram M. Gross (New York, 1968), the Bentley Lectures at Syracuse University; and 'The Measurement of Knowledge and Technology' in *Indicators of Social Change*, edited by Eleanor Sheldon and Wilbert Moore (New York, 1968).

The 'Notes on the Post-Industrial Society' that appeared in *The Public Interest*, nos. 6 and 7, Winter 1967 and Spring 1967, are an abridgement of the papers presented at the California Institute of Technology and Syracuse. In addition, the idea of the post-industrial society was one of the 'baselines' of the Commission on the Year 2000, and a discussion of these ideas can be found in the volume, *Toward the Year 2000*, edited by Daniel Bell (Boston, 1968).

[98] Following Paul Lazarsfeld, I would say that any theoretical scheme is based on *concepts, dimensions and indicators*. A concept is a broad rubric which gathers together various attributes under a common heading; the dimensions are the components of the concept; and the indices the statistical data which measure the changes in the dimensions. Capitalism is a concept. Its dimensions would be, according to one's definition, private property, commodity production, complete mobility of production factors, etc. As regards the post-industrial society I am not arguing that the five dimensions I have specified are the only ones that one can use. Herman Kahn, for example, who has followed most of my usage of the term, takes 'income level per capita' as a measure of distinction between post-industrial and industrial and pre-industrial societies. I use these five dimensions to indicate the central features both of the shift from production to services (rather than consumption), and the crucial new relation of science to technology through the codification of theoretical knowledge.

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Semites and Anti-Semites: Race in the Arab-Israel Conflict

Bernard Lewis*

IN the *Economist* of 9 November 1968, a reviewer of two books on Jerusalem reminded the Jewish authors that 'the Arabs too are Semites, and have the long Semitic memory'. A few weeks earlier, on 26 October 1968, another or possibly the same reviewer, discussing a collection of essays by the late Isaac Deutscher, remarked that 'he [Deutscher] might have added that Palestinians, Jew and Arab, are all Semites, and that both races have a noble heritage of supra-nationalism from which to work'.

Deutscher would not of course have added anything of the kind. Though frequently misguided, he was a sensitive and a literate man, and would no more have called a Jew or an Arab a Semite than he would have called a Pole or an Englishman an Aryan.

The Semite, like the Aryan, is a myth, and part of the same mythology. Both terms—Semite and Aryan—originated in the same way, and suffered the same misuse at the same hands. Primarily linguistic, they date from the great development of scientific philology during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, when European scholars made the momentous discovery that the languages of mankind were related to one another and formed recognizable families. The term Aryan, of Indian origin, was first applied to a group of languages spoken in south Asia, to which Sanskrit and its derivatives belonged, and then extended to a larger group of languages in Europe and Asia, more commonly known as Indo-European. Semitic was applied at about the same time to another family of languages including Hebrew, Arabic, Aramaic, and, later, some other languages of the Middle East and North Africa. The name of course comes from Shem, one of the three sons of Noah, from whom, according to the book of Genesis, the Jews and most of their ancient neighbours were descended. The term Semite in this sense seems to have appeared in print for the first time in 1781, in a contribution by A. L. von Schlözer to J. G. Eichhorn's *Repertorium für biblischen und morgenländischen Literatur.*

Though these terms were strictly linguistic in origin and use, nevertheless confusion between language and race seems to have appeared at quite an early date. The German philologist Max Müller is quoted as saying that one can no more speak of a Semitic or an Aryan

* This article is based on a paper which was delivered to the Institute of Race Relations on 3 February 1971.

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race than one can speak of a brachycephalic or dolichocephalic dictionary. Scholars did in fact speak of Semites, but as a convenient shorthand for people speaking a Semitic language and having a culture expressed in a Semitic language. In this sense—of the speakers of a language, the carriers of a culture, 'Semite' was frequently and respectably used as a substantive. Scholars have never failed to point out—repeatedly and alas ineffectually—that this linguistic and cultural classification has nothing to do with the anthropological classification of race, and that there is no reason whatever to assume that people who speak the same language are of the same racial origin. Indeed, if one looks at the speakers of Hebrew and of Arabic at the present time—not to mention English—such an assumption is palpably absurd. Speakers of Arabic include the racially highly diverse peoples of Syria, Lebanon and Iraq on the one hand, and of the Sudan and North Africa on the other; and even the small state of Israel, after the 'ingathering of the exiles' from all over the world, shows a diversity of racial type even greater than that of the Arab world. One may call the Arabs and Israelis fellow-Semites in the sense that both speak Semitic languages, and that is all. To assume or imply any further content would be rather as if one were to describe the English and, say, the Bengalis as fellow-Aryans, and to suggest that they have some common identity because of that.

Racialist mythologies, based on certain false assumptions concerning Semites, Aryans and other groups, became very popular during the nineteenth century, when they provided, for those who needed it, an ideological justification for rejecting Jews, to replace the religious rationalization which was ceasing to satisfy secularized Christians. If Jews could no longer decently be persecuted because they were unbelievers, then they might be persecuted because they were members of an alien and inferior race. Religious prejudice was old-fashioned and obscurantist; racial discrimination in contrast appeared, to the nineteenth century, as modern and scientific. The important thing was of course that Jews should be kept down, and that some intellectually and socially acceptable reason should be found for this. A further advantage of the new, racial dispensation was that it deprived the Jew of the opportunity, open to him under religious persecution, of deserting his own side and joining the persecutors. The present, third phase, in which politics has superseded both race and religion in anti-Jewish action and propaganda, has restored this option.

Anti-Jewish propaganda in western and central Europe had long had racial overtones. In sixteenth-century Spain the forced mass conversion of Jews and Moslems gave rise to a virulent racialism directed mainly against 'new Christians' of Jewish origin and their descendants, and an obsession with purity of blood—*limpieza de sangre*. Racial themes appear occasionally in the eighteenth century, in the writings of the French Enlightenment. They became commoner during the

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nineteenth century, and were given a more systematic form in Germany, where the term anti-Semitism was first used.[1]

HATRED of the Jews has many parallels, and yet is unique. In some respects it resembles the normal hostility which one may find among people for neighbours of another tribe, another race, another faith or from another place, or the attitude which majorities sometimes adopt towards minorities. There are many examples all over the world of minority groups, often of alien origin, who play some specific economic role, and arouse hostility in consequence. Such are the Asians in East Africa, the Chinese in South-East Asia, and the Lebanese in West Africa. Hostility to Jews often arises or is aggravated by similar causes, but nevertheless anti-Semitism—in its persistence and extent, its potency and results, is without parallel. The one other persecution that is at all comparable, the massacre of the Armenians, is of a different order. The persecution of the Armenians was limited both in time and in place—to the Ottoman Empire, and to the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. It was in reality a struggle between two different peoples for the same country. It was not associated with either the demonic beliefs or the deep, almost physical hatred which inspire and direct anti-Semitism in Central and Eastern Europe and sometimes elsewhere. It may perhaps be described as an outstanding example of normal conflict. The uniqueness of anti-Semitism lies in the peculiar relationship of the Jews to Christianity, and in the role assigned to the Jews in Christian beliefs concerning the genesis of their faith. Some years ago, an American Secretary of State made a very revealing remark. Speaking of Arab hostility to Israel, he observed that it was not really surprising, since the Jews had murdered Muhammad. They did not, of course, but it is quite obvious what he had in mind.

What then is the relevance of all this to the Arab-Israel dispute? How far is this dispute a racial problem? Before attempting to answer this question, I should like to clarify two important points. The first is the meaning of the term race. This word has been used and misused in many ways in our time, and much misunderstanding has been caused by unrecognized differences of definition. It is not my purpose here to define the nature of race or of racial identity, but it may be useful to explain what I mean by the word in the context of the present discussion. Race, then, is a quality, possessed or ascribed, which is or is believed to be involuntary, immutable, and hereditary, and thus essentially different from such forms of identity as religion and nationality, which can be adopted or relinquished at will. (I speak of course of the Anglo-

[1] See S. W. Baron, *A Social and Religious History of the Jews*, 2nd ed., vol. XIII (New York, 1969), p. 84 ff.; L. Poliakov, *Histoire de l'antisémitisme* (Paris, 1955–). The anti-semitism of the right is well known; that of the left is often overlooked. See A. Hertzberg, *The French Enlightenment and the Jews* (New York, 1968); E. Silberner, 'The anti-semitic tradition in modern socialism', in *Scripta Hierosolymitana*, vol. III (1956), pp. 378–396; idem, *Sozialisten zur Judenfrage* (Berlin, 1962).

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American term nationality, not of the German *Nationalität* or the Russian *Natsionalnost*, both of which are racial in content.)

My second point is that I am here concerned only with the racial aspects of the problem; not with the rights and wrongs of the Arab-Israel conflict, and not with those aspects, by far the most important, that have nothing to do with race at all.

The argument is sometimes put forward that the Arabs and their friends, in opposing Israel or Zionism, cannot be anti-Semitic because the Arabs themselves are Semites. This argument is doubly flawed. First, the term Semite has no meaning as applied to groups as heterogeneous as the Arabs or Jews, and indeed it could be argued that the use of such terms is in itself a sign of racialism. Secondly, anti-Semitism has never anywhere been concerned with anyone but Jews. The Nazis, who may be accepted as the most authoritative exponents of anti-Semitism, made it quite clear that their hostility was limited to Jews only, and did not include the other so-called Semitic peoples. On the contrary, the Nazis found and still find no difficulty in simultaneously hating Jews and courting Arabs; they made a considerable and on the whole successful effort to cultivate the Arabs, and won the friendship and support of many Arab leaders, including some who still hold high office.[2]

Jews and pro-Jews have often tended to identify enmity to Israel or to Zionism with anti-Semitism, and to see Nasser as a new but unsuccessful Hitler and the *Fatah* as the present-day equivalent of the S.S. This is a false equation. The Arab-Israel conflict is a political one—a conflict between peoples over real issues, not a matter of prejudice and persecution. It is not necessary to assume that Arab hostility to Israel is a result of anti-Semitism—there are other adequate reasons by which it can be explained.

Nevertheless, since Israel happens to be a Jewish state inhabited largely by Jews, and since there are people who hate Jews independently of the Palestine conflict, anti-Semitism may sometimes be a factor in determining attitudes—on occasion even in determining policy and action. How far and in what circumstances is this so? It may be useful to examine this question in relation to some of the different groups involved.

THE first and most important of the opponents of Israel are obviously the Arabs. In general it is true that the Arabs are not anti-Semitic—not because they themselves are Semites, a meaningless statement, but

[2] For a comprehensive study, see L. Hirszowicz, *The Third Reich and the Arab East* (London, 1966) (original Polish edition, Warsaw, 1963). See further E. Rossi, *Documenti sull'origine e gli sviluppi della questione araba (1875–1944)* (Rome, 1944); E. Be'eri, *Army Officers in Arab Politics and Society* (Jerusalem, 1969) (original Hebrew edition, Tel Aviv, 1966), p. 28 ff.; 41–49. For personal testimony see Anwar el Sadat, *Revolt on the Nile* (London, 1957), p. 34 ff.; A. W. Sansom, *I Spied Spies* (London, 1965); F. Grobba, *Männer und Mächte im Orient* (Göttingen, 1967). J. W. Eppler's book *Rommel ruft Kairo* (Bielefeld, 1959), is not available to me.

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because for the most part they are not Christians. Anti-Semitism in its modern form is the response of the secularized Christian to the emancipated Jew—but with theological and psychological roots going back to the very origins of Christianity. In Islam, the Gospels have no place in education—and the processes of secularization and emancipation have barely begun. This being so, we shall not be surprised to find that Christian Arabs have often been anti-Semitic, and indeed played a leading part in introducing European-style anti-Semitism to the Arab world. That characteristic expression of Christian anti-Semitism, the blood libel, has appeared from time to time in the history of the Middle East, as well as in Europe. When it did, it was, until recent years, almost invariably Christian in origin.[3] The most notable case among many in the nineteenth century was the famous Damascus affair of 1840, when Jews in that city were accused of the ritual murder of a Franciscan father. The accusers were his fellow monks and the French consul.

This does not of course mean that Jews under traditional Moslem rule lived in the inter-faith Utopia invented by modern myth-makers. Jews, like Christians, were in both theory and practice second-class citizens. This situation was however by no means as bad as the modern associations of this term would suggest. As members of a protected community, they enjoyed limited but substantial rights, which were at most times effectively maintained. In return, they owed—and gave—loyalty to the state, and accepted certain disabilities which were not normally very onerous. They were expected to keep their place, and the rare outbreaks of violence against Jews or Christians almost always resulted from a feeling that they had failed to do so.[4] They have conspicuously failed to do so in recent years.

The spread of anti-Semitism in the Arab lands in modern times has been due to three main causes. The first, chronologically, is European influence. A few Arabic translations of anti-Semitic tracts were published as early as the nineteenth century. Others followed, including the Protocols of the Elders of Zion, which first appeared in Arabic in Cairo in about 1927. There are now more versions and editions in Arabic than in any other language. There are also numerous other works, translated, adapted, and even original, dealing with the iniquities of the Jews through the millennia and the universal Jewish conspiracy against mankind, and including the old charges of blood-lust, ritual murder and the like, as well as the standard modern myths of

[3] On blood-libels see J. Landau, *Jews in Nineteenth Century Egypt* (New York, 1969), index s.v.; M. Franco, *Essai sur l'histoire des Israélites de l'Empire ottoman depuis les origines jusqu'à nos jours* (Paris, 1897), pp. 220–33; A. Galante, *Histoire des Juifs d'Anatolie, Les juifs d'Izmir (Smyrne)* (Istanbul, 1937), pp. 183–99; idem, *Documents officiels turcs concernant les Juifs de Turquie* (Istanbul, 1931), pp. 157–61, 214–40; idem, *Encore un nouveau recueil de documents concernant l'histoire des Juifs de Turquie: Etudes scientifiques* (Istanbul, 1953), pp. 43–5.

[4] On the position of the non-Muslim in the Muslim state, see *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, 2nd ed., s.v. 'Dhimma', where further literature is cited. For a recent study of Islamic attitudes see Rudi Paret, 'Toleranz und Intoleranz im Islam', in *Saeculum*, vol. XXI (1970), pp. 344–65.

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power and money. There are even writings which defend and justify the Nazi persecution of the Jews. Some contemporary Arab comment on the Eichmann trial in Jerusalem is significant in this respect.[5]

From 1933 onwards the spread of anti-Jewish propaganda among the Arabs was no longer left to chance or to private enterprise. Nazi Germany made a truly immense effort in the Arab countries, and won many converts. This work was continued by Nazi émigrés after the war. In a sense, the final destruction of the Jewish communities in Arab countries was a long-term result of the Nazi effort.

The second factor is the Palestine question. As we have seen, Arab hostility to Israel has in its origins nothing to do with anti-Semitism as such. But Israel is Jewish, and there are Jewish minorities in Arab countries. In a time of crisis, the ready-made themes, imagery and vocabulary of anti-Jewish abuse that were offered to the Arabs proved too tempting to resist.

Jews in Arab countries had in general been indifferent or hostile to Zionism. They were converted, like others, by persecution. The first outbreak in modern times occurred in Baghdad on 1 and 2 June 1941, during the last hours of the pro-German Rashid Ali regime. According to official sources, 110 Jews were killed and 240 injured, 586 business premises sacked, and 911 houses destroyed. Unofficial estimates are higher. The next wave came in November 1945, with riots and attacks on synagogues and Jewish shops in Egypt and Syria, and a massacre in Libya, where 130 Jewish dead were officially counted and so many houses, shops and workshops destroyed that much of the community was left homeless and destitute. A third wave followed in December 1947, with massacres of Jews in Aleppo and Aden. In the latter, official estimates gave 82 dead, a similar number injured, 106 shops sacked, 220 houses destroyed or damaged.[6]

These events, with lesser outbreaks in some other places and increasing pressure almost everywhere, began the liquidation of the ancient Arab-Jewish communities and incidentally contributed greatly to the

[5] The most detailed examination of Arabic anti-semitic literature is contained in Y. Harkabi's book on the Arab attitude in the Israel-Arab conflict, published in Tel Aviv in Hebrew in 1968. An English translation has been announced. See also Sylvia G. Haim, 'Arabic antisemitic literature', in *Jewish Social Studies*, vol. XVII no. 4 (1955), pp. 307–12; Dafna Alon, *Arab racialism* (Jerusalem, 1969). A good specimen of this literature is 'Abdallah al-Tell's 400-page book *The Menace of World Jewry to Islam and Christendom*, published in Cairo in 1964. A very laudatory review, by Muhammad 'Abdallah al-Sammān, appeared in the distinguished Egyptian literary magazine *Al-Risāla*, 7 January 1965, pp. 54–6. Little is available in Western languages, though some idea of the flavour of this literature may be obtained from a Pakistani publication in English—*Jewish Conspiracy and the Muslim World*, ed. Misbahul Islam Faruqi (Karachi, February 1967). The subject is treated from time to time in *Patterns of Prejudice* and in *The Wiener Library Bulletin*, both published in London.

[6] For a brief account of these events, see S. Landshut, *Jewish Communities in the Muslim Countries of the Middle East*, London, 1950. On the Baghdad massacre, see H. J. Cohen, 'The anti-Jewish *Farhud* in Baghdad, 1941', in *Middle Eastern Studies*, vol. III (1966), 2–17, and E. Kedourie, *The Chatham House Version* (London, 1970), p. 306 ff. These events are glossed over or omitted in most histories of modern Iraq and of the other countries concerned.

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creation of Israel. The armed struggle in Palestine in 1947–48, the proclamation of Israel, and the subsequent Arab-Israeli conflict completed the process.

It has sometimes been argued that the outbreaks of violence against Jews in Arab countries and the subsequent flight of Arab Jews from their homes were due entirely to Zionism and the Arab reaction against it. This explanation has some plausibility, and there can be no doubt that the Palestine problem is an important element in the growth of Arab hostility to Jews. But it is not a sufficient explanation. In two countries with large Jewish minorities, Iraq and Yemen, the governments of the time not only permitted but positively facilitated the transfer of their Jews to Israel; other Arab governments too have shown more interest in the departure of their Jews than in their ultimate destination. The first post-war pogrom, in November 1945, was touched off by demonstrations on the anniversary of the Balfour Declaration, and might be explained by concern for the fate of Palestine, then under consideration. The same cannot be said of the earlier massacre in Baghdad. At the beginning of June 1941, Hitler ruled Europe, and Stalin was still his loyal helper; America was neutral, and Britain was strictly enforcing the 1939 White Paper in Palestine. Zionism—which was in any case rejected by most Iraqi Jews—could hardly have seemed a serious threat, and one needs great faith to believe that the Baghdad mobs in June 1941 were moved to fall upon their Jewish compatriots because of a problem 600 miles away and a threat six years in the future.

The reaction against Zionism and the response to European anti-Semitism both had their effect. But what finally sealed the fate of the Arab Jews was the third, and in many ways the most important, factor—the general worsening of the position of minorities, both ethnic and religious, in the Middle East. In a time of violent change, the old tolerance has gone, the new equality has proved a fraud. All are insecure, some are persecuted—and the Jews, as so often, suffer in an acute and accelerated form the ills of the society of which they are a part.

From the outpouring of official and private anti-Semitic propaganda in Arabic—not only in books, but also in newspapers, magazines, films, radio and television—one might gather that the Arabs were going through a wave of anti-Semitism similar to that of the Nazi period. Such an impression would be mistaken. Unlike German anti-Semitism, or that of Poland or Russia, this anti-Semitic literature in the Arab countries does not rest on any real popular feeling, and has no roots in the past; indeed, it is doubtful whether one can really speak, even now, of anti-Semitism among Moslem Arabs—though of course there are always exceptions. Even across the battle lines, personal relations are still possible between Jews and Arabs, of a warmth and sincerity inconceivable to many Westerners. The anti-Semitic literature is overwhelmingly foreign in content and style—even the anti-Jewish

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cartoons have to use German and Russian stereotypes. In the Arab lands anti-Semitism is not, as in Europe, exploited by politicians, but is created by them. It has, so to speak, been switched on; it could as easily be switched off.

THIS does not of course mean that there has been no antagonism to Jews in the Arab countries in the past, or that Arab hostility today is purely political and ideological. Those Arab experts who know some Arabic are aware that it is only in the last few years that Arabs have begun to refer to their adversary as 'the Zionists'. Previously the enemy was *al-Yahūd*, the Jews, and to a large extent remains so now, except in public and in print. But this is not racial, nor does it resemble Christian anti-Semitism. It rests on no theology of guilt, no scriptural condemnation, no assumption of racial distinctness and inferiority. Rather is it the anger of a dominant group at a formerly tolerated minority which has signally failed to keep its place in the proper order of things. The Jew—in the East even more than in the West—has defaulted on his stereotype. An important factor in the Arab response to Israel is surely a sense of shock and outrage at the appearance of the Jew—familiar, tolerated, and despised—in this new and strange role, as soldier, administrator, and ruler.[7] Such resentments are by no means directed against Jews only. They also touch other communities which have somehow offended against the proprieties of the traditional order, and at the present time offer more of a threat to the Christian minorities—emancipated, assimilated and affluent—than to the few remaining Jews in the Arab East.

All this has nothing to do with anti-Semitism in either its religious or its racial form, but belongs rather to the category of normal conflict. European opponents of Israel— the Russians, the Poles, the East Germans and the rest—are quite a different matter. The Soviet Union no doubt has good political reasons for its present policy towards Israel. Unlike the Nazis, the Russians would be perfectly capable of

[7] For discussions of this aspect of the problem, see G. C. Alroy, 'Two decades of Arab-Jewish war', in *Jewish Social Studies*, vol. XXXII (1970), pp. 52–3; B. Lewis, *The Middle East and the West* (London and Bloomington, Ind., 1964), pp. 125–6. There are many descriptions of the traditional relationship, of which one, from a recently published document, may suffice. It comes from a report by H. E. Wilkie Young, the British Vice-Consul in Mosul, written in January 1909: 'The attitude of the Moslems towards the Christians and Jews, to whom as stated above, they are in a majority of ten to one, is that of a master towards slaves whom he treats with a certain lordly tolerance so long as they keep their place. Any sign of pretension to equality is promptly repressed. It is often noticed in the street that almost any Christian submissively makes way even for a Moslem child. Only a few days ago the writer saw two respectable-looking, middle-aged Jews walking in a garden. A small Moslem boy, who could not have been more than eight years old, passed by and, as he did so, picked up a large stone and threw it at them—and then another—with the utmost nonchalance, just as a small boy elsewhere might aim at a dog or bird. The Jews stopped and avoided the aim, which was a good one, but made no further protest.' *Middle Eastern Studies*, VII (1971), p. 232.

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changing sides if they thought it desirable. Indeed, for a brief period some 20 years ago they supported Israel against Britain, and it was arms from the Eastern bloc which enabled the infant state to withstand the Arab armies in 1948. Since then, however, the Soviet Union has turned the other way, and has, with its satellites and followers, pursued a policy of unrelenting hostility to the Jewish state.

While this policy can be explained on political grounds, certain features are noteworthy.

One of these is the violence of the language used both *to* Israel and *about* Israel, in both diplomatic and propaganda utterances. Even by the standards of communist political vituperation, the invective used in condemning Israel and Israeli actions is remarkable. One may observe striking similarities both in argument and in expression between East Germany and West Germany, in the condemnation of Israel—in East Germany by the official press and radio, in West Germany by the two groups of extremists—of the right, the neo-Nazis, and of the left, both old and new. Their hostility to Israel, and the manner in which they express it, are of course not the only points that these groups have in common.

Perhaps even more noteworthy is the fact that the Soviet Union has on two different occasions broken off diplomatic relations with Israel. This is a step which the Soviets have not taken since early times, even with their most dangerous and avowed enemies. They were careful to maintain diplomatic relations for as long as possible with Pilsudski's Poland—even after the murder of a Soviet ambassador in Warsaw; with Fascist Italy, and with Nazi Germany, even after the *Anschluss* with Austria and the German occupation of Czechoslovakia. Nor have they found it necessary in more recent times to break off diplomatic relations with states which are opposed to them, or which they accuse of being imperialist puppets or communist heretics, in Europe, Asia, Africa or the Americas. They did not, for example, break off relations with Yugoslavia in 1949, with China or the USA at any time, or with the new anti-communist rulers of Indonesia and Ghana. Only with Albania, in 1961, did the Soviet Union break off relations, under extreme provocation, and then only *de facto*, not *de jure*. Most of the satellites retained their diplomatic relations, and a few years later the Soviet Union tried unsuccessfully to restore them. They have however twice broken off diplomatic relations with Israel. The first occasion was in 1953, at the time of the ' Doctors' Plot ' in Moscow, when a small bomb was exploded in the courtyard of the Soviet Embassy in Tel Aviv. There was never the slightest suspicion that this was anything but an irresponsible private operation. Diplomatic relations were restored after a while, but were broken off again in 1967, this time by almost the whole Soviet bloc. This disparity is very striking, and leaves one wondering what peculiar characteristic of Israel, lacking in other countries, has twice required a rupture of diplomatic relations. The vocabulary and iconography of

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Soviet anti-Zionism, with their covert and sometimes overt appeals to old-fashioned racial and even religious prejudice, may suggest an answer.

A third group of opponents of Israel and Zionism are the non-communist supporters of the Arab cause in the free world. Because these lack the obvious motives, whether political or ideological, of the Arabs on the one hand and the communists on the other, they are the ones most frequently accused of being moved by anti-Semitic motives. Often, this accusation is an injustice. There are many who support the Arab cause out of a sincere conviction that it is a just one; others who support it for good practical, personal, political or commercial reasons unconnected with any kind of prejudice. The fact must however be faced that there are some—what proportion would be difficult to say—for whom the Arabs are in truth nothing but a stick with which to beat the Jews.

IN England and in other English-speaking countries, there has never developed a tradition of intellectual anti-Semitism such as has at different times flourished in France, Germany, and Russia. The attempts by Goldwin Smith and E. A. Freeman to launch German-style racial anti-Semitism in the nineteenth century, like the later attempts by Belloc and Chesterton to import the French clerical variety, had little or no success. This is the more remarkable in that English literature offers what is probably a richer gallery of mythic Jewish villains than any other literature in Europe—a gallery that begins with Chaucer's murderers of St. Hugh of Lincoln, and includes such varied figures as Shylock, Barabas the Jew of Malta, Fagin, Melmotte, Svengali, the sophisticated stereotypes of Grahame Greene and T. S. Eliot and the penny plain stereotypes of John Buchan and Agatha Christie.[8] Prejudice against Jews has of course always existed, and has on occasion—very infrequently—amounted to a factor of some political importance. But it has never in modern times reached the point when anti-Semitism could be openly avowed by anyone with serious intellectual pretensions or political ambitions. Anti-Semitism is on the whole furtive, disguised, and hypocritical. Where openly expressed, it is usually a lower middle class phenomenon—the petty snobbery of the provincial golf club, whose members can find no other way of giving themselves status. In the working class it conflicted with the standards of brotherhood and internationalism, to which all paid at least lip service and often much more. In the upper middle class, the intellectual and professional classes and the upper class, its open expression conflicted with accepted standards of good taste. In the English-speaking countries in particular therefore, the Palestine conflict provided a heaven-sent (if that is the right word) opportunity to be anti-Jewish with a good conscience inside oneself and a good appearance towards others. This was a political

[8] The whole question is discussed in E. Rosenberg, *From Shylock to Svengali: Jewish Stereotypes in English Fiction* (London, 1961). The curious reader may note that some of the more striking phrases found in the English editions of Miss Christie's detective stories have for some reason been omitted from the American editions.

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conflict, not a racial prejudice, and an anti-Jewish position could be justified on the highest ethical and political grounds. I stress again—this is not true of all pro-Arabs, perhaps indeed not of any great number of them, but it is certainly true of some, for whom the Palestine problem and the sufferings of the Arabs provide perfect cover for prejudices which they would otherwise be ashamed to reveal.

Some are easy to detect. The openly fascist and racialist groups still active in various parts of the world are almost without exception pro-Arab—and their literature makes their real sentiments and purposes abundantly clear. Some Arabs have disdained the support of such tainted allies; others, including both governments and revolutionaries, have made good use of it.[9]

In more respectable circles, it is by no means easy to distinguish between those who are pro-Arab and those who are merely anti-Jewish. There are however some symptoms which, though not infallible, are a fairly good indication. One of the characteristics of the anti-Jew as distinct from the pro-Arab is that he shows no other sign of interest in the Arabs or sympathy for them, apart from their conflict with the Jews. He is completely unmoved by wrongs suffered by the Arabs at the hands of anyone other than Jews—whether their own rulers or third parties. He shows no interest in the history or achievements of the Arabs, no knowledge of their language or culture. On the contrary he may speak of them in a way which is in reality profoundly disparaging. No one in his right mind would claim to be an expert on, say, France or Germany without knowing a word of French or German. The claims to expertise of our self-styled Arabists without Arabic rest on the assumption that Arabs are somehow different from—and inferior to—Frenchmen and Germans, in that what they say and write in their own language can be safely disregarded. In the same spirit, some so-called pro-Arabs explain away the more extreme statements of certain Arab leaders by attributing the quality of what they say to the inevitable vagueness and violence of the Arabic language. Arabic is one of the noblest instruments that the human race has ever forged for the expression of its thoughts. It is indeed a language of poetry and eloquence, two arts the practitioners of which are not always to be taken as saying exactly what they mean or meaning exactly what they say. But that is only one side of Arabic. It is also a language of remarkable clarity and precision. As a medium of philosophical and scientific literature, its only peer is Greek. At once poetic and accurate, Arabic was for a very long time one of the major languages of civilization. To offer such excuses for the utterances of individual Arabs is an expression not of sympathy but rather of ignorance and, ultimately, of contempt.

[9] See for example reports of proceedings at the Central Criminal Court against Colin Jordan and John Tyndall, then respectively leader and deputy leader of the British National Socialist movement, in early October 1962; *cf.* an interview with Tyndall in the *Sunday Telegraph* of 10 March 1963. For a more recent example see the report in the *Daily Telegraph* of 13 January 1970 on the trial of T. O. Williams.

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If anyone had tried, in the thirties, to excuse Hitler's speeches by saying that this was the only way in which one could speak in the German language, would he have been accepted either as an expert on Germany—or as a friend of the German people?

A second characteristic of the anti-Jew as opposed to the pro-Arab is his tendency to harp on Jewish power and influence, which he usually greatly exaggerates, and to complain of Jewish double loyalty. There are about 450,000 Jews in Britain. The anti-Jew proceeds on the assumptions (a) that they are all as rich as Rothschild, as efficient as Marks & Spencer, as clever as Isaiah Berlin, as articulate as Bernard Levin, as resourceful as John Bloom; (b) that they are all working together for Israel; (c) that they are committing some offence in doing so.

In fact of course the great majority of Jews in Britain, as elsewhere, are as ignorant, inept, and inert as anyone else. Like others again they are sharply divided, some for Israel, some, no doubt fewer but not unimportant, against Israel, and the great mass at best sympathetic but inactive. The question of double loyalty takes different forms. In democratic and open societies, like Britain and the USA, Jewish double loyalty is in the main a problem only for Jews and anti-Jews, not for the great mass of the population who are neither the one nor the other. Most non-political Englishmen and Americans find it normal that Jews should sympathize with Israel, and are indeed slightly puzzled or even disturbed when they do not. As citizens of a free country, Jews have the same rights as anyone else to be pro-Israel, pro-Arab, or pro-whatever they please. A selective restriction of this right, imposed on Jews but not on others, on support for Israel but not for other foreign causes, would put them, in effect, in a separate and inferior category of citizenship. This line of thought has won little support in free countries.

In countries with an authoritarian tradition, like Russia or Poland, or a centralist tradition, like France, the position is different, and opposition by a group of nationals—Jews or others—to a foreign policy pursued by the government is regarded as a form of dissidence verging on treason. In France, some have seen Zionist Jews as a modern equivalent of the Huguenots and the Ultramontanes; the resemblance is remote, and its effect very limited, though it has already caused some concern to French Jews.[10] In Poland and Russia, where this kind of argument is more familiar, the pressures and penalties to which the Jew is subject are incomparably greater. Russian and Polish Jews must not merely refrain from supporting Israel; they must actively oppose her. The point was well made—in private—by a distinguished Polish Jewish writer during the 1967 war. 'I agree', he said, 'that a man can have only one country to which he owes allegiance—but why does mine have to be the United Arab Republic?'

[10] See for example the article by R. Massigli, published in *Le Monde* of 27 February 1970, and the comments of Romain Gary (1 and 2 March), I. Lacouture (23 March), and I. Kaplan (25 March). See further R. Aron, *De Gaulle, Israel and the Jews* (London, 1969) (French original, Paris, 1968) and Renee Weingarten, 'Jews in the mind of France', in *Commentary*, November 1970, pp. 64–8.

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IN our time, anti-Zionism has come to have a wider range and relevance, often quite unconnected with the Middle East and its problems. In the nineteenth century, religiously-expressed anti-Judaism was regarded as reactionary and outmoded, and gave way, in more modern and secular circles, to racially-expressed anti-Semitism. In our time racialism in turn has been discredited, and has, for some, been duly succeeded by an anti-Zionism in which politics takes the place previously occupied by religion and then race. The change is one of expression and emphasis rather than of substance, since all these elements have been and still are present. Even now, if one wishes to attack or discredit a Jew, one may call him an unbeliever, a Semite, or a Zionist, depending on whether the atmosphere and prevailing ideology of the society in which one operates is religious, ethnic, or political. In Poland, I am told, people are dismissed from their posts for having a Zionist grandmother.

Racial feelings can work both ways, and may underlie non-Jewish support for Israel, as well as non-Arab hostility. One group, the approximate rather than exact counterpart of the Jew-hating Arabophiles, are those who favour Israel because they hate Arabs. Such motives were at one time evident in France, where the war in Algeria gave rise to a quasi-alliance with Israel against the common Arab enemy, and where the final French withdrawal left a feeling of bitterness for which the Israeli victories provided some solace. This feeling was however specific and transitory; it was political and psychological rather than racial, and is of declining importance. In the English-speaking countries hostility to the Arabs as such is not a factor, though there are some who include the Arabs in a generalized dislike of lesser breeds. For these, the choice between Jew and Arab may present an agonizing dilemma.

Two other groups, among the supporters of Israel, are the inverted and repentant anti-Semites. By inverted anti-Semites I mean those who basically accept the anti-Semitic myth of the secret Jewish world power, but see it with respect and admiration rather than with hatred and fear. A classical example is Benjamin Disraeli, whose view of the role of the Jews does not differ greatly from that of the anti-Semites, but is presented in positive instead of negative terms, with pride instead of hate. Disraeli's ideas on the Jews owe more to his Christian education than to his Jewish birth. The same kind of awestruck belief in Jewish power can be found in some gentile sympathizers with Zionism—even, for example, among some of the promoters of the Balfour Declaration, who saw in it a device to win 'international Jewry' to the Allied cause.[11] This belief still appears occasionally even at the present day, though it has lost most of its cogency in view of the manifest inability of 'international Jewry' to do anything against either Hitler or his successors in enmity to Judaism. Awe for the mysterious power of Jewry has given place to

[11] For a striking example see E. Kedourie, 'Sir Mark Sykes and Palestine 1915–16', in *Middle Eastern Studies*, vol. VI (1970), pp. 340–5.

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respect for the political and military power of Israel—but this is not a racial consideration.

The repentant anti-Semites—usually vicarious—are another matter. There can be no doubt that one of the most important sources of support for Israel in the period following the fall of Hitler was guilt—guilt, that is, in the modern sense, a psychological state rather than a legal fact. The true anti-Semite is rarely repentant, and feelings of guilt for crimes against the Jews are often in inverse proportion to the degree of personal responsibility. They were, nevertheless, a factor of importance, and the response of many Christians to the emergence of Israel was determined by the feeling that they, their countries, and their churches, were accessories to the Nazi crimes, if not by active complicity, then by acquiescence or indifference.

Such feelings are a dwindling asset to Israel, and must inevitably die away as the memory of Nazi crimes recedes into the past. In the Soviet Union, official propaganda has even tried to conceal the fact that the Nazis persecuted Jews; to reveal it might arouse sympathy for either the Nazis or the Jews, and both responses would in different ways be undesirable. In the West one can almost hear the sigh of relief with which some persons and institutions have, after more than 30 years of unease, resumed their posture of moral superiority to the unredeemed and unbelieving Jews.

FINALLY, what of the Jews themselves? For the Jews are by no means unanimous in their support for Israel. The universal Jewish conspiracy, whether for Israel or any other purpose, is of course a figment of anti-Semitic imagination and has never had any reality. Many Jews are pro-Israel to varying degrees and a minority of them are active in Israel's support. There is however a by no means insignificant number of others who are active opponents of Israel—certainly more than in the past. These Jewish opponents of Israel are of several kinds. Some, as with non-Jews, are believers in the justice of the Arab cause; some are moved by internal Jewish religious considerations. Of the remainder, the most important are supporters of the old and new lefts, whose reactions to this as to most other problems are determined by political decisions, not necessarily their own, and by the current position of the ideological hemline. Many in particular proceed on the fashionable progressive assumption that any cause or any state which is supported by the United States must be an evil one; Israel, enjoying such support, must therefore necessarily be in the wrong in any dispute in which she is involved.

This is not a racial question. In the case of Jewish leftists old and new, however, there is an additional factor which should not be underrated. This is the phenomenon of Jewish self-hate—the neurotic reaction which one finds among some Jews to the phenomenon of anti-Semitism by accepting, sharing, expressing, and even exaggerating some of the

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basic assumptions of the anti-Semite.[12] In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries this kind of response could be found, in particular, among assimilated German Jews, of both left and right. A classical example is Karl Marx's essay on the Jewish question, now enjoying a new popularity in Arabic translation. Another is the posture of some German Jewish conservatives, who adopted the standards and outlook, as far as they could, of the German Nationalist right, and repeated their accusations against Jews, particularly Jews other than those of Germany. This did not of course help them in any way when the Nazis came to power and imposed their own solution of the Jewish problem. Today the phenomenon of Jewish self-hate is found chiefly on the far left, where hostility to Israel provides, or appears to provide, an opportunity of freeing oneself from ancestral and, more immediately, parental bonds, and passing from the minority to the majority. This may help us to understand some of the tortured utterances of the claustrophobic or rather claustrophiliac world of Jewish left-wing Marxism, and the curious phenomenon of Jewish supporters of black anti-Semitism in the USA—the American children of survivors of European ghettoes and death camps, who accept, or rather demand, a share of guilt for the enslavement of the African in America, and thus tacitly assert their membership of the dominant even if guilty majority.

All this—Gentile anti-Semitism or philo-Semitism, Jewish loyalty or self-hate—has nothing whatever to do with the rights and wrongs of the Arab-Israel dispute. It does however influence and sometimes determine the attitude of important groups of observers and participants from outside, including journalists, politicians, officials, and hence even governments. There are several familiar, sometimes pathetic figures—the Jew driven one way or the other by tribal solidarity or the desire to escape; the old-style white racialist, trying to decide which he hates more, Arabs or Jews; the tormented American WASP liberal, who sees the Palestine conflict as, ultimately, one between Harlem and the Bronx, and makes a choice determined by his own personal blend of prejudice and guilt; the anxious politician, now as in the thirties, seeking to avoid even the appearance of serving a Jewish purpose, and falling over backwards into other, less mythical, dangers.[13]

Race is topical at the moment, and the racialist is the fashionable enemy. It is therefore good propaganda to present one's problem as

[12] On Jewish self-hate, see I. Berlin, 'Benjamin Disraeli, Karl Marx, and the search for identity', in *Transactions of the Jewish Historical Society of England*, vol. XXII (1970), pp. 1–20, especially p. 17 ff.; earlier studies by T. Lessing, *Jüdischer Selbsthass* (Berlin, 1930), and D. Abrahamsen, *The Mind and Death of a Genius* (New York, 1946).

[13] For an example of how such concerns influenced British policy towards Turkey on the eve of the First World War, see E. Kedourie, 'Young Turks, Freemasons and Jews', in *Middle Eastern Studies*, vol. VII (1971), pp. 89–104. The fear of serving Jewish purposes was a not unimportant factor in the appeasement of Hitler, long after the point when self-interest clearly required that he be resisted. The advance of Soviet power in the Middle East has been eased by similar anxieties on the part of some who might otherwise have opposed it.

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racial, and to call the adversary a racialist. This has given rise to a series of accusations, some grotesquely comic—such as the insult 'Nazi', hurled by Hitler's allies at Hitler's victims—others merely false.

At first sight it might seem that some at least of the accusations on both sides are true. Have not the Arab governments persecuted their Jewish subjects? Is not Israel a self-proclaimed Jewish state, to which Jews and only Jews have a right of entry? Yes indeed. But 'Jewish' is a racial category for anti-Semites and those who have been misled by them, including some Jews. It is not and never has been such for authentic Jews, nor for that matter for most Arabs. Legal decisions in Israel have confirmed that a Jew converted to another religion ceases to be a Jew while a Gentile converted to Judaism becomes a Jew. This is not a racial definition. Correspondingly, Arab hostility to Jews, whether directed against the Jewish state or against the Jewish community, in whatever words and actions it may find expression, is fundamentally not racial in character.

Fortunately—for the Palestine problem is difficult enough without injecting racialism—all this has little real effect on either the Arabs or the Israelis. The problem is political and strategic, social and economic, national, communal, and perhaps even religious—but not, despite all the efforts that have been and are being made, racial. Neither Arabs nor Israelis are completely free from racial feelings and prejudices, and both have racial tensions of a sort within their own societies. But these are comparatively minor and, what is more important, are not directed against one another. The Middle East has its racial problems, and in the past these have sometimes caused trouble, but it does not share the obsessive concern with race that affects its neighbours in Europe, Asia and Africa. However difficult the Palestine problem may be, it is not as yet poisoned by the bitterest conflict of our time—and in this there is some faint cause for hope.

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Samizdat: Jews in the USSR: Document: Soviet Union

Roy Medvedev*

THE October Socialist Revolution in Russia very speedily alleviated the gravity of the 'Jewish problem' in our country. The revolution categorically banned all forms of discrimination against national minorities, including the Jews, many of whom played an extremely active part in the revolutionary struggle. In the minds of the majority of Party members during the first years of Soviet power, the concept of anti-semitism was firmly associated with that of counter-revolution. No one in our Party was shocked when, immediately after the triumph of revolution, a Jew became the formal leader of the Soviet state—chairman of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee (initially L. Kamenev, but replaced by Ya. M. Sverdlov a few days later). No one was shocked that the first Soviet Government included several Jews, or rather, persons of Jewish origin (who regarded themselves in the first instance as internationalists and also as leaders of the Russian workers' movement and the Russian (Bolshevik) Communist Party). At the beginning of the twenties no less than one-quarter of the members of the Bolshevik Central Committee were Jews. At all the Party Congresses up to and including the Fourteenth, Jews amounted to more than 10 per cent of all delegates with casting votes, falling second only to Russians in this respect.

From the reminiscences of Old Bolsheviks we learn today that as early as the twenties Stalin's words and deeds revealed definite anti-semitic tendencies. However, to display anti-semitism openly was impossible even for Stalin at that time. In 1931, replying to a question put by the US Jewish Telegraph Agency, Stalin declared that anti-semitism, as an extreme form of racial chauvinism, was the most dangerous survival of capitalism. 'Anti-semitism', said Stalin at the time, 'is a danger to the working people, a false trail leading them away from the right path and into the jungle. Therefore communists, as steadfast internationalists, cannot fail to be steadfast and sworn enemies of anti-semitism' (*Works*, vol. 13, p. 28).

As we see, a categorical statement. But Stalin very soon forgot those words.

Even during the Patriotic War Stalin had insisted on the implementation of certain measures restricting the rights of the Jews. During the post-war period these anti-semitic tendencies of Stalin's assumed the character of a state policy. The cult of Stalin, his inordinate glorification

* This is an excerpt from a longer *Samizdat* document.

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and his total usurpation of power in our country and in the Party had inevitably to be accompanied by mass repressions. The formative years of this cult saw the annihilation of the dictator's rivals, or of those whom he considered his rivals and competitors. After the cult of Stalin had become [firmly] established, it was a matter of annihilating dissenters. However, even when [the country was] to all appearances united and there was no sign of any obvious dissension, the Stalin regime was unable to exist without repression. Stalin's despotic system was in constant need of scapegoats, upon whom blame could be laid for all the shortcomings, mistakes, and vices of the regime. An exact parallel with the Christian religion: all good originates from God, all evil from Satan.

We know that during the years of the first five-year plan, it was the 'bourgeois specialists' who became the scapegoats: the engineers, technicians, economists and agronomists, scholars and teachers, who were declared 'saboteurs'.

At the time of the second five-year plan Stalin named as scapegoats the 'Trotskyists' and 'Bukharinites', to whose ranks he and the NKVD relegated whomsoever they pleased. In the post-war period it was the Jews who were chosen as scapegoats.

All of us remember well that the already preposterous mass political campaign against 'rootless cosmopolitans' bore a patently anti-Jewish stamp. The group of theatre critics was only the start. The campaign spread rapidly into other fields of art, and then to all spheres of the country's cultural life. Jews were removed from positions of authority and dismissed from ideological organizations. 'Purges' of Jews were intensively carried out in the Central Committee apparatus, the Moscow [Party] Committee, the Moscow City Committee, all regional and district committees, the paper *Pravda*, the organs of the procuracy, the courts, the organs of the MGB and MVD, military organizations, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Sovinformburo, the Radio Committee, and many other organizations. However, the affair did not stop at mere dismissals and transfers. At the end of the forties, the organs of the NKVD—undeniably assisted by Stalin—concocted a provocative allegation concerning the existence within the USSR of a 'pro-American conspiracy of Jews'. In connexion with this, leading public and state figures of Jewish nationality in our country began to be arrested. Almost all the members of the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee, formed during the war, were arrested. Most of them (apart from Academician Shtern, who was sent into exile) were shot. Also shot was the oldest member of the Central Committee of the All-Russian Bolshevik Communist Party, deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs S. A. Lozovsky (Dridzo), whose execution came shortly after his 74th birthday. (In carrying out his repressions, Stalin did not spare even his closest helpers. Molotov's wife Zhemchuzhina, for instance, was arrested. L. Kaganovich's brother, M. Kaganovich, learning of the charges brought against him, committed suicide.) Nearly all the greatest Jewish writers were arrested and shot: Perets Markish, D. Bergelson, I. Pfefer, L. Kvitko and many others. The

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Jewish Theatre was virtually annihilated by the organs of the NKVD. The distinguished artist and leading public figure S. M. Mikhoels, director of the Jewish Theatre, was shot in Minsk. Many of the leading artists of the Jewish Theatre (Zuskin and others) were arrested. Dozens of littérateurs and critics were arrested: D. Gofshtein, S. Galkin, A. Isbakh, G. Gukovsky, and also many leading Soviet scientists: P. A. Gelvikh, E. L. Shteinberg and others. All these scholars and writers have now been fully rehabilitated, but the majority of them posthumously.

At the end of 1952 Stalin, with the assistance of some employees of the NKVD, personally staged a new provocation, the so-called 'Doctors' Plot'. A large group of the most distinguished physicians from the Kremlin hospital, M. Kogan, A. Feldman, A. Grinshtein, Ya. Etinger, Vovsi and others, were accused of having connexions with a certain international Jewish nationalist organization 'Joint' and also of murdering Zhdanov-Shcherbakov and of attempting to murder marshals and admirals of the Soviet Army. A slanderous paragraph concerning the affair, published in the main newspapers on 13 January 1953, marked the beginning of a campaign of anti-semitism unprecedented in the history of our country. Thousands of specialists of Jewish nationality were dismissed from all the medical organizations, institutes, hospitals, establishments of higher education and research institutes 'as a prophylactic measure'. Many [academic] departments, hospitals, and laboratories lost as much as one-half of their staff. Publishing-houses deleted books by Jewish authors from their lists of prospective publications. Even some medicines developed by Jewish doctors were banned. Simultaneously the organs of the NKVD made urgent preparations for the mass deportation of Jews from all the principal cities of the USSR. The same fate that had befallen the Chechens, Ingushes, Crimean Tatars, Kalmyks, Germans, and certain other national minorities now awaited the Jews. Barracks for Jews were hastily erected in several districts of Kazakhstan. The text of an address to the Jewish people was prepared, to be signed by leading personalities of Jewish nationality in science and cultural affairs, 'requesting' resettlement; some of the biggest factory-plants passed resolutions on the deportation of Jews; in a number of regions of the country pogroms and massacres of Jews took place. And it was only the death of Stalin at the beginning of March 1953 that called a halt to the new and monstrous crime he had been contemplating.

AS we know, immediately following the death of Stalin the affair of the 'Doctors' Plot' was reviewed and all the persons accused in the case rehabilitated. The projected deportation of Jews was also cancelled. Gradually the campaign against 'cosmopolitans' was curtailed and later even denounced. Tens of thousands of specialists and scholars of Jewish origin who had been earlier dismissed returned to their former organizations, although not to their senior positions: these had already been filled by other persons. Even before the Twentieth Congress

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several tens of thousands of people had been released from imprisonment and rehabilitated, and they included a considerable number of Jews. After the Twentieth Congress hundreds of thousands of political prisoners (those who had survived of the many millions of inmates of Stalin's camps for political prisoners) were rehabilitated and returned to their families. Amongst those who returned were a great many Jews. Relations with Israel, which had been broken off in 1953, were normalized. One Jewish socio-political and literary journal (published in Yiddish) was reinstated, albeit with considerable delay.

However, the measures I have listed above, whilst they outlawed the most glaring forms of state anti-semitism, did not signify an end to all kinds and forms of discrimination against the Jews; indeed discrimination became in some respects more refined and perfected.

Under the pretext of ignorant discourses upon 'indigenous' and 'non-indigenous' nationality,[1] persons of Jewish origin had, even after the death of Stalin, virtually no access to jobs in the higher Party apparatus, the regional and district Party committees, the various central ideological organizations, the higher organs of military command, the diplomatic service, the organs of the KGB and the Procuracy. There were of course some exceptions in this connexion, but they merely served to corroborate the general rule and for the most part resulted from the necessity to prove the absence of discrimination against the Jews in our country.

Even during the rule of N. S. Khrushchev a standard percentage intake of young people of Jewish origin into many establishments of higher education was retained; the percentage was particularly low in military academies and colleges, and some special establishments of higher education. The number of senior employees of Jewish nationality was restricted in scientific institutes and cultural organizations. The persistence of traditional anti-semitism in certain sections of the apparatus was clearly shown after the publication of Evtushenko's poem 'Babi Yar' in the *Literary Gazette*.

Publishers continued to restrict the numbers of books by Jewish authors on their lists. The present writer, who was at that time deputy editor-in-chief of the large Moscow publishing-house 'Uchpedgiz', had many an occasion to hear remarks made by the directive-issuing authorities to the effect that there were too many Jewish surnames on the publisher's lists. 'Why are you preparing for publication a book on Russian style by Rozental?' the then Central Committee instructor M. Ryakin would say to me. 'Haven't you any other authors on that subject?' The fact that there was a school textbook on the

[1] The question arises of how many years a given national group must reside on a given territory in order to achieve the status of an 'indigenous' nationality? On the territory of the Ukraine, Belorussia, and many regions of Russia the Jews have already been settled for several centuries. The first Jewish settlements in the Caucasus and in Kievan Rus appeared over 1,000 years ago and chroniclers of the time have 'recorded' the first Jewish pogrom.

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Russian language written by an Armenian, Barkhudarov, did not annoy M. Ryakin in the least. That was the time when I became acquainted with the principal feature of instructions of this type: they were all issued orally; the compilation of written documents and resolutions on the subject was not permitted.

Unfortunately the majority of these discriminatory regulations and recommendations with regard to the Jews were retained in our country even after 1964. And after all this, how can the assertion be made in a variety of articles and statements that there is no 'Jewish problem' in the USSR, and never has been!

THE press conference given on 4 March [1970] in Moscow by Soviet citizens of Jewish nationality for Soviet and foreign correspondents was evidently intended to play a special role in the present anti-semitic campaign. At this press conference, a large group of Soviet citizens of Jewish origin who had achieved success in the field of art and literature, scientific work or in their career as civil servants, spoke to a gathering of journalists. A mere listing of the positions, the qualifications, and honorary titles of the assembled persons would seem to repudiate the 'fantasies' of Western and Israeli propaganda regarding the difficulties of the Jewish national minority in the USSR. But it is impossible to repudiate facts that are known to everyone.

Of course, the majority of the facts cited at the press conference concerning the success of many Soviet Jews in various scientific and cultural fields do correspond with reality. But there would be far more of these facts if there did not exist in our country a lingering and many-faceted discrimination against citizens of Jewish origin. Of course, no obstacle is completely insuperable, and a small ratio of persons of Jewish origin does rise to the summits of science and culture, gains senior positions in the civil service, and wins the most distinguished awards, prizes, and other tokens of recognition. Moreover, the present system of discriminatory measures itself does provide a small number of loopholes. Jews are not completely banned from entering establishments of higher education; there is a fixed percentage intake which varies from city to city and school to school. In Kiev the percentage is less than in Moscow, and in Moscow less than in Odessa. In Moscow State University it is less than in Moscow State Pedagogical Institute. And military academies and diplomatic schools provide practically no access for young persons of Jewish nationality. Why? After all, 35 years ago the People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs of the USSR was M. Litvinov, whose Jewish origin was a generally known fact. There were also considerable numbers of Jews among the commanders of the Red Army (I. Yakir and others). A fixed percentage exists too for the filling of senior posts in establishments of higher education and scientific research institutes by Jewish persons. And if there is one Jew amongst the nine or ten heads of departments or faculties, then a second will not be admitted, or if he is admitted, 'compensation' will have to be made at the

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expense of another institute. It stands to reason that by depriving our science and culture of many potentially talented people, we are acting against the higher national interests of our country. The success of a country in present-day competition depends to a great extent on how fully not only all its economic resources, but also its intellectual resources are mobilized. But those who determine Soviet policy towards the Jews are obviously little worried by this.

The chief orator at the press conference was V. E. Dymshits, a deputy of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and vice-chairman of Gosplan. The career of V. E. Dymshits, who is indubitably a great economist and an able administrator, has long since been used in our propaganda. But can this isolated fact really refute other and far weightier facts? It is not difficult to prove that in the ranks of the higher leaders of the state and managers of industry the number of employees of Jewish origin is steadily diminishing, and at the present time V. E. Dymshits is virtually the sole remaining [Jew] with ministerial rank. Amongst the first secretaries of our regional Party committees there is apparently not a single Jew; the same applies to first secretaries of district committees. Nor are there any Jews in the Central Committee Secretariat or the Politburo. We have already noted that at the beginning of the twenties no less than one quarter of the members of the Bolshevik Central Committee were Jews, and this was a reflection of the enormous contribution made by workers and intelligentsia of Jewish origin to the victory of the October Revolution and Soviet power in Russia. At the present time, of the 300-plus members and candidate members of the Central Committee of the Communist Party there are barely four or five persons of Jewish origin.

Discrimination of a kind is practised in literature too. Our journals readily publish the works of A. Chakovsky, not only because he occupies the post of editor-in-chief of the *Literary Gazette*, but evidently also because he participates eagerly in enterprises such as the press conference of 4 March [1970]. But why not invite also to the same press conference the writer G. Svirsky, who as early as 1965 spoke firmly at a meeting of Moscow writers against discrimination with regard to cultural workers of Jewish origin, and who adduced convincing facts on that score . . . and whose works ceased from that moment to be printed in any anthologies and journals.

Naturally we agree entirely with the participants in the press conference in their condemnation of the crimes committed in the Middle East by the Israeli militarists, the bombing of civilian targets, the repressions [carried out] against the civilian population in the occupied territories, the system of hostages, and the tortures [inflicted] in places of imprisonment. But we must not be one-sided in our condemnation. For the blowing-up of civilian buildings on Israeli territory, the attacks on school buses, and the acts of terrorism committed against civilian airlines also deserve condemnation. Soviet public opinion is unable to remain silent when communists are being murdered and

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democratic freedoms stifled in Greece or Portugal. But nor should it have remained silent when communists were being murdered and elementary rules of democracy violated, not only in Iraq and Jordan, but in the United Arab Republic too.

But who, one wonders, will be deceived by the attempts of the speakers at the press conference to deny the existence of a 'Jewish problem' in the USSR? Although the organizers of this enterprise attached great significance to it, which was obvious if only from the fact that the press conference was not merely reported in detail in all the papers, but even televised, the stagers of the spectacle can hardly be said to have achieved in our country, let alone abroad, the propagandist aims they had set themselves. Lieutenant-General D. A. Dragunsky is doubtless an honourable man. However, there are few people either in our country or abroad who would take seriously today his assertion that no Jewish problem exists in the USSR and that the nationalities problem in the USSR has, broadly speaking, already been solved. Unfortunately, not only the Jewish problem but many other problems of national structure in the USSR are far from being solved, and these problems will have to be given ever greater attention in the near future.

The Deputy Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Jewish Autonomous Region, I. L. Bokor, is evidently also a very honourable man. However, his statement that there were no Soviet citizens of Jewish nationality who wished to leave [the USSR] and take up permanent residence in Israel was immediately refuted in many collective and individual statements made by Soviet Jews, statements that were published in the foreign press in March and April 1970 and even discussed at the United Nations.

The numerous facts concerning discrimination against Soviet citizens of Jewish nationality are no secret today either in our country or abroad. And that is why it is difficult to see how the present propaganda campaign can alter the idea that public opinion in many countries has formed regarding the situation of the Jews in the USSR. To do so we would need not strident propaganda campaigns but a real change in some aspects of our nationalities policy.

OF the many articles devoted to the Jewish problem and Zionism that have been published in our papers and journals in recent months we shall attempt here an examination of one only—the article by the editor-in-chief of the journal *The Peoples of Asia and Africa*, I. Braginsky, entitled 'On the class essence of Zionism'. This article was published on 17 March [1970] in *Pravda*.

At the very beginning of his article I. Braginsky writes of the existence of two tendencies in the development of Jewish settlements in European countries and particularly in Russia: the tendency to isolationism and the tendency to unity with the national majority of the given country. 'The tendency to unity', he writes in his article,

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> to organic inclusion in the life of the country, has been expressed in particular in the field of culture: the Jews have adopted the language of the given country and this has led to their complete merging (assimilation) with the majority of the population, with the dominant nationality. The tendency to isolationism was caused both by external, forcibly imposed factors (for instance, settlement in ghettos) and discriminatory measures, and by the aspirations of conservative Jewish circles to self-isolation which they justified by [referring to] concepts of 'exclusivity' and 'election by God'. It was precisely this conservative tendency that Zionism made the basis of its method of 'solving' the Jewish problem.

The statement is correct, but nevertheless these factors cannot in any sense be equated. In spite of the doctrine of 'exclusivity', and in spite of the strivings of 'conservative Jewish circles', the Jews would long since have been assimilated with the peoples of Europe and Africa if there had not been periodic anti-semitic campaigns which went as far as attempts at total physical extermination of all Jews. Of course all these campaigns are used by the Zionists, but it is not they who are the instigators and implementers of the campaigns. *Anti-semitism does not result from Zionism; on the contrary, Zionism is the result of anti-semitism.* And if there were no anti-semitism then there would be no Zionism either: the latter has been consolidating its position with every large-scale anti-semitic campaign, and there have been quite a few of them since the end of the nineteenth century. Zionism, an extreme nationalist movement, was itself engendered by the extremities of anti-semitism. It is significant that in the last 20 years hardly more than 20,000 persons have left the USA [to settle] in Israel, although our papers talk of anti-semitic attitudes in America. Jews leave for Israel less for religious reasons than because their existence and the lives of their families are threatened: thus it was at the time of the Jewish pogroms in Russia in 1905–07, thus it was at the time of the Jewish pogroms on the territory occupied by White Guards during the civil war years, and thus it was during the years of Hitler's 'new order' in Europe.

I. Braginsky continues:

> The natural, voluntary assimilation of Jews that occurred on the basis of their emancipation as citizens, has given historical proof of its progressiveness, which was all the more [evident] as bourgeois-democratic changes developed increasingly in the particular country. All the truly progressive figures of both Jewish and non-Jewish nationality were in favour of a solution of this kind to the Jewish problem. Karl Marx himself advocated it. V. I. Lenin wrote: 'The Jewish problem can be expressed precisely thus; assimilation or separation.'

This problem, i.e. the problem of the assimilation of the Jews, leserves a more detailed examination. V. I. Lenin was indeed in favour of Jewish assimilation, of the unification of workers and toilers of

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all nationalities in the struggle against Tsarism and the bourgeoisie. And most Jewish workers actively responded to this call of Lenin's and the Bolsheviks. But there is another thing we must not forget: Lenin regarded as the main condition for the assimilation of the Jews after the victory of the Revolution the complete eradication of all forms and kinds of anti-semitism from our Soviet socialist state. It was not resettlement in some 'promised land', but the creation of a truly democratic socialist society in the given country, with complete equality of political and other rights for all nationalities and peoples living in that country, that, Lenin believed, guaranteed a correct solution to the Jewish problem.

And it was precisely this Leninist policy with regard to the Jewish problem that was implemented in the twenties and the beginning of the thirties in the Soviet Union with great success. Parallel with the development of Jewish national culture, language, literature, and suchlike, the Jews succeeded in gaining large-scale access to all branches of Soviet Russian culture. There was a resolute struggle against anti-semitism, and the latter rapidly dwindled. At the same time there occurred a fairly rapid and intensive assimilation of the Jewish population. The number of mixed marriages increased. The overwhelming majority of Soviet Jews no longer spoke Yiddish; Russian became their native tongue. It was a sound, judicious policy that swept the ground from under the feet of Zionist propagandists and led to the near-disappearance of Zionist attitudes in our country. It is a fact that after the civil war ended, Soviet Jews virtually ceased to emigrate to Palestine or the United States, and ceased to apply for permission to do so.

However, by the end of the thirties Stalin had begun to modify many aspects of Lenin's nationalities policy, including his policy with regard to the Jewish problem. And soon after the war, anti-semitism in the Soviet Union began to be revived in its most perverted forms and became in practice an element of state policy; we have already mentioned instances of this earlier in our article. In a more 'diluted' and camouflaged form anti-semitism continued to exist even under Khrushchev, and it has still not disappeared at the present time. And it was this state anti-semitism that was the chief factor in, and the main cause of, the revival of Jewish nationalism and Zionist attitudes within the USSR.

The efforts made towards an assimilation of the Jews in our country were ruined in the first place by Stalin and other anti-semites of his ilk. By speaking out against the ideology of Zionism we were in fact lending him enormous support, and this practical support for Zionism still continues today, thanks to the retention of many discriminatory measures against the Jews, both in the USSR and in certain other socialist countries (especially Poland, where over one-half of the Jews were forced in 1968–69 to leave the country because of the unceasing persecutions and humiliations).

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And it must be stated bluntly: most of the opportunities that we had 40 years ago to fight Zionism and work for the assimilation of the Jews are today lost. First and foremost, we cannot ignore the cardinal fact that the state of Israel has come into being and existed for more than 20 years already. That state was founded through the efforts of Zionist organizations, and the creation of Israel is a decisive victory for them. However, as we have already said above, the founding of Israel preceded the movement against British imperialism in the Middle East, a movement which the Soviet Union also supported. Generally speaking the idea of a Jewish state and a Jewish national hearth is not the monopoly of the Zionists. As we know, here too in the USSR there have been attempts to create a Jewish autonomous republic. We can see the traces of this unsuccessful project today in the form of the so-called Jewish autonomous region.[2] There was also a plan to settle a part of the Soviet Jewish population in the Crimea in place of the Crimean Tatars who had been deported therefrom. This project was fortunately not implemented. The prosperity of one people cannot be built on an injustice to another people. This holds true not only for the Middle East, but also for the Soviet Crimea.

THE creation of the state of Israel radically alters the so-called Jewish problem throughout the whole world. The most important change, from our point of view, is that the very fact of the existence of an independent Jewish state completely alters the *sensitivity threshold* of the Jewish population in any country to anti-semitism. In the past a Jewish family might go to distant Palestine (which was, moreover, under Turkish and later English rule), only in the most exceptional instances, when the existence of the family was threatened, but nowadays, even the 'milder' forms of anti-semitism, which in past ages the Jews bore patiently, evoke a sharp protest and are becoming intolerable. The feeling of national consciousness and personal dignity of the Jewish population in all countries has grown, and this inevitably lessens the possibilities of discrimination and arbitrariness with regard to the Jews in any country. This is a positive fact. 'What is your attitude to the state of Israel?' enquired the Soviet scientist K. in 1966 of an Israeli worker who had come here from Czechoslovakia. 'There's a lot I don't agree with', replied the worker, 'and my life is still not an easy one. But when someone says "dirty Jew" to me—I just go and have a wash.'

Naturally, many of the instructions given and statements made by V. I. Lenin regarding the Jewish problem require a partial revision today, otherwise they cannot be used as the basis of our policy towards the Jews.

For instance, the problem of Jewish assimilation and 'repatriation' is now an entirely different one. Jews today have their national state,

[2] Birobidzhan [transl.].

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their national hearth, their nation, and there is nothing surprising in the fact that a certain section of the Jewish population in any country will aspire, for various motives and reasons, towards resettlement in Israel. And this aspiration cannot in any sense be regarded as ' treachery ', ' a reactionary movement ' or ' complicity with imperialism '. We must display nowadays a far more sober and realistic approach to the problem.

I. Braginsky is firmly against the emigration of Jews to Israel. He states repeatedly that ' in a socialist society, the roots of anti-semitism have been *completely* undermined, and the conditions for its existence liquidated ', that precisely ' the Soviet Union has proved historically that the Jewish problem may be radically solved *and thereby removed from the agenda* only on the basis of the victory of socialism '. But all these assertions are deliberate untruths. Unfortunately the Jewish problem has not been removed from our agenda in the slightest. And our history demonstrates that although the victory of socialism does indeed create conditions for the complete eradication of anti-semitism, those conditions and opportunities were not properly utilized by us in practice.

What is more, none other than the Soviet Union has shown the world some examples of particularly refined and subtle anti-semitism. And so there is nothing surprising in the fact that many tens of thousands of Jews (the latest figures indicate a total of 200,000 people, including [members of] families) have for several years now been pressing for permission to emigrate to Israel, thereby destroying the propagandists' myth that the Jewish problem in our country has been completely overcome.

ONE may observe that each nation in our multi-national country clearly displays three groups of people and a multitude of transitional types.

First there is the basic core of the given nation. The Armenians in Armenia, the Georgians in Georgia, the Ukrainians in the Ukraine, the Buryats in the Buryat Autonomous SSR, and so on. These Armenians, Georgians, Ukrainians, and Buryats generally communicate in their own national tongue, play an active part in the development of their national culture, care about the preservation and augmentation of their national treasures and traditions, and about their national identity. A large place in their national consciousness is taken up with events in the history of their nation. As you know, there is going on in our country an intensive development process of these socialist nationalities and their national cultures, and this is a progressive process.

However, parallel with this process—the development of socialist nationalities—we have another process, and that is the process of the mutual intermingling and mutual assimilation of the various nationalities and peoples of the Soviet Union. And this process too is a progressive one. It is natural also that assimilation is an extremely lengthy process

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occurring over several generations and so resulting in a multitude of transitional types.

Thus, for example, the Armenians live not only in Armenia but also in Georgia, Azerbaidzhan, and certain other republics. Moreover, Armenians living in other republics frequently strive to preserve their national identity, traditions and customs, their language, and their culture. And the Soviet state assists them in this. There are, as we know, Armenian schools, Armenian theatres, Armenian papers and journals, not only in Armenia but in Georgia and Azerbaidzhan also. However, at the same time, Georgian or Azerbaidzhani Armenians are, as a rule, well acquainted with the Georgian or Azerbaidzhani language, and familiar with local customs and traditions. They also know the Russian language and Russian culture.

The Armenians living in Moscow or, say, Sverdlovsk, display a far greater degree of assimilation. If the older generation of these Armenians knows the Armenian language, their children, and especially their grandchildren, do not generally know the language and consider Russian their native tongue. They have little connexion with Armenia, rarely cook national dishes, and are often ignorant of the details of the history of the Armenian people, and so on. But can we condemn these Armenians for having assimilated with the Russian majority? Can we demand (as Dzyuba does) that all Ukrainians, no matter in which republic they live, be obliged to study the Ukrainian language? Of course not! For we are dealing with a natural and progressive process. And although for a section of that people this process is accompanied by a loss of some [of their] national heritage, it is also, however, accompanied by the acquisition of many other heritages, by the mutual enrichment of national cultures and also by a more rapid development of a common Soviet culture, science and economics.

Considerable numbers of Armenians are known to be living outside the USSR too: in the Balkans, in North and South America, and in the Middle East. This Armenian diaspora is the result of the extremely savage persecution of the Armenian population at the time of the Ottoman Empire, which culminated in the total physical annihilation of all the Armenians in Turkey. More than 800,000 people fell victims to this genocide, and the remaining Armenians from the provinces of Turkish Armenia scattered throughout the world. Many of these Armenians have adapted to their enforced emigration; others wish to return to Armenia—Soviet Armenia—and the Soviet Government does all it can to assist them.

But surely very similar processes are occurring today amongst the Jews also, though with one important difference—the national kernel, the national territory of the Jewish people lies outside the bounds of the USSR.

THE majority of Soviet Jewry has become virtually assimilated with the Russian (less frequently with the Ukrainian, Belorussian and

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Georgian) population of our country. These Jews do not know the Jewish tongue (neither Yiddish nor Hebrew), are barely acquainted with their own Jewish national culture, and display almost no Jewish national consciousness. They have intermingled with the Russian population, and participate actively in the creation of a Soviet Russian culture and science, and in economic construction. They have lost their Jewish customs and traditions, and do not, as a rule, practise the Jewish faith; many of them are atheists and Marxists, and members of the CPSU. Only certain external traces of their Jewish nationality remain, and their surnames (and incidentally many Jews changed their names and surnames during the twenties). These people feel themselves to be Russians, and are in practice more Russian than Jewish. As you know, Zionist extremists declare themselves resolutely against the assimilation of the Jews and frequently attempt to insult and humiliate assimilated Jews.

[The present writer] strongly objects to the behaviour of these Zionists. Jewish assimilation (if it occurs voluntarily) is a progressive process. Nobody can, or should condemn an artist as great as Arkady Raikin [3] for playing such an active part in the development of *Soviet Russian* culture. Raikin lives in the USSR and his enormous talent can express itself to the fullest in the forms of Russian culture. In the same way Maya Plisetskaya is an outstanding artist of the Russian ballet. No Jewish ballet whatsoever exists in our country, and nor possibly does it exist in Israel either. Therefore only the Russian ballet can offer an opportunity for Maya Plisetskaya's talent to reach its artistic peak and thus bring to hundreds of millions of people throughout the world the maximum aesthetic enjoyment. But unfortunately the progressive process of Soviet Jewish assimilation cannot come to completion because of our native anti-semites who care more about 'racial purity' than about the development of Soviet Russian culture, science, art, and literature. Although the majority of assimilated Jews feel themselves to be more Russian than Jewish, they are constantly being reminded that they are Jews. The word 'Jew' appears in their passports and [application] forms, and all the unlawful restrictions that exist in our country with regard to Jews apply automatically to both non-assimilated and assimilated Jews. In this respect the press conference of 4 March 1970 is extremely significant. Among its participants was the well-known Russian actress Bystritskaya. As you know, Bystritskaya created the deeply Russian interpretation of Aksinia in the film *Quiet Flows the Don*, and also many other interpretations of Russian women. It is perfectly evident that, despite her origin, Bystritskaya considers herself or feels herself to be a Russian. The many admirers of her talent have also considered her to be Russian. But for whom is she a Jewess? For the officials in the police's passport department and the officials in the personnel department? But what right have they to

[3] A well-known and ever-popular actor and comedian/satirist [transl.].

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determine the nationality of a person? And what is their main criterion for determining [his or her] national affiliation? Is it 'purity of blood' or is it the sum total of far more important features: culture, language, national consciousness, and so forth? How can we, in a socialist state, base our determination of [a person's] national affiliation upon such essentially racist features as origin or 'purity of blood'? Indeed, in this [respect] we have gone substantially further even than the Tsarist government. After all, before the revolution, for the Jew who had adopted the Orthodox faith there were no fixed percentages, pales of settlement, or appreciable restrictions [placed] on his advancement.

Yes, we can agree with I. Braginsky—the assimilation of the Jews is an historically progressive phenomenon, as V. I. Lenin, and Karl Marx before him, wrote on more than one occasion. But in that case all measures that hinder assimilation (including the notorious Point 5 in questionnaires and Point 3 in passports) should be regarded as *reactionary*. It would be sufficient to remove these points from questionnaires and passports and to forbid personnel departments to take an interest in the nationality of the person being offered employment, for the assimilation of Jews—and of many other persons of non-Russian origin also—to proceed at a considerably increased pace.[4]

There is a second large group amongst Soviet citizens of Jewish origin. I am referring to those Jews who wish to preserve their national identity, tongue, and culture, and, if they are believers, their religious affiliation also. These people want to be Jews, not Russians or Ukrainians. But they want to be Jews in the USSR, not in Israel. They want to remain Soviet citizens and, as one of the national minorities, to participate together with the other peoples in the creation of a socialist society and a Soviet culture. Many generations of these people have been born and bred on the territory of Russia, the Ukraine, Belorussia, Georgia, and Daghestan; their homes, families, relatives, and friends are here. They do not wish to leave their motherland, but they strive to preserve their affiliation to the Jewish nationality, that is, to enjoy all those rights that are enjoyed by other national minorities within the USSR. And this is a legitimate and natural desire.

The development of the Jewish national culture and language on the territory of the USSR is also a progressive process. In the 1959

[4] In the past some young people, when making passport applications, have called themselves Russians although their parents were Jews and had Jewish surnames. This act was not only indicative of their desire to escape discrimination (on the advice of their parents). These young people simply felt themselves to be Russians; they were devoid of any Jewish national consciousness. It is natural that questionnaires completed by these people when seeking employment should state the word 'Russian'. And despite this, personnel departments and special [security] departments continue to regard these people as Jews. In recent years questionnaires including two new headings—'father's nationality' and 'mother's nationality'—have had to be filled in for many secret organizations, for positions of responsibility, and even for certain establishments of higher education. It would be interesting to hear the opinion of I. Braginsky on this point, since he is for the assimilation of Jews. Unfortunately he says nothing about facts like these—and there are many of them.

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census more than 500,000 people named Yiddish as their native tongue. That is a fair-sized nationality group and it ought to be given all possible facilities for the expression of its national consciousness. As we know, the Soviet Government went some way to meet the wishes of Soviet Jews; as early as the twenties it assisted in the creation of a Jewish press: papers, journals, and publishing-houses. Jewish theatres were founded, and in a number of regions the teaching of the Jewish tongue (Yiddish) was organized. An attempt was even made to create on the territory of the USSR a Jewish national state educational [system]. However, as we said above, during the five years from 1948–53, a period of terror for the Jews, almost all the Jewish national culture in our country was destroyed, and its most distinguished representatives arrested or shot. Any manifestation of the rightful aspirations of a section of the Jewish population of the USSR to preserve its national identity and culture came to be regarded as 'Zionism'. And although after Stalin's death some organs of the Jewish language press in the USSR were reactivated under the pressure of certain elements of Soviet and international public opinion, *Soviet* Jewish national culture, having gone through a period of relative prosperity in the twenties and thirties, is today a very sorry sight—and this, of course, through no fault of the Jews.

There is, lastly, a third group of Jews in our country. It consists of those people who evince a persistent desire to emigrate to Israel. Their motives for doing so appear to be many and varied. Some of those who apply for permission to leave for Israel are trying to be reunited with their families (son, daughter, mother, father), who came to be in Israel for the most part as a result of the events of the Second World War. For the majority this is the main reason, perhaps because it is only applications on this basis that are accepted for consideration by OVIR, the Department of Visas and Registrations. The Jewish writer Iosif Kerler asks in his 'Open letter' that he and his family be allowed to emigrate to Israel since there is no mass Jewish reading public in the USSR today. 'And what do you expect me to do', he writes, 'me, a Jewish poet, without this reading public, with no contact with the live colloquial and literary language, with no Jewish cultural life?' And we can understand this reason too. But we cannot agree with Kerler's appraisal of the assimilated Jews, whom he calls 'capitulators'. We encounter also motives of a religious nature. And amongst those trying to go to Israel there are young people too who express the desire to participate in the rebirth of the Jewish nation in the 'land of their forefathers'.

We may of course surmise that, had the state of Israel arisen not 20 but 40 years ago, even then a certain section of Soviet Jewry would have expressed the wish to become Israeli citizens. But at that time they would probably have been a very small group of people, with Zionist inclinations. The Soviet patriotism of our Jewish fellow-citizens is etched in blood shed by them in the Great Patriotic War, in their selfless labour on the Soviet front. We need only refer to the

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latest figures quoted by the chairman of the Nationalities Council of the USSR Supreme Soviet (see *Pravda*, 7 May 1970). According to these figures, the Jews occupy fifth place for the number of Heroes of the Soviet Union, although their population number (approximately two and a half millions) places them in all probability no higher than fifteenth [amongst Soviet national minorities]. In a wartime poem the Soviet Russian poet Mikhail Svetlov (a Jew by origin) wrote:

> Here I fired! Here, where I was born,
> Where I took pride in self and friends,
> Where epic tales of our nations
> Never sound in translations . . .
> I shall not let my country be sold
> Beyond the expanse of alien seas!
> I fire—and there is no justice
> More just than this bullet of mine!

Such were the feelings and attitudes of the vast, overwhelming majority of Soviet Jews both before, during, and after the war.

However, decades of persecution and humiliation have had their effect. The history of Soviet Jews over the last 25 years is filled with sorrowful pages; these people suffered and still suffer insulting discrimination. A whole generation of young Jews has grown up who have never breathed the pure air of national equality and never felt themselves to be full and equal Soviet citizens. In these conditions the third group [of Jews] has enlarged at the expense of the two other groups, and the number of people wishing to emigrate to Israel has become quite considerable (according to some statistics it is between one-eighth and one-tenth of Soviet Jews). The mood of these people is influenced too by the present Middle East situation and by apprehension about the fate of the state of Israel.

Only a few of those who have applied have received permission to emigrate to Israel. What are the reasons for this? Of course, the present military situation and the fear of incurring the wrath of Arab leaders create serious obstacles to 'repatriation'. Apart from this, an exodus from the USSR of between 200–300,000 Jews would prove the existence of a Jewish problem in our country, the presence of which is officially denied. Certain other reasons are also put forward. In a private talk, one highly placed official said: 'Imagine how many state secrets those Jews would carry off with them'—although, of course, it is hardly likely that any of the Jews seeking repatriation are in possession of state secrets.

We believe that exit to Israel could immediately be made easier for a section of Soviet Jewry, and, after a Middle East settlement, exit permission could be granted to all Jews who press for it. And if we want the number of 'repatriates' not to be too significant we should radically alter the position of all the Jews within the USSR, and repeal and prohibit all the discriminatory measures that are being enforced with regard to this national group.

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Power and Its Uses

Maurice Cranston

Change in Communist Systems [1] is a collection of essays inspired by the belief that 'the totalitarian model' is unsuitable for a sound 'social science analysis' of the Soviet Union and other communist countries, and that a fully 'scientific' account both of the nature of such societies, and of the changes taking place within them, needs to be given with the aid of other models. Different contributors deal with different problems, but what emerges from the whole book is something very peculiar, namely a picture of the communist world which is in several crucial respects plainly inaccurate. In 'social science studies' we are familiar enough with the platitudinous and the meaningless, but it is not often that the laboured and self-conscious employment of such 'technique' produces palpable error.

Professor Chalmers Johnson, the editor of this book, explains why he and his colleagues have discarded what he calls the 'totalitarian model'. That model, he says, does not allow one to understand the fundamental changes 'that are occurring or about to occur in the Communist world'. These changes, he asserts, include (1) a change from dictatorship towards a party-dominated national front; (2) changes from a high reliance on terror to a medium and towards a low reliance on terror; (3) changes in the structure of the economic system from centralized economy towards market socialism; (4) a change in the status of satellite states towards that of a national communist state.

Professor Johnson's essay and the others were written for a seminar held in 1968, so that we may consider his references to 'changes that *are occurring or about to occur* in the communist world' in the light of events since mid-1968. And one is bound to ask what evidence is there in the history of those years to justify a belief that the kind of change that Professor Johnson outlines has actually taken place? Surely everything that has happened, most dramatically in Czechoslovakia, but on a lesser scale in certain other communist countries, bespeaks a movement in a direction diametrically opposed to that which Professor Johnson predicted, a movement, that is to say, towards a greater reliance on terror, increased subordination of satellites, and increased bureaucratic control of the economy.

Professor Johnson and his friends complain about 'the totalitarian model', but it needs to be said the scholars who have written about the Soviet Union and similar systems as 'totalitarian'—Friedrich, for example, or Schapiro, Fainsod or Brzezinski—have never taken this talk about 'models' too seriously. They have used the word 'totalitarian' as a *word*; and it is a very useful one since it serves to denote a type of political society which is wholly novel in the twentieth century, and for which no other, or older, word is adequate. To use a word is

[1] *Change in Communist Systems*. Edited by Chalmers Johnson. Stanford University Press.

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not to set up a model. It is something much more ordinary and unexceptionable.

Some contributors to these pages, however, wish to deny the novelty of the communist systems, and we find more than one echo here of the old 'convergence theory'—the theory that the USA and USSR are getting more and more alike. Professor Alfred G. Meyer, for example, seems eager to revive this theory because of his agonized belief that *if* the Soviet Union is unique it 'cannot be explained in terms of general theories of human behaviour'. And then, he says 'social science would be in a deplorable state'. Many people suspect that social science is already in a deplorable state, but it is surely going to be in a worse one if we have to bend facts to keep social science alive. Whether the Soviet Union is unique or not depends entirely on what is the state of affairs in that country and whether that state of affairs bears any true resemblance to what prevails in the USA or any other given country. It is all very well for such popular political polemists as J. K. Galbraith to say that the USA and USSR are getting more and more alike; for such talk is perfectly valid as peace propaganda or as an emotional plea for Soviet-American *détente*, but it has nothing to do with scholarship or truth—and as serious political science it is rubbish. The Khrushchev 'thaw' of the early 1960s was so obviously over by the late 1960s that even the fellow-travellers from the Stalinist era (Sartre, for example) remarked upon it. And if there is no sign of the USSR becoming more liberal, there is no sign, either, of the USA becoming more communistic. Professor Meyer reaches the odd conclusion that one's assent to, or rejection of, the convergence theory, is a matter of political choice: as he puts it, it is 'subjective'. But this is to try to fortify bad political science with bad philosophy. Even if all political and moral judgments are 'subjective', statements about events in the external world remain empirical, or 'objective', and must be justified by evidence which is, at least in principle, open to verification. The 'convergence theory' is either true or false: and its truth does not depend on what anybody feels or believes, but on what is actually going on in the USA and USSR. There is nothing 'subjective' about that.

Authoritarian Politics in Modern Society[2] is an exemplary book. One may hope that its authors will not be accused of employing 'the authoritarian model'—for they use the word 'authoritarian' in the only way it can be used, as a broad epithet for a kind of society which is not free and democratic; and they would readily admit that there is no hard and clear line between a democratic and non-democratic order. In the modern world democracy is a matter of degree. The focus of interest in this book are societies where one-party government has established itself, either in a conservative or revolutionary form. The authors use the straightforward method of examining in turn the various one-party systems that exist, or have existed in different parts of the world. Each chapter is by a specialist, and the two editors, Professors Samuel P. Huntingdon and Clement H. Moore, provide a short general survey of the field, which could not easily be bettered.

One of the points which emerges from this book is that a one-party

[2] *Authoritarian Politics in Modern Society*. Edited by Samuel P. Huntingdon and Clement H. Moore. Basic Books, $12.50.

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state is by no means necessarily totalitarian. Indeed as Professor C. J. Friedrich shows in a skilful analysis of the Third Reich, the Nazi Party enacted an ambiguous and fluctuating role in the history of that regime. And Juan J. Linz shows, in a study of the past 40 years in Spain, that the fascist-type party, the Falange, was first cultivated and then diminished by Franco as he sought to transform a dictatorship based on conquest into some form of legitimate sovereignty with constitutional foundations.

There is always the possibility of a political party, even though it is the only one in the state, becoming a platform for some sort of popular participation in government. However, as Professor Huntingdon points out: 'The party can countenance all sorts of groups representing and expressing special interest, but it cannot permit another group to promote a competing general interest, a competing image of the good society, or a competing view of the moral basis of political authority.' Thus, if a one-party state can be to some extent democratic, it is less easy for such a state to be free in more than a limited sense of that word. In many parts of the Third World, freedom from alien rule is the only freedom the people currently enjoy, or can expect to enjoy for a long time to come.

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Khrushchev Remembers

Robert Conquest

A VAST amount has been written about *Khrushchev Remembers* by all those qualified to comment (and by a great many not so qualified, too, with such results as a pleasant piece in the *New Statesman*, presenting Khrushchev not merely as the creator of the Soviet hydrogen bomb—quite untrue—but also in the more delightful characterization of a lover and patron of the arts. One remembers this modern Medici, does one not, shouting that some pictures at the Manezh exhibition looked as if they were the result of a child doing its business on the canvas, while others ought to get their perpetrators 10 years in a labour camp on charges of homosexuality . . .).

Anyway, after all this mass of well-argued, ill-argued and unargued comment, a few general points summarizing the main issues, and in particular the question of the value of the book to serious students, may be less wearisome to the *Survey* reader than yet another large-scale set-piece.

One can say straight away that its value to the really serious student is negligible, if only because of the wholly unsatisfactory knowledge we have been given of its origins. Strictly speaking, no such knowledge at all has been provided; even Mr Crankshaw, who wrote the preface, was simply shown a typescript. The much publicized discussions between *Time-Life* executives and Mr Victor Louis, the well-known representative of Soviet agencies, certainly appears to show that at least some of the material came through those channels. On the other hand one is told that some of it, or most of it, was already in the West prior to these negotiations. But if it did come in various sections, perhaps from various sources, no one has told us which is which. It is even the case that the editor remarks that he has inserted certain bridge passages and rearranged material, without making clear just what his contribution was. In fact we are totally without the means of applying any normal critical apparatus, and any given fact may be spurious, even on the most favourable view.

Every attempt I have seen to prove the book authentic does so by quoting facts from it which we already knew to be true. But in the present circumstances, since we are given no way of telling the origin of any portion, the authenticity of one paragraph (even if much more indubitably established) could not in any case confer any of its virtue on adjacent material. Which is to say that we are left with accepting the truth of such items in the book as we know to be true already, and of nothing else, making its net contribution to our knowledge precisely nil.

I have written elsewhere (*The Listener*, 21 January 1971) on the question of authenticating *samizdat* material, to which there are several approaches, with the result that we are almost always able to come to firm conclusions. *Khrushchev Remembers* is not *samizdat;* that is to

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say, it has never been circulated in the Soviet Union and is known solely by the copy that reached the publishers in the West.

No student of the Soviet Union can, it is true, afford to dismiss out of hand even the strangest and most unofficial material. On the other hand, we all know such books as the *Litvinov Diaries* or the even more egregiously fabricated work of Budu Svanidze. We all remember, what is more, that Professor E. H. Carr provided an introduction (if by no means a wholly confiding one) to the former, while Isaac Deutscher accepted the latter. (The *Litvinov Diaries*, in fact, well captured the tone of Kremlin and Party life—a thought which may lead us to attach less significance to the equivalent successes in *Khrushchev Remembers*.)

Simply as a matter of subjective impression, I would agree with the bulk of opinion so far expressed that at least part of *Khrushchev Remembers* may well be in some sense Khrushchev's. At lowest, his tone has been very well caught, and there are sections which derive from known speeches and talks. It would be interesting if we could go on from this to accepting as veridical the account given here of the preparations for the coup against Beria. But unfortunately, for the reasons given above, we can't.

Authenticity would in any case not mean veracity. The real Khrushchev is a man addicted not merely to the habitual falsehoods of the Party tradition as a whole, but to his own brand of crazy and often contradictory romancing. It has been pointed out by most commentators that the form is not that of genuine memoirs (nor, indeed, do the publishers overtly claim that it is). But the slapdash inaccuracy of large tracts of it shows that it cannot even have been a reasonably thought out batch of notes (oral or written) for such a project. Many of the errors are ones which could easily be corrected by reference to Khrushchev's own shelves—there is no reason to believe that his library has been taken from him, any more than Molotov's has. He could not have thought that he became a candidate member of the Politburo in 1935; he could not have believed that Yenukidze had telephoned him about events which took place long after Yenukidze's own fall; and so on and so forth. Moreover, Khrushchev's factual unreliability was anyhow notoriously worse in private conversations and harangues than in his more formal and public statements; and much of the book has the informal tone which implies—if genuine at all—such conditions of origin.

Even at its face value, and even if we were in a position to verify the origins, there is not much here even of interest let alone of value, for the serious student (and the *interesting* material is to a large extent coincident with the plainly untrue, as with the alleged loss by Kosygin of his posts in 1949–50.) There is nothing about the Kirov murder, about the Anti-Party Group crisis of June 1957, about Khrushchev's own fall in October 1964, no justification of his later policies. That is, if authentic at all, it is far removed from the normal concerns of a politician's memoirs—which would imply, at the very least, that much original material has been cut by someone in the process of reaching us. The only people concerned to cut such material must be the present Soviet authorities, and those who can cut can also alter.

These omissions are also relevant to Victor Zorza's eccentric theory that the book was composed by, or for, the CIA. If that body had indeed forged, or assembled, the material their motives must have

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included a desire to show the Soviet record in as bad a light as possible. To do this, they would scarcely have omitted the powerful political passages and dramatic individual stories of terror to be found not only in Khrushchev's Secret Speech of February 1956, but also in more public pronouncements such as his speeches to the Twenty-Second Party Congress in October 1961. For the CIA to produce, at the cost of great toil, a document which actually reveals less than material still available in printed form in the USSR would indeed be inexplicable.

The argument from omission also applies to the notion that the material, or any but a negligible portion of it, had any other provenance but Soviet official circles. We are in fact left with the probability that all or most of it came to us through KGB channels, and the possibility that most, or much, of it might originally be traced to Khrushchev. But we cannot say of any given story that it is genuine even in this not very rigorous sense. So the book, which at best would be of moderate value only, is, at least until we are given further information about it, of no value at all at any serious level, though not without a certain entertainment value.

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Theory and Practice of Centrally Planned Economies and their Relations with Market Economies

No. 3 Vol. 9 1969

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Cuba: a Long View

David Buchan

'POOR Cuba always hopeful, always deceived' is the refrain Professor Thomas takes for his new book [1]—certainly the longest and probably the best ever written on Cuba. Cuba's romantic pursuit of freedom—attempts to throw off first Spanish and then American dominance and even perhaps Russian at some future time—has always and will always founder on the boring reality of her dependence on sugar. Because of over-production, and in common with other agricultural commodities, the world market for sugar is a stagnant one. So, as Professor Thomas' detailed history of Cuba's sugar shows, while a war or some crisis may momentarily boost the world market price, Cuba's long-term search has been for a closed market that will pay a premium price for her saccharine life-blood. But this puts her fate in the hands of this principal customer—whether American or Russian.

As later with the Russians, Cuba first welcomed American intervention in 1898—as freeing her from Spain. And many Americans saw their own intervention in a genuinely altruistic spirit of helping the underdog. But mixed with this goodwill was American economic expansionism—because by that time Americans had conquered their own frontier and were beginning to look further afield. Both these emotions were whipped up by the Hearst and Pulitzer press to a false intensity. What tended to subside after the war was the goodwill; but the expansionism did not. But whatever American motives, the Cubans were genuinely grateful at the time for the intervention and the ensuing influx of American capital. In this context it is easier to see how the infamous Platt Amendment (which allowed the United States to intervene in Cuba 'for the preservation of Cuban independence and the maintenance of stable government') passed into the Cuban Constitution.

But, as Professor Thomas remarks,

> power confers responsibility, whether desired or not. Overwhelming economic strength in a country gives its holder political power. It is difficult to see that the USA was aware of its responsibility in Cuba in the early twentieth century, of its duty, that is, to Cuba—to Cuba as a political organism with a future and a past as well as a present, to Cuba as something more than an economic colony.

And Professor Thomas suggests that it might have been better in the long run for both sides if the United States had directly taken Cuba over. This might have been possible in the early part of the century—before the fund of Cuban goodwill towards the United States had been exhausted. However the United States was bound by the Teller Amendment not to; and to have done so would have the United States open to the very charge of empire-building she was so keen on laying at the feet of the Europeans.

In any case the Platt Amendment soon came to foul up Cuban-

[1] '*Cuba: or the Pursuit of Freedom*' (Eyre and Spottiswoode. 1,720 pages. £7·50). Hugh Thomas.

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American relations to the point where this was not possible. The threat of intervention from the north put the US ambassador in Havana in a very special position. Often it was the case that a word of recognition or non-recognition from him could make or break a Cuban administration. For instance the chance of a liberal government in 1933 was dashed by Sumner Welles' disapproval of Grau San Martin. For a while all Cuban political factions stood an equal chance of getting American help. But gradually US ambassadors ceased to mediate on merits and came to settle for anyone who could provide even superficially stable government. This is how the dictator Machado lasted so long. Strangely enough, the repeal of the Platt Amendment in 1933 did little to help matters. For the US ambassador was still left with the immense economic hold of his country over Cuba. Indeed it may have made matters worse by diminishing American responsibility, but not power, over Cuba. So that while various members of the State Department were unhappy about Batista during his second term, there could in any case be no direct intervention against him. Possibly the worst effect of the Platt Amendment was the habit all Cuban political parties contracted of always turning to the United States for help and not relying on their own resources. In all, the United States came out of its association with Cuba in the Platt Amendment era badly; and this acted as a watershed in its relations with Latin America. In Professor Thomas' words, 'In the nineteenth century there had been almost universal admiration for the U.S.A. in the twentieth there would be apprehension, even fear'.

Against this background Fidel Castro came to power. And from then on US-Cuban relations went from bad to worse—culminating in the Bay of Pigs invasion. In examining this turning-point in Cuban history, Professor Thomas manages to avoid two old traps which usually ensnare doctrinaire historians—whether of left-wing or right-wing persuasion. He does not automatically assume, as many right-wing Americans have done, that Castro was a communist in the Sierra Maestra or when he came to power in January 1959. But nor does he fall into the opposite trap of taking the line that Castro was forced to become a communist by President Eisenhower's heavy-handed actions. Professor Thomas' guess (and it can only be a guess because of the closed nature of decision-making under Castro) is that Castro had decided by the autumn of 1959 that he needed the communists and that they would have to play a big role in his Cuba. The communists were necessary because they were the best organized group in the country. Their administrative expertise, which Castro's own, disintegrating, 26 July movement had not got, was needed in running the country's newly nationalized industries. He had in any case always leaned heavily on the advice of Raul, his brother, and Che Guevara, who had always been communist or near-communist. But Castro's change of heart was always masked by the fact that it was only on his terms that he became a communist. Those terms were that the Cuban Party should become his personal Party and the only Party discipline be his discipline. Castro found these terms easy to impose because the prestige of the official Party, which had only entered the struggle against Batista at a very late stage, was much lower than his. So in a sense General Cabell of the CIA was right when he testified to the American Senate in autumn 1959 that 'it is

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questionable whether the communists desire to recruit Castro into the Communist Party, that they could do so if they wished or that he would be susceptible to communist discipline if he joined'. Only General Cabell was looking at it from the wrong angle. It was Castro who was doing the recruiting—not the other way round. But the important point here is that all this was an internal process and that nothing Eisenhower did had any effect on it.

Thereafter the 'tit-for-tat' process started—in which it is very difficult to put the blame on any one side. Both sides acted in a somewhat heavy-handed manner, but in accordance with their own interests as they saw them. By the end of 1959 relations were strained but not yet to breaking-point. Castro had carried through his first spate of land nationalizations and for American land was only offering 20-year bonds at 4½ per cent. Though these were better compensation terms than have since been offered by other Latin American countries, the Americans complained that only cash on the nail would satisfy them. And until this was forthcoming there would be no more American loans for Cuba. But it was loans which Castro desperately needed both to pay compensation and to keep the country going. So when Mikoyan arrived in Havana at the end of January 1960, Castro was delighted to strike a trade agreement with him which included a low-interest loan. The amount was not great, mainly because, as Professor Thomas thinks, the Russians had no real designs on Cuba at the time. But there was promise of more to come and Castro seized on it as the life-line which would enable him to continue his hostile attitude to the United States. The Americans had no prima facie reason to be suspicious of the deal, for Cuba had been trading with the Soviet Union for some time. But in the context of their already strained relations with Castro, they read the worst into it. In March the Belgian arms ship *Le Coubre* was blown up in Havana harbour; and Castro, who had already been nettled by the fact that the Americans were doing nothing to prevent Cuban exiles taking off from Florida and bombing Cuban cities, shrieked accusations of United States involvement in the explosion. Soon the U2 crisis was to prevent the American-Russian summit conference taking place and to worsen American-Russian relations to the extent that the Americans objected more and more to Russian involvement in Cuba and the Russians, who were originally lukewarm to Castro, became more willing to help him. Now that Castro could afford to flout the United States, he did something which he had probably always wanted to do and which he must have known would offend American public opinion. In his long 1 May speech he denounced elections and declared that direct democracy as he practised it was 'a thousand times more pure'. With a Bill in the American Congress threatening to cut the Cuban sugar quota, Castro continued to nationalize more American lands and interests. And in June when Western oil companies refused to refine Russian oil (partly on the quite reasonable grounds of the damage this would do to Venezuelan interests, but partly because of official American pressure), Castro expropriated them. In retaliation, the Americans cut the sugar quota which was immediately taken up by the Russians. By October—when President Eisenhower put a stop to all American foodstuff exports to Cuba—the break had become complete.

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Thus far one can say that the Americans acted more or less reasonably; but then came the Bay of Pigs invasion which turned out to be an act of pure folly. By April 1961 the Americans should have had time to appreciate the overwhelming popular support that Castro commanded and to realize that an invasion would have little chance of success. But even though President Kennedy himself apparently had forebodings, his better judgment seems to have been swept aside by the CIA who had been preparing invasion plans since March 1960. At least American policy-makers drew the right lesson from the fiasco. Ever since, American policy towards left-wing Latin American regimes has been more passive.

Professor Thomas, having devoted most of his book to a narrative of little-known Cuban history before 1959, deals with the well-documented Cuba of Castro largely by drawing up a balance sheet of gains and losses of the Revolution—in the good old-fashioned liberal way.

> Those who admire the social advances made under the Revolution must consider the brutality of the gaolers, the arbitrary character of an unpredictable but ubiquitous tyranny, the tedium of an inefficient bureaucratic state and the melancholy of a society where eccentricity and private experiment, much less private enterprise, is damned. Those who abhor the tyranny need to be reminded of the evident integrity of many of the leaders, that a minimum wage, and universal schooling and medicine did not obtain before (but could have done so), and that rural poverty is much reduced.

This even-handed approach would appear to make the gains and losses cancel each other out.

But any cost/benefit analysis—whether of an airport or a revolution—which starts comparing like with unlike runs into trouble. And Professor Thomas makes this mistake of assuming that economic gains and political losses are of the same order, i.e. comparable. For a start, economic security is more basic a need than political freedoms. For instance only those with full stomachs can start to care about the freedom of the press. Nor can it be argued that Cuba under Castro lost much in the way of political freedoms that she previously had had. Pre-Castro Cuba had a tradition of corrupt elections, a butal police and a biased press, as Professor Thomas would be the first to acknowledge. Whereas it is the case that the vast majority of Cubans gained economic security under the Revolution for the first time.

But there is no proven link between economic welfare and political liberty which says that the one can only be achieved at the expense of the other. Indeed, while political liberty might expose the touchy Castro to a dangerous amount of criticism, Professor Thomas points out that it might have kept him from some of his worst economic mistakes. For instance,

> a free press might have prevented the neglect of the sugar industry during 1960–63, the numerous wasteful industrial projects, the still controversial coffee campaign of the late 1960s, or the sad neglect of the beautiful city of Havana (which whether Castro likes it or not is one of Cuba's prides), and even the Ten Million Ton Harvest of 1969–70.

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Be that as it may, the situation that Castro has now got himself into is that, until the economy's poor performance improves, he appears to feel that he cannot allow political liberties and the freedom to criticize—even though lack of constructive criticism is what the country suffers from.

What has always fascinated people about Castro's Cuba is the differences between Cuba and orthodox communism. In the early days, when Castro was the darling of the New Left, it seemed that Castroism might provide communism with a Latin American gaiety and humanity that the other socialist regimes so visibly lacked. This hope has been long since dashed; but the differences remain. Castro rules as no other communist leader does. He is not responsible to the Party, whose central committee never meets nowadays. There is no constitution to fetter him. Castro takes his mandate from the response of big crowds to his big speeches; and here Professor Thomas draws an illuminating parallel with Fascism. With Mosley or Hitler, Castro shares the belief that political power lies in 'the response of a large audience to a stirring speech'. And Professor Thomas continues the parallel,

> there is the willingness of large sections of the population, including intelligent and humane people, to surrender their individuality to Castro as men did to Fascist leaders. There is the persistent elevation of the principle of violence and appeals to martial reactions in the regime's propaganda; and there is the cult of leadership, the emphasis on physical fitness in the education system, and the continual denigration of bourgeois democracies.

But if the present Cuban system is built on 'the response of a large audience to a stirring speech', then Cuba is in for a radical change on the death or retirement of Castro. His personal charisma is not transferable. But can a 'collective leadership' on orthodox communist lines function effectively in Cuba?

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Letter to the Editor

April 26, 1971

Sir,

In addition to the data to which David E. Powell refers in his article on alcoholism in the USSR (*Survey*, Winter 1971) I would also like to point out the statistics which may be derived from the *Narodnoe khoziaistvo SSSR*. Although the last year for which the production of distilled liquor (*vodka i vodochnye izdeliia*) is cited is 1962 (*Narodnoe khoziaistvo SSSR v 1962*, p. 203), when it was 162 million dekalitres, one may note that the production of ethyl alcohol (*spirit etilovyi*) which may be presumed to stand in some rough relation to liquor output, has risen by some 30 per cent since then according to a comparison of the figures given in the 1962 and 1969 handbooks. Furthermore, an examination of the figures for retail trade turnover shows that the largest single category of expenditures is conveyed under the heading 'Other food items' (*Drugie prodovol'stvennye tovary*), which, when traced back through the issues of *Narodnoe khoziaistvo SSSR* for previous years, turns out to be a merging of two headings 'Alcoholic and non-alcoholic beverages' and 'Other food items', with the proportion between the two being (on the basis of calculations for the years 1955 and 1958–60) about 87·5 per cent 'beverages' and 12·5 per cent 'other items'.

If we examine the figures on the trade turnover of state and cooperative retail trade for 1969 (*Narodnoe khoziaistvo SSSR v 1969*, pp. 606–607), we find:

Total: 144,399 million rubles.
Of which: 'Food items' 80,657, 55·8 per cent of total.
And, of 'Food items': 'Other food items' 24,812.
17·2 per cent of total 30·7 per cent of food items.

This means that, given the approximate division between 'beverages' and 'other items' prevailing in the 1955–60 period; there were some 21,000 million rubles which were spent for 'beverages' in 1969. This is a greater expenditure than for any other single class of objects, whether food or non-food, listed in the *Narodnoe khoziaistvo's* tables on retail trade, although the items distributed among 'clothing, underwear, hats and furs', 'knit goods, stockings and socks', 'shoes', and 'haberdashery and sewing threads' would, if combined, reach a total of some 31,200 million rubles.

And, although the rubric in the annual issues of *Narodnoe khoziaistvo SSSR* used to run 'alcoholic and *non-alcoholic* beverages' (italics mine), the very careful silence, either in the tables on retail sales or on the production of the food industry (*Narodnoe khoziaistvo SSSR v 1969*, pp. 606–607 and 266 respectively), with regard to non-alcoholic beverages would seem to argue that there is no significant output or sale.

One can therefore scarcely avoid assuming that per capita expenditure annually on beverages, principally alcoholic, hovers in the region of 85–90 rubles, and that, except for clothing and footwear, it is the largest single item in the budget of that perhaps mythical being, the average purchaser.

Robert V. Allen.

Washington D.C.

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